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Course 
Pass out Syllabus. 
Readings 
 Susan Leigh Anderson, On Kierkegaard. (I’ll say more about this later.) 
 Bretall, A Kierkegaard Anthology. 
 Fear and Trembling, Alastair Hannay trans. 
 The Concept of Anxiety, Reidar Thomte trans. (Princeton series.) 
 The Sickness unto Death, Alastair Hannay trans. 
Optional: 
 Alastair Hannay and Gordon Marino, ed. The Cambridge Companion to 
Kierkegaard. There will be some assigned readings from this (the volume is on 
reserve in the main library), but not enough to warrant buying the entire book for 
those two items alone. (Nevertheless, it’s a good book!) 
First reading assignment 
Your first reading assignment, which you should get started on right away:  
 Anderson, On Kierkegaard. Read the whole thing; it’s short. This is for general 
orientation and background. I’ll have some more to say about this book in a 
moment. 
 Also, the MacIntyre article from The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, on E-Reserves 
for this course. (I’ll say more about our E-Reserves collection in a moment.) 
 Cambridge Companion, Chap. 1, on SK’s life and times, and a little more general 
orientation. (On the Extras page of our Oncourse site. I’ll say more about our 
Oncourse site too in a moment.) 
Then. after that 
 Cambridge Companion, Chap. 4, on SK’s relations with Hegel. 
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Mechanics of the course 
Important parts of this course will take place on the University's Oncourse website 
(xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx). Both those who are taking this course under the P335 
number and those taking it under the P535 number should go to the Oncourse tab for the 
P335 version. It reads: SP11 BL PHIL P335 13649. 
Here on our Oncourse site, you will find:  
 A copy of the Syllabus.  
 Announcements relevant to this course.  
 A quiz-taking utility, for (almost) weekly quizzes, as I’ll describe in a moment.  
 An “Assignments” utility, where you will submit all examinations and papers for 
this course in digital format. 
 A page of instructions for how to do this. 
 Toward the end of the semester, you will find a “drop box,” on Oncourse, the 
function of which is described in the Syllabus. 
 A “Post’Em” grade-reporting utility, where you can see your running grades for 
this course: quiz grades, examination grades, paper grade, comments, etc. (Note : 
I have to upload these grades manually from my Excel spreadsheet gradebook. So 
there will be some lag-time between, say, taking a quiz and seeing the results 
posted here.) I’m not using the regular “Gradebook” utility on Oncourse, since I 
find the “Post’Em” utility much more flexible.  
 An email archive, where you can view messages from me or your classmates 
relevant to this course. You can send ordinary email from home on on-campus to 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, and it will be automatically forwarded to all members of 
this class and deposited in the email archive on Oncourse for later viewing. I’ll be 
using this utility to send you comments on the quizzes, for instance, or follow-up 
remarks on things that come up in lectures. Note that this email utility is to be 
used only for matters relevant to this class. If you start abusing it and sending 
random emails to everybody, I'll just have to reconfigure it so that only I can send 
mail through it.  
 A link to our E-Reserves collection, run through the main library. You can go to 
that page either through the general Library website or directly through our 
Oncourse page. 
 A page of suggested bibliography that may be useful to you in writing your term 
papers. This page also contains a list of things on our E-Reserves page. 
 A page where I will post links to online versions of all class handouts that 
supplement the lectures. 
You will be expected to keep current with what is going on on this Oncourse site. 
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Weekly quizzes 
 There will be a total of eleven more or less weekly quizzes in this course, starting 
next week. They will be conducted through Oncourse, outside the classroom. 
(Once on our Oncourse site, click on “Original Test and Survey” in the menubar 
on the left of your screen.) For the details of how these will work, see the 
Syllabus. On weeks when we are having a quiz, they will be available to take any 
time between Wednesday afternoon at 2:15 (right after our class is over) and the 
following Sunday midnight (strictly, Monday morning at 00:00.) 
The quizzes are meant to cover the kind of factual and basic conceptual material you 
need to keep straight if you are going to do any real work on Kierkegaard. They will be 
demanding, but as fair and reasonable as I can make them. 
Note: These are in a sense “open book” quizzes. You can use your textbooks, your 
lecture notes, on-line materials, things from the library, or other such materials when you 
take these quizzes. You can ask one another, if you like. You can go print out a copy of 
the quiz and then come back after you’ve done some homework and actually fill it in and 
submit it later. 
There is really only one way you can cheat, and that’s to have someone else log in as you 
and take it for you. But the way I’ve set it up, why bother? 
Note: You only get to submit each quiz once, so be sure you have it the 
way you want it before you do. 
Mid-term examination 
There will be a mid-term examination (around mid-term, naturally). It will be submitted 
through the “Assignments” utility on Oncourse. For the details, see the Syllabus. 
Term paper 
There will be a full-dress term-paper due near the end of the semester. For the paper, I 
want you to do a philosophical analysis of some fairly extended passage or passages from 
Kierkegaard himself. In other words, I want your paper to be text-based (and not just an 
abstract discussion of overall "themes" or a “what Kierkegaard means to me” paper), but 
also philosophically sensitive (and not just a "book report"). I will provide further advice 
on your paper, and some suggested topics, as we get into the semester. 
Peer reviews 
Instead of a final examination, we’re going to try something a little different this 
semester. After you submit your term-papers through Oncourse, I will go through and 
assign you one or two papers by your classmates for you to read and “review.” (One if 
you’re taking this course under the P335 number, two if you’re taking it under the 
graduate P535 number.) These papers will appear in your Oncourse “drop box,” which 
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I’ll turn on at that time for this purpose. By “reviewing” a paper, I mean in effect read it, 
grade it and write comments on it. These “reviews” will be due by the beginning of the 
final examination period for this class during finals week. Once they are all submitted, 
I’ll submit the reviews of your own paper to the same “drop box,” so you can see what 
your classmates think of your own work. (This will all be done anonymously both ways. 
That is, you will not know whose papers you are reviewing, and you will not know who 
is reviewing your own paper. Depending on whether people turn in late papers, you may 
or may not get a review of your own paper back, or you may get more than one back.) 
Plan of attack 
Here’s how we’re going to proceed: 
First of all, I’m going to give you a kind of capsule presentation of what might be called 
the “standard” view of Kierkegaard (if there is one). 
Some of you may have taken P135 with me before. And in that course, I’ve given you a 
kind of “standard” picture of what SK is up to. This is roughly the picture you’ll see in 
lots of surveys, histories and “once-over-lightly” treatments. If you’ve taken P135 with 
me, or similar courses elsewhere, this much will be review and should sound pretty 
familiar. But I need to include it for the sake of those of you who haven’t taken such a 
course before. (And for those of you have, I’ll be including some further material you 
probably haven’t heard before.) 
This is why I want you to read the Anderson book, and the MacIntyre article on E-
Reserves. For my purposes, these are representative statements of the “standard” view. 
Then: We’ll go on. In effect, this “going on” will amount to a test of that “standard” 
picture. It’s not so much that the “standard” picture is just wrong (although I think a lot of 
it is), as that—as we’ll see—there so much more to be said, and it’s not nearly as tidy as 
it’s sometimes presented. That’s where we get into the good stuff, and that’s what we 
want to spend the bulk of the semester on. 
What I want to talk about today, then, is a brief introduction to SK’s life and times. On 
Wednesday, I want to talk about his writings, since he wrote a lot, and keeping track of it 
all is a complicated business. (I’ve included a web page on this on our Oncourse site.) 
Then, next week, we’ll talk about SK’s philosophical context, who he was reacting 
against, the philosophical climate of the times, and so on. In particular, some background 
on Hegel. 
After that, I’ll spend the next two weeks giving you a quick tour of what we’re calling the 
“standard” picture, and introducing some basic concepts and notions in SK. This will 
involve our first actual taste of SK’s writings, as given in the Syllabus. 
But our first in-depth look at a complete work of SK will come after that, when we talk  
about Fear and Trembling. I’ve used this work a lot in P135, and so does almost 
everyone else who teaches Kierkegaard. It’s undoubtedly his most widely read book, and 
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it’s probably the best single work he ever wrote to get people really turned on and kick 
started about this guy. 
We’ll see, I think, that although some of this will sound familiar if you’ve taken my P135 
before, and some of it will surely sound familiar from our presentation of the “standard” 
view—things are not quite as we thought! And at that point, we’ll be ready to get into the 
real thick of it! 
Life 
I’ve put a fairly detailed chronology of Kierkegaard’s life on the Extras page of our 
Oncourse site, compiled from several sources. You may want to consult that from time to 
time. (See also Anderson, Chap. 1, and Chap. 1 from the Companion.) 
If you’re interested in more detail about his life, I should mention a major biography by 
Joakim Garff, first published in Danish in 2000, translated in 2005, and now available in 
paperback: Søren Kierkegaard: A Biography, Bruce H. Kirmmse, trans. (Princeton 
University Press, 2007). It’s enormous, rather controversial, pretty inexpensive, and a 
pretty good read. I’ve asked the Library to put this on physical reserves. 
Here are the bare bones of SK’s biography: 
He was born on May 5, 1813, in Copenhagen, Denmark. He died in the same city on 
November 11, 1855.  
Note: He died when he was 42. So he was relatively young. A lot happened in a fairly 
short time. 
SK pretty much stayed in Copenhagen all his life. He did make a few trips to Berlin, but 
they were short and infrequent. And occasionally he would go visit somebody in the 
countryside near Copenhagen. But basically, he was a city-boy through and through. 
And he loved it. For all his caustic criticism of Copenhagen society (which we’ll see as 
we go along), SK was obviously very proud of being a Dane, and of living in 
Copenhagen in particular. 
His name 
SK’s name is: Søren Aabye Kierkegaard. 
The first name is a Danish form of the Latin ‘Severinus’ (or ‘Severus’, for fans of Harry 
Potter). The ‘ø’ in it is pronounced like German o-umlaut: ö, and is found spelled that 
way in some older Danish texts. (Round your lips as though you were going to say ‘oh’, 
and then—holding your lips in that position—say a long ‘a’.) 
In modern Danish, the double-a in his middle and family names is spelled with what 
English-speakers sometimes call “a-ring”—‘å’, taken from Swedish. It’s pronounced 
roughly like ‘aw’, or even roughly (to an American ear) like a long “o”. (But the double-a 
is preserved in some place-names and in some traditional names. So we never see 
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‘Kierkegård’.) ‘D’ is never pronounced after ‘r’ in Danish, so we get: “Søren Aabye 
Kierkegaard.” 
Basically, the surname ‘Kierkegaard’ means “churchyard.” (In the modern spelling, there 
is a perfectly ordinary word ‘kirkegård’—no ‘e’ immediately after the ‘i’—with exactly 
that meaning.) Just as in English, the word in Danish suggests “cemetery,” “graveyard.” 
This seems like a pretty unlucky name to be saddled with all your life, but there’s a story 
behind it. An older meaning of the name is something like “church farm” or “church 
grounds.” (‘Gård’ is related to English “garden” or “yard.”) And in fact, that’s where the 
family got its name: from an old social arrangement (leftover from feudal times) whereby 
the family tended sheep on lands (the “farm”) belonging to the local Lutheran church up 
on the Jutland peninsula. 
SK’s father in fact was originally a country shepherd in Jutland before he moved to the 
city (to Copenhagen) and made good. 
In fact, the father moved to Copenhagen in 1768, at the age of  11, and lived with an 
uncle, a successful dry goods merchant of men’s clothing (a “haberdasher”). When he 
was 21, he was officially released from his feudal obligations by the local Lutheran priest 
up there in Jutland. 
The father, Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard, proved to be a good businessman. At the age 
of 32, he branched out—with the official blessing of the King of Denmark—and got into 
the importing business, specializing in goods from the Danish West Indies—what are 
now the Virgin Islands—and from India and China. He was very successful. 
At the relatively late age of 37, in 1794, Michael married his business partner’s sister, a 
certain Kirstine Nielsdatter Røyen, who was 34 or 35 at the time. 
She died childless, some two years later. In the same year, the uncle (whose house he and 
his wife were living in) died, and Michael Kierkegaard suddenly found himself in 
possession of a considerable fortune. When Michael himself died, sometime later (in 
1838), Søren Kierkegaard—our man—inherited the bulk of the fortune, including the 
family house, and never had to work a day in his life at a real job. 
Søren was the youngest of seven children. But not by Kirstine, the woman his father had 
married in 1794—because, remember, she died childless shortly thereafter. 
Rather, the mother of all Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard’s children was a certain Ane 
Sørensdatter Lund. She had been a family servant and kind of “attendant” to Michael’s 
wife Kirstine. Well, after Kirstine’s death, Ane Lund found herself “in the family way,” 
and she and Michael were married in 1797. Their first of seven children was born with 
unseemly haste soon afterward. Michael and Ane raised a family, and she died at the age 
of 66 in 1834. Whatever you want to make of it, our Søren says absolutely nothing at all 
about her. 
The family seemed to be jinxed. SK’s father Michael was apparently a morbid, obsessed 
man. Not without fondness for his children, but he was a severe father, with a very 
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demanding and harsh view of religion—not uncharacteristic for Denmark at the time, 
although Michael seemed to be especially taken with the severity of it. 
Michael also seems to have thought he had committed some literally unforgivable sin in 
his youth. Not his obvious lapse with the household servant Ane (later his second wife—
that wouldn’t have been “in his youth”), but much earlier—before he had moved to 
Copenhagen as a child. (There is some uncertainty about exactly what it was. The 
following story did happen, but whether it was the source of Michael’s melancholy is 
debated.) 
It seems that one day, when he was very young, he was tending sheep up there on that 
barren, windswept church farm in Jutland, and he finally had had enough, raised his fist 
and cursed God. This was a serious matter in the prevailing religious views of the time, 
and later Michael became convinced that this unforgivable sin of the father would be 
visited on his entire family. 
In a sense, he was right. 
Of the seven children Michael had with his second wife Ane, the oldest one—a daughter
—died before she was 25. A second daughter died at 33, and the third child (also a 
daughter) likewise died at age 33. One son died from a blow to the head in a schoolyard 
accident at the age of 12. And another son, who became something of a professional 
crank, emigrated to America and died in Trenton, N.J., at the age of 24, in 1833. 
Of all seven children, the only one—besides Søren, the youngest—to survive their 
father’s death at the age of 82 in 1838 was his older brother Peter Christian Kierkegaard, 
who became a Lutheran theologian and bishop and eventually died at the ripe old age of 
83 in 1888 (long after Søren’s death in 1855). 
In addition, various other branches of the family were populated by people who were 
deformed or crippled in some way, who went clinically mad, who committed suicide—or 
in some other way lent support to the notion that the whole clan was just plain cursed! 
In fact, SK was for a long time convinced that he would never survive his father, and was 
genuinely quite surprised to wake up one morning in 1838 to discover that the old man 
had died and he, Søren, was still alive! 
OK, let’s turn the clock back a bit. In 1821, at the age of 7, SK was enrolled at the 
primly-named “School of Civic Virtue” in Copenhagen, a very strict school, a kind of 
combination of grade-school and our high school. He proved a precocious student, bright 
but rather undisciplined and lazy. 
In 1830 (at age 17), he enrolled at the University of Copenhagen, where his chosen field 
was theology. Although he did quite well in the work he actually did, he was something 
of a “perennial student.” He spent a total of ten years at the University (although not just 
at what we would call the “undergraduate” level), apparently deciding not to let his 
“classes interfere with his education,” and living as a free-spirited “man about town.” 
Eventually, he came to find his father’s influence stifling, moved out of the house, and 
began to question the significance (note: never the truth) of his own religious convictions. 
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In 1837, he met the one love of his life, Regine Olsen. He was 24, she was 14—which at 
that time was no particular cause for scandal. 
His father died the following year, in 1838, after he and Søren had had a kind of 
reconciliation. The death of his father seems to have rejuvenated Søren. He published his 
first real book the following month, and went on to finish, publish and defend his 
dissertation On the Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates. In the 
meantime, he had proposed to Regine Olsen in 1840 (she was now 17), and she accepted. 
The following year, in 1841, Kierkegaard for some reason decided that this marriage just 
wasn’t going to work. He returned the ring, and eventually the engagement was formally 
broken. SK never really got over Regine, who keeps popping up thinly disguised in a lot 
of his writings, particularly the early ones. 
A little later, in 1843, he began the major part of what he called his “authorship.” We’ll 
talk about that next time. 
Between then and 1851, he published an astonishing array of works. 
Then, in 1851, he went into a kind of hibernation. He published nothing, until in 1854 he 
started what amounted to a kind of “pamphleteering war” against the established 
Lutheran Church in Denmark. 
In the meantime, he continued to spend his inherited family fortune, and eventually—just 
after he had withdrawn the last sum of money from the account—he collapsed on the 
street outside, was taken to the hospital, and died there about a month later, probably of 
some kind of lung infection. 
What to expect 
SK is a religious author. Even though you can’t always tell on the surface, in fact pretty 
much everything he ever wrote has a religious purpose to it. 
If you’re squeamish about this, you’ll just have to get used to it—or you should get out 
now, because there’s going to be no getting away from it. 
SK has a very particular notion of what religion is and what it ought to be. And he 
doesn’t mince words trying to be “broad minded” and “non-judgmental.” 
Furthermore, his views on religion are almost guaranteed not to be your own. Whether 
you think of yourself as on the whole a religious person or not, I can confidently assure 
you: it isn’t what SK is talking about. 
But along the way, SK also has some very intriguing and insightful things to say about 
human psychology and philosophy of mind, about “human nature,” about the 
metaphysics of the self, about time, about the arts, about ethics in general, and so on. 
It would be a violent distortion to suppose we can focus on those more purely 
philosophical aspects of SK’s work and ignore the religious component. Not only would 
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you miss what he himself took to be most important, you would also not even understand 
the aspects you do focus on. 
So, we’re just going to have to take SK as he comes. 
 
Writings 
[At this point, I displaed the collected works, including Journals & Papers, all nicely 
lined up on a table. It makes for an impressive display!] 
The display is all the more impressive once you realize that, with a few exceptions, he 
wrote all this in a span of nine years (1843–51). (So, there are no excuses for not getting 
your term papers in on time!) There’s a page on SK’s writings on our Oncourse site. 
There are several ways to classify and divide up this mass of material. 
 “Kierkegaard’s Writings” (KW) and the “Journals and Papers” (JP) 
To some extent, this division is an artificial one and merely reflects the publication facts 
about these writings. 
In English, the “standard” modern translation of SK’s works is a series edited by Howard 
and Edna Hong. (The name is not Chinese. Howard was born in North Dakota, and grew 
up in Minnesota. His wife’s maiden name was Edna Hatlestad, and she was born and 
raised in Wisconsin.) The series is translated either by the two of them working as a team 
or by various other people they commissioned to do certain volumes. These translations 
are not necessarily the “best.” In fact, there is some controversy about that. (I put on E-
Reserves an article called “The Dangers of Clarity” by Marilyn Piety that appeared in the 
Times Literary Supplement in 1997, talking about the merits and problems of the various 
available English translations.) 
For this course, the translation of The Concept of Anxiety (by Reidar Thomte, who taught 
at St. Olaf College in Minnesota) is part of this “Hong and Hong” series. The various 
translations in the Bretall volume are all earlier ones. 
Our translations of Fear and Trembling and The Sickness unto Death are by Alastair 
Hannay. Hannay’s translations are universally agreed to read better than any of the 
others, and in my judgment are more philosophically accurate as well. Howard Hong got 
his degree in English, and Edna Hong was a poet. Neither one was especially trained in 
philosophy, although Howard taught in the Philosophy Department at St. Olaf College for 
many years. (Again, you can look at that “Dangers of Clarity” article if you want more 
details about the various Kierkegaard-translations.) 
But whatever their literary merits or philosophical accuracy, the “Hong and Hong” series 
has become the de facto standard. That series is published in two parts: (a) Kierkegaard’s 
Writings, in 25 volumes (plus an Index volume), published by Princeton University Press; 
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and (b) and Journals and Papers, in six volumes (plus a slim index volume), published 
by Indiana University Press. (The latter is available in its entirety on-line through an IU 
subscription; see our Oncourse site.) 
This division corresponds roughly (but only roughly) to a division in the original Danish 
language editions. And it is based on the fact that SK wrote a lot of stuff he never 
published. His published works were of course gathered together and published in a kind 
of Collected Works edition shortly after his death. 
But there was a lot of other stuff too, some of which was eventually edited and published 
in the original Danish under the heading Papirer (= Papers). (But there is stuff left that is 
still unpublished!) Among these materials is a quite extensive set of Journals—a kind of 
diary SK kept virtually all his adult life. The first entry was made on April 15, 1834 when 
he was not yet quite 21; the last one was made on September 25, 1855, less than two 
months before he died. 
I said these Journals amounted to a kind of “diary,” but that’s not entirely correct. They 
do constitute a “diary” in the sense that they consist of jottings on various topics, often 
very personal, and often—although certainly not always—explicitly dated. But they are 
not a diary, in the sense that they were obviously intended to be read by others. He fully 
expected them to be published after his death, and they were. So, while the Journals are 
sometimes very personal, they are not and were not really intended to be private; they 
were meant for an audience.  
The physical objects themselves were originally bound volumes of blank pages, just as 
you would buy today if you were to buy a diary for your own use. And we know that SK 
would sometimes write things down on random scraps of paper, whatever he had handy
—we know this because we still have some of them—and then later on recopy them 
carefully into the bound Journals. So they are in no sense the unrehearsed outpourings of 
his innermost feelings. 
The Papirer, including the Journals, are arranged and sorted in a complicated way that 
still confuses me, although it’s been explained to me many times. But in your readings 
(mostly in the footnotes), if you see a reference of the form “Pap.” (for “Papirer,” 
obviously), followed by a Roman numeral, sometimes with a superscript, and then some 
other stuff, it’s a reference to the Papirer. For example, the chronologically very last 
entry in the Journals is cited as: Pap. XI2 A 439. (The “Pap.” is often left out if it’s clear 
that you’re referring to the Papirer to begin with.) In the English JP, lots of these papers 
are arranged topically, totally out of chronological order, and totally out of the order they 
actually have in SK’s own volumes. 
But, in addition to the Journals, there are also other things included in the Papirer. For 
example, they include also (a) a number of rough drafts and preliminary versions of 
things he at some point actually published. There are also (b) several fairly polished 
drafts, pretty much ready for publication, of works that for one reason or another SK did 
not publish during his lifetime. For example, there is a very important work called The 
Point of View for My Work as an Author that was written in 1848 but was only published 
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after his death by his brother, Peter Christian Kierkegaard. (Recall, Peter was the only 
one of SK’s siblings to survive him, and the only one to live to old age.) 
There is also another, very important work, now called The Book on Adler, that went 
through several complete but different drafts, and that SK withheld from publication, in 
part because he felt it would do too much damage to a certain Danish pastor named 
Adolph Adler, who SK thought was an utter fool, but who was nevertheless at least an 
honest fool, and SK thought he didn’t really deserve the ridicule his book would bring 
upon him. Nevertheless, certain parts of the complete draft of this book were extracted 
and included in a work SK did publish, called Two Ethical-Religious Essays (1849). 
So the conventional distinction in the Hong & Hong translations between the 
Kierkegaard’s Writings (KW) series and the Journals and Papers (JP) has its origin in a 
corresponding distinction in the original Danish editions. 
But in fact it’s more complicated than that. Both in the Danish editions—particularly in 
later editions—and in the Hong & Hong set, some of the things SK didn’t publish 
nevertheless come to get included among the Collected Works. For example, the Hong & 
Hong series of KW includes both The Point of View for My Work as an Author and The 
Book on Adler. 
Furthermore, the Hongs’ KW series also includes a volume of Letters and Documents. 
This includes, for instance, letters between him and Regine Olsen, the great love of his 
life, as well as various documents not by SK himself, and not letters addressed to him, 
but in some other way related to him. For instance: (a) what amount to report cards from 
when he was a student, and (b) hospital records from when he was hospitalized right 
before his death; (c) a document stating his physical unfitness for military service—and 
therefore his exemption from what amounted to a universal draft (a kind of “national 
service” law that they have in many countries even today). 
So it’s all very complicated, and I don’t pretend to be able to keep clear about all the 
details. Nevertheless, you need to know that there is this basic but conventional 
distinction between two types of works. 
Pseudonymous vs. “signed” works 
More intriguing is another broad division of SK’s writings into what we might call his 
“signed” works—that is, writings that he actually put his own name to—and his 
pseudonymous writings. 
Again, the distinction is a little messy. The Journals, I suppose, count as “signed” works 
in the sense that there was absolutely no pretense of their being written by anyone other 
than SK himself. And there is one work, the so called Johannes Climacus—an interesting 
little work about what happens to a man who tries to put into real practice the “Cartesian” 
principle that philosophy begins with doubt. This work was never published at all during 
SK’s lifetime, and has no name at all attached to it in the draft form. So, in effect, I guess 
it’s strictly “anonymous” and doesn’t belong to either the “pseudonymous” or the 
“signed” works. 
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But—apart from these few “funny” cases—this is a fairly straightforward and extremely 
important distinction. For the fact is that, in addition to the works he published under his 
own name, SK also published many works under various pseudonyms—including all the 
main works we’re going to be reading this semester. 
For example, Fear and Trembling has the author “Johannes de silentio” on the title page. 
The Concept of Anxiety has “Vigilius Haufniensis” (= “The Watchman of the Harbor” or 
“The Watchman of Copenhagen”—Copenhagen is in fact a port city, and in fact the name 
for it—‘København’—just means “Commercial Harbor” or “Buying Harbor,” or 
something like that). The Sickness unto Death is by “Anti-Climacus.” 
Other works are attributed to people like “Victor Eremita” (= “Victor the Hermit” or 
“The Hermit Victor,” or something like that), “Constantin Constantius,” “Johannes 
Climacus” (who was a real person, an early Christian author of a mystical treatise called 
The Ladder of Perfection.) Also people like “H. H.” (who knows what that’s supposed to 
mean), “Hilarius Bookbinder,” “Nicolaus Notabene” and others. 
Furthermore, some of his main works are divided into subparts that claim to be by 
different people yet: “John the Seducer,” “Judge William,” “Frater Taciturnus” (= “The 
Quiet Brother” or “The Quiet Friar”), and even “Quidam”—which is just Latin meaning 
“Somebody.” 
Now what’s going on? Well, first of all, nobody was fooled. For the most part, the names 
SK chose for his pseudonyms were transparently made-up names. Even if you didn’t 
know who really did write these things, you wouldn’t for a moment really think someone 
named “Hilarius Bookbinder” had written them. They were obviously meant to be 
pseudonyms. And this was quite common in literary circles at the time. 
Furthermore, Copenhagen was not an enormous place in SK’s day—perhaps 100,000 
people, about the size of Bloomington when all the students are here. And people in 
“society” more or less knew who was doing what, particularly someone as visible as SK. 
And finally, to publish anything in SK’s Copenhagen, you first had to submit a copy to 
the “censors.” These were not concerned so much with public morality or the threat of 
pornography as with sedition and fomenting revolution. And you had to identify yourself 
for real to get past the censors. (None of this “Hilarius Bookbinder” nonsense.) 
So in effect everyone knew who was writing these books. 
Why then did SK take the trouble to write under pseudonyms? 
Well, he tells us. Or at least he addresses the problem—in The Point of View and a few 
other places. We’ll talk about this in much greater detail later on, but it has to do with 
what is called “indirect communication”—a technique of more or less tricking people 
into getting the point of what you are trying to say, although for whatever reason you 
can’t just some right out and say it directly. 
Sometimes you’ll also see SK refer to this as his “maieutic” method (from Greek 
μαιεύομαι). This is a Greek term, and refers to the role of a midwife, who doesn’t bring 
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forth children of her own (at least not in that capacity), but who helps other women give 
birth. 
The allusion is of course to Socrates, who although he himself didn’t have and didn’t 
claim to have any wisdom of his own, could nevertheless bring forth wisdom in others. 
SK thought of himself as a kind of Socrates figure to Copenhagen. (And in fact, Socrates 
himself explicitly uses the “midwife” analogy for his own work.) 
But still, what’s it mean? And why does SK insist on using this indirect, “maieutic” 
method in some cases—as though he just couldn’t proceed any other way? 
Well, that’s something we’ll want to talk about later on. 
But for the present, note that SK was very conscious of this distinction between the 
pseudonymous and the “signed” works. In some cases—for instance, in an important and 
relatively late work (1850) entitled Practice in Christianity, and in Sickness unto Death, 
which we’ll be reading—SK adopted the fiction that the book is really by someone else 
but just edited by himself, Søren Kierkegaard. 
So things get really subtle. 
In any event, SK throughout the first half or so of his literary career adopted a curious 
practice: Every time he published a pseudonymous work, he would also publish a 
“signed” work, and vice versa—sometimes on the very same day and in any event very 
close in time to one another. (We’ll see that this claim needs some qualifications.) 
Often these “signed” works went under the name of Edifying (or Upbuilding) Discourses. 
For example, in 1843—a tremendously prolific year for SK—he published the 
pseudonymous Either/Or (“by” Victor Eremita) in February, followed in May by a book 
called Two Upbuilding (or Edifying) Discourses under his own name. In October, he 
published two pseudonymous books on the same day: Fear and Trembling (by Johannes 
de Silentio) and Repetition (by Constantin Constantius). On the same day, he published 
Three Upbuilding Discourses under his own name. And—just to match the fact that in 
October he had published two pseudonymous works, in December he went on to publish 
another signed book, this time called Four Upbuilding Discourses. 
The “upbuilding discourses” look very much like sermons. That is, they are built around 
a particular scriptural text, and just plain sound like sermons. SK insists they are not 
sermons but only “discourses”—a distinction we’ll probably have occasion to talk about 
later on. 
But there are other “signed” works as well that aren’t called “discourses.” Again, the fine 
points get messy. 
So for now all you need to be aware of is the fact that whenever you read SK, you always 
have be conscious of whether you are reading a signed work or a “pseudonymous” work. 
At one point, SK actually warns the reader: “Don’t attribute to me,” he says, “anything 
that doesn’t have my own name on it.” In other words, the pseudonymous works don’t 
necessarily represent SK’s own point of view! They may be just presenting a viewpoint 
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that is not his own, but that nevertheless he wants you to think about as sympathetically 
as you can—so that you will come to see on your own what is wrong with it and thereby 
be “indirectly”/“maieutically” brought to the view that is really the one he thinks is right 
but that he thinks cannot be directly stated in a way that is really going to convince you. 
The odd thing about this perverse method is that it actually works! When you read SK, 
you find yourself coming to believe things you don’t want to believe, and to regard things 
as important that you previously were inclined to dismiss! And you wonder how exactly 
you got there—even though every step of the way was quite explicit and above-board and 
seemed compelling at the time! 
Now, this raises a very interesting and puzzling problem: 
If it’s true—and it is—that we cannot automatically assume that what we find presented 
in the pseudonymous works is what SK really wants us to believe, can we turn it around 
and assume that what we find in his signed works is the “straight story”? 
For example, in a lot of the secondary literature on SK, the practice seems to be to appeal 
to the Journals to help us disambiguate what’s going on in the pseudonymous works. But 
can we do that? 
The Journals, remember, even though they aren’t pseudonymous, were carefully revised, 
gone over, and intended to be read. So, does the fact that they make no pretense of being 
by anyone other than Kierkegaard mean that here at last SK is “coming clean”? Or is it 
instead merely another layer of “indirection”? And the same goes for the Discourses and 
his other “signed” works? 
In fact, is SK ever saying what he really means? It’s not clear what the answer to that is, 
but I have my own doubts. And of course, if he doesn’t ever “come clean,” then where 
does that leave us? Can we end up saying anything with confidence about what all this 
vast production of words is really doing? 
In this situation, some secondary authors, perhaps overly-influenced by various recent 
trends in “deconstructionist,” “post-modern” thought, get really excited and start seeing 
SK as confirming convictions they have already come to on other grounds—namely, that 
we can never tell what an author is really up to, that in fact the question may not even be 
meaningful, and that—and here’s where SK comes in—that this was in fact the whole 
point of SK’s “indirect” method, to get us to see that there is no ultimate meaning behind 
the “text.” 
I think this is a particularly dangerous way to read Kierkegaard, or any author for that 
matter. First of all, it’s self-refuting. (How can the whole point be that there is no point?) 
But apart from that, it’s always suspicious, and generally lazy, when one starts 
interpreting old authors in ways that end up being a ratification if not the outright 
glorification of presently-held views.  
Nevertheless, not all critics on the “post-modern” end of the spectrum are lazy and 
careless, and there is a lot to be learned from them. 
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Still, if what SK is up to is not merely a matter of showing us that he’s not up to anything 
at all, it’s certainly fair to ask what he really is up to instead! 
Aesthetic vs. religious works 
Yet another way of dividing things up is to draw a distinction between SK’s so called 
“aesthetic” works and the “religious” works. 
This is a distinction SK himself draws in The Point of View, as we’ll talk about later on. 
There he seems to suggest that his pseudonymous works are all what he calls “aesthetic,” 
whereas his “signed” works are “religious”—and that the subtle plan of the whole 
“authorship,” as he calls it, was to lead the reader to the religious point of view by way of 
the “aesthetic” works, which are certainly much more fun! 
But—as always—we have to be careful. The Point of View, where this line is taken, was 
after all never published! Why not? Because it presented a false picture? And besides, it 
was written in 1848, when SK still had three more years of productive publishing ahead 
of him, plus a few other things even after that. He thought about publishing it, and in fact 
at one point thought about publishing it under a pseudonym—Johannes de silentio! But 
he ended up deciding against it. 
Still, the distinction between the aesthetic and the religious works is a distinction you 
should know about, even if it isn’t neatly to be identified with the distinction between the 
“signed” works and the “pseudonymous” works. 
Works in the “authorship” and the other works 
Also in Point of View, SK talks about his “authorship” as if it had a kind of subtle design 
to it from the very beginning. And yet what he says there is plainly a bit of a falsification. 
First of all, he obviously means to include among the works of his “authorship” only the 
works he actually published. This would exclude the Journals and some other fairly 
“complete” works that nevertheless for one reason or another he never published—but 
also some other things. For that matter, it would exclude Point of View itself, since that 
was never published during his lifetime! 
But more to the point, SK excludes from his “authorship” some works he did publish. For 
example, there is a well-known work called A Literary Review, which is a review of a 
novel entitled Two Ages. Sometimes SK’s review is referred to as Two Ages as well, or 
even The Present Age, which is the second of the two “ages” referred to in the novel, and 
the most interesting part of SK’s review. But whatever it’s called, it’s not included in 
what SK thinks of as his “authorship,” apparently because it is merely a “review.” 
At the same time, SK regarded his “authorship” as beginning with Either/Or—an 
absolutely crucial and terribly interesting book, published in 1843. But before that time, 
he had published several other things. For instance, his dissertation in 1841, The Concept 
of Irony, with Continual Reference to Socrates. In Point of View, SK apparently regards 
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this early work as out of the sequence, as not really “counting” as part of the plan—even 
though he does sometimes refer to it in later writings. 
Again, even while he was a student at the university, SK published a book entitled From 
the Papers of One Still Living, a kind of protracted review and criticism of a novel by 
SK’s Danish compatriot and contemporary, Hans Christian Andersen, on the notion of 
what a “genius” was. 
These early works are sometimes ignored when treating of SK’s writings, but it’s worth 
asking whether they really should be. There’s a good case to be made that, no matter 
what SK says in Point of View, a number of themes brought up in these early, “pre-
authorship” writings are crucial to understanding what is going on his later works. 
Some of the main works 
Let’s now step back and talk a little about some of SK’s works in more detail, just to let 
you get familiar with some of the names and ideas. 
The Concept of Irony 
We’ve already mentioned this. It was SK’s master’s thesis—although the “master’s” 
degree at that time was far more than our own M.A. degree. In fact, it was recognized as 
the equivalent of what was called the “doctor’s” degree in the other faculties of the 
University. 
The Concept of Irony had been tinkered with on and off for many years, but after his 
father died SK finally got serious, finished it, published it, and defended it in 1841. 
(Publication was part of the requirement for the degree.) The full title is The Concept of 
Irony, with Continual Reference to Socrates. 
It was done for the theology faculty of the University, which may seem odd if you 
actually read the thing, since it has very little obviously to do with anything theological at 
all. 
But it does offer a subtle and insightful analysis of the notion of “irony” in ancient Greek 
life—particularly in Socrates, whom SK regarded as having been the first “ironist” in 
history. But then, in a later section of the dissertation, SK goes on to discuss the notion of 
“irony” in more modern thought—in particular in Hegel (we’ll talk about him next week) 
and the German Romantics. 
It’s an important work, because SK himself was a master of the “ironical” way of talking 
and writing, as you’ll see once we get into him. So in a sense, this work perhaps gives us 
a clue about how to read SK in his other works. 
Yet The Concept of Irony is an odd work in several respects. First of all, it’s written in 
Danish, not Latin. The custom at the time was to write all academic works in Latin, 
which was after all the universal academic language of the day. But SK actually 
petitioned the King of Denmark for permission to write his thesis/dissertation in Danish, 
not in Latin. The argument SK gave was that the topic of “irony” required something 
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more than the rather stilted, dry academic language of the day. The permission was 
granted, but this wasn’t an especially big deal. It was becoming increasingly common for 
people to write their academic treatises in the vernacular rather than in Latin, and in fact 
the same King had granted permission to a couple of other people to write in Danish that 
very same year! So SK’s petition was not anything unprecedented or even especially 
unusual. 
Note that it’s not as though SK couldn’t handle writing an academic treatise in Latin. On 
the contrary, he was quite fluent in Latin, and even had taught Latin for several years 
privately. Indeed, although the work itself was written in Danish, SK defended it in Latin 
for seven and a half hours in a public forum, on Sept. 16, 1841. So it’s not as though SK 
was pleading inability here. 
But more than that, the work simply doesn’t read like an academic thesis or dissertation. 
It’s far too polemical and sarcastic for that. And in fact, everyone on the examining 
committee for SK’s oral defense of the dissertation complained about the style of the 
work and suggested he tone it down and stick to the more usual style. (He didn’t.) 
One of the audience at the public oral defense (in Latin) of this thesis described the 
occasion as SK’s playing “toss in a blanket” with his examining committee. Whatever 
exactly this is supposed to mean, it’s clear that SK was arguing circles around his 
committee members, and decidedly had the upper hand. 
Some of the other works we need to mention at least: 
Either/Or 
Either/Or (1843). The first work in the so called “authorship” as recognized in Point of 
View. The work pretends to be two sets of papers found by the author, “Victor Eremita,” 
in an old desk he had bought. The first set of papers was by an “aesthete,” with a 
particular view on life. The second set is a set of three letters by one “Judge William,” 
addressed to the author of the first half. The third letter includes what purports to be a 
sermon Judge William had just received the text of, by someone else. 
The point of the work is that it presents two entirely different views on how to live life. 
In February, we will be reading some passages from Either/Or. See the Syllabus for 
details. 
Fear and Trembling 
Also in 1843, we get probably SK’s best known and most electrifying work, Fear and 
Trembling. This is a profound and disturbing meditation on the Biblical story of 
Abraham’s “sacrifice” of Isaac, in Gen. 22. It’s the first work we’ll be reading in its 
entirety. 
 18
Philosophical Fragments (or Philosophical “Crumbs”) 
Marilyn Piety, in her review of Fragments (“The Dangers of Clarity,” see the handout of 
bibliography), argues that the title should be translated as “Philosophical Crumbs,” in 
order to preserve an allusion to a Scriptural passage that any native Dane would 
immediately catch. I’m not convinced. Besides, “Philosophical Crumbs” just sounds silly, 
and suggests that the book is supposed to be “crummy,” which it definitely isn’t. You’ll 
occasionally see some secondary authors who adopt Piety’s suggestion, but the title 
Philosophical Fragments is too entrenched to be displaced now, and that’s what I’ll call 
it. 
This is an exceptionally interesting work, published in 1844 under the pseudonym 
“Johannes Climacus,” although the title page says it was “edited” by Søren Kierkegaard. 
 Fragments is in effect SK’s response to the Socratic/Platonic theory of “recollection” 
that we find, for instance, in the Meno. But it’s not a purely philosophical work by any 
means; it’s religious through and through. 
This is the earliest of what are sometimes called SK’s “algebraic” works—a description 
taken from his own discussion of them. It means a work that is fairly short, concise and 
theoretical. From the point of view of reading SK philosophically, the “algebraic” works 
are perhaps the most important and rewarding ones. In addition to Fragments, the 
“algebraic” works include The Concept of Anxiety (also 1844) and The Sickness unto 
Death (1849). We won’t be reading much from Fragments, although some passages are 
in Bretall, but we’ll be reading all of the other two. They are some of SK’s most exciting 
and profound works. 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
This is a major work that we will be reading parts of, but by no means the whole thing—
it’s over 600 pages long in the Hong & Hong translation. It was published in 1846, and 
was in some sense intended to be the end of SK’s “authorship.”  
SK was morbidly half-convinced he would never live to be 34 (because Jesus died at 33). 
And in 1846, when Postscript was published, he was 33. 
Well, Postscript wasn’t the end of the authorship. He went on to write a lot more. But it’s 
the last pseudonymous work before he wrote—but didn’t publish—Point of View.) 
The point of the title is that this was supposed to be a minor “postscript” to the 
Philosophical Fragments. In fact, of course, it’s enormously longer than Fragments, and 
one of SK’s most important works. Like Fragments, its pseudonymous author is 
Johannes Climacus, although it is “edited” by Søren Kierkegaard. 
Others 
I should also mention a few other works. In 1847, SK published two series of 
“deliberations” collectively called Works of Love. This was published under his own 
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name—so it’s one of the “signed” works. Recently, there has been a lot of secondary 
literature on this work. It’s one of SK’s truly great writings! 
In 1850, there is an important work called Practice in Christianity (formerly translated as 
Training in Christianity), by the pseudonymous author “Anti-Climacus,” who was 
likewise the author of The Sickness unto Death in 1849. (Both were “edited” by 
Kierkegaard.) 
And finally, let me mention a series of “newspaper” articles (not “news reporting,” but 
more like extended “letters to the editor”), together with a series of pamphlets SK 
published under the title The Moment, right at the end of his life (1854–55). These were 
polemical pieces, not to say vitriolic, and amounted to a sustained attack on the 
established Lutheran Church of Denmark, which SK thought had betrayed true 
Christianity. This last flurry of writings are sometimes collectively called The Attack 
upon Christendom. (There is no actual work by SK with that title.) 
 
Background on Hegel 
Fair warning: I am no expert on Hegel, to say the least. And so some of what I’ll be 
saying in this section is going to be rather sketchy and “schematic.” But I’ll just have to 
do the best I can. 
Why should we be talking about Hegel at all in a course on SK? There are several 
reasons: 
A. If you’ve looked at the MacIntyre article from The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
which I asked you to read, you’ll know that SK strongly reacts against Hegel. So 
one basic reason for knowing something about Hegel in a course on SK is simply 
“know the enemy.” But in fact the situation is much more complex than that. 
B. For second, despite his reaction against Hegel, SK was himself at one time a 
Hegelian of sorts, who later came to regard his adoption of Hegelianism as a 
mistake. 
Hegelianism was all the rage in Denmark when SK was at the University, not the pure 
Hegelianism of the “master” himself, but a kind of “Danish” Hegelianism that was in the 
air, largely as a result of the influence of J. L. Heiberg, a kind of arbiter of Danish 
intellectual and cultural thought in the early nineteenth century. 
Perhaps the high-water mark of Kierkegaard’s Hegelianism was his dissertation, The 
Concept of Irony. Later on, he wrote, 
Influenced as I was by Hegel and whatever was modern, without the 
maturity really to comprehend greatness, I could not resist pointing out 
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somewhere in my dissertation that it was a defect on the part of Socrates to 
disregard the whole and only consider numerically the individuals. 
What a Hegelian fool I was! It was precisely this that powerfully 
demonstrates what a great ethicist Socrates was. (Concept of Irony, xiv.) 
C. Third, although SK comes to reject Hegel vehemently, there is much of Hegel that 
remains active in SK’s writings, perhaps most obviously in his description of the 
ethical life in Either/Or and in Stages on Life’s Way. 
D. Fourth, even where he is disagreeing with Hegel, Hegel often sets the context for 
much of what is distinctively Kierkegaardian. 
Here are seven questions Hegel in effect asks and that are answered (often in a quite 
different way) in SK: 
1. Philosophy/Religion: What is the relation between philosophy and 
religion in general? For Hegel, religion is basically a “feeling” about 
“spirit,” while philosophy rationally comprehends what religion only felt. 
So, for Hegel, there is no real disagreement between faith and reason; it’s 
just that reason and philosophy “go further” than faith. For SK, no. On the 
contrary, for SK religion shows the limits of philosophy. 
2. Understanding/Knowledge: (This is closely related to the preceding 
question.) How are we to conceive of faith and its relation to 
understanding and knowledge? For Hegel, faith does not go beyond 
knowledge. As we’ve just said, it’s the other way around. For SK, it does 
go beyond knowledge. 
3. Self/God (Absolute): What possible relations are there between the self 
and God (or the Hegelian “Absolute”)? For Hegel, we can in effect adopt 
the viewpoint of God, a kind of absolute viewpoint. Not for SK; for him, 
God is wholly other. 
4. Ethics: Does living an ethical life constitute the highest form of human 
existence? For Hegel, yes. For SK, no. 
5. Thought/Being: What is the relation between thought and “being”? For 
Hegel, they are in the end pretty much the same. “The real is the rational 
and the rational is the real” (a famous line from Hegel, although it’s often 
taken to mean all sorts of things Hegel never intended.) For SK, no. 
6. System of Existence: Is a “system” of existence possible? For Hegel, yes. 
For SK, no—at least not for us. 
7. Presuppositionless: Can philosophy have a presuppositionless beginning? 
For Hegel, yes. For SK, no. 
 21
As we will see later on, questions 1–4 figure prominently in Fear and Trembling, and the 
others appear throughout SK’s writings too. 
E. The fifth  point is that SK often uses Hegelian terminology without really defining 
it in any way that helps. Being clear about what Hegel meant by his terminology 
does not, of course, necessarily mean you can just assume SK uses the 
terminology in the same way, but it’s a good place to start. And getting clear on 
what differences there may be is a good way to start to understand SK on his own 
terms. Here are some examples of Kierkegaardian terms “borrowed” from Hegel 
(in no particular order): 
1. The finite and the infinite 
2. Dialectic 
3. The Absolute 
4. The System 
5. Social Morality (Sittlichkeit) 
6. Spirit 
7. Immediacy 
8. The aesthetic 
9. The universal. 
See also the handout on “buzzwords.” 
Hegel 
Gottfried Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). He died when SK was 18. 
Hegel represents the culmination of (and to some extent already the transition beyond) 
the so called Romantic tradition in philosophy, which was largely a reaction to Kant, and 
in particular to Kant’s views about the limits of what we can know. This Romantic 
tradition includes, in addition to Hegel, people like Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich 
Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling. (SK actually attended some lectures by Schelling in 
Berlin, shortly after his break-up with Regine Olsen.) 
What kinds of limits did Kant think there were on what we can know? Well, consider the 
questions of the immortality of the soul, the existence of God, human free will. Kant 
thought we cannot know these things in what he calls “speculative metaphysics”; they are 
rather “transcendental ideas.” We cannot know them, but reason impels us to think them 
anyway—and in fact to accept them, if we’re serious human beings. 
This is part of Kant’s attack on speculative (or theoretical) metaphysics. 
Kant’s project in part was to define the scope of what we can know theoretically. 
Knowledge for Kant has two components: an intellectual component, what he calls 
“understanding,” and a sensory component, what he calls “intuition” or “sensibility.” 
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Understanding Intuition or 
“sensibility” 
active passive 
a priori 
concepts 
( “categories”) 
space and time 
For Kant, all our experience, and therefore all possible knowledge of that experience, 
must conform to space and time, and to the concepts of the understanding—the 
categories. 
Intuitions are mere appearances; they do not give us any knowledge whatsoever of the 
“things in themselves.” Neither does understanding, since that comes from our own 
activity. 
God knows the “things in themselves,” but we don’t. We cannot theoretically know them, 
but we can “know” them practically—or at least deal with them practically, since “know” 
is probably not the right term to use here (even though Kant sometimes does use it). 
Otherwise, for Kant, ethics simply makes no sense. 
There are two related aspects of this picture that upset the Romantics, including Hegel. 
1. We can’t apprehend ultimate reality (“things in themselves”). 
2. We can’t have theoretical (philosophical or metaphysical) knowledge of the 
Absolute (in effect, of God). 
One of the reasons the they were so upset about these consequences of Kantian 
philosophy was that such consequences seemed to lead to complete skepticism and moral 
anarchy. But the whole philosophy of the Enlightenment, including Kant, was to throw 
off mere belief and superstition and to follow the light of reason precisely in order to 
avoid skepticism and moral anarchy—to uphold the stability of an orderly society, not to 
undermine it! 
Schelling came up with a “solution” to answer this threat. The Romantics in general stick 
as much as they can to Kant, treat him with respect, but they don’t like these two points. 
Schelling’s answer is what he calls “intellectual intuition.” 
For Schelling, unlike Kant, yes you can intuit God’s existence. Kant was right that we 
can’t do it through the intuitions that come in terms of space and time (sensation), but we 
can do it through this other faculty of the mind called “intellectual intuition.” As a result, 
we can have knowledge of the Absolute, we can apprehend ultimate reality. In effect, we 
can know ultimate reality just the way Kant had said God knows it. 
Hegel inherits this much from Schelling. That is, he agrees with Schelling’s result, that 
we can know these things. But he came to reject Schelling’s odd notion of “intellectual 
intuition.” 
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The problem of course was how to give this “intellectual intuition” a good basis. What 
happens when people claim to have conflicting “intellectual intuitions”? 
As I said, Hegel eventually gave up Schelling’s notion of “intellectual intuition.” Instead, 
what he put in its place is this: He tried to come up with a conceptual system that would 
give us knowledge of ultimate reality (“things in themselves”) and of the Absolute (God)
—exactly what Kant had said we couldn’t do. 
Hegel’s substitute for “intellectual intuition” involved his notion of dialectic. 
The dialectic is what is going to allow us to know ultimate reality, including God. 
There are lots of ways of describing the Hegelian “dialectic,” but all (1) involve starting 
with some putatively “presuppositionless” starting point, (2) analyzing it, letting it work 
itself out, with the result that (3) it turns out that this “presuppositionless” starting point 
isn’t really as “presuppositionless” as it was initially described. This involves a continual 
process of self-undermining, which ultimately leads (here’s the mysterious part) to 
“absolute knowledge”—i. e., God’s knowledge, or knowledge of the Absolute. 
In Hegel’s Science of Logic, this process is described in terms of “thesis/antithesis/
synthesis.” An initial thesis generates its opposite, its “antithesis,” and their conflict or 
tension inevitably produces a kind of compromise or “synthesis” of the two. But the 
“synthesis” becomes a new thesis, which generates a new antithesis, and so on. 
A Quick Example: 
In Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Spirit, the first step, the putatively 
“presuppositionless” beginning—THE THESIS—is what Hegel calls “sense certainty.” 
This is the view that the truest and most adequate way of grasping things is just to sense 
them, without doing anything else—without actively thinking about them. This is pure 
“immediacy,” independent of any prior assumptions or presuppositions. Just “open your 
eyes.” 
But (the Phenomenology of Spirit goes on), once we think about this notion of sense 
certainty, we realize it presupposes a distinction between the one doing the sensing and 
the object sensed. Even just saying “This is here, now” presupposes the taking of a point 
of view or perspective (from the “here” and “now”), which is an active role on our part. 
This realization—THE ANTITHESIS—undermines the original notion that “sense 
certainty” is as “presuppositionless” as we thought. As a result, we must adopt some 
other candidate for what the truest and most adequate way of apprehending things is. In 
the Phenomenology of Spirit itself, this leads to Hegel’s next step, what he calls the 
doctrine of perception. (THE SYNTHESIS.) 
In the end, this cyclic process leads to a final goal: the standpoint of “absolute 
consciousness.” Here we get what Hegel calls “rational knowledge of the Absolute.” 
Hegel doesn’t seem ever to use the term ‘metaphysics’. But he does talk about “rational 
knowledge of the Absolute.” 
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What is the Absolute? For Kant, it meant the “unconditioned,” there are no “conditions” 
on it. Roughly speaking, the Absolute is “uncaused”, “necessary,” “independent” or 
“presuppositionless,” as we just put it. Or, as both Schelling and Hegel would sometimes 
put it, that which doesn’t depend on anything else in order to exist or in order to be 
conceived. (If you’re familiar with Spinoza, you might recognize this pairing  of 
“existing” and “being conceived” as sounding a lot like Spinoza’s notion of substance. 
The Romantics were in general very taken with Spinoza.) 
For Schelling and Hegel, only one thing can satisfy this description: God, or the universe 
as a whole. (Again, this sounds like Spinoza’s “God or Nature.”) 
This is a big move. Notice what it does: It brings God “home,” down into this world. God 
in effect just is the whole of this world. God is not in some metaphysical “beyond” for 
Schelling and Hegel. So, in an odd sense, Kant was perfectly right in saying we cannot 
theoretically know God—if by God we do mean something “beyond” like that (which 
Kant certainly did mean). There isn’t any such thing. 
Both Schelling and Hegel adopt a kind of biological model for this dialectical process, a 
model that is sometimes called “vitalism.” This is to be contrasted with the more 
mechanical picture of the world we find in Newton or Hume (“billiard balls” bouncing 
into one another). For Schelling and Hegel, the process is better thought of along the lines 
of the development of an organism. Not just a process of coming to know the Absolute; 
the Absolute itself develops! 
This is not an atheism, but rather a kind of pantheism. God ends up being identical with 
the whole of nature, conceived along “vitalist” lines. 
This quasi-biological process goes on, getting more and more “organized” and 
“developed.” Spirit—a “buzzword”—is the highest level of this organizational structure. 
This means that for Hegel, God, the whole of reality, is a process, not a static thing. And 
this in turn means God is temporal, in time; God develops over time. As Hegel says, “The 
divine nature is the same as the human.” That is, we ourselves are divine, and in the 
course of the dialectic we gradually come to realize this. 
This ultimate truth about Spirit is at first comprehended only in “feeling”—in religion 
and faith. Later on, philosophy comes to comprehend it rationally—in Hegel’s own day. 
Individuals, particulars or parts of the whole universe are described as “finite,” whereas 
the universe as a whole is described as “infinite.” (See the handout on “Buzzwords.”) 
Individual consciousness partakes in but also constitutes (in the sense of being an 
ingredient of) Spirit—the highest level of organizational structure of the universe. 
The process of the dialectic takes place in world history. The stage at which history finds 
itself at any given time sets a limit on what can be comprehended at that time. In effect, 
Hegel is trying to get away from the view of philosophy as “ahistorical” or a matter of 
“eternal” viewpoints. (It’s curious but true that Hegel is the very first person to write a 
real “history of philosophy”—as distinct from a mere “lives of the philosophers” or a 
survey of how your own predecessors were wrong.) 
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Hegel seems to think history had got far enough in his own day that we could at least get 
a glimpse of where it will end—what the goal of it really was all along. 
Earlier we described this goal as “rational knowledge of the Absolute.” But Hegel also 
describes it in other terms, as the realization of human freedom. And this leads us to his 
ethical theory. (This is a transition now!) 
When Hegel speaks of human freedom, he’s not thinking so much in terms of individuals 
and of the question of “free will.” He’s mainly thinking of human freedom in terms of 
nation states. 
The “archenemy” of Hegel’s conception of freedom is the so called “liberal” conception 
of freedom, and the “liberal” conception of the state. 
This is not “liberalism” as opposed to “conservatism.” The “liberal” conception of 
freedom makes it a matter of being able to do whatever you choose to do. The only 
constraint is that you are not allowed to get in anyone else’s way. So too the “liberal” 
conception of the state; it’s a matter of competing individual interests, which are to be 
pursued subject only to the constraint that we don’t get in one another’s way and prevent 
others from pursuing their individual interests too. 
Hegel thinks this conception of freedom leads, if you take it as the whole story, to a 
bankrupt view of human freedom and the state. 
Instead, Hegel has what might be called a “self-actualization” picture of freedom. We 
must now try to figure out where this view comes from. 
There are really two sources: Aristotle and Kant. 
From Aristotle, Hegel takes the view that the notion of human freedom has to be based 
on a conception of human good, which in turn draws on a particular picture of human 
nature—it’s not arbitrary or “up to us.” For Aristotle, achieving that human good is in 
effect realizing, “fulfilling” our own essence, and we fulfill it, Aristotle thought, by 
seeking happiness. 
Hegel accepts part of this: the notion that freedom is based on human essence. But he 
doesn’t think this is all a matter of seeking happiness, as Aristotle does. (So Hegel’s 
ethics is not a eudamonism.) 
It is from Kant that Hegel gets the notion that the human good is not based on happiness. 
Rather, it’s based on the notion of “realizing oneself through one’s own activity.” On the 
other hand, Kant disagreed with Aristotle on the human good’s having to do with human 
essence or nature. 
For example, finding a job that fits your own inclinations and talents is a realization of 
your self through your activity, even though it may not make you particularly happy, and 
may not have anything to do with your human nature. There may be a lot of unhappiness 
and day-to-day drudgery in that job. 
So human freedom, based on the human good: 
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Human freedom, 
based on the 
human good: 
is a matter of 
fulfilling our human 
nature of essence 
is achieved through 
seeking happiness 
is a matter of 
realizing oneself 
through one’s own 
activity 
Aristotle Yes Yes ? 
Kant No No Yes 
Hegel Yes No Yes 
 
In the end, Hegel thinks this kind of “self-realization” can only take place in the context 
of the State. The State, like the universe as a whole, is a totality, an organism. And just as 
a lung, for instance, doesn’t “realize itself,” doesn’t “fulfill its essence” by just doing 
whatever it wants to, provided only that it doesn’t interfere with other organs, so too with 
human beings. (So Hegel’s ethics is an anti-liberalism.) Just as the lung “fulfills its 
essence” only in the context of the larger organic structure of which it is a part, so too 
with human beings. 
Ethics, therefore, is for Hegel a kind of social morality (Sittlichkeit) or conventional 
morality. 
(This doesn’t just mean doing what everyone else does, any more than it does for the 
lung. It involves critical reflection on one’s culture. Still, it is “context-dependent.” But 
now we’re getting well beyond my knowledge of Hegel, and we’ve done enough for 
present purposes.) 
 
The “standard” picture 
OK, let’s move away from Hegel now, and back to SK. 
What I want to do in this and the next few lectures is sketch for you a kind of “standard,” 
“capsule” overview of what SK is up to. And then one of the things we want to do 
throughout the rest of the course is to keep one eye on which parts of this “standard” 
view need to be adjusted. 
Reading 
For your reading, you should by now have finished Anderson’s On Kierkegaard. I have 
also asked you to read the short article on Kierkegaard by Alasdair MacIntyre in the 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and the two articles I’ve listed from the Compantion 
volume. Together, Anderson and MacIntyre will give you some “documentary evidence” 
for various aspects of the “standard” picture I’m about to present. 
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Also, you should now start on Fear and Trembling, if you’ve not done so already. I’m 
asking you to read all of it, including the very mysterious “Problem III,” which I don’t 
think anyone really understands. Also, read Hannay’s “Introduction,” which is pretty 
good—although when he gets to talking about “Problem III,” it’s just as mysterious as 
Kierkegaard himself. We’ll be talking directly about Fear and Trembling very soon. 
More immediately, there is an upcoming reading assignment on the Syllabus, from the 
Bretall volume. It’s a passage from Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and one of the 
most important passages in Kierkegaard. 
But for now, let me give you some background on “The Standard Picture.” 
Sources 
When I first started preparing more advanced lectures on Kierkegaard for the first version 
of this class, back in 2000, I worried for a while about just how “standard” this so called 
“standard” picture is. 
To tell the truth, what the “standard” picture really is is the story I’ve been telling my 
P135 classes for the last thirty-some years. 
Now I never claimed to be an expert on Kierkegaard in those courses (and don’t in this 
course either), but he was just one of the people we were going to talk about in them. And 
as these things go, when you have to teach material you’re not an authority on, you tend 
to shape it, develop it the way you think it would go, answer questions the way you think 
it goes—and then, later on, remember those answers and begin thinking of them as part 
of the original view. And of course, all that happened in my teaching of Kierkegaard. 
But then, when I started reading Kierkegaard more seriously, I gradually began to realize 
that things were not altogether as I had thought. This “picture” I had been presenting to 
my classes (and still do) wasn’t quite right. 
And that’s, I say, why I worried a bit when I began to put together the first version of this 
course for the Fall of 2000. In short, is there anything really “standard” about what I was 
calling the “standard” picture—or is it just another name for Spade’s uninformed and 
highly idiosyncratic “take” on Kierkegaard, one that I had come up with gradually over 
the years before I knew any better and that, far from being “standard,” you’ll probably 
only find on the Bloomington campus of IU? 
Well, I went back and did some poking around, and I’m happy to report that: 
No. What I’m calling the “standard” interpretation is not just the product of my ignorance 
and an overactive imagination. It really is a fairly “standard” view. 
You won’t find it all nicely set out in any one author, and the details will vary depending 
on who you read. But, by and large, if you read brief summaries of Kierkegaard, they’ll 
probably look a lot like the view I’m going to sketch for you. 
For example: 
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1. Donald D. Palmer, Kierkegaard for Beginners, part of “A ‘Writers and Readers’ 
Beginning Documentary Comic Book, Philosophy Series.” You may have seen 
other volumes in this series. They have one Freud for Beginners, Marx for 
Beginners, etc. There’s one Sartre for Beginners, which I think is just silly. But, 
somewhat to my surprise, the Kierkegaard volume is actually rather good. It 
doesn’t go very deep, but it does have a lot of useful information in it. By and 
large, Palmer presents what I’m calling the “standard” picture of Kierkegaard. 
2. The article on Kierkegaard by Alaisdair MacIntyre in The Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, which I mentioned earlier. 
3. Susan Leigh Anderson’s book On Kierkegaard. 
There are other places that give the “standard picture” too, and I’ll cite some of them as 
we go along. Each of these sources has its own idiosyncrasies, and each one has a certain 
“spin” that’s not to be found in the others. But never mind. For now, I just want to paint 
in very broad strokes.  
(1) Reaction to Hegel 
Now what is the “standard” picture? What are its features? 
Well, surely the most uncontroversial part of it is that SK represents a strong reaction to 
Hegel. 
So, in effect, take everything I was talking about in our discussion of Hegel, and put a 
great big ‘NOT’ in front of it. 
Putting it that strongly is obviously a caricature, but there’s a lot of truth in it anyway.  
(2) Emphasis on the individual 
In what ways did SK react to Hegel? 
One of the big ways was in shifting the whole emphasis to the individual. 
Think back to our discussion of Hegel. Did you notice how much emphasis there was in 
all of that on large scale generalities? 
We had all this talk about the Absolute, which turned out to be—well, everything! The 
whole universe. 
We talked about the goal of the entire course of World History, which was: to realize 
human freedom. Everything was in very broad strokes. 
Even human freedom itself was not thought of as primarily a matter of individual human 
freedom. Morality, for instance, is not a matter of the individual’s freedoms and 
responsibilities. The individual is situated within a whole series of larger and larger 
totalities—the family at the most foundational level, then civil society, and ultimately the 
nation as a whole. 
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SK rejects all that. And he rejects it not so much because it’s wrong (although he thinks a 
lot of it is wrong), as because it misses the point. 
You don’t really understand what’s going on—you don’t really understand what you 
want to understand—if you insist on dissolving everything into ever more abstract 
generalities. 
As a result, therefore, SK rejects the attempt to construct vast, all-inclusive systems of 
philosophy. Not just the Hegelian attempt, which is really the only one he had any 
familiarity with, but ultimately any such attempt. It won’t work, and it misses the point 
even if it does work. 
Let me read you a passage that illustrates part of what’s going on here. It’s not from SK, 
but from Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, the chapter on “Existential Psychoanalysis” 
(pp. 713–15). Although it’s Sartre and not Kierkegaard, I think SK would enthusiastically 
agree with it. 
Sartre is talking about “psychological biographies” of a certain kind that used to be more 
fashionable than I suppose it is nowadays. And to make his point, he picks as a specimen, 
a biography of the French author Gustave Flaubert by someone named Paul Bourget. 
Here’s what Sartre says: 
A critic, for example [he’s thinking of Bourget], wishing to explain the 
“psychology” of Flaubert, will write that he “appeared in his early youth 
to know as his normal state, a continual exaltation resulting from the 
twofold feeling of his grandiose ambition and his invincible power  The 
effervescence of his young blood was then turned into literary passion as 
happens about the eighteenth year in precocious souls who find in the 
energy of style or the intensities of fiction some way of escaping from the 
need of violent action or of intense feeling, which torments them.” 
In this passage there is an effort to reduce the complex personality of an 
adolescent to a few basic desires, as the chemist reduces compound bodies 
to merely a combination of simple bodies. The primitive givens will be 
grandiose ambition, the need of violent action and of intense feeling; these 
elements, when they enter into combination, produce a permanent 
exaltation. Then—as Bourget remarks in a few words which we have not 
quoted—this exaltation, nourished by numerous well-chosen readings, is 
going to seek to delude itself by self-expression in fictions which will 
appease it symbolically and channel it. There in outline is the genesis of a 
literary “temperament.” 
Now in the first place such a psychological analysis proceeds from the 
postulate that an individual fact is produced by the intersection of abstract, 
universal laws. The fact to be explained—which is here the literary 
disposition of the young Flaubert—is resolved into a combination of 
typical, abstract desires such as we meet in “the average adolescent.” 
What is concrete here is only their combination; in themselves they are 
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only possible patterns. The abstract then is by hypothesis prior to the 
concrete, and the concrete is only an organization of abstract qualities; the 
individual is only the intersection of universal schemata. But … we see 
clearly in the example chosen, that it simply fails to explain what makes 
the individuality of the project under consideration [= Flaubert’s life]. The 
fact that “the need to feel intensely,” a universal pattern, is disguised and 
channeled into becoming the need to write—this is not the explanation of 
the “calling” of Flaubert; on the contrary, it is what must be explained. 
 
At each stage in the description just quoted, we meet with a hiatus. Why 
did ambition and the feeling of his power produce in Flaubert exaltation 
rather than tranquil waiting or gloomy impatience? Why did this exaltation 
express itself specifically in the need to act violently and feel intensely? … 
And why does this need instead of seeking to appease itself in acts of 
violence, by amorous adventures, or in debauch, choose precisely to 
satisfy itself symbolically? And why does Flaubert turn to writing rather 
than to painting or music for this symbolic satisfaction; he could just as 
well not resort to the artistic field at all (there is also mysticism, for 
example). “I could have been a great actor,” wrote Flaubert somewhere. 
Why did he not try to be one? In a word, we have understood nothing; we 
have seen a succession of accidental happenings, of desires springing forth 
fully armed, one from the other, with no possibility for us to grasp their 
genesis. The transitions, the becomings, the transformations, have been 
carefully veiled from us, and we have been limited to putting order into 
the succession by invoking empirically established but literally 
unintelligible sequences  
I’ve quoted this passage at some length because I think Sartre’s point is utterly 
convincing, completely irrefutable—and obviously right! 
Now we have to be careful: Sartre is not Kierkegaard, and certainly Bourget is not Hegel. 
But there is a lot of carry-over. The emphasis in Hegel, as in Bourget’s biography, is 
entirely on the general, the universal, the large-scale. In Kierkegaard, as in Sartre, the 
emphasis is shifted onto the individual above all. 
Even if you agree with all the general, universal, large-scale themes the other guy is 
addressing, they aren’t going to be enough to do the trick if what you’re interested in 
dealing with is the individual. As Sartre says, all the “transitions, the becomings, the 
transformations,” are veiled from us. 
(3) A “practical urgency” to Kierkegaard 
But there’s more. In the passage from Sartre, you get the sense that what he’s mainly 
interested in is understanding an individual such as Flaubert. It’s an intellectual, cognitive 
matter. 
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For SK, that’s not the main worry. It’s much more a practical matter for him, and 
moreover a pretty urgent practical matter. But it’s still a matter of individual concerns. 
For example, here’s a famous passage from SK’s Journals (August 1, 1835—one of the 
very earliest journal entries) [Bretall, p. 5]: 
 the thing is to find a truth which is true for me, to find the idea [see the 
handout on “buzzwords”] for which I can live and die. What would be the 
use of discovering so-called objective truth, of working through all the 
systems [a Hegelian term] of philosophy and of being able, if required, to 
review them all and show up the inconsistencies with each one [exactly 
what Hegel claimed to have done in his “dialectic”]; what good would it 
do me to be able to develop a theory of the state and combine all the 
details into a single whole [again, as Hegel had claimed to do], and so 
construct a world in which I did not live, but only held up to the view of 
others [and for that matter, to my own view]; what good would it do me to 
be able to explain the meaning of Christianity [as Hegel had tried to 
“explain” Christian dogmas “rationally”] if it had no deeper significance 
for me and my life 
In short, system-building is useless when it comes to the really important questions: What 
does it mean for me? How is it going to affect the way I live my life? 
That’s what SK is interested in. 
(4) Kierkegaard’s “dialectic” 
Recall Hegel’s “dialectic,” the three-cylinder engine that drives the whole of World 
History toward reaching its goal—Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis (which becomes a new 
Thesis). And round and round we go in this spiral fashion. 
Well, SK has something we might call a “dialectic” too. At least that’s what I have called 
it in other classes, although SK himself uses the term “dialectic” much more broadly. 
And like Hegel’s dialectic, Kierkegaard’s too has three parts. 
Nevertheless, apart from its triadic structure, there’s very little else in common between 
Hegel’s dialectic and Kierkegaard’s “answer” to it. 
Kierkegaard’s “dialectic” is not about three stages of an inevitable, one way progression 
through a given sequence, but rather three different ways of living—three different 
“lifestyles.” Only we’re not talking about “lifestyles” in any trivial, small-scale sense. 
We’re not talking about whether you live in the urban metropolis/suburbia/rustic 
countryside, for instance, or whether you’re straight or gay, of whether you live a simple, 
frugal lifestyle or a lavish, frantic one. 
No, we’re talking about three different ways of living—lifestyles—in a sense that goes 
much deeper than that, as we’ll see. 
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What are these three “lifestyles” in Kierkegaard’s so called “dialectic”? They are 
generally called: 
 The “aesthetic” [The Hongs spell it “esthetic”] 
 The “ethical” 
 The “religious” [= the life of faith] 
Now let’s pause. As far as I’ve been able to determine, SK himself never uses the term 
‘dialectic’ to refer to this threefold distinction. He does use the term ‘dialectic’ 
frequently, but not for this. He will even say there is a dialectical relation among these 
three ways of life. But that’s not the same as saying that SK’s notion of dialectic has to 
do with these three ways of life—as it is true to say that Hegel’s dialectic has to do with 
the tripartite pattern we call Thesis/Antithesis/Synthesis. 
Furthermore, as far as I’ve been able to determine, even the convention of calling these 
three lifestyles SK’s “dialectic” does not seem to be part the “standard picture”—at least 
not of other people’s “standard picture.” That much does seem to be something I just 
invented on my own. 
But there is pretty general agreement in the “standard picture” that SK does recognize 
three basic ways to live. For example. 
(1) James Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard (an older but still useful book, first published 
in 1953), p. 42: 
That there are three stages on life’s way [= the title of one of SK’s works]
—the esthetic, the ethical, and the religious—is Kierkegaard’s most 
famous doctrine, the one contribution with which he is usually credited by 
general histories of philosophy. 
(2) Again, Donald Palmer’s Kierkegaard for Beginners says (pp. 76–77): 
Kierkegaard divides humanity into three possible modes of existence: “the 
aesthetical,” “the ethical,’ and “the religious.” Each of these modes of 
existence is more than just a “stage on life’s way,” as he sometimes calls 
them [there’s that phrase again], rather they are whole human worlds, 
complete with their own ideals, motivations, and forms of behavior. Each 
one is a complete world view. Any of these frames of reference can be 
chosen voluntarily by the individual  
That quotation is a very full statement of what I take to be the “standard view” on this 
point. We’ll talk more about the various parts of it later on. 
(3) In Alaisdair MacIntyre’s article in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, he has a section 
entitled “The aesthetic and the ethical”—describing what he calls “two ways of life,” And 
 33
the next section is entitled “Christianity,” which is obviously going to be the “religious” 
way of life. 
(4) John Douglas Mullen, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy: Self-Deception and Cowardice in 
the Present Age (see the handout on “bibliography”—a very nice little book) describes 
these three lifestyles in Chaps. 6–8. 
(5) And finally, Susan Leigh Anderson’s On Kierkegaard presents the same tri-partite 
picture. 
What are the three lifestyles? 
OK, let’s look now at these three lifestyles (“stages,” “spheres of existence,” “existence-
spheres”), and see if we can figure out what they are and how they are related. 
I want to organize this in a kind of schematic and tabular fashion, for easy reference. 
(Distribute handout.) 
“Stage” or 
“Lifestyle” Question Criterion Character Book Problem 
Aesthetic 
What do 
I want to 
do 
today? Pleasure 
Don 
Giovanni, 
Johannes the 
Seducer Either Despair 
Ethical 
What 
should I 
do 
today? 
Duty or 
obligation 
Socrates, 
Judge 
William Or 
Guilt, or 
Sin 
Religious 
or Life of 
Faith 
What 
does God 
want me 
to do 
today? 
God’s 
will (?) Abraham 
Fear and 
Trembling. Also all 
the Upbuilding 
Discourses and the 
signed works 
generally 
Fear and 
Trem-
bling 
The aesthetic life 
This is a life governed by pleasure, impulse, emotion. The “aesthete” wakes up in the 
morning and asks, “What do I want to do today? Notice that it’s all about what you want 
to do. The idea is to do what pleases you. This is not necessary sensual, although it can 
be. So the “aesthetic” lifestyle is a kind of hedonism. 
Kierkegaard sometimes uses the figure of Don Juan or Don Giovanni as a kind of literary 
symbol of this lifestyle. Also, John the Seducer, from “Diary of a Seducer” in Either/Or. 
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In the “aesthetic” life, no ethical rules count. You might know about ethical norms and 
standards, and even feel their “pull,” but they aren’t going to count for you if they 
interfere with doing what you want. 
SK wrote a lot about this kind of life. See the “Either” part of Either/Or, where we get, 
among other things: 
1. A brilliant study of Mozart’s opera Don Giovanni. 
2. The Rotation Method (an after-dinner speech on how to avoid boredom). 
3. Diary of a Seducer—where the point of the story is not to get the woman 
(whose name is Cordelia, as it turns out), but rather the artful pursuit of her. 
But the aesthetic life is not entirely satisfactory. It leads to something called despair. 
(Note: SK uses the term ‘despair’ in lots of different ways—“despair” in fact is the 
“sickness unto death” SK talks about in the book by that title.) But one of those ways is 
this way. 
“Despair” (in this sense) is the dissatisfaction you get over the lack of purpose and 
meaning in this way of leaving. There is no “point” to it. “Despair,” in this sense, is a 
kind of jadedness. Imagine a moment of the most intense pleasure possible. When that 
moment has passed, you ask yourself “is that all?” That’s “despair.” 
This is not a dissatisfaction because you aren’t getting enough pleasure, but rather a 
dissatisfaction with getting nothing but pleasure. 
Texts 
Here are some texts to illustrate “despair” in this sense: 
Journals, Bretall, p. 7 (from 1836): 
I have just returned from a party of which I was the life and soul; wit 
poured from my lips, everyone laughed and admired me—but I went away
—and the dash should be as long as the earth’s orbit _________-
_____________________________________________________ and 
wanted to shoot myself. 
Again, Journals, Bretall, p. 5 (from 1835): 
I have looked in vain for an anchorage in the boundless sea of pleasure 
and in the depth of understanding; I have felt the almost irresistible power 
with which one pleasure reaches out its hand to the next; I have felt the 
kind of meretricious ecstasy that it is capable of producing, but also the 
ennui and the distracted state of mind that succeeds it. 
Kierkegaard doesn’t think the presence of despair in this sense in any way refutes the 
aesthetic life, that it somehow shows that the aesthetic life is not the lifestyle to choose. 
 35
He’s just observing that if you live that way, you’re going to feel dissatisfied with it. He’s 
simply describing this way of living, with all its ramifications. 
The ethical life 
(2) The second stage of SK’s “stages on life’s way” is  the ethical life. 
It accepts a universal code of ethics. The ethical person lives a more rule-governed life. If 
the “aesthetic” person wakes up in the morning and asks himself, “What do I want to do 
today,” the “ethical” person wakes up and asks himself, “What should I do today?” 
As a result, this kind of life has a kind of coherence, meaning and purpose (belonging to a 
larger whole— recall Hegel) that the aesthetic life lacked. The ethical life overcomes 
despair. 
The ethical life for SK is typified by marriage. (Judge William in Either/Or is all the time 
talking about marriage.) Contrast this with Don Juan for the aesthetic life. Socrates and 
Judge William are the figures he uses to symbolize this life. 
SK writes about this life in the “Or” part of Either/Or. Significantly, that part is much 
more organized, prosaic, and just plain “long-winded” than the lively, witty “Either” part. 
(But it’s interesting reading anyway.) 
Hegel’s social morality (= Sittlichkeit) belongs here, and is no doubt primarily what SK is 
thinking of. From that point of view, being ethical means playing your role in society, 
fitting in to your niche, being a “good citizen.” 
Nevertheless, there are passages where SK seems to be distinguishing Hegel’s Sittlichkeit 
from what he (Kierkegaard) means by the “ethical” life. For example, there are passages 
where he says that Hegelianism “doesn’t really have an ethics”! I’m not yet quite sure 
what to make of those claims. 
Now you may think you’ve gained something by living this kind of life. After all, you are 
no longer in despair. But now you have a new problem. 
If the aesthetic life was unsatisfactory, left you feeling not quite satisfied because of the 
despair over its pointlessness, there is a similar negative emotion that accompanies the 
ethical stage: guilt and sin. 
This didn’t arise at the aesthetic level. Guilt and sin arise only when you fail to live up to 
the standards you guide your life by. You didn’t have those standards at the aesthetic 
level; it is only at the ethical stage that we try to live by such standards. 
Now you may object that the aesthetic life does have a kind of standard. The standard or 
ideal is to get as much pleasure as possible! But that’s not the same thing. In the aesthetic 
life, if you fail to get as much pleasure as possible, you might feel disappointed, you may 
regret an “opportunity lost,” and so on. But you won’t feel guilty about it! That’s a whole 
different kind of response. 
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Guilt and sin are inevitable in the ethical life—because the standards we live by at the 
ethical stage are ideals. And the whole point of ideals is to be—well, “ideal,” and so, out 
of reach. They are something to strive for, even as we inevitably fall short of them. 
The religious life, the life of faith 
(3) The third “stage on life’s way” is the religious stage, the life of faith. (There are two 
forms of the “religious” stage. In Concluding Unscientific Postscript, we get a distinction 
between “Religion A” and “Religion B.” So does this mean there end up being four 
stages? As we’ll see, there is some question over just how many “stages” there are for 
SK.) 
SK doesn’t really describe this religious stage in Either/Or at all, but he does at great 
length in Fear and Trembling and in other works. Fear and Trembling will be the first 
place where we will see this lifestyle described at some length. 
The religious life, the life of faith, involves for SK a direct, one-on-one relation with 
God. (Not a God-relation that has to go through any general principles or rules—like the 
Ten Commandments—to get to God. You don’t relate to God through the intermediation 
of a “priestly” class, for instance. This is one strand of Reformation though.) 
If the aesthete wakes up in the morning and asks himself “What do I want to do today?,” 
and the ethical person asks himself, “What should I do today?,” the religious person 
wakes up and asks “What does God want me to do today?” Abraham is the symbol for 
this kind of life. 
Like the aesthetic life, the life of faith is not one governed by ethical rules. In some cases, 
it may in fact look from the outside a little like the aesthetic life. Much of “Problema III” 
of Fear and Trembling is devoted to ruminating on exactly what the difference is. 
Faith, the religious life, is not without its problems too. Just as at the first two stages, so 
too here: the individual is not comfortable. This discomfort is what we can call “fear and 
trembling.” (From Philippians 2.) 
We’ll see more about just what causes this negative emotion when we discuss Fear and 
Trembling directly. But we can begin even now. Abraham in Fear and Trembling goes 
beyond ethics. 
You might say: Wait a minute! I thought ethics isn’t what mattered in the life of faith; 
that’s not what you’re living your life in terms of. So why should it bother Abraham? 
(For that matter, the same point can be made about the aesthetic life.) Reply: True 
enough. But the pull of ethics is still felt, even for Abraham; it’s just not decisive. 
Note how the “ethical” is in a sense the “focal” standpoint here—it’s central. What 
bothers you about the aesthetic life is the lack of structure and focus that is supplied by 
the ethical. What bothers you about the life of faith is that it “goes beyond” ethics, is “no 
longer” ethical. And what bothers you about the ethical life is that it’s not ethical enough
—you inevitably fall short. 
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But the “centrality” of ethics doesn’t decide anything. It doesn’t in any way force a 
decision. 
Contrasts between Hegel’s dialectic and Kierkegaard’s “stages on life’s 
way” 
Let’s contrast Kierkegaard’s “stages on life’s way” (Kierkegaard’s “dialectic,” as I’ve 
called it) with Hegel’s. And let me list here several putative contrasts. In every case, we 
have to keep our eyes on these contrasts later on, to see if they are really there. In other 
words, to see if this “standard picture” is right. 
1. Hegel’s dialectic is broader in scope. He’s trying to explain all of reality. 
Kierkegaard is just talking about human beings. By the same token, Hegel’s 
dialectic is far more abstract and conceptual. Kierkegaard’s is much more 
particular, concrete. 
2. Hegel’s dialectic involves a fixed order: thesis, then antithesis, then synthesis, 
which serves as a new thesis. Never any other way; you can’t go back in the other 
direction. Kierkegaard’s “stages on life’s way” don’t have this fixed order. 
They’re just three distinct, self-contained lifestyles, three different ways of 
approaching life. 
3. Hegel’s dialectic involves an inevitable progression. Kierkegaard’s structure 
doesn’t. There’s nothing to say you have to move from one lifestyle to the next. 
(There really isn’t any “next,” since there’s no fixed order to them.) You can live 
your entire life at a single stage; many people do. On the other hand, you can 
change from one “stage” to the “another.” But if you do, it’s a matter of choice, 
not of necessity. And, I suppose, you can even change back again. Kierkegaard 
thinks such changes are possible and do happen, but they are relatively rare—they 
involve a complete renegotiating of your priorities. They are like religious 
conversion experiences, a complete reorienting of your life. Whatever you think 
of such “conversion” experiences, they do happen; they don’t happen to everyone, 
and they don’t happen every day. But there they are, and they involve a complete 
re-evaluation of everything. 
4. Hegel’s dialectic is cyclic. It repeats itself. Kierkegaard’s “stages” don’t work like 
this. They don’t repeat. Therefore, Kierkegaard’s structure doesn’t map onto 
Hegel’s dialectic in any obvious way. Faith is not in any sense a “synthesis” of the 
aesthetic and the ethical. That doesn’t make a lot of sense. 
Things to ask 
Here are some questions to ask about this picture: 
1. Is it possible to live in two “stages” at once? Despite Anderson’s remarks on p. 
45, I think the answer is no. Take the aesthetic and the ethical stages, for example. 
Certainly it’s possible to do something that conforms to what you take to be your 
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ethical duties and simultaneously is what you want to do. But that’s not the point. 
The question is whether you would still do it if it weren’t what you wanted to do, 
or whether you would still do it if, on further thought, you decided that it was in 
conflict with your ethical duties after all. In other words, it’s not what you do, but 
why you do it. Similarly, you can be “ethical” all week, but then go out and 
behave very “aesthetically” (shall we say) on the weekend. But, again, this can be 
accommodated within the ethical stage; after all, we already know that guilt and 
sin are the negative features that accompany the ethical life. 
2. Why are there only three stages? Aren’t there other styles of life too? Anderson 
tries to argue (pp. 45ff.) that these three stages exhaust all the possibilities. There 
she claims one has to live either “for oneself,” “for the community” (ideally all), 
or for “God”? But I think that’s a patently flimsy argument. Why should those be 
the only alternatives? Right off the bat, there’s another obvious possibility: to live 
for one other person (other than God)—consider “love,” for instance. And we’ve 
been given no reason to think there aren’t yet other possibilities too.  
3. Do you have to be in one stage or another? Can you be in none at all, or “in 
between.” I suspect you can be, at least for short periods of time. I’m not sure 
what Anderson’s view is here. She discusses the question briefly on p. 51. There 
she seems to think being in one of these “stages” amounts to being there 
knowingly and reflectively. But why suppose that’s true? 
Criterionless choice 
This is important: There is no proof or criterion, or anything else for that matter, to push 
you inevitably from one stage to another in Kierkegaard’s “stages on life’s way.” The 
choice of what stage to live at is a choice of criteria, a choice of what you are going to 
count as important to you in making subsequent decisions: pleasure, duty, God’s 
demands—or what? 
SK’s three lifestyles are therefore three self-contained world-views, each with its own 
self-consistent set of priorities, and each one totally incommensurable with the others. It’s 
no good arguing against the aesthete that he’s being ethically immoral. From the 
aesthete’s point of view, that just doesn’t matter. He’s chosen something else to guide his 
decisions. He feels their lack—in despair. But that is not what’s decisive for him. 
Similarly, it’s no good arguing against the ethical person that his life is dry and dull. 
That’s to argue from an aesthetic point of view, which simply carries no weight for the 
ethical person. The ethical person can understand the argument, and can even perhaps 
agree that his life is comparatively dull and uninteresting. He can even miss all the fun 
the aesthete is having. But, in the end, that’s not what he lets decide things for him. 
Here’s some textual evidence that I’m not making this up, that it’s really part of the 
“standard picture”: 
Palmer, Kierkegaard for Beginners, pp. 76–77 (I quoted this earlier): 
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Kierkegaard divides humanity into three possible modes of existence: “the 
aesthetical,” “the ethical,’ and “the religious.” Each of these modes of 
existence is more than just a “stage on life’s way,” as he sometimes calls 
them, rather they are whole human worlds, complete with their own ideals, 
motivations, and forms of behavior. Each one is a complete world view. 
Any of these frames of reference can be chosen voluntarily by the 
individual  
So, if you are going to move from one stage to another, it’s not because of any decisive 
factors internal to the various lifestyles. 
You can find this claim throughout Susan Leigh Anderson’s book too. 
How then do you choose the lifestyle to live at—if you ever do? 
Well, Anderson seems to think you just look for the one that feels right to you (p. 45). 
There’s no one size fits all here. Different people will fit into different stages. There’s no 
one answer that’s right for everyone; you have to find the one that’s right for you (p. 44, 
and throughout). 
The problem with this answer is it seems to be saying that some mysterious “feeling” is 
the decisive factor. But why should feeling count? Isn’t that an aesthetic criterion? And 
isn’t the question precisely whether aesthetic criteria (or any other criteria internal to one 
or another of the “stages”) are going to be the ones that count? 
There’s another possible answer here, one that has had considerable circulation in the 
secondary literature. This is the notion that a decision of the kind we’re talking about is a  
criterionless choice. There is no place to turn; you are entirely on your own. 
Here’s some textual support that this interpretation is actually held: 
MacIntyre, Encyclopedia of Philosophy article, p. 337 (emphasis added): 
Kierkegaard buttressed his doctrine of the will with his view of the 
ultimacy of undetermined choice. He maintained that the individual 
constitutes himself as the individual he is through his choice of one mode 
of existence rather than another. 
 
The essence of the Kierkegaardian concept of choice is that it is 
criterionless. On Kierkegaard’s view, if criteria determine what I choose, 
it is not I who make the choice; hence the choice must be undetermined. 
[Otherwise, “where’s the choice”?] Suppose, however, that I do invoke 
criteria in order to make my choice. Then all that has happened is that I 
have chosen the criteria. And if in turn I try to justify my selection of 
criteria by an appeal to logically cogent considerations [for example], then 
I have in turn chosen the criteria in the light of which these considerations 
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appear logically cogent. First principles at least must be chosen without 
the aid of criteria, simply in virtue of the fact that they are first. 
Note that the kernel of what MacIntyre is saying here is not a claim about what SK 
actually thought (although MacIntyre goes on to claim that as well), but rather about the 
nature of choice. It’s really a theoretical claim, not a historical one. 
Dread or anxiety 
Such ultimate choices are things we don’t like to make. They are accompanied by a 
negative emotion called dread or anxiety. This is the later existentialists’ notion of Angst 
or anguish. (Note the title of SK’s book The Concept of Anxiety.) 
This notion of dread or anxiety is crucial. There is no proof that you are making the 
“right” choice. The choice you are making is a choice of what is going to count as the 
“right” choice for you. So dread is not fear of making the wrong choice. It is simply the 
fear of choosing, fear of our own freedom, fear of ourselves. SK compares this “anxiety” 
to a kind of ‘vertigo” or dizziness. Jean-Paul Sartre makes use of a similar metaphor. I’m 
walking along a mountain path, very close to the edge of a cliff. I pause and go right up 
the edge and peer over. And what do I feel? A certain queasy imbalance—vertigo. Now, 
since we’re telling the story, we can set the scene any way we want. Let’s suppose it’s a 
calm day, with no wind; so there’s no real danger that a sudden gust is going to puff me 
over the edge of the cliff! And let’s suppose I’m the only person on that particular part of 
the path; so there’s no worry that someone is going to jostle me over the edge! And let’s 
stipulate that the ground is solid, and that we’re in a seismically stable area, so the ledge 
isn’t likely to give way suddenly and tumble me over the edge! And yet—and yet, I feel 
vertigo. What’s going on here? What’s bothering me? 
What’s bothering me is not the possibility that I might fall over the edge, but the 
possibility that I might jump! Why would I do that? Well, no particular reason—but I 
could. What is to prevent me from doing that? Nothing at all; I could. It’s up to me. And 
that possibility, that freedom, is what I don’t like. 
I went to graduate school in Toronto. Now Toronto has a very nice subway system, 
which I often rode. And, after a while, I began to notice something. While people were 
waiting on the subway to pull into the station, they would mill about on the platform and 
often lean way over the track, to see whether the train was coming. (Never mind that if 
there really was a train coming to the station, you could feel a wave of compressed air 
long before you could see the train!) And people would do this in what had to have been 
objectively a pretty dangerous way. (There was an electric rail off the edge of the 
platform, after all!) But never mind, dangerous or not, people did it all the time. 
Until the train actually did start coming into the station! Now, understand, subway trains 
are constructed in such a way that they don’t have protrusions sticking out on the sides to 
lop off the heads of potential passengers who happen to be standing too close to the edge. 
Still, as the train was actually coming into the station, all those people who, just a 
moment ago, were making the most acrobatic contortions to peer down the subway 
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tunnel, would suddenly step back away from the train—as if now they were in a 
particular danger. 
What’s going on here? Those people were by no means in any greater objective danger 
than they were a moment earlier when they were leaning out into the tunnel. But now 
they are suddenly confronted with the possibility of leaping in front of the train! They 
step back, not to get to safety, but literally to “put a distance” between themselves and 
that terrifying possibility. That’s anxiety! 
Once, when I was teaching this course at the graduate level, a student came up to my 
after call one day and said, “Oh, I know what you’re talking about with this ‘anxiety’ 
thing.” I wasn’t sure I wanted to hear the end of the story, but he went on—and it turned 
out he had an excellent example. He and his wife were at home one evening after dinner, 
doing the dishes in a perfectly straightforward, domestic way. She was washing and he 
was drying. And, he said, “All of a sudden, there was this big knife!” Now, I hasten to 
add, nothing actually happened. But still, there was this knife, and as he put it, “You get 
strange thoughts while doing the dishes!” 
Obviously, he was confronted with the possibility of using the knife to slash his wife. 
Now, why on earth would he want to that? After all, he loved his wife very much, and as 
far as I know, they’re still happily married. But still, there was this knife, and he could do 
that! 
One final example, this time from an undergraduate, who volunteered it in class. Once, 
when he was a child, he was riding in the car with his parents, and he was in the back seat 
with the windows down. And all of a sudden he realized that he could just throw his 
teddy bear out the window. Now of course he liked his teddy bear, and didn’t want to 
lose it. But he could do that! This thought so upset the child that his parents had to stop 
the car to calm him down. 
Again, that’s anxiety. The thought of what I might do, that it’s up to me, is terrifying, and 
yet it’s also fascinating; we can’t quite let go of the thought, we toy with it. And the 
resulting anxiety tells us something deep about ourselves! 
The “standard” picture goes on to say that this is, in part, why Kierkegaard writes the way 
he does. (Anderson says this, for instance.) Kierkegaard presents you with alternatives. 
He’s not trying to persuade you that one way of life is to be chosen over another. In 
Either/Or, for instance, he doesn’t claim that the ethical stage is “better” than the 
aesthetic, or vice versa. He simply lays out both alternatives for you as fairly and as 
sympathetically as he can—but with all their features, both appealing and unappealing 
ones. And then you choose. 
This is true even if you know where Kierkegaard himself stands. Earlier, I told you that in 
Point of View, SK says that he wrote in pseudonyms with the purpose of maneuvering 
you into seeing the superiority of the religious viewpoint. But that doesn’t change 
anything. It’s still true that nothing he can say is going to convince you unless you choose 
to give it weight, to make it count as a convincing consideration. 
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All right, those are the main features of the “standard picture.” We will need to watch to 
see how many of them have to be rethought—or just plain rejected—as we get more and 
more into this. (And for that matter, it would be good also to keep an eye on how many of 
them are things I just came up with myself, and aren’t found either in SK himself or even 
in the usual secondary literature on him.) 
Other notions in Kierkegaard 
But before we start on Fear and Trembling, I want to mention a few other basic notions 
we’ll find in SK. In a way, they are part of the “standard” view, although they’re not 
especially controversial. 
Existence 
Here we need a lesson in Kierkegaardian terminology, and at the same time a mini-lesson 
in Danish grammar. 
Kierkegaard uses the word ‘existence’ (or ‘is’) in more than one way—or at least that’s 
the way it usually looks in translation. And it’s important to be aware of the various 
senses, and the various things the word might mean when you see it. 
It’s also important for another reason: Kierkegaard is rightly regarded as one of the 
earliest figures in the so called “existential” tradition. And in fact one of the senses in 
which SK uses the term ‘existence’ is the basis for the term ‘existentialism’. That is, it 
tells us what “existentialism” has to do with “existence.” 
But first a digression: 
An important study tool: The first four volumes of the Hong/Hong translation of the  
Journals and Papers (which are basically the Journals part of that collection—and 
remember that these are available online through the Library website) are not arranged 
chronologically. In fact, we often don’t know the chronology of the entries. 
Instead, they’re—quite artificially—arranged alphabetically by broad topic. For instance, 
vol. 1 contains entries under topics beginning with ‘A’ through ‘E’. Thus, we have 
Journal entries dealing with “Abstract, Abstraction,” “Absurd,” “Action,” and so on. 
This is obviously messy, but that’s the way the Hongs do it. And these volumes come 
with tables in the back, correlating the various entries in the Hong/Hong Journals and 
Papers with their location in the original Danish editions. 
But also, there are notes and commentary at the end of each volume, divided and 
arranged according to the topic headings in that particular volume. 
Now—and here is the point—at the beginning of the various sections of notes and 
commentary in these volumes, there is a little discussion of the term or terms for that 
heading. Thus, in vol. 1, on p. 497, we begin with a “commentary”—really just a 
paragraph—discussing what SK means by ‘abstract’ or ‘abstraction’. 
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These little discussions are sometimes totally useless, but often they tell you things you 
want to know. It’s good to be aware of this in doing your reading and study for your 
papers. 
The point of this little digression is this: In vol. 1 of the Journals and Papers, there are 
two such “commentary” entries at the back that are relevant to what I want to talk about 
now. One is an entry for ‘being’, and the other is an entry for ‘exist, existence, 
existential’. 
Now what is going on here involves two different Danish verbs (and their corresponding 
verb forms), plus a third verb (and its corresponding forms) that is really not Danish at 
all, but is just a Latin verb that SK imports and uses as though it were Danish. (The same 
thing had happened in German earlier.) 
(1) But let’s start with the two common or ordinary Danish verbs. One of them is 
‘være’ = ‘to be’, the infinitive. In the present tense, the forms are ‘er’. Thus ‘jeg er’ = “I 
am.” 
(2) The other is the same verb plus a preposition that goes with it: ‘være til’ = ‘to 
exist’. (‘Jeg er til’ = “I exist.”) When you make a noun out of it, you get ‘tilværelse’ = 
“existence.” (The German equivalent is ‘Dasein.’) 
Thus: 
To be/is  være/er;  (Værelse), Væren 
To exist/exists  være til/er til;  Tilværelse, Tilværen 
(By rights, there ought to be a corresponding noun ‘værelse’ going with ‘være’ = “being,” 
in the sense of what things that are do. But in modern Danish, and in Kierkegaard’s 
Danish too, that word means something else—a “room” or an “apartment.” So let’s not 
worry about that word. There is also an alternative form ‘væren’ = “being” which 
Kierkegaard does use.) 
What’s the difference between these two word-clusters? Well, the preposition ‘til’ in 
Danish means “to”—or, as a conjunction, it means “until.”  And in both cases, it connotes
—or can connote—time. 
So, to talk about ‘tilværelse’, to say of something that it ‘er til,’ is to say that exists in 
time, it endures. To say of something merely that it ‘er’ doesn’t suggest that connection 
with time. (It doesn’t rule it out either, I suppose, but it certainly doesn’t require it.) 
Furthermore, to say of something that it ‘er til’ sometimes means not just that it exists in 
time, that it endures—but that it is itself a process, and should be thought of in dynamic 
rather than static terms. 
This should remind you of what we were talking about earlier in terms of Hegel. For 
Hegel, the Absolute is to be thought of, recall, as a kind of dynamic process, in organic 
terms. It changes and develops; it doesn’t just sit there. 
So a Danish Hegelian could well say that the Absolute “er til.” 
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Kierkegaard will say that human beings “er til”—they develop and change, they are not 
static things. In fact, you might almost say that Kierkegaard thinks of human beings as 
processes rather than as things. 
By contrast, for Kierkegaard, abstractions or abstract essences don’t develop and exist in 
time in this way. They don’t “er til”; they only “er.” (They don’t exist; they are.) 
So too—and get this—God doesn’t “exist”; he “is.” He’s not a process, an event; he’s 
eternal. (SK disagrees with Hegel over this.) 
Later on, we’ll see SK talking about the relation between time and eternity. When that 
happens, you should keep this terminology in mind. Eternal things cannot be described 
by saying they “er til”; rather they just “er.” 
By contrast, “er” isn’t usually confined to things in time. You can talk about temporal 
things by saying they “er,” but you can’t talk about non-temporal things by saying they 
“er til.” 
Hegel, by moving God down into this world—by saying that human nature and the divine 
nature are really the same nature—in effect took God out of eternity and put him squarely 
into time. 
If you know your theology, you might very well ask “Isn’t that exactly what the doctrine 
of the Incarnation does—bring God down from eternity into time?” Well, yes, that’s part 
of what Hegel thought he was doing, and why he thought his own philosophy gave a kind 
of rational account of traditional Christian dogmas. 
We’ll need to watch what happens to this move with Kierkegaard. 
OK, I said there were three Danish verbs we needed to deal with. We’ve got two of them, 
but what about the third? 
(3) Well, the third verb is ‘existere’ (modern spelling = ‘eksistere’). 
This word does occur in Danish, but it’s a fancy word, and is obviously taken over more 
or less intact from Latin. (The same thing happens in the German Romantic tradition as 
well.) And the word does have the ‘-e’ on the end of it, which fits the normal pattern of 
Danish verbal infinitive endings. But really, it comes from Latin, and just means “to 
exist.” 
So we have two words in Danish that are translated into English as “exist”—‘være til’ or 
‘er til’ and ‘existere’. What’s the difference? 
Well, in Latin, ‘existere’ = ex +sistere = “to stand out,” to “emerge.” The original idea 
was “standing out” against the backdrop of non-being, or something like that. But for SK, 
it refers to the person who stands out from the general mass of people by choosing how to 
live, by consciously and deliberately adopting one or another of the “stages on life’s 
way”—making a criterionless choice. 
So, using ‘existere’ now, not everything exists. Not even everything in time exists. Only 
human beings do. And not even all of them. 
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After all, most people perhaps never stop to make any kind of conscious decision about 
how to live their lives. They just unreflectively “go with the flow,” and carry on in 
whatever “lifestyle” they start off in. 
For SK, such people don’t exist in the sense of ‘existere’, although of course they do exist 
in the sense of ‘være til’. 
Furthermore, as we’ll see, for SK, at anything beyond the most superficial level, simply 
deciding to live a certain way is not the end of the matter. You have to work at it; you 
have to achieve it. 
So one way of putting it is that the “existing (existerende) individual” is the striving 
individual, someone who’s consciously and deliberately trying to become a certain kind 
of person. 
This is the sense of “existence” that is behind the term ‘existentialism’. In later 
existentialists, this notion re-emerges in the notion of authenticity, deciding for yourself, 
not just getting caught up in the flow. 
Unfortunately, the Hongs in their translations are not entirely consistent in rendering this 
vocabulary. Where it matters, they pretty faithfully distinguish between being and 
existence—that is, between forms of ‘være’ and forms of ‘være til’ or ‘existere’. What 
they conspicuously do not do is to distinguish regularly between forms of ‘vare til’ and 
forms of ‘existere’. These are both routinely translated as “exist,” even though they don’t 
mean the same thing. Sometimes the Hongs will insert the Danish in parentheses to warn 
you, but not always. This seems to me to be a major failing of their translations (and of 
most of the others I’ve seen as well). 
Truth 
SK is famous for coming up with a peculiar notion of “truth as subjectivity.”  This is a 
large part of the point of the passage I’ve asked you read already from Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript in the Bretall volume (pp. 207–31). Let’s see what we can make 
of it. 
SK distinguishes at least three different senses of ‘truth’. 
(1) “Eternal” truth. This basically means God, or at any rate the “divine.” Sometimes this 
is also called “essential” truth, although that term may in fact be broader. 
(2) “Objective” truth. This is the normal notion of truth, as a kind of correspondence 
between our thoughts or claims and the facts, reality. This sense of truth goes back at 
least to Aristotle, who said “To say of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not is 
true.” 
SK is perfectly happy to accept this kind of truth, to grant there really is such a thing and 
even that in some cases we can know what it us—that is, what is true in this sense. But 
he’s just not very interested in this kind of truth. 
E.g., Bretall, p. 215: 
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In the case of a mathematical proposition the objectivity is given, but for 
this reason the truth of such a proposition is also an indifferent truth. 
(3) The interesting kind of “truth” for SK is what he calls “subjective” truth, or “truth as 
subjectivity.” And what is that? 
Well, as SK tells us (Bretall, p. 213), when we’re talking about “objective” truth, the 
emphasis is on what is said, but when we’re talking about “subjective” truth, the 
emphasis is on how it is said, and not at all on what is said. 
In other words, objective truth is a matter of matching up our beliefs or claims with 
reality. It is a relational notion—and if the relation between my thoughts or claims and 
the external facts is a “match up” relation, then we say our thoughts or claims are true, 
and if they’re not, then we say they’re false. And if we aren’t really sure whether we’ve 
got this match up relation or not, then we just have to say we don’t know whether we’ve 
got the truth or not. 
For subjective truth, on the other hand, the point is not so much a matter of matching up 
with external facts. It’s mainly a matter of my own subjective state of mind. In a sense, 
subjective truth has nothing at all to do with whether what you are saying or believing is 
objectively true in the “correspondence” sense. It’s possible, for instance, to hold in 
subjective truth something that’s just downright false in the objective sense. 
Well, what then counts as “truth” in this “subjective” sense? Here is how he defines it 
(Bretall, p. 214): 
An objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation process of the most 
passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth attainable for an 
existing (existerende) individual. 
This is a famous definition, and you should get it down. But what does that mean? 
Let’s break it down part by part: 
appropriation process = grab and hold on. To “appropriate” it, make it your own. 
So we’re talking about a truth that is “true for you.” (Recall the passage from the 
Journals about what is “true for me.”). 
most passionate inwardness = it’s something important to you, not something 
indifferent or trivial like one of those mathematical truths considered as a point of 
pure curiosity. “Inwardness” of course refers to the subjective state, the fact that 
this kind of truth is an internal matter, and has nothing especially to do with how 
things turn out in external fact. 
But the crucial part of the definition is: 
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objective uncertainty = i. e., “truth” in this sense is going to have to deal with 
something that isn’t objectively certain or obvious, with something that can’t be 
proved. 
In effect, SK is saying he’s just not interested in what you can prove. The only kind of 
“truth” he’s interested in is about things you can’t prove. 
(Anderson makes a big deal out of this. And she’s right to do so! It’s a very troubling 
notion! Anything goes? It doesn’t matter what you believe as long as you can’t prove it?) 
Why is SK interested in this? In the case of an “objective certainty” that you can prove, 
you don’t have to exert any energy of your own to believe it; you just passively observe 
the evidence. But in the case of an “objective uncertainty,” the energy has to come from 
you. You have to work at it, decide to believe it. 
Think of people who are obviously trying to persuade themselves of something. They’re 
working very hard at it, sometimes to the extent of refusing to listen to contrary evidence! 
The kind of truth SK is talking about, then, “subjective” truth, always involves a risk. The 
more risk there is, the more energy you have to put out to believe it—and the more 
“subjective” you are, the more you have to do with it. 
Note: We’re talking about the “most passionate inwardness”—something that is 
unqualifiedly, infinitely important to you, like one of those three ultimate stages or 
lifestyles. Now look what SK says (Bretall, pp. 214–15). In such a case, he says: 
 the subject [i.e., the person] merely has, objectively, the uncertainty; but it is 
this which precisely increases the tension of that infinite passion which constitutes 
the inwardness. The truth [i.e., the subjective truth] is precisely the venture which 
chooses an objective uncertainty with the passion of the infinite. I contemplate 
nature in the hope of finding God, and I see omnipotence and wisdom [this is the 
so called “argument from design”]; but I also see much else that disturbs my mind 
and excites anxiety. [He’s talking here about the “problem of evil.”] The sum of 
all this is an objective uncertainty. But it is for this very reason that the 
inwardness becomes as intense as it is, for it embraces this objective uncertainty 
with the entire passion of the infinite. 
(Then he goes on to make the remark I’ve already quoted about mathematics, which is 
objectively certain and therefore “indifferent” as far as SK is concerned.) 
Now this, SK says, amounts to a kind of “faith.” Bretall, p. 215: 
But the above definition of truth is an equivalent definition for faith. 
But be careful. This is not the full-blown notion of “faith” SK is aiming at. It’s the kind 
of “faith” that was available to Socrates, who was a very impressive and noble character 
but was after all still a pagan. This will turn out to be what later on, in Postscript, SK 
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calls “Religion A,” as opposed to “Religion B”—which is the really high octane kind of 
faith. 
Now (Bretall, pp. 215–20) we get a discussion of Socrates, not all of which I understand
—particularly where it starts talking about “sin.” But here are some important highlights 
of it. 
The paradox 
One crucial notion to come out is what SK calls “paradox.” For SK, ‘paradox’ doesn’t 
just mean the “surprising”; it means the contradictory. Not necessarily what’s logically 
contradictory, but the incommensurable, a juxtaposition of opposites. For example—and 
this is really the only kind of example he has in mind throughout this entire passage: the 
juxtaposition of the eternal with the temporal, or of the finite with the infinite, what is not 
at all subject to time with what is irreducibly subject to time. 
In particular, a juxtaposition of the divine with human beings. 
For example, when human beings make the reality of God [notice how I do not say 
“existence,” which is a restricted term for SK], which cannot help but be objectively 
uncertain, a matter of absolutely infinite importance to them, that is paradoxical. The 
uncertainty is completely incommensurable with the infinite “passion” of such a 
commitment; it in no way warrants such an infinite commitment, and would in fact 
warrant only a tentative hypothesis at best. 
So someone who believes in God with infinite passion is in a paradoxical situation in this 
sense. Look at Bretall, p. 216: 
The eternal and essential truth [recall, that’s God], the truth which has an essential 
relationship to an existing individual because it pertains essentially to existence 
[whatever that means]  is a paradox. But the eternal essential truth is by no 
means itself a paradox; it becomes paradoxical by virtue of its relationship to an 
existing individual. 
That’s the mismatch—a double mismatch: simultaneously the mismatch between the 
eternal and the temporal and the mismatch between the objective uncertainty and the 
infinitely passionate commitment. 
This is the kind of “faith” Socrates had, SK says. 
But things get more complicated. Let me do a little “reading” (with commentary) from 
SK himself (Bretall, p. 219—skipping some material): 
When the eternal truth [= God] is related to an existing individual, it becomes a 
paradox [as we’ve seen]  But since the paradox [= that is, here, God] is not in 
the first instance itself paradoxical (but only in its relationship to the existing 
individual [as we have seen]), it does not repel with a sufficient intensive 
inwardness.  [But] [w]hen the paradox is paradoxical in itself, it repels the 
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individual by virtue of its absurdity [not just a paradox this time, but an 
absurdity], and the corresponding passion of inwardness is faith [in the stronger 
sense of “Religion B”—contrast the sense of “faith” we got in the earlier passage 
I quoted from p. 215]. 
In other words, first of all there’s an infinite contrast between the objective uncertainty of 
God’s existence and my infinite, unqualified commitment to it nevertheless. That contrast 
SK calls a “paradox.” But there’s nothing “paradoxical” about the reality of God all by 
itself—only if I believe it, and only if I believe it with this totally outlandish commitment 
that’s completely incommensurable with the limited evidence. 
But if what I believe is paradoxical all by itself (and not just in relation to my 
commitment to it), then we have what SK calls the “absurd,” and not just a “paradox.” 
Now remember the kind of “paradox” we said was the only kind SK was interested in? 
Bretall, p. 218: 
The paradox emerges when the eternal truth [= God] and existence [= human 
beings and the human, temporal perspective] are placed in juxtaposition with one 
another. 
Therefore, the “absurd” arises when what we have is not just a paradoxical relation 
between my infinite commitment and the uncertainty of what I’m committed to, but an 
infinite commitment to something that’s already paradoxical all by itself—that all by 
itself combines God and the human. 
And what fundamental Christian doctrine can you think of that all by itself, whether you 
believe it or not, is a doctrine that combines the divine and the human in this way? 
Answer: The Incarnation. That’s not just paradoxical; that’s downright absurd. And it’s 
the commitment to that absurdity that marks the distinction between what SK calls 
“Religion A” and “Religion B.” 
Listen again (Bretall, pp. 219–20—repeating a little bit): 
When the paradox is paradoxical in itself [and not just in relation to our 
commitment to it], it repels the individual by virtue of its absurdity, and the 
corresponding passion of inwardness is faith [= Religion B]. 
 
When Socrates believed that there was a God, he held fast to the objective 
uncertainty with the whole passion of his inwardness, and it is precisely in this 
contradiction and in this risk, that faith [i. e., Religion A] is rooted. Now it is 
otherwise. Instead of the objective uncertainty, there is here a certainty, namely, 
that objectively it is absurd; and this absurdity, held fast in the passion of 
inwardness, is faith [in the sense of Religion B]. 
 
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What now is the absurd? The absurd is—that the eternal truth has come into being 
in time, that God has come into being, has been born, has grown up, and so forth, 
has come into being precisely like any other individual human being, quite 
indistinguishable from other individuals. 
Fear and Trembling 
Fear and Trembling is probably Kierkegaard’s most widely read work. It was published 
in 1843, along with two other works on the very same day, one called Repetition (by 
“Constantin Constantius”) and the other a set of Three Upbuilding Discourses under 
Kierkegaard’s own name. 
The book is pseudonymously authored by one “Johannes de silentio” (= John of Silence). 
The significance of the name is not clear, although one of the themes of the book (in 
Problema III) is Abraham’s “silence” about what he was up to. (I have a page on our 
Oncourse site—and a handout—following up a conjecture about the source of 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonym in one of Grimm’s fairly tales. The conjecture is reported in 
Alastair Hannay’s “Introduction” to our volume, p. 10. As far as I can tell, it’s purely 
conjectural, and I don’t see much basis for it myself.) 
The book is a prolonged meditation on the notion of faith, and what it is to have faith. It 
focuses on the story of Abraham’s aborted “sacrifice” of Isaac in Gen. 22, which you 
absolutely must familiarize yourself with if you are going to be able to deal with this 
book. (A copy of the relevant passage is posted on our Oncourse site—and again, here is 
a handout.) 
I’ve asked you to read the entire book, including Hannay’s “Introduction.” Apart from 
that “Introduction,” here is a kind of roadmap of the book as a whole: 
The book falls into two main parts, a bunch of preliminary build-up material at the 
beginning, and then three “problems” (SK for some reason uses the Greek plural 
‘problemata’)—in effect, three questions raised by the story of Abraham. Then there is a 
short “Epilogue” at the end. 
 Preliminary material: 
o Preface 
o “Attunement” (that is, a “tune-up” to get you all primed for what is 
coming up) 
o “Speech in Praise of Abraham” 
Then we finally (p. 57) get to the section called “Problemata.” But we’re not quite yet 
ready to start on them. We get one more, fairly substantial piece of “build up”:  
 “Preamble from the Heart” 
And only then (p. 83): 
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 Problema I: “Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical?” 
 Problema II: “Is there an absolute duty to God?” 
 Problema III: “Was it ethically defensible of Abraham to conceal his purpose 
from Sarah [= his wife], from Eleāzar [= his servant], from Isaac [= his son and 
“victim”]? 
And finally: 
 Epilogue 
(Notice, incidentally, that Problema III is the only one of the three that is directly 
concerned with a detail of the Genesis story. The other two are more general questions.) 
We need to be clear from the outset that some parts of this book—particular sentences, 
particular concepts, whole sections of the text—are very mysterious and hard to interpret. 
In fact, Problema III, when Johannes goes off on a “riff” about the story of “Agnete and 
the Merman,” seems to me just to fall apart. Even Hannay’s “Introduction, which in other 
respects is very helpful and clear, becomes baffling here (see pp. 26–27), as Hannay 
himself acknowledges (p. 26): 
The reader is begged to excuse the complexity of the next few lines, which 
is due as much to the subject-matter as to my poor ability to express the 
point more clearly. 
Preface 
The Hegelian background against which SK is writing is made plain already in the 
Preface to the work. Johannes de silentio makes the observation that (p. 42): 
Today nobody will stop with faith; they all go further. It would perhaps be 
rash to inquire where to, but surely a mark of urbanity and good breeding 
on my part to assume that in fact everyone does indeed have faith, 
otherwise it would be odd to talk of going further. In the old days it was 
different. For then faith was a task for a whole lifetime, not a skill thought 
to be acquired in either days or weeks. 
The talk about “going beyond faith” is a direct jab at Hegel’s view, as we have seen, that 
religious concepts that operate on the level of intuition and feeling (“faith”) can be made 
conceptually understandable in philosophy. In particular, Hegel claimed that “the 
substance” of the Christian religion and of his own philosophy were “the same.” In that 
sense, Hegel did not think he was abandoning religion in favor of philosophy. On the 
contrary, he maintained: 
I am a Lutheran, and through philosophy have been at once completely 
confirmed in Lutheranism. 
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It was just that, for Hegel, the essence of religion could now be expressed in two different 
languages that adopted two different cognitive forms. One language was the language of 
“feeling” and “piety” (faith). Scientific cognition, on the other hand, manifested itself in 
speculative philosophy, which sought “scientific ascertainment of religious truth.” This 
scientific cognition is comprehensible only to the few, the educated, while the language 
of faith, of “feeling” and “piety,” is open to everyone. For Hegel, the difference was one 
between knowing and merely believing. 
So in that sense the Hegelians of SK’s day thought of themselves as having gone beyond 
faith. But, SK thinks (strictly, Johannes thinks), they’re badly mistaken. Consider (pp. 
42–43): 
The present author is no philosopher, he has not understood the System, 
nor does he know if there really is one, or if it has been completed. As far 
as his own weak head is concerned the thought of what huge heads 
everyone must have in order to have such thoughts is already enough. 
Even if one were to render the whole content of faith into conceptual form, 
it would not follow that one had grasped faith, grasped how one came to it, 
or how it came to one. 
And then, almost at the very end of the Preface (43): 
No, I prostrate myself before any systematic bag-searcher; this [i.e., what 
I’m doing] is not the System, it hasn’t the slightest thing to do with the 
System. 
(In other words, he has great admiration [said ironically] for those who understand the 
Hegelian “System.” But, no matter what they say, they don’t understand what faith is.) 
Notice what Johannes is saying here. He’s not saying that the Hegelians have never 
reached the point of having faith, much less that they’ve never gone beyond it (although 
he no doubt believes that’s true). He says they haven’t “grasped faith, grasped how one 
came to it, or how it came to one.” 
And that’s what Johannes is trying to do in this book. The official point then isn’t so 
much get the reader (or Johannes himself) actually to have faith (note that Johannes 
doesn’t claim to have faith himself), but to “grasp” it, to understand what it is. The 
question of the book, then, is a cognitive one. The Hegelians, who have made faith into a 
doctrine that can be either believed in faith or known “systematically” and 
philosophically, have missed the target. That’s not what faith is. 
So, if the Hegelian attempt is the wrong way to go about trying to grasp faith, what then 
is the right way? Where are we to go if we want to come to an understanding of what 
faith is, insofar as we can? 
Well, one traditional Christian (and perhaps Jewish) response to this question is to point 
to the story of Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac. Abraham is said to be the “father of faith,” 
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and we are often told that if we really want to know what faith is all about, look to this 
story. 
Fear and Trembling as a whole, then, can be regarded as an attempt to take an 
unflinching look at the Abraham story, and to come to grips with some startling choices 
we are going to have to make about whether or not to accept the vision of faith that 
comes out of this story. As we’ll see, the vision of faith that emerges is quite contrary to 
the Hegelian version of faith. 
The story of Abraham 
OK, so what is the story of Abraham. 
Well, you know it. Abraham had an agreement going with God. In return for leaving his 
homeland and the traditional pagan ways of his culture, and for adhering to the one true 
God, God would guarantee that Abraham would become the father of a great nation of 
people, his progeny would be as numerous as the stars in the sky, as the grains of sand on 
the seashore. 
But there was a problem: Abraham had no children. At one point earlier in Genesis, 
Abraham’s wife Sarah is so concerned about this that she arranges to let Abraham sleep 
with a servant woman Hagar, and Abraham does produce a son Ishmael. But Genesis 
makes clear (Gen. 17, Gen. 21:12) that the agreement with Abraham is for a legitimate 
succession; for this purpose Ishmael doesn’t count. But Abraham was getting very old, 
and his wife Sarah was well beyond her child-bearing years. 
Nevertheless, Abraham had faith. And sure enough—wonder of wonders—eventually he 
and Sarah do have a son: Isaac. Isaac then is the fulfillment of the covenant. 
Understand the picture here: The story of the sacrifice of Isaac is not just a father-son 
story, which would be powerful enough. No, everything is at stake in Isaac—the whole 
covenant! 
Well, things seem to be in order at last. But one day, Abraham hears the voice of God. It 
tells him: Take Isaac, go up over there into the land of Moriah, and sacrifice him to me. 
Kill him! I so order! 
And Abraham doesn’t hesitate. He gets the pack animals, gathers up Isaac, and starts out 
on a journey of three days and nights—that’s a nice touch: Abraham has plenty of time to 
think about what he’s about to do—goes up into the mountains, ties up Isaac, raises the 
knife to do the deed—and at the last moment an angel comes to stay his hand and says, 
“Stop! It was all just a test.” 
This then is the story Johannes asks us to focus on to see what faith involves; this is the 
story that is the paradigm of it. 
Notice the situation Abraham is in, even though SK doesn’t actually put the matter this 
way. If God doesn’t really intend for the sacrifice to be carried out (which presumably is 
actually the case, given the outcome of the story), then God is a liar, since he deliberately 
deceived Abraham into thinking he did! If he does intend the sacrifice to be carried out, 
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then once again God is a liar, since he has this solemn covenant with Abraham—and now 
he’s canceling it! And yet Abraham puts his complete faith in this God who, he must 
realize, ends up being a liar no matter what! And Abraham has had three days and nights 
to realize this! 
The only way out is for Abraham to suppose that 
 Either God will let him kill Isaac, but then miraculously bring him back to life. 
This is the interpretation offered by Heb. 11:17–19 (see the handout with the text 
of Genesis 22), as a kind of anticipation of the Resurrection of Jesus: 
By faith Abraham, when put to the test, offered up Isaac. He who had 
received the promises was ready to offer up his only son [NB: Ishmael 
doesn’t count—it has to be a legitimate son], of whom he had been told, 
“It is through Isaac that descendants shall be named for you.” [Gen. 21:12]  
He considered the fact that God is able even to raise someone from the 
dead—and figuratively speaking, he did receive him back. 
 Or else, I suppose, God could let Abraham kill Isaac and then provide another 
legitimate son in his old age. (Note that this possibility is rejected by Heb. 11:18: 
“It is through Isaac that descendants shall be named for you.”) 
On either of these alternatives, faith ends up looking like a high-stakes, calculating poker 
game with God. Is that what it means then to have faith? On these interpretations, 
Abraham thinks he’s not really going to lose anything in the end! Faith is just a matter of 
having “nerves of steel,” of being able to “out-bluff” God! 
Situating the text 
Before going on the next section, the “Attunement,” let’s take a moment to situate Fear 
and Trembling in terms of SK’s other writings. Remember, we can’t just assume that 
Johannes de silentio’s views are Kierkegaard’s own. In fact, in the later work Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, pseudonymously “authored” by Johannes Climacus—but, please 
note, “edited” by Søren Kierkegaard—Climacus says in a footnote late in the book, 
where he’s discussing how faith cannot be detected by any external means (CUP, Hong/
Hong trans., p. 500): 
In Fear and Trembling, a “knight of faith” such as this was portrayed. But 
his portrayal was only a rash anticipation, and the illusion  was gained by 
depicting him in a state of completeness, and hence in a false medium, 
instead of an existence medium, and the beginning was made by ignoring 
the contradiction—how an observer could become at all aware of him in 
such a way that he could place himself, admiring, outside and admire that 
there is nothing, nothing whatever, to notice, unless Johannes de Silentio 
would say that the knight of faith is his own poetic production. But then 
the contradiction is there again, implicit in the duplexity that as poet and 
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observer he simultaneously relates himself to the same thing, consequently 
as poet creates a character in the medium of the imagination (for this, of 
course, is the poet-medium) and as observer observes the same poetic 
figure in the existence medium. 
That’s not exactly crystal clear, but we can at least see that here we have another of 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms (Johannes Climacus, whose work SK says he is “editing”) 
criticizing the “author” of Fear and Trembling and calling the view of faith presented 
there a “rash anticipation” and an “illusion.”So we need to be careful about attributing the 
view of faith we get in Fear and Trembling to Kierkegaard himself. 
A second complication arises from the fact that in The Point of View for My Work as an 
Author, SK lists Fear and Trembling (along with all the other pseudonymous works) 
among the so called “aesthetic” works (p. 21), and later on goes on to claim in one of his 
section titles in Point of View (§ 5—not in the selection in Bretall): 
That the whole of the aesthetic work, viewed in relation to the work [i. e., 
the authorship] as a whole, is a deception—understanding this word, 
however, in a special sense. 
This has to do with the notorious problem of SK’s “indirect communication,” which we’ll 
talk about later on. 
Finally, Johannes de silentio himself repeatedly remarks that he himself does not have 
faith; he can only recognize its glory. 
In short, there are at least three possible ways in which the picture of faith we get in Fear 
and Trembling is not SK’s own, final view: 
1. It’s the view of an “outsider”—Johannes de silentio. 
2. It’s an “aesthetic” treatment of the topic, and therefore designedly deceptive. 
3. In any case, it’s at best a “rash anticipation” of the true picture, as Climacus says. 
All this is inconclusive, of course, but it needs to be kept in mind. In any event, let’s 
move on to the next section. 
“Attunement” 
This is a section of the text (pp. 44–48) that first-time readers often find especially 
tantalizing. It’s very nuanced, beautifully written—even in translation—and just a 
knockout. But what is going on? 
What we have here is a series of four “variations” on the Abraham story, each one 
accompanied by some comparisons with the process of weaning children. The “weaning” 
metaphor I don’t know what to make of. But I do have a partial story about the four 
versions of Abraham. 
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First of all, it’s important to note that none of these alternative “versions” is the true 
version, according to Johannes de silentio; none of them is what actually took place. 
Rather, what we have here—I suggest—is a series of alternatives to the real Abraham 
story, alternatives that are close enough that we can mistake them for the real story, with 
the result that we can make Abraham’s deed comprehensible to us, make his motives 
understandable in ways such that we would not be inclined to fault him. Johannes’s 
implicit argument, I think, is that to the degree we make Abraham and his motivations 
understandable to us in these ways, we trivialize faith. 
So each of these four “Abrahams” is an imposter, not the real Abraham, who had faith. 
What are the four variations, then, and the four “trivialized” versions of faith they would 
imply? 
First version (pp. 45–46) 
In the first variation, Abraham lets Isaac know he is going to be killed, but tries to 
convince Isaac that it is really his—Abraham’s—idea, not God’s. As Abraham tells 
himself, “[I]t is after all better that he believe I am a monster than that he lose faith in 
Thee.” 
(Note: This is exactly what SK himself did with Regine Olsen after his breaking of their 
engagement. He tried to convince her that he was a scoundrel and a completely 
disreputable fellow. Why? Because he somehow got it into his head that otherwise—if 
she saw what was really going on—Regine would somehow lose faith in God. Whether 
Regine was really as unstable as that, this seems to be obviously in the back of SK’s mind 
when he is writing this first variation on the Abraham story.) 
On this first variation, what would the story of Abraham tell us about faith? Well, it 
seems: 
Faith is: 
 A willingness to do God’s bidding, even in extreme cases. 
 A willingness to cover up the truth about God, in order to protect someone else’s 
faith in him. 
So faith → a willingness to lie in order to hide the truth about God from others. Is that the 
lesson we are to draw from the story? 
Second version (p. 46) 
On this version, Abraham does things exactly as happened in fact, except that he comes 
away a broken man, fed up with God: “From that day on, Abraham became old, he could 
not forget that God had demanded this of him. Isaac throve as before; but Abraham’s eye 
was darkened, he saw joy no more.” 
So faith → doing what God tells you to do, even at the expense of your personal relation 
to God. Faith will destroy you? 
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Third version (pp. 46–47) 
This one is harder to tell a story about: 
First of all, notice that in this version of the story, Abraham goes up the mountain twice. 
The first time he goes with Isaac, and the second time he goes back alone, to think about 
what happened the first time. 
On this second occasion, Abraham recognizes that being willing to kill Isaac violates his 
ethical duty to him, and asks God to forgive his sin. He cannot see how it could be a sin 
to offer the best he had to God, and yet he cannot see how it isn’t a sin to be willing to 
sacrifice his son for any reason. 
So faith → a conflict of duties? Perhaps. (There’s no doubt a lot more in this third 
version, but this is the best I can do for now.) 
Fourth version (pp. 47–48) 
Abraham was cool and composed until he actually drew the knife, but then Isaac sees him 
shudder and loses his own faith. Abraham suspects nothing. 
Note that this is the only one of the four variations to discuss what Isaac actually thinks. 
And it’s perhaps the hardest of the four to interpret. 
What is the picture of faith we are to draw from this variation? That faith is what 
Abraham had when he drew the knife and shuddered? In that case, faith → a willingness 
to do the horrible even though it revolts you? 
Or are we to say that faith is what Isaac lost when he saw Abraham shudder? In that case, 
faith → the belief that God will make everything work out without a high price to pay? 
Or perhaps that faith depends on other people’s attitudes and reactions? I’m not sure. 
General observation 
However you work out the details of these variations on the story of Abraham, there is 
one crucial thing to note about them: 
In all of them, Abraham is actually willing to kill Isaac. And yet none of 
them is a real Abraham, the “father of faith.” Hence, whatever we are to 
make of the details, it appears that faith is more than just doing whatever 
God commands you to do—even in extreme circumstances. At least for 
Johannes de silentio, the point of the story, and the point of faith, has got 
to be more than just a willingness to obey no matter what. 
(Note: Kierkegaard drafted several versions of these preliminary variations on Abraham, 
and continued to do so even after the book was completed and published. In fact, in a 
couple of versions from much later in his life [1851 and 1853], Abraham actually kills 
Isaac. In one of them, God asks Abraham, “Didn’t you hear me tell you to stop at the last 
moment?” And Abraham says, “Yes, I did. But I knew it couldn’t be you, because you 
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told me to do it!” [I must say, Abraham has a good point here.] God gives Abraham 
another Isaac—but it isn’t the same Isaac, and Abraham is not happy. 
In another version of the story, God brings Isaac back to life. But Abraham decides it’s in 
a sense not the same Isaac, because Isaac has grown old as a result of the knowledge that 
he was picked out by God for the sacrifice! Isaac was ruined. 
The passages may be found in Journals and Papers III, pp. 361–62 [Pap. X4 A 338, n.d. 
1851] & II, p. 508–09 (Pap. X5 A 132, n.d. 1853), and in the Hong/Hong translation of 
Fear and Trembling/Repetition [KW VI], pp. 267–6, 270–71.) 
If none of these versions is the “real” Abraham, what more is involved? Well, let’s see is 
we can find out. 
Speech in praise of Abraham (pp. 49–56) 
The next section of the text is a “Speech in Praise of Abraham.” By and large, we don’t 
have to spend a lot of time on this. It is mainly a kind of prolonged, lyrical rhapsodizing 
about Abraham, coupled with a highly dramatic telling of the story of Abraham’s 
sacrifice—which I’ve already told you. 
But there are a few things to be said about this passage: 
1. Johannes de silentio is clearly trying to get us—both here and in other parts of the 
text—to put ourselves in Abraham’s place, to try to ask what it must have been 
like for Abraham. 
In other words, let’s not soften the story by rushing to explain what it means in abstract 
terms—“obedience to God,” “sacrificing the best one has,” etc. Those considerations are 
all correct as far as they go, but they miss something essential—the “pathos,” the 
“passion.” 
And this is what Johannes finds so astonishing and difficult about the story. It’s not so 
much that there is a conceptual problem about the story (although there is no doubt some 
of that as well); it’s rather how can he do that! 
Suppose you’re told about someone who rubbed his eyeballs out with a piece of coarse 
sandpaper—slowly, while pouring salt on all the time. There’s no special conceptual 
problem about doing that; you just take a piece of sandpaper and a salt-shaker and go to 
work. But the problem is: How could he do that! 
2. There’s at least one other thing to notice about this Speech. Johannes says (pp. 
53–54) that Abraham had faith for this life. That is, his hopes, his confidence, his 
faith—in fact, the whole Covenant he had with God—was all about this world, 
not about how “it will all work out for the best in eternity.” As Johannes says (p. 
54—emphasis added): 
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But it was for this life that Abraham believed, he believed he would 
become old in his land, honoured among his people, blessed in his 
kin, eternally remembered in Isaac [that is, he would be remembered 
in this world even after his own death], 
Keep that focus on this world in mind. 
Preamble from the heart 
First of all, notice something about the structure of Fear and Trembling. The full title is 
Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric. Now I remarked earlier on how we get we first 
get all this preliminary material: 
 The Preface 
 The “Attunement” 
 “Speech in Praise of Abraham” 
And only then we come to the section called “Problemata.” The first part of that section 
is entitled “Preamble from the Heart,” and then finally we get a discussion the three 
problems. 
I want to suggest—and it is only a suggestion—that the phrase “Dialectical Lyric” 
reflects the two main divisions of the book: 
(1) The first part, the “buildup” material,” is the lyrical part. That doesn’t mean it’s 
poetry, or that it is to be judged only on the basis of its literary merits (which are pretty 
strong).  But it is true that these qualities are especially on display in this first part of the 
book. 
(2) The second part, the “Problemata” section, is the dialectical part. That is, it is the 
more theoretical part. We can already begin to see this in the “Preamble from the Heart,” 
where we get the discussion of the important notions of the Knight of Infinite Resignation 
and the Knight of Faith, and where we begin to get some actual theory and not just 
rhapsodizing over how great Abraham is and how no one can understand him! We 
certainly don’t abandon the high-powered rhetorical flourishes of the build-up material, 
but we do get more theory. 
As partial confirmation of this hypothesis about the significance of the phrase 
“Dialectical Lyric,” I call your attention to the very last paragraph of the “Preamble from 
the Heart” (p. 82): 
What I intend now is to extract from the story of Abraham its dialectical 
element, in the form of problemata, in order to see how monstrous a 
paradox faith is, a paradox capable of making a murder into a holy act 
well pleasing to God, a paradox which gives Isaac back to Abraham, 
which no thought can grasp because faith begins precisely where thinking 
leaves off. 
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(That last part is a jab at Hegel, for whom thought—philosophy—went beyond faith.) 
All right, now what goes on in the “Preamble”? 
Offering the best you have 
At first it looks as if we’re simply going to get more of the same—more lyricism. For 
instance (p. 58): 
Now the story of Abraham has the remarkable quality that it will always 
be glorious no matter how impoverished our understanding of it, but only
—for it is true here too—if we are willing to ‘labour and be heavy laden’. 
But labour they will not, and yet they still want to understand the story. 
But what’s he talking about? He’s saying, in effect, people (“they”) want to talk about 
Abraham, they want to praise him, glorify him. But they want to do it on the cheap. That 
is, instead of facing up to the full significance of the story, what they do is water it down 
and then praise that! He goes on (p. 58): 
One speaks in Abraham’s honour, but how? By making it a commonplace. 
For example, they look at the story of Abraham, and interpret it like this (p. 58): 
his greatness was that he so loved God that he was willing to offer him the 
best he had. 
Note: We’ve seen that phrase before. Recall, back in “Attunement,” Variation III, 
Abraham could not see how it was a sin to offer the best he had to God, although how 
could it not be a sin to be willing to sacrifice his son? But again, the variations we get in 
the “Attunement” are not the way the story actually happened; all those versions of 
“Abraham” fall short of the real Abraham. 
The same phrase comes up back in the “Speech in Praise of Abraham” (in the “lyrical” 
part, earlier in the book than the “Preamble,” which is where we are now), where 
Johannes suggests what might have happened if Abraham had doubted (p. 54)—NB 
another false Abraham: 
He would have marched out to the mountain in Moriah, chopped the 
firewood, set light to the fire, drawn the knife— 
And then, Johannes suggests, instead of sacrificing Isaac, he would have killed himself! 
(p. 54): 
[H]e would have cried out to God: ‘Do not scorn this sacrifice [i.e., me], it 
is not the best I possess [there’s the phrase again], that I well know; for 
what is an old man compared with the child of promise, but it is the best I 
can give. Let Isaac never come to know [recall Variation I], that he may 
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comfort himself in his young years.’ He [= Abraham] would have thrust 
the knife into his own breast. He would have been admired in the world 
and his name never forgotten; but it is one thing to be admired, another to 
be a guiding star that saves the anguished. 
Remember how in “Attunement” Version III, Abraham couldn’t understand how it could 
be a sin to offer God the best he had. But here in the “Speech in Praise of Abraham”—
we’re still not in the “Preamble”—the doubting Abraham (a fiction) certainly does 
understand how it can be a sin, and that’s exactly why he can’t go through with it: It’s a 
sin because it’s not just the best he had—it’s Isaac, his own son, whom he loves! 
And that’s basically what Johannes brings out here in the “Preamble.” It’s all very good 
to say Abraham was willing to offer the best he had. As far as it goes, that’s true enough. 
But it leaves out the important part, Johannes says; it leaves out the anguish (p. 58). 
(Note: The word ‘anguish’ here is ‘Angest’, otherwise translated as ‘dread’ or ‘anxiety’. 
But the word does not seem to be used here in the sense of making a criterionless choice 
[recall the “standard interpretation”], or in the sense in which we find it in The Concept of 
Anxiety. At least not obviously so. Here it seems to mean “anguish” in the more ordinary 
sense of the word.) 
It was exactly the anguish, in this sense, that was the reason the doubting Abraham of the 
“Speech” couldn’t go through with the sacrifice of Isaac. And here in the “Preamble,” it’s 
exactly the anguish that people tacitly leave out when they conveniently slide from 
talking about Abraham’s sacrificing Isaac, whom he loves, to talking about his sacrificing 
the best he has. 
In the Gospel, Christ meets a rich young man who wants to know what he has to do to be 
saved, and Christ tells him to sell all he has and give it to the poor (Matt. 19:16 ff.). 
Johannes tells us (p. 58): 
Yet he would not have become an Abraham even had he given away the 
best he had. What is left out of the Abraham story [by comparing him to 
the young man] is the anguish; for while I am under no obligation to 
money, to a son the father has the highest and most sacred of obligations. 
Yet anguish is a dangerous affair for the squeamish, so people forget it, 
notwithstanding they want to talk about Abraham. 
Well, fair enough. Leaving the story at the level of “offering the best you have” omits the 
anguish. But what does it add if we do take account of the anguish? Does that somehow 
make everything OK? Is it OK to kill your son, whom you love, as long as you’re 
anguished over it? Surely that can’t be what Johannes is suggesting! 
The “special case” interpretation 
And yet Johannes praises Abraham. Why? He goes on (p. 60): 
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Is it because Abraham has acquired proprietary rights to the title of great 
man, so that whatever he does is great, and if anyone else does the same it 
is a sin, a crying sin? 
In other words, is Abraham some kind of “special case”? No, he says (p. 60): 
If so, I have no wish to take part in such mindless praise. 
And now we get an important passage (p. 60): 
If faith cannot make it into a holy deed to murder one’s own son, then let 
the judgement fall on Abraham as on anyone else. If one hasn’t the 
courage to think this thought through, to say that Abraham was a 
murderer, then surely it is better to acquire that courage than to waste time 
on undeserved speeches in his praise. [Note: That’s exactly what Johannes 
himself gave just a few pages earlier, although perhaps that one wasn’t 
“undeserved.”] The ethical expression for what Abraham did is that he 
was willing to murder Isaac; the religious expression is that he was willing 
to sacrifice Isaac. 
Notice the phrase ‘the courage to think this thought through’. This, I’m convinced, is one 
of the key notions to get in Kierkegaard. In some of his later writings, SK says quite 
explicitly, “I don’t claim to have faith; but what I do claim to have is the courage to think 
through what it means to have faith, not to shy away from it—the courage to think the 
thought whole.” And even in Fear and Trembling, at the beginning of the very next 
paragraph, Johannes says, “For my own part I don’t lack the courage to think a thought 
whole” (p. 60). 
In this case, the “thought” we’re talking about is that Abraham is a murderer—or at least 
an attempted murderer. How then can we praise him? As Johannes says, it only works if 
faith can “make it into a holy deed to murder one’s own son.” 
Notice what he’s saying. Faith doesn’t make it not murder. It’s still murder; it just calls 
that murder (or willingness to murder) a holy deed. As he says, the ethical expression for 
it is that he was willing to murder Isaac; the religious expression is that he was willing to 
sacrifice Isaac. 
This is a little like the Hegelian notion of the same thing’s being described by the 
language of “feeling” and “piety” vs. by the language of “philosophy.” But now the 
tables are turned. Rather than philosophy’s making it philosophically intelligible why we 
want to praise Abraham in the language of feeling and piety, instead it makes it 
unintelligible how we can praise Abraham without leaving something out! 
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The “context of his times” 
But maybe you don’t think that ethically it was really murder. We need to take the 
Abraham story in context. Thus (p. 60): 
Or perhaps Abraham simply didn’t do what the story says, perhaps in the 
context of his times what he did was something quite different. 
That is, we sometimes hear, “human sacrifice wasn’t so unusual in the ancient world” 
(which is probably false), or something like that. But in that case, Johannes says (p. 60): 
Then let’s forget him, for why bother remembering a past that cannot be 
made into a present? 
The “knights” 
What do we get out of this so far?  The suggestion is that if we look at the Abraham story 
ethically and philosophically, he doesn’t come off looking like a glorious character at all. 
He’s an out and out  murderer, or at least someone you ought to take into custody for the 
sake of public safety. 
Obviously, if we’re going to praise Abraham, we need to say a lot more. 
In any case, let’s go ahead and look at two other notions that come up in the “Preamble 
from the Heart”:  the Knight of Infinite Resignation and the Knight of Faith. 
The “Knight of Infinite Resignation” first comes up on p. 67, although the phrase ‘infinite 
resignation’ is used on p. 66. 
What are these two figures? Well, whatever else we can say about them: 
 The Knight of Faith has faith, whereas the Knight of Infinite Resignation doesn’t; 
he doesn’t get that far. Therefore, we can use this discussion to illustrate what 
“faith” means in this book. 
 In Fear and Trembling we get the important claim that the Knight of Infinite 
Resignation is the last stage before faith, that you can’t be a Knight of Faith 
unless you’ve already been a Knight of Infinite Resignation (75). 
Does this mean you can’t have faith without being a Knight of Infinite 
Resignation first? (Yes, it seems so.) Or, can you have faith without being 
a Knight of Faith? (No, apparently not.) 
In other words, does faith amount to being a Knight of Faith, and does 
faith require that you have been a knight if infinite resignation? 
In the “Preamble from the Heart,” the discussions of the two “Knights” takes place on 
two levels simultaneously: (a) an “aesthetic,” literary description (the young man who 
loves a fair princess, etc.); (b) a more “structural,” conceptual description. 
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Let’s look at the structural description first, and let’s start with the Knight of Infinite 
Resignation. 
The “structure” of the knight of infinite resignation (p. 72) 
The Knight of Infinite Resignation does three things (72): 
1. “For the knight will then, in the first place, have the strength to concentrate the 
whole of his life’s content and the meaning of reality in a single wish.” 
This is what is “infinite” about the situation. There is nothing that counts more for this 
person—it trumps everything else. (Don’t think of mathematics when you hear SK 
talking about “infinity.” And don’t use ‘infinity’ as a mere excuse to start “speaking in 
tongues,” to roll your eyes, sway back and forth and say anything you want. No, 
whatever ‘infinity’ means in Kierkegaard—and it perhaps doesn’t always mean the same 
thing—it isn’t being used as just a “mumbo-jumbo” term.) 
Note: This “single wish” sounds at first like “purity of heart is to will one thing.” But I 
don’t think that’s necessarily what’s going on here. Certainly the young man who loves 
the fair princess is not “willing one thing” in the sense SK is talking about in the 
Upbuilding Discourse by that title. 
Then (72): 
2. “Secondly, the knight will have the strength to concentrate the whole of the result 
of his reflection into one act of consciousness.” 
What is this “whole of the result of his reflection”? Well, I think he’s talking about a very 
particular reflection we’ve been told about on the previous pages. On pp. 70–71 we get 
the example of the young man and the princess: 
A young lad falls in love with a princess, the content of his whole life lies 
in this love [that’s the first ingredient above], and yet the relationship is 
one that cannot possibly be brought to fruition, be translated from ideality 
into reality. 
And then, in a footnote (p. 71), Johannes observes that “any other interest whatever in 
which an individual concentrates the whole of life’s reality can, when it proves 
unrealizable” do just as well. (Note once again: This is not what SK means when he’s 
talking about “purity of heart.”) 
But then a little later on p. 71, we read: 
He reflects over his life’s circumstances, he summons the swift thoughts 
that like trained doves obey his every signal, he waves his rod over them, 
and they rush off in all directions. [Note: the implicit reference to the story 
of Noah after the Flood, when he sent out some doves to see whether they 
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came back. If they did not, that meant there was dry land someplace.] But 
now when they all return as messengers of sorrow and explain to him that 
it is an impossibility [i.e., there is no dry land], he dismisses them, he 
remains alone, and he performs the movement [that is, he makes the 
“infinite resignation”]. 
I think this is the “reflection” Johannes has in mind when says on p. 72 that the Knight 
concentrates the whole of the result of his reflection into one act of consciousness. In 
short, he focuses on the impossibility of his life’s most important goal. 
Notice here that, if our description of the ethical “sphere” is correct, then anyone who 
seriously lives the ethical life and thinks about it is going to fit these first two 
requirements. Ethical standards—which are “the whole of his life’s content and the 
meaning of reality” in that “sphere”—are ideal and “out of reach”; we will inevitably fall 
short. 
But let’s go on. What does the Knight do in this situation? This is perhaps the puzzling 
part (p. 72): 
3. “So the knight makes the movement, but what movement?  Does he want to 
forget the whole thing?” 
Certainly not, Johannes says. Does the Knight say, “Well, if I can’t get what I’m after, 
then I guess I’d better change my goals and go after something more realistic instead”? 
No. The Knight is not some fickle opportunist; this goal is the most important thing in his 
entire life, after all. He’s not just going to pretend he doesn’t want it any more. 
So, Johannes says, the Knight doesn’t just “forget the whole thing.” Rather, Johannes 
says (p. 72): 
 the knight will remember everything; but the memory is precisely the 
pain, and yet in his infinite resignation he is reconciled with existence. 
What does that mean? Well, it means the Knight doesn’t stop trying to achieve his goal 
(doesn’t “forget the whole thing”), and yet he knows good and well he’s going to fail. He 
resolves, in other words, simply to put up with this situation (he’s “reconciled with 
existence”). In short, he’s willing to live a life of infinite frustration rather than 
a) be so cheap as to abandon what counts infinitely to him (in short, he preserves the 
first ingredient above); and rather than 
b) engage in a kind of self-deception in which he deludes himself into thinking that 
perhaps there is some chance of success after all (in short, he preserves the second 
ingredient above). 
Once again, perhaps it’s the case that anyone who is a clear-headed ethical person is 
going to fit this description, and will therefore be a Knight of Infinite Resignation. 
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(Compare Kant on “regulative ideals.”) But you don’t get that sense from what Johannes 
is saying here. Here it seems that the Knight of Infinite Resignation is supposed to be 
relatively rare. 
The “aesthetics” of the knight of infinite resignation 
I’ve said a little about what state of mind the Knight of Infinite Resignation is in, how he 
is resolved to put up with a life of infinite frustration. But let’s see if we can’t get a little 
better feel for what it’s like. 
And here let’s return to our figure of the young man who loves a fair princess (pp. 70–
71). He realizes he can’t possibly marry her, not realistically, and so he “makes the 
movement”? What happens, exactly? Well (p. 72): 
His love for the princess would take on for him the expression of an 
eternal love, would acquire a religious character, be transfigured into a 
love for the eternal being which, although it denied fulfillment, still 
reconciled him once more in the eternal consciousness of his love’s 
validity in an eternal form that no reality can take from him. 
He goes on to say (p. 73): 
He pays no further finite attention to what the princess does, and just this 
proves that he has made the movement infinitely  [Again,] [w]hat the 
princess does cannot disturb him. 
What does this mean? Well, some commentators—e.g., John Lippitt, Routledge 
Philosophy Guidebook to Kierkegaard and Fear and Trembling,(London and New York: 
Routledge, 2003), pp. 46ff.—notice the talk about “a religious character” and “the eternal 
being,” and think Johannes is talking about God. In that case, once the Knight “makes the 
movement,” his love for the princess is somehow mysteriously turned into a love of God. 
In my view, the problem with this interpretation is that it seems utterly implausible. 
Granted, the frustrated Knight could, I suppose, console himself by joining a monastery 
or becoming a mystic. But this sounds to me like exactly what the Knight doesn’t do; 
remember that the Knight doesn’t stop loving the princess, doesn’t change his goal. 
I suggest that what Johannes has in mind here is not so much taking refuge in religion as 
a kind of eternalizing of his love for the princess. It’s no longer a matter of constant 
adjustments to the circumstances of daily life; it becomes a matter of principle—in a 
sense frozen. He’s going to love the princess no matter what she does. In a sense, as 
Johannes says, his love takes on a religious character, but I don’t think that means it has 
anything especially to do with God. 
Now notice what Johannes says happens here. Once the Knight’s love is “transfigured” 
into “a love for the eternal being”—that is, a love for an eternal version of the princess—
the Knight is reconciled “once more in the eternal consciousness of his love’s validity in 
 67
an eternal form that no reality can take from him” (p. 72). That is, this so called 
“transfigured” love is guaranteed not to fail. The Knight doesn’t succeed in actually 
winning the princess in this life, but he does win a kind principled dignity or honor. 
That’s why Johannes described him as so “other worldly”—Knights of Infinite 
Resignation are “strangers in the world” (p. 70). 
My point is that this is exactly what Abraham does not do! Abraham, we know, “had 
faith for this life” (p. 53), not in some eternal realm; his faith was not “other worldly.” 
The “structure” of the knight of faith 
OK, now let’s talk about the Knight of Faith. Structurally, the Knight of Faith does 
everything the Knight of Infinite Resignation does, but he does one thing more. 
The fact that the Knight of Faith does everything the Knight of Infinite Resignation does 
means you cannot be a Knight of Faith without being a Knight of Infinite Resignation 
first. Thus (p. 75): 
Infinite resignation is the last stage before faith, so that anyone who has 
not made this movement does not have faith. 
But what’s the extra thing the Knight of Faith does? Well, in addition to recognizing the 
impossibility of achieving the whole goal and purpose of his life, and in addition to 
reconciling himself to that fact—while still keeping the same goal and purpose—the 
Knight of Faith also is quite confident he will achieve his goal anyway, “on the strength 
of the absurd.” 
What does this mean? One thing it means is that the Knight of Faith is committed to a 
contradiction: both to the impossibility and to the sure success of getting what he’s after. 
In short, he’s committed to the absurd. 
In a sense, this fits what we’ve seen earlier, where we were talking about Postscript, 
where Johannes Climacus tells us that faith is not just “holding fast” to an objective 
uncertainty but “holding fast” to an absurdity. 
Now some commentators—Alastair Hannay, our translator, among them—go to some 
pains to insist that this does not mean that the Knight of Faith is committed to an out and 
out logical contradiction. For instance, in his “Introduction,” Hannay says (p. 17): 
The word ‘absurd’ here means not ‘logically impossible’ but ‘humanly 
impossible’, or ‘in any intelligible way impossible’. 
Surely there is textual evidence for this. In the “Preamble,” just after introducing this 
extra step the Knight of Faith takes, Johannes de silentio says (p. 75): 
The moment the knight was resigned he was convinced of the 
impossibility, humanly speaking; that was a conclusion of the 
 68
understanding, and he had energy enough to think it. In an infinite sense, 
however, it was possible, through renouncing it. 
But I’m not so sure. I don’t think the textual evidence is that clear. It is easy to 
understand why commentators want to say this. They want to clear Kierkegaard of the 
charge of advocating out and out irrationalism.  But 
 First of all, Johannes de silentio—and for that matter Johannes Climacus—are not 
Kierkegaard; they are pseudonyms. 
 Second, I think it is always dangerous to try to defend Kierkegaard from the 
charge of maintaining outrageously extreme views. He does maintain 
outrageously extreme views, he tells us you’re going to be offended by his exreme 
views, and he does all this repeatedly in his signed works. 
 Third, Abraham goes up the mountain fully believing that God can be trusted to 
keep his word, even though—as we’ve already seen—he has to realize that, no 
matter how the story turns out, God is a liar and therefore cannot be trusted to 
keep his word! That is an outright logical contradiction: God will keep his word, 
even though he’s a liar no matter what happens. You can reword this in a way that 
isn’t contradictory if you want to tone it down, just as you can tone down the 
story of Abraham in other ways (“sacrificing the best you have,” “Abraham is a 
special case”). Or you can word it this way, which is contradictory, and which is, 
after all, a correct description of what Abraham is committed to. 
Nevertheless, there’s room for argument here, and let’s leave it as an unsettled question 
just what kind of “absurdity” is involved here. 
The “aesthetics” of the knight of faith 
Once we turn to the “aesthetics” of the Knight of Faith—that is, once we pick up our 
story of the young man and the fair princess again—we get some further information 
about the Knight. And things become pretty puzzling. 
The Knight of Infinite Resignation, recall, continued to love the princess, but his love 
became eternalized, elevated to a matter of principle, no longer subject to the 
contingencies and uncertainties of this life. 
But the Knight of Faith doesn’t do that. Abraham’s faith, recall, is for this life (p. 53), not 
just for eternity. 
This raises an interesting problem about the relation between the two knights. Both (1) 
have an infinite goal, and both (2) recognize its impossibility. That much stays 
structurally the same throughout the two stories. In addition, we said, the Knight of 
Infinite Resignation required a third ingredient, which we called (3) the “infinite 
movement,” “resignation,” or being “reconciled with existence.” 
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But if we ask what that third ingredient adds over and above what we already have in the 
first two ingredients, the only story we got was about making everything eternal and 
other-worldly. This is a point about the psychology of the Knight of Infinite Resignation. 
Now, we say, that is just what the Knight of Faith does not do. His faith is “for this life.” 
Does this mean that Knight of Faith does not after all do everything the Knight of Infinite 
Resignation does (and one thing more)? But Johannes tells us he does (p. 75): 
He does exactly the same as the other knight, he infinitely renounces the 
claim to the love which is the content of his life; he is reconciled in pain; 
but then comes the marvel, he makes one more movement, more 
wonderful than anything else, for he says: ‘I nevertheless believe that I 
shall get her, namely on the strength of the absurd, on the strength of the 
fact that for God all things are possible.’ 
The picture here doesn’t seem to be that infinite resignation is a stage the Knight of Faith 
passes through, so that by the time he becomes the Knight of Faith he is no longer 
making the “movement of resignation.” No, the picture seems to be that he continues to 
make the “movement of resignation” even while he is a Knight of Faith. 
But the problem is that we don’t have any idea what that “infinite resignation” consists of 
psychologically, except for the description of eternalizing the love for the princess, 
making it other-worldly—which the Knight of Faith doesn’t do. 
I don’t know how to solve this puzzle.1  
The knight of faith cannot make the additional movement on his own 
In any case, notice something: As a Knight of Infinite Resignation, you’ve made the 
“movement of infinity” and given up what is infinitely important to you. (Not that you no 
longer want it; it’s just that you’re realized you’re not going to get it.) That’s hard work
—in fact, it exhausts you. You have no energy left. In particular, you have no energy left 
to make the additional movement required of the Knight of Faith. 
Therefore, if nevertheless you do go ahead and make that additional movement—if you 
not only renounce but also firmly believe you’re going to get the object of your infinite 
                                                 
1 But consider this. In the passage I just read you, we read that the Knight of Faith, like the Knight 
of Infinite Resignation (p. 75): 
infinitely renounced the claim to the love which is the content of his life. 
Nevertheless, a couple of pages later, we read (77): 
Through faith Abraham did not renounce his claim on Isaac, through his faith he received 
Isaac. 
And a few lines earlier, we read (77): 
Through faith I don’t renounce anything, on the contrary in faith I receive everything. 
 70
focus—that’s not something you can do on your own; on the contrary, it has to be 
something that is done to you, or—perhaps better—something given to you. Thus (p. 78): 
But by my own strength I cannot get the least little thing of what belongs 
to finitude [once I’ve become a Knight of Infinite Resignation]; for I am 
continually using my energy to renounce everything. By my own strength 
I can give up the princess, and I shall be no sulker but find joy and peace 
and repose in my pain, but with my own strength I cannot get her back 
again, for all that strength is precisely what I use to renounce my claim on 
her. But by faith, says that marvelous knight [= the Knight of Faith], by 
faith you will get her on the strength of the absurd. 
In short, faith—much less the success of what you believe by faith—is not something you 
can get under your own power. You can be a Knight of Infinite Resignation on your own, 
but you cannot be a Knight of Faith on your own. 
As Johannes says (p. 76): 
that requires more-than-human powers. 
He means this—and I think Kierkegaard himself, not just his pseudonym Johannes de 
silentio, means this—quite literally. 
This is our first look at the problem of Pelagianism in Kierkegaard. Pelagianism is a 
theological heresy that, in effect, maintains that it is possible to save oneself under one’s 
own power, that it’s possible to have faith on your own. The orthodox view instead is that 
no, you cannot do this by yourself; you need God’s help. 
We’ll talk a lot more about this later on. But I think it is an absolutely crucial thing in 
Kierkegaard. 
In any event, let’s now move on to the Problemata themselves. 
The first two “problemata” 
I’m not going to touch the third problema except in passing, even though I’ve asked you 
to read it. There is a lot of interesting stuff there, but I confess I have no idea what it all 
comes to. 
Instead, I’m going to focus on the first two problemata. And I’m not going to spend a lot 
of time on these, because I think we’ve got a lot of the questions out on the table already. 
The first problema is (p. 83): “Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical?” 
The second is (p. 96): “Is there an absolute duty to God?” 
The two are very similar questions. And we are surely given to understand that the 
answers to the two questions are going to be the same. They go hand in hand. And we are 
also surely given to understand that if the answer to them is yes, then we have a radical 
reversal of the Hegelian picture. 
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For example, notice how all three problemata begin. Each of them begins by saying 
The ethical as such is the universal 
and then goes on to say that as the universal it “applies to everyone” (Problema I, p. 83), 
it “is the divine” (Problema II, p. 96), and “it is in turn the disclosed” (Problema III, p. 
108—i.e., the “public”—from which we then go on to talk about why then didn’t 
Abraham disclose what he was up to, why he kept silent). 
The claim that begins each of the three problemata, that “the ethical as such is the 
universal,” is a basic Hegelian claim. Remember the Hegelian notion of “social morality” 
(Sittlichkeit). 
Then, in each of the three problemata, we get a little development of the implications of 
saying “the ethical as such is the universal.” Then we get the statement (this structure 
isn’t quite so marked in Problema III, but you can find it) that, if this is the way it is, then 
Hegel is right (about ethics), but that Hegel is wrong in treating Abraham in these terms. 
The first problema 
What does the question in the first problema mean? What does the phrase “teleological 
suspension of the ethical” mean? 
Well, ‘teleological’ comes from Greek ‘telos’ (τέλος) meaning “goal” or “purpose” or 
“end.” (Most basically, a “target.”) So a “teleological” suspension of the ethical is going 
to be a “suspension” of the ethical for the sake of some goal or purpose. 
The term ‘suspension’, I think, is meant to suggest the Hegelian dialectic. In the Hegelian 
dialectic, the thesis and the antithesis are sometimes said to be suspended in the synthesis. 
So ‘suspended’ doesn’t just mean “cancelled”; it means rather something like “preserved, 
but at a higher level.” 
So the question “Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical?” in effect asks whether 
it is possible to “go beyond” ethics for the sake of some further goal or purpose, but in 
such a way that one is justified in doing so? 
The notion of being “justified” is crucial to Problema I. The question is clearly not 
simply whether we can stop being ethical for the sake of doing something else, because 
the answer to that is “of course we can.” We can act for the sake of whatever we choose. 
We can sin, for instance; or we can be an aesthete, a Don Giovanni. 
No, the question is something more than that. As Johannes repeatedly wonders, can we 
be justified in doing so? Thus the Knight of Faith (Abraham) (p. 90): 
puts himself as the single individual in an absolute relation to the absolute. 
Is he justified? His justification is, once again, the paradox  
And again (p. 90): 
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How does the single individual assure himself that he is justified? 
So the question is all about being justified in not being ethical. But “justified” in what 
sense? Ethically justified? But in that case, we haven’t gone beyond the ethical at all. 
The same thing arises with Problema II: “Is there an absolute duty to God?” The word 
‘duty’ sounds like an ethical word if I ever heard one. So what’s going on? 
Problema I spends a lot of time talking about how if we treat the story of Abraham 
ethically, then we cannot praise him; ethically speaking, he is a murderer, and cannot be 
justified. 
That’s the point of the discussion of three “tragic heroes” early on in Problema I (pp. 86–
87—look at Hannay's notes for details on these allusions): Agamemnon, in the context of 
the Trojan War; Jephtha in the Book of Judges; and the story of Brutus from Roman 
history, who had to execute his two sons for treason. (This is not the same as the Brutus 
of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar.) 
In each case we have a story that looks superficially like Abraham’s; in each case we 
have a father who is prepared to kill his child. And yet in each case, Johannes argues, we 
have a story that can be treated entirely in terms of ethics in such a way that the tragic 
hero ends up looking heroic, whereas in the case of Abraham we do not have such a 
story. 
In these other cases, what we have is what in ethics is sometimes called a collision of 
duties. We often find ourselves in situations where we have conflicting ethical duties, and 
we have to make a choice. In such a case, what we do if we’re being ethical is to 
prioritize our ethical duties and then follow the higher duty. And that’s exactly what 
happened in the case of our three tragic heroes. 
In each case, the father’s personal ethical duty to his child is overridden by a prior ethical 
duty to the state (or, in the case of Jephtha, to keep his vow to God). So, while their 
situation was terrible, and while they would each surely have fulfilled their duty to their 
children if they weren’t in this situation, a higher duty takes precedence. 
In each of these cases, the tragic hero is courageous, in each case he is being heroically 
so. But in each case, we don’t go beyond the ethical. 
A point of clarification: Note that the tragic hero is not a Knight of Infinite Resignation. 
The tragic hero does not give up what he values most of all; it is not impossible—
humanly speaking or otherwise—for him to get what he values most of all, or at least 
that’s not the point of the story. (He just can’t get everything he wants.) What he does 
instead is to give up something he values very much for the sake of something he values 
even more. At best, the tragic hero is a Knight of Finite Resignation. 
In any event, the case of Abraham, Johannes argues, cannot be understand in terms of the 
tragic hero. Why not? 
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Well, what higher ethical duty is being served by sacrificing Isaac? His duty to the state? 
No, the state is not involved here at all. There is no “state” in this story, only Abraham, 
Sarah, and Isaac. 
His duty to the Covenant? But he’s not serving the Covenant by sacrificing Isaac; on the 
contrary, Isaac is the embodiment of the Covenant. By sacrificing Isaac, he’s destroying 
the Convenant by his own hands! 
Perhaps, you might want to say, there is a prior ethical duty to obey God no matter what, 
and that this duty overrides everything else. 
That might work, although it’s not the interpretation Johannes adopts. Notice what it 
means. It means we have, in effect, something like what is called a divine command 
ethics, whereby ethical duties get to be duties simply because God commands them. (It’s 
not as if he commands them because they are in some independent sense “ethically 
right”; no, they get to be “ethically right” because he commands them.) 
It also means that Abraham was “justified” in doing what he did, justified in the sense of 
ethically justified. 
Further, it means the story of Abraham, so interpreted, could be treated entirely in 
“ethical” terms. Thus, the story of Abraham would not in that case imply a “teleological 
suspension of the ethical.” 
But—notice—it still means that Hegel was wrong in saying what he did about Abraham, 
because this picture of ethics is not Hegel’s. Hegel does not have a “divine command” 
(and so arbitrary) picture of ethics. 
What Is the question? 
Let’s back away from the text for a moment and see if we can orient ourselves. An 
important part of the problem in talking about this part of the text is to get clear on 
exactly what is being asked. 
The problemata ask about ethics, about teleology, about duty, about justification. All 
these expressions tend to run together in our minds, and that perhaps confuses what is 
going on here. So let’s look more closely. 
We already know—or we take ourselves to know, in virtue of our discussion of 
Kierkegaard’s three “existence spheres” or “stages”—that there is a distinction between 
“values” in the sense of ethical values (“ideals”) and “values” in the sense personal 
priorities. 
When we talked about the three “stages,” we said which one you were in is a question of 
what your priorities are, and that when one makes a “criterionless choice” to change from 
one stage to another, it’s a major event, a complete reordering of your priorities, of what 
ultimately counts for you. 
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In that sense, we can talk about personal values. One thing you might adopt as your 
personal value, what counts most for you, is ethical value, ethical ideals. But that’s not 
the only option. You might choose to let other things have more weight for you. 
And insofar as we can talk about personal values, we can perhaps also talk about certain 
behaviors’ being “justified” in terms of those personal values. Don Giovanni’s lecherous 
behavior is in that sense “justified” in terms of his overriding goal of enjoying himself, 
even though it’s far from being justified in ethical terms. 
Similarly, with a little stretch of terminology, it is perhaps not implausible to talk about 
duties to one’s personal values. That is, certain kinds of behavior follow naturally if you 
have certain priorities. These may be far from ethical duties, of course. Don Giovanni 
may well feel regret or disappointment if he fails at some conquest he’s going after in 
accordance with his priorities, but he certainly doesn’t feel ethical guilt or pangs of 
conscience. 
And finally, if we can—with a little stretch—talk about non-ethical duties, perhaps we 
can also talk about a non-ethical teleology as well. 
So, a lot of the terminology we encounter in these problemata can be tracked in two 
parallel senses at once: (1) the ethical sense, and (2) the personal preference sense. 
But, while I think it’s probably important to recognize this distinction, recognizing it does 
not help one bit in explaining what is going on in the questions these first two problemata 
are asking. 
The ethical sense 
Consider the ethical sense first: 
1. Problema I: Is there an ethical “teleological suspension of the ethical”? That is, is 
it possible to suspend the ethical for the sake of a higher ethical goal? No of 
course not, because—as we saw with the cases of the tragic hero—that’s not a 
suspension of the ethical at all. That stays entirely within the ethical realm. Of 
course we can suspend one ethical goal for the sake of a higher ethical goal, and 
that’s exactly what happens in the case of “collisions of duty.” But it’s clear that 
Problema I means to contrast those cases with what the Problema is asking about. 
So Problema I becomes trivialized if we read it as about a higher ethical telos. 
2. Problema II: Is there an absolute ethical duty to God? That is, is obedience to God 
our highest, our absolute, ethical duty? Well, yes, if you have a divine command 
ethics, or perhaps if you have any ethical theory where God is guaranteed never to 
command anything contrary to ethics. But in either of those cases, the story of 
Abraham does not contain a “teleological suspension of the ethical,” contrary to 
what Johannes says in Problema I. In short, is there an absolute ethical duty to 
God, as Problema II asks? Only on an account that is inconsistent with what he 
says in Problema I. So once again, if we read our terms in an ethical sense, the 
answer has to be “No, of course not”—not if Johannes knows what he’s saying. 
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The “personal preference” sense 
Now consider the personal preference sense: 
1. Problema I: Is there a preferential “teleological suspension of the ethical”? That 
is, does Abraham choose to let something besides ethics count more for him? Yes, 
of course, he does, at least to hear Johannes tell the story. But by the same token, 
Don Giovanni also chooses to let something besides ethics count more for him. Is 
Abraham “justified”? Well, he’s not ethically justified, as we’ve seen Johannes 
argue; but he’s justified in terms of faith. So too, Don Giovanni is not ethically 
justified in seducing “in Spain 1003”; but he is justified aesthetically. In general, 
any behavior conforming to one or another of the three “lifestyles” is justified in 
terms of that lifestyle. But once again, if that’s all the question means, then 
Problema I is trivialized. 
2. Problema II: Is there a preferential absolute duty to God? Well, there is if you 
prefer the life of faith, obviously. But not if you prefer the aesthetic life, and 
maybe not if you prefer the ethical life, depending on what kind of ethics you 
prefer. Again, the point is so obvious that you wonder why Johannes would 
bother to ask it. 
So what exactly is the issue here? 
Some suggestions 
Here are some suggestions. I don’t have any knockdown arguments against any of them, 
although I have my own favorite suggestion. 
First suggestion 
The first suggestion is that the ethical meaning of the terms is the one intended 
throughout the Problemata, and that what Johannes is doing is in effect just arguing 
against the view that Hegelian “social ethics” (Sittlichkeit) is the only way to think about 
ethics. 
In short, there is another kind of morality besides social morality—a “teleological 
suspension of Hegelian ethics.” So the reply to Problema I is yes there is a teleologifal 
suspension of the ethical—and it’s Abraham! 
On this reading, when Johannes says “the ethical as such is the universal” at the 
beginning of each of the three Problemata, he doesn’t really believe that. He’s just 
quoting that Hegelian ethical notion in order to subject it to testing and scrutiny. And in 
fact, when tested against the story of Abraham, the Hegelian slogan breaks down. But 
we’re still talking about ethics in the sense of morality—just not Hegelian morality. 
This is an interpretation that has caught on among some recent interpreters. For example, 
John Lippitt. And it is an interpretation that no doubt appeals to a lot of people working 
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in recent philosophical ethics, where there are all sorts of ways of thinking about ethics 
and morality besides social morality. There’s virtue ethics, for example, or ethics that 
appeal to moral intuitions of real ethical facts (“moral realism”) that may or may not fit 
the prevailing standards of one’s society. 
Still, I am disinclined to think this is what is going on. If that’s all Johannes is doing, then 
he could have done it much more straightforwardly and easily. Why all this talk about 
how he can’t understand Abraham? There’s nothing particularly hard about 
understanding virtue ethics, for instance. But maybe he’s just being ironical and making 
fun of the Hegelians. 
Second suggestion 
Notice that our difficulties with the personal preference reading of our terms were all 
derived from the view that the various lifestyles or ways to live are each independent 
“spheres of existence,” each one self-contained and immune to criticism from outside. 
Thus, the aesthetic life is aesthetically “justified,” etc. 
But that picture of the lifestyles is part and parcel of the standard interpretation of what 
Kierkegaard is up to. 
So perhaps our difficulties here are our first indication that SOMETHING IS WRONG WITH 
THE STANDARD INTERPRETATION. 
Well, maybe. 
Third suggestion 
But the suggestion I like best is different. The questions Johannes is asking are not 
relativized at all. He’s not asking us whether within the ethical sphere, there is an ethical 
“teleological suspension of the ethical,” for instance. As we’ve seen, that trivializes the 
discussion. And he’s not asking us whether each sphere is “justified” in its own terms. 
Once again, we’ve seen that this trivializes the questions. 
Rather, what Johannes is doing is asking us to decide which sphere WE’RE in, to take a 
stand. The question is not whether Abraham is ethically justified, or whether he’s 
justified in terms of whatever “existence sphere” he finds himself in. The question is 
whether he’s justified—period. And in order for you to decide that, you’re going to have 
to decide where you stand. 
The reason I like this interpretation is that it is exactly the kind of thing SK is worried 
about elsewhere. 
In his book A Literary Review, for instance, SK says that what the “present age” lacks is 
passion, the courage to take a stand. Before anyone is willing to say what he thinks, he 
first has to look around for confirmation from others, and only when he is reassured by 
them will he timidly venture to say what he—that is, everyone else—thinks. 
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I recall when it first dawned on me how right SK is on this. Shortly after I had read A 
Literary Review for the first time, I was teaching a course on Philosophy of Religion, and 
we were talking about various “proofs” for the existence of God. I don’t remember which 
“proof” it was we were talking about, but I tried to make the case as strongly as I could, 
and to present the argument in as persuasive a light as I could manage. And then I asked 
the students for their reactions to the argument. 
One student raised his hand and said he thought the proof wasn’t a very good proof 
because “you’re never going to get everyone to agree on that.” I don’t recall the details of 
what I replied, but I do recall that it was unsatisfactory and that I went home bothered by 
his response. 
I finally figured out what was bothering me. He wasn’t answering my question. I asked 
him what he thought, and he told me not everybody else would agree. Yes, no doubt, but 
did he agree? Well, he replied (I’m reconstructing and extrapolating now), “who’s to 
say?” 
Answer: YOU’RE to say! You’re the one I asked, what do you think? Don’t tell me about 
other people. I’m not asking for a statistical report, I’m asking for your verdict. Are you 
afraid to form an opinion of your own unless you’re in a crowd of other people? Reply: 
“But I could be wrong.” Answer: OF COURSE you could be wrong. I’m not asking for an 
infallible guarantee, I’m asking for what you think. Come on! What is it? 
And, I suggest, the same thing may well be what is at stake in Fear and Trembling. “Is 
there a teleological suspension of the ethical?” “Is there an absolute duty to God”—
regardless of what ethics says? I’m not asking what some anonymous “one” would say in 
one or another lifestyle, I’m asking what you say! 
In short, what do you think about Abraham? Johannes tells us (p. 95) that the story of 
Abraham contains a teleological suspension of the ethical. Do you agree? 
I suspect something like this is responsible for why it is so difficult to frame the questions 
in the Problemata in innocent, theoretical, non-committal terms. 
 
What’s wrong with the “standard picture”? 
So far, I’ve given you pretty much a “standard” interpretation of Kierkegaard, taken from 
no one source in particular, but from a variety of sources, with probably some 
idiosyncratic features of my own thrown in too. I now want to begin talking about what’s 
wrong with this “standard picture.” But first, let’s look back over what we’ve done. 
Summary review of the “standard picture” 
Distribute handout on “The ‘standard’ picture” 
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1. Kierkegaard is a reaction to Hegel. (Not that this is all there is to Kierkegaard, but 
it’s certainly present.) 
a. Part of that reaction consists of a reversal of emphasis, so that Kierkegaard 
puts a strong accent on the individual, not on general principles. 
b. Another part of that reaction is the sense of “practical urgency” in all of 
Kierkegaard’s writings, and his lack of patience with the purely theoretical 
aspects of philosophical “system-building.” 
2. Then we had the three “stages on life’s way,” the “existence spheres,” the 
“lifestyles” that frame much of Kierkegaard’s writing: the “aesthetic,” the 
“ethical” and the “religious” spheres 
a. Each sphere has its own governing principle, its own disadvantages or 
negative aspects, its own self-contained way of looking at things. 
b. There is a sense in which the “ethical” stage is central, insofar as what’s 
bothering you in the aesthetic stage is exactly the lack of focus or purpose 
or commitment that the ethical stage offers; it is not yet ethical. What’s 
bothering you in the religious stage is just the sense of going beyond 
ethics; the religious stage is no longer ethical. And what’s bothering you 
in the ethical stage is just that you will inevitably fall short of your ethical 
standards and ideals, so that in that sphere you are inevitably not ethical 
enough. 
c. Despite this, the three “spheres” or “stages” don’t really have any 
necessary order to them, even though they are always conventionally 
presented in the order I just gave them. 
d. There is nothing inevitable about moving from one stage to another in this 
structure. The disadvantages or negative features of one stage are never 
enough by themselves to force you into one of the other stages, since—
first of all—the other stages have their own disadvantages and negative 
features too, and—second—moving out of the stage or sphere you are 
currently in involves turning your back on the priorities that are most 
important to you, abandoning what matters most to you in life. And, while 
it’s always possible to do that, it’s not very likely. What could possibly 
matter so much to you that it would make you abandon what matters most 
to you? 
e. It is impossible to live in two (or all three) spheres at once, because you 
“cannot serve two masters” (as the Scripture says). If you’re lucky, you 
can perhaps get by living for a long time in circumstances where the 
demands of two or more lifestyles don’t conflict with one another—so that 
you can’t tell which one is governing you. But in fact you’re following the 
one or the other—and it would be clear which one you’re following if the 
occasion should ever arise where the demands of the two lifestyles do 
conflict. 
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f. The choice of which “sphere of existence” to live in has to be a 
criterionless choice, simply in view of the kind of radical choice it is. 
(Anderson doesn’t seem to have this feature of the “standard” view.) 
g. Such choices are always accompanied by dread or anxiety, and are quite 
rare. 
3. Also as part of the “standard picture,” we talked about the notion of “existence” in 
Kierkegaard, as meaning existence in time, as a changing, developing being, as 
opposed to the timeless, “eternal” kind of changeless reality God has. 
We also talked about another sense of ‘existence’ in Kierkegaard, 
according to which the only things that “exist” are people who make 
criterionless choices. 
4. Then we got the discussion of “truth,” where we found the distinction between: 
a. “Eternal” or “essential” truth, which is just God. 
b. “Objective” truth, which is just a matter of corresponding with the facts. 
c. “Subjective” truth, which we saw defined as “an objective uncertainty 
held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness” 
(Bretall, p. 214)—that is, a passionate commitment to something we have 
insufficient evidence for. 
5. Finally, we got the discussion of the “paradoxical” and the “absurd.” Basically, a 
“paradox” for Kierkegaard is a blatant incommensurability, a mismatch between 
two things. For example, in “subjective” truth, the incommensurable mismatch 
between my passionate commitment, on the one hand, and the meagerness of the 
evidence, on the other. Or to make it even more paradoxical, an existing human 
being—in time—makes a passionate commitment to the reality of a completely 
uncertain God, who is outside time and is eternal. That’s a double mismatch, and 
a high-order paradox. 
6. If what we’re passionately committed to is not just uncertain, without sufficient 
evidence, but paradoxical all by itself—so that the paradox is not just in our 
passionate relation to this uncertain object, but already in the object itself—in 
particular, if what we’re passionately committed to is the idea of the Incarnation, 
an eternal God who is also a temporal human being, then Kierkegaard calls a 
paradoxical object like that “absurd”—and defines faith as “this absurdity, held 
fast in the passion of inwardness.” (Bretall, p. 220.) 
Initial problems with the standard picture 
How many stages are there? 
We’ve already seen at least one thing wrong with this standard picture—or if not exactly 
wrong, then at least more complicated than the standard picture presents it. And that’s the 
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business about there being exactly three “stages on life’s way” or “existence spheres” in 
Kierkegaard’s view. 
Kierkegaard does give the conventional list of stages in his Stages on Life’s Way. (See the 
handout on “The Standard Picture,” p. 2, passage 1.) And the same three “spheres” do 
come up elsewhere as well. But in Postscript, he divides the “religious” sphere into two: 
“Religion A” and “Religion B.” Religion B is full-blown Christian faith, whereas 
Religion A is something less. Does this mean there are four stages? 
Again in Postscript, we get a discussion of “irony” and of “humor” as belonging 
somewhere in this picture, although it’s not clear just where. 
The claim is that “irony” is a kind of “border territory” between the aesthetic and the 
ethical, and “humor” is another such “border territory” that comes right before the 
“religious.” Does that mean it’s a transitional stage between Religion A and Religion B, 
or between the ethical and either form of the “religious”? Who knows? 
Consider this passage, for example (Postscript, Hong/Hong, p. 531 n.)—see the handout 
again, p. 2, passage 2: 
The spheres are related as follows: (1) immediacy [that is, aesthetics?], (2) 
finite common sense; (3) irony, (4) ethics with irony as its incognito; (5) 
humor; (6) religiousness with humor as its incognito—and then, finally, 
(7) the essentially Christian, distinguished by the paradoxical accentuation 
of existence, by the paradox, by the break with immanence, and by the 
absurd. Therefore, religiousness with humor as its incognito is still not 
Christian religiousness. 
Notice the punctuation in that list. Kierkegaard was very conscious of punctuation, and 
prided himself on using it extremely carefully to suggest important nuances. In the 
English, we have “immediacy [comma], finite common sense [semicolon]; irony, 
[comma], ethics with irony as its incognito [semicolon],” and so on. But that’s not how it 
goes in the Danish. In the Danish, each item is separated by a semicolon. So it looks to 
me as if this passage gives us no fewer than seven “spheres,” including some we haven’t 
heard anything about yet. 
On the other hand, look at passage 3 on the handout, likewise from Postscript (p. 555, a 
few pages later): 
The religious address [that is, an “upbuilding discourse” or a “sermon”] 
will represent the pathos-filled and cross out the dialectical [whatever that 
means], and therefore—however well intentioned, [it will represent] at 
times a jumbled, noisy pathos of all sorts, esthetics, ethics, Religiousness 
A, and Christianity—it is therefore at times self-contradictory  
This time we seem to get four items in our list, and—if we want to take seriously the “of 
all sorts” in the passage—the passage at least suggests that the list is meant to be 
exhaustive. 
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Finally, look in Bretall, p. 324, right at the beginning of the selection from the 
posthumously published The Point of View for My Work as an Author. The title of PART 
ONE, section A, is “The Ambiguity or Duplicity in the Whole Authorship: As to Whether 
the Author is an Aesthetic or a Religious Author.” 
Here we seem to be given only two choices: aesthetic and religious. Are there then no 
ethical authors? In the same work, Either/Or is listed among the aesthetic writings, even 
though the “Or” half of it is all about ethics. Is ethics being incorporated as a part of 
aesthetics here—or what? 
My point in dwelling on this is just to ask where we get the idea that Kierkegaard has this 
three-part structure in mind in his overall authorship. There may be yet other places 
besides Stages on Life’s Way where he operates in terms of three and only three stages, 
but if so, I haven’t found them, although there are lots of places that suggest the three 
stages. 
At the same time, I should point out that the “standard picture” doesn’t really allow for 
“transitional” stages, as we seem to find in that one passage from Postscript (p. 2, 
passage 2 on the handout). On the “standard picture,” there is no natural ordering among 
the spheres, no transitions that would lead from one stage to the “next.” There is no 
“next.” On the contrary, each “sphere” is “self-contained.” 
How rare are criterionless choices? 
Another feature of the “standard picture” is that these life-defining “criterionless choices” 
we talked about are pretty rare. People do make them sometimes, but they don’t make 
them every day, and some people probably don’t make ever them at all. 
On the other hand, criterionless choices are what give rise to dread or anxiety, as we’ve 
seen. 
Now, as we’ll find when we get into The Concept of Anxiety in the second half of the 
semester, in that work “anxiety” is far from rare. On the contrary, it’s pervasive, it’s a 
permanent feature of human psychology. 
How do we account for this difference? 
Those of you who’ve had my introductory-level course on existentialism, where I talk 
about Sartre, will perhaps recall that in Sartre, anguish—for which he uses the French 
equivalent of the German ‘Angst’ and Danish ‘angest’ (alternatively, Danish ‘Angst’, just 
as  in German, which is the word translated as ‘dread’ or ‘anxiety’—is something we 
cannot get away from. For Sartre, every decision we make is in effect a “criterionless 
choice.” 
Sartre, in a famous passage, talks about a habitual gambler who is trying to break his 
habit but has to remake his decision every single time the opportunity to gamble arises. 
Having made the decision once, that decision provides no relief from having to make it 
again and again. (Sartre may very well have got this example from French secondary 
writing about Either/Or II or about For Self Examination—a late SK work.) 
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So if anxiety is as pervasive as it seems to be in Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety, 
then perhaps our picture of Kierkegaardian “criterionless choice” should be more like 
Sartre’s and less like the “standard picture’s.” If that is so, then perhaps for Kierkegaard 
too, every decision we make is as “criterionless” as Sartre would have it, but it’s only 
rarely that we make such “criterionless” choices to change our “sphere of existence,” to 
move from one sphere to another; most of our decisions remain within whatever sphere 
they start from. So, perhaps it’s not criterionless choice or anxiety that’s rare, rather it’s 
moving from one stage to another in Kierkegaard’s picture. 
On the other hand, that’s problematic too. 
If all our decisions are “criterionless,” then what could possibly account for the fact that 
most of our decisions stay within the sphere they start from? Without criteria, how could 
there possibly be any “bias” in favor of staying where you are? Force of habit? But how 
do we choose to follow habit? 
Furthermore, if all our decisions are really criterionless, then what sense does it make to 
talk about “spheres” of existence, “lifestyles” at all? The whole idea of living within a 
given “existence-sphere” or lifestyle was that you would use the demands within that 
sphere as criteria for making subsequent decisions; it was only the criterionless choices 
that were made not within any given “sphere,” but were choices of what sphere to live in 
subsequently and therefore of what criteria to use henceforth. (See the passage in the 
MacIntyre article from The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.) 
But if all choices are criterionless, then we never really do use the demands of any given 
sphere as criteria for making other choices, so that it’s hard to see what’s left of the 
notion of Kierkegaard’s “existence-spheres” at all. 
Obviously, a lot more work needs to be done here. But the main point is that the 
“standard picture” requires that criterionless choices, and their consequent anxiety, 
should be extremely rare—whereas in fact Kierkegaard says—at least in some places— 
that anxiety is far from rare and is effectively universal. 
What about faith? 
A third problem with the “standard picture” emerges over how faith works. 
In Postscript, as we saw earlier, faith is a matter of passionately committing yourself to 
an absurdity—and in particular to the absurdity, the incommensurability, involved in the 
doctrine of the Incarnation. 
On the other hand, this make it awkward, to say the least, to regard Abraham as the 
“father of faith,” since he definitely wasn’t thinking in terms of any kind of “incarnation” 
of God as a human being. 
To be sure, I’ve already mentioned that Johannes Climacus, in Postscript, criticizes 
Johannes de silentio, in Fear and Trembling, for having an over-simplified interpretation 
of faith. But on these grounds? (Answer: No. Rather, because Johannes de silensio claims 
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to praise the Knight of Faith, even thought the Knight of Faith is unidentifiable and looks 
just like anyone else.) 
Again, we can’t just say that Fear and Trembling presents a broader and looser version of 
faith than Postscript does, so that while in Fear and Trembling Abraham is committed to 
the absurdity of canceling the covenant and yet having it remain intact in Isaac, he isn’t 
committed to the Incarnation, as Postscript would require. 
For in that case, Fear and Trembling would just be presenting a broader view of faith 
than the later Postscript had. But no, that won’t work, because the differences between 
Fear and Trembling and Postscript seem to go deeper than that. 
In Postscript, as we’ve seen, faith amounts to a passionate commitment to an absurdity, 
and in particular to the absurdity of the Incarnation. 
On the other hand, in Fear and Trembling, we saw that you couldn’t have faith without 
being a Knight of Infinite Resignation first: 
Infinite resignation is the last stage before faith, so that anyone who has 
not made this movement does not have faith. (Hannay, p. 75.) 
Furthermore, the Knight of Infinite Resignation, as we saw, has to give up something—
and in fact, give up the whole point of his or her life, be infinitely “resigned.” Recall that, 
in Fear and Trembling, it was precisely because I had used up all my human energy to 
renounce the most important thing in my life that I had no energy left over to make the 
next movement on my own—to get it back. That required a more than human strength. 
So suppose I do passionately believe in the Incarnation (as in CUP), absurd though it is. I 
believe it as passionately as Kierkegaard could ever want. Still—what have I “infinitely 
resigned” thereby? I’ve renounced reason, perhaps, but was that the whole focal point 
and meaning of my life? I don’t see why it has to be. In other words, “infinite 
resignation” seems to have no place in the Postscript picture of faith. 
In short, Kierkegaard’s views on faith are far more nuanced and subtle than we’ve seen 
so far. 
The aesthetic life 
Now let’s focus on the aesthetic life in particular. I want to take as my text for this the 
“Either” half of Either/Or, where the aesthetic life is the main theme. (I’ve asked you to 
read the Bretall material from Either/Or—both parts—on pp. 19–108.) 
I think we will begin to see that the aesthetic life is not quite what we have been led to 
believe. 
First of all, let’s just survey the contents of the “Either” half of Either/Or. 
To begin with, as a kind of general “Foreword” to the whole book, the editor—Victor 
Eremita—tells the story of how he came into possession of the two sets papers he is 
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editing in this book. We do not have that Foreword in the Bretall volume, but I have done 
a translation of my own, available here. 
Part One of Either/Or consists of a series of papers, essays, jottings, by an anonymous 
“aesthete” known simply as “A.” It consists of eight parts (see the handout on 
“Writings”): 
1. Diapsalmata (partly in Bretall). 
2. The Immediate Stages of the Musical-Erotic. (The analysis of Don Giovanni
—not in Bretall.) 
3. The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama. (Not 
in Bretall.) 
4. Silhouettes. (Not in Bretall.) 
5. The Unhappiest One. (Not in Bretall.) 
6. The First Love. (Not in Bretall.) 
7. The Rotation Method (Hong & Hong, Rotation of Crops, partly in Bretall). 
8. Diary of a Seducer (Hong & Hong, The Seducer’s Diary, partly in Bretall). 
Diapsalmata 
These are a random collection of sayings, “thoughts” on life and the cosmos. (The word 
means something like “pauses,” and is taken from a word found in the old Greek version 
of the Psalms.) 
Some of the Diapsalmata are found in Bretall, pp. 33–36, although the full set includes 
more. (For some reason, Bretall places these after his selection from “The Rotation 
Method,” even though “Rotation” comes much later in the original.) 
Now remember, the “aesthetic” stage is the life governed by pleasure and desire of the 
moment.  And we do find some of the tone of delightful whimsy in the Diapsalmata. For 
instance (Bretall, p. 34): 
The essence of pleasure does not lie in the thing enjoyed, but in the 
accompanying consciousness. If I had a humble spirit in my service, who, 
when I asked for a glass of water, brought me the world’s costliest wines 
blended in a chalice, I should dismiss him, in order to teach him that 
pleasure consists not in what I enjoy, but in having my own way. 
Again (Hong & Hong, p. 25—not in Bretall): 
And now the innocent pleasures of life. It must be granted to them that 
they have only one flaw—that they are so innocent. Moreover, they are to 
be enjoyed in moderation. When my physician prescribes a diet for me, 
there is some reason in that; I abstain from certain specified foods for a 
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certain specified time. But to be dietetic in keeping the diet—that is really 
asking too much. 
Yet again (Hong & Hong, p. 20—not in Bretall): 
I don’t feel like doing anything. I don’t feel like riding—the motion is too 
powerful; I don’t feel like walking—it is too tiring; I don’t feel like lying 
down, for either I would have to stay down, and I don’t feel like doing 
that, or I would have to get up again, and I don’t feel like doing that, 
either. Summa Summarum (= the sum of the whole thing): I don’t feel like 
doing anything. 
It’s a mildly amusing passage, and describes a kind of “aesthetic” idleness. But note: He 
doesn’t feel like doing anything. Does that sound as though he’s having fun? 
Here’s another along the same line (Bretall, p. 34): 
My life is absolutely meaningless. When I consider the different periods 
into which it falls, it seems like the word Schnur in the dictionary [i.e., a 
German dictionary; in Danish it’s ‘Snor’], which means in the first place a 
string, in the second, a daughter-in-law. The only thing lacking is that the 
word Schnur should mean in the third place a camel, in the fourth, a dust-
brush. 
Here we begin to see the sense of what we called “despair,” jadedness, the sense of 
“seeing through” everything, the “meaninglessness” of it all. 
There’s more along these lines (Bretall, p. 34 again): 
Wine can no longer make my heart glad; a little of it makes me sad, much 
makes melancholy. My soul is faint and impotent; in vain I prick the spur 
of pleasure into its flank, its strength is gone, it rises no more to the royal 
leap. I have lost my illusions.  (There’s more.) 
“Lost his illusions”—he’s seen through it all. 
So far, there’s nothing really surprising here. We see some illustrations of wit, humor, 
pleasure—but also of the “ennui,” the jadedness that we said always accompanies a 
dedicated aesthete. (We called it “despair.”)  
But there’s more. When you read through the entire Diapsalmata section, the overall 
impression is that this guy’s not just burnt out, not just jaded; he’s positively morbid—
and furthermore loves it! And this is something we wouldn’t have expected from the 
Standard Interpretation.) 
Consider (Hong & Hong, p. 20—not in Bretall): 
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In addition to my other numerous acquaintances, I have one more intimate 
confidant—my depression. In the midst of my joy, in the midst of my 
work, he beckons to me, calls me aside, even though physically I remain 
on the spot. My depression is the most faithful mistress I have known—no 
wonder, then, that I return the love. 
Note: He loves being depressed! 
Again (Hong & Hong, p. 21—not in Bretall): 
I say of my sorrow what the Englishman says of his house: My sorrow is 
my castle. Many people look upon having sorrow as one of life’s 
conveniences. 
He’s positively wallowing in sorrow! 
It gets worse (Hong & Hong, p. 20—not in Bretall): 
There are, as is known, insects that die in the moment of fertilization. So it 
is with all joy: life’s highest, most splendid moment of enjoyment is 
accompanied by death. 
And, one of my favorites (Hong & Hong, p. 30—not in Bretall): 
In a theater, it happened that a fire started offstage. The clown came out to 
tell the audience. They thought it was a joke and applauded. He told them 
again, and they became still more hilarious. This is the way, I suppose, 
that the world will be destroyed—amid the universal hilarity of wits and 
wags who think it is all a joke. 
But the grimmest one of all is perhaps this one (Hong & Hong, p. 19—not in Bretall): 
What is a poet? An unhappy person who conceals profound anguish in his 
heart but whose lips are so formed that as sighs and cries pass over them 
they sound like beautiful music. It is with him as with the poor wretches in 
Phalaris’s bronze bull,2 who were slowly tortured over a slow fire; their 
screams could not reach the tyrant’s ears to terrify him; to him they 
sounded like sweet music. And people crowd around the poet and say to 
him, “Sing again soon”—in other words, may new sufferings torture your 
soul  
                                                 
2 Phalaris, an ancient tyrant in Sicily, had a bronze bull made. It was hollow, with a door in the 
side. It was fitted out with a cunning acoustic device that would make screams sound like the most 
melodious music. Jolly old Phalaris put his enemies inside the bronze bull, built a fire under them, and 
enjoyed the fine concert made by his enemies’ roasting to death. 
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Enough examples. What does all this come to? 
What did we expect to find? Well, the “standard interpretation” would lead to the picture 
of the dedicated aesthete, at least, as someone who is fundamentally cultivating a life of 
pleasure, even though he’ll come to find that an empty, pointless life. “My life is utterly 
meaningless,” as we just saw. The aesthete would be someone who is pursuing pleasure 
and is willing to pay the price of a meaningless existence in order to do so. 
But what do we find instead? Someone who is not fundamentally cultivating pleasure, but 
rather cultivating the meaningless! The author of the Diapsalmata loves his depression; 
he’s as “faithful” to her as she is to him. He’s cultivating “depression,” 
“meaninglessness”—to the point of dwelling obsessively on death! 
The “dead club” 
This theme carries over to many of the other sections of the “Either” part of Either/Or. 
Thus, parts (3)–(5) in the list we gave above all pretend to be “addresses” or speeches 
delivered before the Συμπαρανεκρώμενοι (= “Dead Club,” Hong & Hong “Fellowship of 
the Dead”). 
In Silhouettes (part (4)), we have a speech given at a meeting of the club right after the 
summer solstice: “we rejoice anew that the happy occasion has repeated itself, that the 
longest day is over and night begins to triumph” (Hong & Hong, p. 167). “we all 
regard death as the greatest good fortune” (ibid.). In effect, it’s an essay on various types 
of sorrow. For example, we get a certain kind of “secret sorrow” that is “similar to the 
sensual pleasure in bleeding to death” (p. 175). We get talk about the “knight of grief” (p. 
175). 
Again, The Unhappiest One (part (5))—which he describes as “an inspired address to the 
Συμπαρανεκρώμενοι—starts off (Hong & Hong, p. 219): 
As is well known, there is said to be a grave somewhere in England that is 
distinguished not by a magnificent monument or a mournful setting but by 
a short inscription—“The Unhappiest One.” [Actually, it’s in Worcester 
Cathedral.] It is said that the grave was opened, but no trace of a corpse 
was found. 
Again (ibid.), 
And look, the grave was empty! Has he perhaps risen from the dead [?] [A 
rather vicious play on the doctrine of the Resurrection.]  Did he find no 
rest, not even in the grave; is he perhaps still fitfully wandering over the 
earth? 
So the author suggests that they try to find him—“the unhappiest one”—and that they 
should therefore hold a kind of competition (p. 221): 
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So, then, we are inaugurating an open competition  every worthy 
member of the community of the unhappy is welcome; a seat of honor is 
designated for every really unhappy person, the grave for the unhappiest 
one. 
So we get, throughout several sections of the “Either” half of Either/Or, this sustained 
dwelling on death, this working at being unhappy. 
The First Love 
The sixth part—The First Love—is different, and I’m not really sure how to fit into the 
overall picture of Either. It purports to be a review of a translation by Johan Ludvig 
Heiberg (a kind of literary “poobah” in Copenhagen circles of the day) of a play called 
“The First Love” by a Frenchman named Augustin Eugène Scribe (1791–1861). 
Scribe actually existed, and moreover turns out to have been pretty important in French 
theater at the end of the eighteenth century. He wrote a number of opera librettos, 
including some for operas by people you’ve heard of—like Verdi. And he did in fact 
write this play called “The First Love”—actually, “The First Loves” (plural, which may 
be significant) in the French original—and it was translated into Danish by Heiberg (who 
turned it into the singular), and was in fact performed on stage in Copenhagen during the 
time Kierkegaard was writing Either/Or. 
I could not find this play translated into English, and in fact could find no evidence that it 
ever had been translated into English, although we did have the French in the library. So I 
hired a graduate student over a summer several years ago to translate it for me. 
(Handout.) The play is the stuff of comic opera, a piece of “vaudeville,” really. There’s a 
lot that turns on mistaken identities, disguises, and all the familiar props of comic opera. 
But basically, it’s all about Emmeline and the return of her childhood love (her “first 
love”) Charles. 
The overall impression of the play, and the point Kierkegaard—or A—drives home, is the 
silliness of being single-mindedly dedicated to one’s first love, as though you could never 
have another. It’s the stuff that comes from reading too many novels, A says. Contrast 
what Judge William says in the second part of Either/Or, where he takes this idea quite 
seriously, as being the key to ethical earnestness. 
As I say, I don’t know exactly how this fits into the theme of the “Either” part of 
Either/Or.  
(Alaistair Hannay, in the “Introduction” to his abridged translation of Either/Or [p. 4], 
suggests that this essay was written earlier than most of the rest of Either/Or, before SK 
really had a clear picture of what he was going to do in the book. Still, even after he did 
have a clear picture of what he was going to do in the book, he decided to include this 
essay.) 
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The last two essays 
The last two parts of the “Either” half of Either/Or are rather different. They are “The 
Rotation Method” and “Diary of the Seducer,” both of which are present in ample 
extracts in the Bretall volume (although both are considerably longer than the extracts—
the “Diary” is in fact 145 pp. in the Hong & Hong translation). 
Here we don’t see this morbid obsession with death, this dedicated cultivation of 
depression and sorrow. But in both cases, we see something along the same lines. As you 
read through those passages, I think you get—if you read carefully—the distinct sense 
that something has gone terribly wrong here. 
Consider “The Rotation Method,” for instance (Bretall, p. 26): 
To forget—all men wish to forget, and when something unpleasant 
happens, they always say: Oh, that one might forget! But forgetting is an 
art that must be practiced beforehand. The ability to forget is conditioned 
upon the method of remembering, but this again depends upon the mode 
of experiencing. Whoever plunges into his experiences with the 
momentum of hope, will remember so that he cannot forget. [Notice what 
he’s telling us here: Have no hope.] Nil admirari [Bretall, in a note, 
translates this as “to wonder at nothing”—it doesn’t mean “to have no 
questions,” but something more like “to be amazed at nothing” or even “to 
be impressed by nothing”] is therefore the real philosophy. No moment 
must be permitted a greater significance than that it can be forgotten when 
convenient; each moment ought, however, to have so much significance 
that it can be recollected at will.  Enjoying an experience to its full 
intensity to the last minute will make it impossible either to remember or 
to forget. 
Notice what he’s saying here. This isn’t the picture of someone enjoying life to the full, 
draining each experience to the last drop. In fact, that’s exactly what he’s telling us not to 
do! 
Again (pp. 31–32): 
The whole secret lies in arbitrariness.  One does not enjoy the 
immediate, but rather something which he can arbitrarily control. You go 
to see the middle of a play, you read the third part of a book. By this 
means you insure yourself a very different kind of enjoyment from that 
which the author has been so kind as to plan for you. You enjoy something 
entirely accidental; you consider the whole of existence from this 
standpoint; let its reality be stranded thereon. 
What the author is recommending here is, far from plunging into life, precisely to insulate 
yourself from it! There’s always this lack of commitment, this reserve. 
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Once again, this is not what we would have expected from the “standard picture.” 
The same thing emerges in “Diary of the Seducer.” Consider: 
How beautiful it is to be in love, how interesting to know that one is in 
love. (Bretall, p. 48.) 
It is indeed a wonderful thing to find a pure immediate femininity, but if 
one dares to attempt a change, then one gets the interesting. (p. 51.) 
Like a physician I can therefore take pleasure in observing all the 
symptoms in her case history. (p. 56.) 
Have I been constantly faithful to my pact in my relation to Cordelia? That 
is to say, my pact with the aesthetic.  Has the interesting always been 
preserved? Yes, I dare say it freely and openly in this secret conversation 
with myself. Even the engagement was interesting, exactly because it did 
not offer that which one generally understands by the interesting. (p. 76.) 
Here again, there is this process of insulating going on. Johannes the Seducer is not really 
enjoying the seduction of Cordelia. His enjoyment is only vicarious; what he’s really 
enjoying is watching himself seduce Cordelia. (The “interesting.”) 
He talks about how “enjoyable” it all is, but by ‘enjoyment’ he means “interesting.” So 
too in “The Rotation Method.” 
It’s all very cerebral, all very reflective. And of course “reflection” always involves some 
kind of mental distance between you and the object you’re reflecting on. 
The same kind of thing is going on in the Diapsalmata, and in the “Dead Club” sections. 
There is this careful avoiding of any kind of entanglements with life. 
In fact, you come away from the “Either” part of Either/Or with the decided impression 
that there’s something desperate—almost panicked—about these people, that they’re 
driven by fear, not by any kind of “lust for life.” 
All their talk about the “interesting” instead of full-blooded, honest pleasures, all their 
dwelling on death and depression—all this strikes me as dishonest. These people are 
hiding something! Avoiding something! 
Notice: We can call all these things symptoms of “despair” if we want. But “despair” in 
this sense is certainly not “boredom,” not even ennui or “jadedness.” No, these people are 
scared! 
What we have then is not really a picture of the “aesthetic” life that more or less succeeds 
on its own terms, although of course there is a price to pay and there are other 
perspectives. What we have is the picture of the “aesthetic” life as a complete failure, a 
failure even on its own terms. It doesn’t even succeed in being aesthetic! They’re not 
really having fun, and not even trying to. 
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Don Giovanni 
The only part of the “Either” half of Either/Or—apart from “The First Love,” which I 
said I didn’t know what to do with—where we don’t have this sense of desperate failure 
is in “The Immediate Stages of the Musical Erotic,” the analysis of Mozart’s “Don 
Giovanni.” 
There’s no holding back there, no reserve, no taking refuge in the interesting. Quite the 
contrary! There’s nothing reflective about Don Giovanni! 
But, at the same time, Kierkegaard says, Don Giovanni isn’t really a full human being 
either, he’s not a person. Listen (Hong, p. 134): 
What it means to say—that Don Giovanni’s essential nature is music—is 
clearly apparent here. He dissolves, as it were, in music for us; he unfurls 
in a world of sounds. This aria has been called the champagne aria,3 and 
undoubtedly this is very suggestive. But what we must see especially is 
that it does not stand in an accidental relation to Don Giovanni. Such is his 
life, effervescing like champagne. And just as the beads in this wine, as it 
simmers with an internal heat, sonorous with its own melody, rise and 
continue to rise, just so the lust for enjoyment resonates in the elemental 
boiling that is his life. 
Again (pp. 118–19): 
Don Giovanni is the hero in the opera; the main interest is concentrated 
upon him; not only that, but he also endows all the other characters with 
interest. This must not, however, be taken in any external sense, for the 
very secret of this opera is that its hero is also the force in the other 
characters. His passion sets in motion the passion of the others. His 
passion resonates everywhere; it resonates in and supports the 
Commendatore’s earnestness, Elvira’s wrath, Anna’s hate, Ottavio’s 
pomposity, Zerlina’s anxiety, Mazetto’s indignation, Leporello’s 
confusion.  Compared with his life, the lives of all the others are only 
derived   [Don Giovanni]—precisely because he is not a character but 
essential life—is absolutely musical. The other characters in the opera are 
not characters, either, but essential passions, which are posited by Don 
Giovanni  [T]hey are the external consequences that his life itself 
continually posits. 
One more (p. 123): 
                                                 
3 It’s in Act I, Giovanni’s aria “Fin ch’han del vino.” 
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Just as in the solar system the dark bodies that receive their light from the 
central sun are always only half-luminous, that is, luminous on the side 
turned to the sun, so it is also with the characters in this piece. Only that 
part of life, the side that is turned toward Don Giovanni, is illuminated; 
otherwise they are obscure and opaque. This must not be taken in the 
narrow sense, as if each of these characters were some abstract passion 
[i.e., as if it were an allegory], as if Anna, for example, were hate, Zerlina, 
irresponsibility. Such insipidity does not belong here at all. The passion in 
the individual is concrete, but concrete in itself, not concrete in the 
personality, or, to express myself more specifically, the rest of the 
personality is devoured by this passion. 
In short, Don Giovanni not really a human being. He’s a force of nature—like the sun, 
like a whirlwind, like thunder. It’s true, Giovanni is presented as being conscious; he has 
desires and wants, for example. But he’s conscious the way a goat is conscious. There’s 
no reflection there at all. 
In short, Don Giovanni is not really a human being! 
The upshot of it all 
Where does this leave us? 
Well, Don Giovanni certainly doesn’t feel despair. He doesn’t seem to feel the lack of 
any central “meaning” in his life. He’s not bored, he’s not jaded, he’s not defensively 
insulating himself from life, he’s not taking refuge in thoughts about death. He’s having 
lots of fun—apparently with no ill consequences. (Of course, he does go to hell at the end 
of the opera, but we’ll pretend we don’t know that.) 
So it looks as if, quite in opposition to the “standard interpretation,” there is a lifestyle, a 
way to live that avoids the negative disadvantages we talked about in all three of 
Kierkegaard’s stages: Be Don Giovanni, be Joe Six-Pack. (An alternative explanation 
might be that the aesthetic life does not always entail despair.) 
But notice what this means: We can do this, but only at the cost of being sub-human, by 
not exercising our capacity for reflection, which is the very thing that sets us apart and 
makes us “human.” 
You may think this sounds like pious moralizing, and perhaps it is. You may think that 
Kierkegaard, by portraying Don Giovanni as sub-human, is really just telling us that he 
personally holds such life in contempt. Perhaps that’s right. 
But in any case, it’s certainly true that Joe Six-Pack, the non-reflective person (if you 
want to call that a “person”), has no part in the main themes Kierkegaard will be talking 
about. He’s simply not interested in such cases. 
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The “ethical” 
Now let’s talk about the second part of Either/Or. 
Part II is supposed to be written by a judge, “Judge William,” and is supposed to be 
directed TO A, the anonymous author of the first part. And what the judge is trying to 
argue is the superiority of the ethical life over the aesthetic life of A. So what we get from 
the Judge is a kind of critique of the aesthetic. 
Note: From the point of view of the “standard” interpretation, this is a pointless and 
hopeless task from the outset. If the three “stages” are the self-contained, self-sufficient 
worlds we have been led to believe they are, then there is no way the Judge can argue for 
the superiority of his own point of view—except by begging the question, i. e., except by 
arguing from his own ethical point of view, which by hypothesis the aesthete is not going 
to accept. (See the MacIntyre article.) 
Of course, to say what the Judge is doing is pointless and hopeless is NOT necessarily to 
say the Judge isn’t doing it anyway. Perhaps he just doesn’t recognize the true situation 
here. After all, “preaching to the choir” is something that happens all too often. 
And yet, when we actually read what the Judge says, it doesn’t seem that this is what is 
going on at all. What he’s arguing is not just that the ethical life is superior to A’s life in 
some ethical sense, but that A’s life fails—and fails on its own terms, that is, fails in a 
way that A himself, if he’s being honest with himself, will recognize is a failure. (This is 
something we already got a bit of a sense of in our discussion of the Either half of Either/
Or.) 
Notice, for instance, the odd title of the first long “letter” in Or: “The Aesthetic Validity 
of Marriage.” Now the Judge is not only the “author” of the second half of Either/Or; he 
also comes back and is the “author” of the second third of Stages on Life’s Way. And in 
all these places, he’s constantly talking about marriage. Marriage, for the Judge, seems to 
be the sum and substance of the ethical life. 
And yet here, in the first “letter,” the argument is not for the ethical validity of marriage, 
but for its aesthetic validity. That is, whatever it is you’re after, A, you’re not going to 
find it living the way you do; the only way you’re going to find it is to get married and 
settle down—in short, to become ethical. 
This is not just a matter of what we’ve seen on the “standard interpretation,” where what 
the aesthete is after is pleasure and enjoyment, although of course he has to put up with 
the feeling of emptiness we called “despair.” No, on that interpretation, the aesthete can 
get what he’s after, on his own terms, although there is a price to pay. The Judge, on the 
other hand, is here arguing that the aesthete cannot get what he’s after, even on his own 
terms. And, as we’ll see, it’s a fairly powerful argument. 
Of course the fact remains, we can still say the Judge is just wrong, that he doesn’t 
understand the situation. And perhaps that’s right. But nevertheless, it does seem that 
what Either/Or gives us as a whole is not what we have been led to expect. It is not a 
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neutral laying out of two alternative viewpoints, showing the positive and negative 
features of each, so that the reader is left to choose for himself. (See Anderson’s book.) 
Of course, in the end the reader is going to have to choose for himself. But never mind, 
the book as a whole is written in such a way that it looks at first as if the Judge wins! For 
example, he gets to give a critique and analysis of the aesthetic life, but the aesthete does 
not get to respond. A is given no chance in the book to give a counter-critique of the 
ethical. The Judge gets the last word. 
You might think at first that this doesn’t really matter, that the Either part, presenting as it 
does the aesthetic viewpoint, is in effect an implicit critique of the ethical, and that the 
fact that is comes first is purely incidental. (After all, books by their very nature are 
sequential things, and somebody has to go first!) 
But that’s not right. What we get in the Either part, whether it comes first or second, is 
not a critique of the ethical in the same sense in which the Judge gives us a critique of the 
aesthetic. If you actually read the Either part, there’s really no critique of the ethical there 
at all. And there’s certainly no argument—implicit or otherwise—that the ethical life fails 
on its own terms and that what it’s really after can only be found in aesthetics. 
Nevertheless, although we do perhaps get the sense that the Judge wins the contest with 
A, there are indications in the book that the Judge doesn’t win altogether. 
For instance, although there are two main parts, there are in fact three parts to Or. 
1. “The Aesthetic Validity of Marriage,” as we’ve already seen. 
2. “Equilibrium between the Aesthetical and the Ethical in the Composition of the 
Personality” (Bretall)—or “The Balance between the Esthetic and the Ethical in 
the Development of the Personality” (Hong and Hong). 
3. And then, finally, “Ultimatum [= The Last Word]: The Upbuilding that Lies in the 
Thought That in Relation to God We Are Always in the Wrong.” 
The third part is a not supposed to be a letter written by the Judge to A, but instead a copy 
of a sermon written by one of the Judge’s older friends, an anonymous pastor out in 
Jutland. The pastor had sent it to the Judge, and the Judge is forwarding it to A. In a little 
prefatory note, the Judge says 
In this sermon he has grasped what I have said and what I would like to 
have said to you; he has expressed it better than I am able to. 
The problem, however, is that what the sermon says turns out to be not just different 
from, but quite opposite to, what the Judge has been saying all along. In short, we are left 
at the end of the book with the distinct impression that the Judge doesn’t quite know what 
he’s saying! 
Again, as we have seen, at the end of the Either part, we got the strong sense that there 
was something wrong with A, that he was hiding something, afraid of something. And 
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that’s right, and in fact is exactly what the Judge is going to pick up on. By the same 
token, at the end of Or, we perhaps also get the impression that there is something wrong
—or at least something very suspicious—about the Judge. 
It’s not what we might have thought from the “standard interpretation.” On the standard 
interpretation, we should expect to find the Judge feeling guilty because of his inability to 
live up to ethical ideals. But the Judge gives no sign of feeling the slightest bit guilty. On 
the contrary, the Judge seems totally content, self-satisfied—even complacent. 
What the Judge does do,  however, is to make a big deal out of glorifying mediocrity. In 
the ethical life, one should avoid being exceptional. (Recall the Hegelian “fitting in.”) 
One should cultivate the small things, the little domesticities, the wonderful hum-drum 
details of daily life. In fact, you come away thinking the Judge’s own view is: 
How glorious it is to be mediocre! 
Or, to put it more paradoxically: “How great it is to be anything but great!” “How 
extraordinary it is to be ordinary!” 
This is so obvious that I think it’s deliberate. We’re supposed to get the sense that the 
Judge is protesting too much—that he too is avoiding something, just like A. But the 
point is not developed at all in Either/Or. It’s just a seed of suspicion left planted in the 
reader. 
The Judge’s diagnosis of the aesthetic 
What is the Judge’s critique of the aesthetic life? Unfortunately, we don’t get a lot of the 
important passages in the short selections in the Bretall volume. I’ll try to fill in the 
blanks for you as we go along. (HANDOUT ON “SOME PASSAGES FROM JUDGE WILLIAM.”) 
First of all, we have to realize that the “aesthetic” covers a lot of ground. As we’ve 
already seen from the Either part, at one extreme we have the immediate, spontaneous, 
unreflective case of Don Giovanni—who is such a limiting case that he can be regarded 
as sub-human. At the other extreme, we have A, who doesn’t do anything spontaneously 
and unreflectively, who is shielding himself from all that. 
And then we have everything in between. This entire spectrum can be regarded as the 
sphere of the “aesthetic.” 
The Judge’s overall view is that all of these people are not really in control of themselves. 
The ethical person, by contrast, is in control of himself, is—by and large—master of his 
own fate. That of course doesn’t mean he can control the forces of nature that determine a 
lot of what happens to him; but it does mean that the things he really cares about are 
things that are under his control. 
The Judge seems to have a view that there is in all of us—no matter where we are in the 
“stages”—a kind of fundamental drive to “be somebody.” I don’t mean this in the sense 
of being somebody exceptional, since we’ve already seen that the Judge glorifies 
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mediocrity and the un-exceptional. But we all have a drive toward acquiring some kind of 
sense of ourselves, a sense of self-identity. 
Notice: This is a psychological claim. And in fact we might even say it’s an ontological 
claim about the structure of human nature. There’s nothing peculiarly ethical about the 
claim. It’s not a claim about priorities or values; it’s a claim about the dynamics of the 
psyche. Thus, it’s a claim that might well be accepted anyone in any of SK’s “spheres” of 
existence. 
Furthermore, I think it’s a claim that not only the Judge holds, but Kierkegaard himself 
holds as well. We find throughout SK’s writings—the signed ones as well as the 
pseudonymous ones—constant talk about acquiring a self, about the development (or 
“composition”—Bretall) of the personality (see the title of the second letter in Or), or 
about the emergence of “spirit.” 
Now of course it’s easy to make fun of such talk about “acquiring a self” or having a 
“self-identity.” Of course I have a self-identity! If I’m not identical with myself, who am 
I identical with instead? How can I possibly acquire a self? If I don’t already have a self, 
who is there to do the acquiring? 
But we’re not primarily making a logical point here. Rather, the claim is a psychological 
one. And although I suspect there may be all sorts of ontological and perhaps even logical 
implications, in the first instance what we’re talking about is your sense of yourself. 
This is a view we find all through Kierkegaard, although we’re encountering it first in the 
Judge. Here’s part of what he says (“Equilibrium” passage #1 on the handout): 
Every human being, no matter how poorly talented he is, no matter how 
subordinate his position might be in life, has a natural urge to formulate 
for himself a life-view, a notion of the significance of life and of its 
purpose. 
This “significance of life” and its “purpose” are not necessarily the “fitting into the larger 
picture” notion that we got in the standard interpretation’s account of the ethical life. No, 
it can be quite individual. The aesthete too has this “natural urge,” for instance 
(immediately following the preceding quotation, continuing passage #1 on the handout): 
He who lives aesthetically does this too, and the common expression one 
has heard at all times and from the different stages [Danish: Stadier. I’m 
not sure what this means here, but it doesn’t refer to other “stages” besides 
the aesthetic—perhaps it just means “from various platforms”] is this: One 
must enjoy life. There are naturally very many variations of this, 
according as the notion of enjoyment is different. But all are united in this 
expression, that one must enjoy life. 
(He doesn’t literally mean “all are united” since, as we’ll see, he doesn’t agree; he means 
all aesthetes are united and agree on this, and they amount to a lot of people.) 
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Notice: Although the Judge gives this as the guiding theme of the aesthetic life, it doesn’t 
seem to describe A. As we’ve seen, he’s doing anything but throwing himself into the 
enjoyment of life. As I said a moment ago, A is at the opposite end of the aesthetic 
spectrum from Don Giovanni, who is portrayed as effectively sub-human. In fact, at one 
point Judge William says A is “to a certain degree beyond” the aesthetic (still in passage 
#1 on the handout): 
You [= A] run the risk of getting into bad and coarse company [namely, 
all those run-of-the-mill aesthetes], you who are so outstanding. I do not 
deny it must be uncomfortable to have a life-view in common with every 
boozer or Jagtliebhaber [Hong/Hong translate this “hunting buff”]. 
Neither is that quite the case. For you lie to a certain degree beyond the 
aesthetic territory, as I shall show later 
Notice the surprising consequence of this: It means that Either/Or does not present us 
with a straightforward picture of the aesthetic life in the first half and of the ethical life in 
the second half, as virtually everybody says. What we get in the first half is only a limit, 
the edge of the aesthetic life, the point of view of someone who’s already “to a certain 
degree beyond” that life. Even the discussion of the sub-human Don Giovanni at the 
other extreme is written by this hyper-aesthetic A. We never get to hear from Don 
Giovanni himself. 
In any case, here is the Judge’s fundamental diagnosis of what is going wrong with any 
aesthete, including presumably A (passage #1 on the handout, the first paragraph): 
But he who says he wants to enjoy life, he always sets up a condition that 
either lies outside the individual or is in the individual in such a way that it 
is not there by means of the individual himself. 
This is italicized in the original, to indicate that it’s important. And, in case there’s any 
doubt, the Judge goes on (ibid.): 
Concerning this last point, I will ask you to hold rather fast to the 
expressions, for they have been carefully selected. 
What does this mean? 
What he’s talking about is the aesthete’s own self-interpretation. And in every case, he 
says, the aesthete is thinking of his life in terms of something beyond his control—either 
something “outside the individual” altogether, and therefore beyond his control, or else 
some personal characteristic (“in the individual”) that nevertheless is still not in the 
individual’s control (“is not there by means of the individual himself”). 
For example: 
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“Outside” the self “In” the self 
Wealth (a banker, an 
entrepreneur) 
Beauty (a “model,” a 
movie-star) 
Honors, reputation, fame (a 
statesman, a public figure, an 
author, a celebrity) 
Somewhat more refined, 
taking satisfaction in the 
development of some 
great talent (a painter, a 
musician). 
One’s social class, being a 
“blue blood” 
 
But of course all of these things can be lost, and are not within a person’s complete 
control. With respect to the internal factors, beauty can and does fade, the painter can go 
blind or lose the use of his hands, the musician can go deaf or become paralyzed and 
unable to play. The same thing holds of the external factors, where it’s even more true. 
Money can be lost, reputation and honors depend on the opinions of others and can be 
lost, whether justifiably or not, at any time. Social class-lines can and do fluctuate. And 
while you might think being a “blue blood” or having a certain pedigree is something that 
cannot be lost, since after all the facts of your birth don’t change, nevertheless it may turn 
out that in fact you’re not who you thought you were—scandals come to light about your 
parentage, or there was some dastardly switcheroo at the hospital and in fact you’re 
someone else’s child. All that’s possible. 
So all these things can fail you. And obviously this means that if you build your whole 
self-identity around these things, you’re taking a risk. 
You might think these observations sound quite traditional, that they could have been 
said by Boethius or by any classical Greek or Roman Stoic. And that’s right. This part of 
the Judge’s second letter does sound very classical. 
All of these conditions, both the external ones and the internal ones not under your 
control, are what the Judge calls “finite” or sometimes “immediate” conditions. In the 
present context, this simply means they are worldly things. 
Now, let’s tell a story. Consider someone whose sense of identity is based on one or 
another of these finite or immediate ends. Consider, for example, a concert pianist whose 
whole sense of himself is in terms of his art and skill. There’s no doubt his skill is beyond 
measure and his art is impeccable. Everything is successful and more than satisfactory. 
The aesthetic pianist is enjoying life, everything is working to reinforce the identity he 
sees himself in terms of. It seems as if he’s perfectly happy with the way things are 
going. 
Now, suppose this fellow suffers a stroke and loses the use of his hands, or suppose 
there’s some horrible accident and he loses his hands altogether. What happens? The poor 
fellow is devastated. His whole sense of himself has been shattered. In an important 
sense, he’s lost his self. As Judge William says, he despairs. 
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Now you may say that this is not “despair” in the sense in which we talked about it earlier 
in connection with the aesthetic stage. It’s not a sense of jadedness or lack of larger 
purpose. Rather, it’s “despair” in the more ordinary, everyday sense. Fair enough, but 
let’s let the Judge continue. 
The Judge goes on to say that the fact that the pianist despairs in this situation shows that 
he was really in despair all along. Even at the height of his artistic success, when to all 
appearances he was happy, no—he was really in despair, even if he didn’t realize it. 
This is a crucial claim. Here is exactly what he says (passage #2 on the handout): 
… [H]ere I merely insist that you admit that a very great many people 
would find it all right to despair. Now let us see why they despaired. 
Because they discovered that what they had built their lives on was 
something transient? But is that a reason to despair? Has there occurred an 
essential change in what they built their lives on? Is it an essential change 
in the transient that it shows itself to be transient? Or is there rather not 
something accidental and inessential about it the fact that it does not show 
itself so? Nothing new has happened that could be the basis for a change. 
Thus when they then despair, this must lie in the fact that they were in 
despair already. The difference is merely that they did not know it. But 
this is a completely incidental difference. Thus it turns out that every 
aesthetic life-view is despair, and that everyone who lives aesthetically is 
in despair, whether or not he knows it. BUT WHEN ONE DOES KNOW THIS, 
AND YOU INDEED DO KNOW IT [this is addressed to A], THEN A HIGHER FORM 
OF EXISTENCE IS A PRESSING DEMAND.
As it stands, this is a very puzzling passage, and looks like a blatant non sequitur. 
Because I despair now, I must have been in despair all along? 
In a case like this, we can either dismiss what the Judge is saying as simply confused, or 
else we can ask ourselves if there is something going on here that we don’t yet 
understand. Well, what else might be going on? 
Consider the part about “Is it an essential change in the transient that it shows itself to be 
transient?” In other words, did we think it was impossible for the pianist to suffer a stroke 
or to lose his hands altogether? The answer is no, obviously not. Are we baffled, 
confused when it happens? No, of course not. We perhaps didn’t expect it, since these 
things are rather out of the ordinary, and we may be surprised and even shocked when it 
happens, say it’s a damned shame, incredibly bad luck, a “tragedy.” But of course we 
knew all along it was a possibility. 
Now—and this I think is the crucial point—THE PIANIST KNEW IT TOO. After all, the fact 
that the use of your hands is something you can lose at any moment is hardly a secret. It’s 
something everybody knows; it doesn’t take any specialized knowledge or inside 
information. So neither we nor the pianist can be surprised when he loses the use of his 
hands in the way we would be if the law of gravity were suddenly repealed, for instance. 
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So by basing his self-identity on his skills as a pianist, the fellow was in the end taking 
what he had to have known was a colossal gamble. And yet, when he loses the gamble he 
knew was never a sure bet, he’s thunderstruck, he’s completely disoriented—in short, 
he’s surprised by what cannot have surprised him. 
The pianist had been deceiving himself all along. He blinded himself to what he was 
doing—staking everything, his entire identity, on a risky bet. 
Crucial point: The problem with the pianist—and in fact the problem with any aesthete, 
as far as the Judge views it—is not that he’s “staking his entire identity on a risky bet” 
(Abraham does that, and he’s certainly no aesthete, although the Judge doesn’t talk about 
Abraham), but the fact that he’s blinding himself to what he’s doing, with the result that 
he’s completely at a loss when the bet fails. 
This is what the Judge calls despair—self-deception. It shows up—it’s unmasked—only 
when the pianist is disabled, but it was there, the Judge says, all along. 
Once again, you might say this isn’t despair in the sense in which we used the term 
earlier, for the sense of jadedness, lack of overall purpose, in the aesthetic life. But it is. 
Think about it. The description of “despair” as “jadedness” or “purposelessness” that the 
“standard interpretation” got—probably from thinking about the Either part of Either/Or
—is basically a description of the realization that our immediate, finite, “aesthetic” 
defining values have failed us, that even if they’re not taken away (as they were with the 
pianist), they’re just in some sense not enough. That’s what we called “despair.” (The 
sense of “Is that all there is?”) So it is “despair” in the sense we talked about earlier. 
And the Judge is saying that as long as we continue to stay at the aesthetic level—that is, 
as long as we continue to define ourselves in terms of something we have to realize is not 
sufficient to define ourselves—we are deceiving ourselves. That is, we are in “despair” in 
the Judge’s sense. 
It’s still despair, it’s just despair thought about more deeply. 
The Judge’s diagnosis of A in particular 
What we have so far is the Judge’s diagnosis of any aesthete. But A, as we have seen, is 
not just any aesthete; he’s a limiting case. What then is the Judge’s diagnosis of A in 
particular? 
Well, A has in a sense realized the truth of what the Judge is saying. He recognizes the 
futility of defining himself in terms of a finite, immediate goal. A is in the position of the 
paralyzed pianist—he realizes his finite goals have failed him. 
And in fact A realizes this is not just a problem with some particular finite, immediate 
goal. It’s not just that, if this one is insufficient, I’ll just go and pick another one instead. 
No, A has seen through it all—no finite goal is going to be of any real consequence to 
him; that’s why he is systematically shielding himself from all of them and always 
moving to “reflection” instead. 
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The problem is: A doesn’t know WHAT TO DO NEXT. 
If I can’t identify myself with any of the things that suggest themselves, then who am I? 
The problem with A, as the Judge sees it, is that A in an important sense isn’t anybody. 
His identity isn’t given in terms of attachments to the world around him, since he’s seen 
through all that. A doesn’t seem to have any available self-descriptions or ways of 
interpreting himself that he would not be willing to renegotiate on a whim. (“A bank 
teller,” as A says at one point.) 
The Judge’s diagnosis is that what A is lacking is fundamentally a will. What he needs to 
do is make a choice, an “either/or.” The ordinary aesthete defines himself in terms of 
some finite end or goal. A has seen the futility of all that and so refuses to do it. But what 
to do instead? A doesn’t know; he’s in effect paralyzed. He’s in despair big-time. In fact, 
he makes a point of being in despair, as we have seen from some of the Diapsalmata. 
The Judge’s view is that acquiring a self—a real self—is basically a matter of the will. 
Once you identify yourself, once you get your sense of self-identity, not in terms of all 
those “iffy” things you can’t control but in terms of your own will, which you can control
—now you’ve got a real self, one that isn’t subject to the contingencies of the world but 
is stable and firm. Now you’ve acquired an “eternal self,” as it’s sometimes put. 
Well fine, A needs to will. But what should he will? He’s seen through the futility of all 
the obvious choices, and that’s precisely why he’s in conscious despair about what to do. 
Well, the Judge says, if nothing else, then choose despair (passage #4 on the handout). 
Choose something! But choose it, and don’t just kind of choose it while you’re telling 
yourself you’re doing something else—like simply recognizing the obvious way to go, or 
something like that. 
Once you choose, once you explicitly define yourself like this, you acquire a self—a real 
self that’s in charge of who it is, not a bogus self that can be shattered on a moment’s 
notice. 
Conclusion 
The Judge, it seems to me, has made a pretty good case. There’s something wrong with 
the aesthetic life, even the limiting case of the aesthetic life represented by A. The 
ordinary aesthete identifies himself in terms of something he knows good and well is no 
basis for self-identity; in short, he’s deceiving himself. A has seen through all that, but is 
paralyzed, doesn’t know what to do next. The Judge’s prescription: Choose something, 
even if it’s only choosing despair. 
There is an interesting problem about the Judge’s argument. It’s not a small point, but I 
don’t want to take lecture-time on it now. Instead, here is a handout on it. (HANDOUT: 
“THEY CAN’T TAKE THAT AWAY FROM ME!”) 
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Indirect communication, or the problem of the pseudonymous 
authors 
I want to talk now about “indirect communication”—the “maieutic” method whereby 
Kierkegaard plays the role of a “midwife” in maneuvering people where he wants them to 
be. We talked earlier about how this was a big feature of Kierkegaard’s work, and how all 
readers and scholars of Kierkegaard have to come to terms with it at some point. 
To some extent, we can view the problem of “indirect communication” as equivalent to 
the problem of trying to figure out what Kierkegaard is up to with his device of writing 
under pseudonyms. Why does he do that? 
We’ve seen, for instance, that Fear and Trembling is written under the pseudonym 
“Johannes de silentio,” whereas Either/Or is written by A and B (where B = Judge 
William), and the whole thing edited by Victor Eremita. Even within the “Either” part, 
the “Diary of a Seducer” is not written by A (at least if we take what A says at face value) 
but by another person “Johannes the Seducer,” a copy of whose diary somehow came 
into A’s possession, and is now “edited” by Victor Eremita—all of whom, of course, are 
really Kierkegaard. 
Why all these layers upon layers of “covering”? 
We’ve also talked a little about how Johannes Climacus in Postscript (Hong/Hong, p. 
500) criticizes Johannes de silentio in the earlier Fear and Trembling for what Climacus 
calls a “rash” picture of the Knight of Faith. Quite apart from the question exactly what 
the criticism is here, what’s going on? If this were just a matter of Kierkegaard’s having 
thought about faith some more and changing his mind about it, why didn’t he just say so? 
People change their minds all the time, and go back to revise or retract things they had 
said earlier—and they do it without resorting to these veils of pseudonymity. Why does 
SK then resort to them? 
But “indirect communication” perhaps goes beyond the business of pseudonymous 
authors. For instance, there is a book by one Michael Strawser, Both/And: Reading 
Kierkegaard from Irony to Edification. On the whole, I do not think this is a very good 
book. But it does make the interesting point that we really have no reason to think 
Kierkegaard is being any more “up front” in his signed writings—for instance, in the 
Upbuilding Discourses or the Journals—where, once again, things are not always as they 
seem. Or if we do have reason, it’s a matter that has to be thought through carefully for 
each particular passage. 
(Note: I was privileged to direct a very fine recent dissertation on “indirect 
communication”: Antony Aumann, Kierkegaard on the Need for Indirect 
Communication, Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 2008.) 
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Nonsense about indirect communication 
Ineffability 
This question of “indirect communication” I find one of the most puzzling and intractable 
issues in all of Kierkegaard. And, in my judgment, it’s also probably the one on which 
more utter nonsense has been written than on any other. 
A lot of the time, in my experience, people try to explain Kierkegaard’s method of 
“indirect communication” by claiming that what he’s trying to say is strictly speaking 
ineffable, so that of course he can’t just come right out and tell you what he’s up to. 
The advantage of this explanation is that you can arrive at it without actually reading 
what Kierkegaard really says. On the other hand, the corresponding disadvantage is that 
if you do actually take the trouble to look at his texts, you’ll soon realize that there’s no 
basis at all for supposing that what Kierkegaard is trying to convey is “ineffable,” or that 
he thought it was. In fact, as far as I can tell, nowhere in Kierkegaard is there any notion 
of “ineffability.”4 There are lots of things we don’t know, to be sure. But that doesn’t 
mean they’re ineffable. 
Consider Fear and Trembling, for instance, where—if anywhere—you might think that, 
in the discussion of the Knight of Faith, we do have something ineffable. There 
Kierkegaard (or Johannes de silentio) explicitly says that a Knight of Faith cannot explain 
himself to anyone else, and that one Knight of Faith cannot even help another. 
Doesn’t that sound like “ineffability”? No, it doesn’t—not if you think about what 
Kierkegaard is really claiming here. 
The Knight of Faith can perfectly well say—quite straightforwardly and directly—what it 
is that justifies him. Kierkegaard even tells us what he could say. He could say, “I’m 
justified in (say) slaughtering Isaac because I heard the voice of God commanding me to 
violate every ethical duty in the book, in such a way that the single individual is above 
the universal”—or something like that. 
That’s quite direct, and in fact—if he really is a Knight of Faith—it’s even 
straightforwardly and literally true. 
But what the Knight of Faith cannot do in this direct and “up front” way is get anybody 
else to believe him. Not even another Knight of Faith. Another Knight of Faith would 
presumably believe that such things happen, since he believes he himself is a single 
individual above the universal. But he certainly isn’t going to be inclined to think it’s 
happening with the Knight who’s trying to explain himself. In fact, he’ll have just as 
much if not more reason than the ordinary person to be suspicious of people who make 
such claims. 
                                                 
4 To be sure, there is a mention in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits. But nothing is made 
out of term there. 
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Does that make the position of the Knight of Faith “ineffable”? Well, if it does, then it 
would seem that just about everything will be ineffable, since there’s very little I can 
make people believe if they don’t want to, just by my saying so. 
This is not, of course, to deny that the Knight of Faith is in a peculiarly difficult position. 
But it is to deny that the inability to persuade people in any way makes what you’re 
trying to persuade them of ineffable—unless of course we want to make the notion of 
ineffability so broad that we trivialize it. 
So let’s avoid this unseemly rush to declare things “ineffable,” and see if we can’t find 
out what’s really going on. If it turns out that Kierkegaard really is trying to express the 
ineffable, let’s draw that conclusion after we look at what he actually does and what he 
says about what he’s doing—not before. 
Other nonsense 
But even where commentators don’t rush to appeal to ineffability, there’s still an 
inordinate amount of sheer nonsense written about Kierkegaard’s “indirect method.” 
(Handout on Indirect Communication.) 
(1) Consider, for example, MacIntyre’s remarks on this in his Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy article (vol. 4, pp. 336–37). Here’s the sum total of what he says about it: 
One device of Kierkegaard’s must be given special attention: he issued 
several of his books under pseudonyms and used different pseudonyms so 
that he could, under one name, ostensibly attack his own work already 
published under some other name. His reason for doing this was precisely 
[don’t you just love that ‘precisely’?] to avoid giving the appearance of 
attempting to construct a single, consistent, systematic edifice of thought. 
Systematic thought, especially the Hegelian system, was one of his 
principal targets. 
No doubt this is part of what SK was up to. But to stop with that “explanation” is to 
explain nothing at all. If that’s the end of the story, then the purpose of the pseudonyms is 
a purely destructive one. Furthermore, if SK’s trying so hard to avoid “giving the 
appearance” of a single, consistent point of view, then why do we have the “signed” 
works, which—whether they are to be taken “directly,” at face value, or not—certainly 
do present a fairly consistent viewpoint— precisely what MacIntyre said SK wanted to 
avoid and was in fact one of SK’s “principal targets.” 
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(2) Here’s another passage, from a paper by John A. Mourant entitled “The Limitations 
of Religious Existentialism”5: 
For Kierkegaard the problem of communication is bound up with that of 
truth. As is well known, he proclaimed the subjectivity of truth. He was 
convinced that what he termed the essential truth, religious truth, is 
subjective, inward, concealed and secret. As such it cannot be shared with 
others nor communicated directly to them. 
Think about that quotation. “It cannot be shared with others nor communicated directly to 
them.” So it cannot be shared and yet it can be shared after all—only indirectly, whatever 
that means? (This begins to sound like the typical confused “ineffability” claim—that 
Kierkegaard’s method of “indirect communication” is his clever way of doing what we 
just said couldn’t be done at all!) 
Furthermore, if it’s so concealed and SECRET, why would you want to communicate it at 
all, even indirectly? You see the problems. 
(Actually, I don’t want to ridicule this passage too much, because I think it’s largely 
correct. It certainly says pretty much exactly what Kierkegaard himself says — except 
that it’s Johannes Climacus — in a passage in Postscript.6) 
What seems to be going on in this quotation—and it’s a common way of “explaining” 
what Kierkegaard is doing—is that indirect communication is being thought of along the 
lines of “communicating in code.” You can say what you mean, but you have to do under 
a pseudonym, with hints and veiled allusions—because after all—it’s a secret, and needs 
to be concealed from at least some people. On this view then, the difference between 
direct and indirect communication is just the difference between what cryptologists call 
the “plain text” and the “cipher text” of the message. 
For example, in World War II there would be radio broadcasts that would say things like, 
“The eagle’s nest is empty. Repeat: The eagle’s nest is empty.” And, if you knew the 
code, you would know that this means “We’ve just spotted enemy submarines off the 
Straits of Gibraltar,” or something like that. But of course the enemy themselves, who 
can easily intercept these broadcasts, would have no idea what the encoded message was. 
Now Kierkegaard does mention this way of communicating. And he does so right at the 
very beginning of a work we’ve recently read: Fear and Trembling. The epigraph there 
reads (Hannay trans., p. 39) 
                                                 
5 International Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1961), pp. 437–52 at pp. 437–38. Quoted in Steven M. 
Emmanuel, Kierkegaard & the Concept of Revelation, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1996), p. 135. 
6 Hong & Hong, pp. 79–80, the passage about the distinction between an accidental and an 
essential secret. 
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What Tarquin the Proud said in his garden with the poppy blooms was 
understood by the son, but not by the messenger. 
This is a quotation from Johann Hamann, a German Romantic author. The Hong and 
Hong translation explains the quotation like this (p. 339): 
When the son of Tarquinius Superbus [= an early Roman king] had 
craftily gotten Gabii [= a city] in his power, he sent a messenger to his 
father [i.e., back to Tarquinius] asking what he should do with the city. 
Tarquinius, not trusting the messenger, gave no reply but took him into the 
garden, where with his cane he cut off the flowers of the tallest poppies. 
The son understood from this that he should eliminate the leading men of 
the city [but the messenger didn’t get the point]. 
Scholars have sometimes suggested that what Kierkegaard intended to signal by this 
quotation was that the whole of Fear and Trembling was in effect a kind of encoded 
message in this way, a message intended for Regine Olsen, who would somehow be able 
to decipher what it was all about. 
But this won’t work. And even if it does work, it can’t be what Kierkegaard has in mind 
with his “maieutic” method of indirect communication. 
Think through the implications of it. The point of Tarquinius’s behavior was to conceal 
any hint of his true meaning from the messenger; the message was intended only for his 
son. Does that mean then that the “message” of Fear and Trembling was intended solely 
for Regine Olsen, and that the rest of us aren’t supposed to have any clue what the true 
message is? But if that’s what he’s doing, why publish a book at all? Why not just write 
Regine a private letter, or speak to her on the street? Tarquinius resorted to his behavioral 
“code” because he didn’t have the option of communicating in “plain text,” as they call it 
in cryptography. But that’s not Kierkegaard’s situation with Regine. 
Besides, the whole purpose of conveying secrets by “speaking in code” like this is 
defeated if you’re simultaneously publishing a series of “signed works” where the very 
same secrets are publicly blabbed about for all to hear without any encoding at all! 
No, the idea of “indirect communication” as “speaking in code” just doesn’t work very 
well—even if Kierkegaard perhaps does occasionally resort to “codes” like this for other 
purposes. 
(3) Here’s another piece of nonsense, this time taken from Steven M. Emmanuel, 
Kierkegaard & the Concept of Revelation, p. 136: 
‘Becoming’ is, for Kierkegaard, the basic existential category. Subjective 
truth, which is related to becoming, requires an existential appropriation. 
Since subjective truth is an existence [that’s not quite right, although it’s 
true that only “existing” human beings can have or be “in” subjective 
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truth], and existence is a continual process of becoming, such truth cannot 
be directly communicated without thereby falsifying it. 
What is he saying? Is he claiming, with Parmenides and Heraclitus, that we can’t talk 
about “continual processes”? But of course we do that all the time, and do it quite 
straightforwardly. In fact, whole areas of physics and chemistry do so quite precisely and 
clearly. There are, to be sure, deep and profound philosophical problems about change, 
but it isn’t “ineffable.” 
Or is he saying that we can talk about such “continual processes,” but only if we do so 
indirectly? 
Emmanuel quotes a passage from Kierkegaard to support his claim here (p. 136 again): 
As Kierkegaard explains: “Precisely because he himself is constantly in 
process of becoming inwardly or in inwardness, the religious individual 
can never use direct communication, the movement in him being the 
precise opposite of that presupposed in direct communication.”7 
But whatever that last business is supposed to mean, the point here seems to be different 
from what Emmanuel is saying. Kierkegaard’s claim doesn’t seem to be that we can’t 
talk “directly” about processes in general, but rather that we can’t talk “directly” about 
the quite particular process of “becoming inwardly or in inwardness,” whatever that 
means. But whatever it means, Emannuel doesn’t address that point at all in this passage. 
(4) One last example. This is from Michael Strawser’s book Both/And: Reading 
Kierkegaard from Irony to Edification that I mentioned earlier. It’s hard to come up with 
a good quotation from Strawser to illustrate what I find wrong with his view of indirect 
communication, because I think it’s simply unclear what his view of indirect 
communication is. But he does talk a lot, in ways that are familiar through recent writings 
from a semiotic, literary criticism, postmodern point of view (although he nevertheless 
criticizes such approaches) about the intractable problems of interpreting texts—any 
texts, not just Kierkegaard’s—about the inevitable distance between writer and reader, 
about the fallacy of assuming that the writer is always in the best position to say what his 
or her own writings actually mean (as distinct from whatever he may have intended them 
to mean), and so on. 
And he seems to think that this is what “indirect communication” and Kierkegaard’s use 
of pseudonyms are really all about. 
Yes, there are serious problems here. But it seems to me they are all in effect variations 
on the traditional problem of other minds, which has been around since the dawn of 
philosophy. 
                                                 
7 The quotation is from Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 73–74 n. in the Hong & Hong 
translation. 
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It’s a serious problem, no doubt, but it’s a problem that applies to all communication 
among people, not just to what Kierkegaard is doing. So if this is all Kierkegaard has in 
mind when he’s talking about “indirect communication,” then there’s nothing special 
about what Kierkegaard is doing—there’s no particular problem about dealing with his 
writings that isn’t also a problem about dealing with anyone else’s writings. 
But that seems plainly false! Don’t you find him harder to interpret than a lot of other 
things you’ve read? 
Furthermore, this approach seems to suggest that all communication is “indirect 
communication,” so that the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” communication 
completely collapses. 
Now all that may be true, but it certainly isn’t what Kierkegaard says. He clearly thinks 
there is a distinction. 
Sources on indirect communication 
Let’s set all these preconceptions aside, then, and let’s just look at what Kierkegaard 
actually says. 
I want to focus my discussion on four passages in Kierkegaard where he talks more or 
less explicitly about what this “indirect communication” is all about. There are lots of 
others—he talks about it in many places—but I’ll think we’ll see even from these four 
discussions that they are not all the same. Indirect communication isn’t necessarily one 
thing for Kierkegaard. He has quite different pictures in different passages. 
These different “pictures” of what’s going on with “indirect communication” are not 
necessarily incompatible, but some of them may be. We’ll have to see. 
In any event, none of the passages we’ll look at is about ineffability, about 
communicating in code, about the supposed impossibility of talking about things that 
change, or about the problem of other minds in general. 
Here are the texts I want to consider (in the order we’ll be talking about them): 
 The Point of View for My Work as an Author, part of which is included in the 
Bretall volume. (I’ve asked you to read that selection.) This was written in 
1848, but never published during Kierkegaard’s lifetime. 
 A particular passage in Concluding Unscientific Postscript: in the Hong & 
Hong translation, vol. I, pp. 75ff. (Not in the Bretall volume.) The notion of 
indirect communication comes up repeatedly in Postscript, but I want to zero 
in on this one, because I think it is a particularly clear, interesting and 
provocative one. 
 An extremely interesting series of notes in the Journals and Papers (Hong & 
Hong, vol. 1, pp. 267–308, §§ 649–57). These are notes for two “lectures” 
Kierkegaard drafted on the issue of “communication.” In the “Supplement” 
section of the Hong/Hong translation of Works of Love, we read that 
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Kierkegaard had originally planned a series of twelve such “lectures on 
communication,” together with another twelve on love. The twelve on love 
were actually written, and appeared as Works of Love. But the lectures on 
communication were never completed, and we only have the draft notes for 
these two. 
 A discussion in Practice in Christianity, Hong & Hong trans., pp. 133ff. (This 
is not included in the selection in the Bretall volume, where the title of the 
work is translated as Training in Christianity.) Here he links the idea of 
“indirect communication” very tightly with central doctrines of Christianity. 
We won’t have time to go into this passage in detail, but I will say a little 
about it. 
Notice something ironic and perhaps significant: Of the four items on this list, two were 
never published by Kierkegaard at all (Point of View and the Journals), and the two that 
were published were published under pseudonyms. Even when he was considering 
publishing Point of View, he considered for a while publishing it under a pseudonym—
Johannes de silentio! 
Point of View 
You have roughly a quarter of this work in the Bretall volume. 
The full title is: The Point of View for My Work as an Author: A Direct Communication: 
Report to History—except of course that he decided not to publish it, so that as far as he 
was concerned it isn’t really any kind of communication, direct or indirect. 
Even if he had published it, the fact that he says it is a “direct communication” doesn’t by 
itself prove anything. Saying you’re speaking “directly” may just be a peculiarly subtle 
form of indirection. 
In any case, here’s how he begins (Hong & Hong, p. 23—not in Bretall — TEXT (4) ON 
THE HANDOUT): 
A point has been reached in my authorship where it is feasible, where I 
feel a need and therefore regard it now as my duty: once and for all to 
explain as directly and openly and specifically as possible what is what, 
what I say I am as an author. 
He goes on to say that Either/Or is about to be republished in a second edition, and that 
therefore the time is appropriate for him to come clean. “There is a time to be silent and a 
time to speak,” he says (ibid.—Text (5) on the handout). Then (ibid.—Text (6) on the 
handout): 
The content, then, of this little book [= Point of View] is: what I in truth 
am as an author, that I am and was a religious author, that my whole 
authorship pertains to Christianity, to the issue: becoming a Christian, with 
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direct and indirect polemical aim at that enormous illusion, Christendom, 
or the illusion that in such a country [as Denmark] all are Christians of 
sorts. 
In Part One of the book (some extracts are in Bretall, pp. 324–30), he explicitly 
acknowledges authorship of the various writings up to that time (1848),8 divided into two 
groups—the aesthetic and the religious works, with Postscript (1846) presented here as 
being in a category all by itself.9 
He suggests that you might think what has happened here is that you have an author who 
was originally an aesthetic writer, but who “got religion” later on and then became a 
religious author. But, he argues, that’s not what happened at all. Then he points out that 
there were really two series of publications all along—the pseudonymous “aesthetic” 
writings and the signed “religious” writings—and claims that the purpose of the whole 
thing has been religious from the very beginning. (We’ve talked about some of this at the 
very beginning of the course.) 
But the part I want to focus on is Chapter One of Part Two (pieces of which are in 
Bretall). Here he tries to explain why he is playing this tortured roundabout game. 
Right at the beginning of Chap. 1 of Part Two, he asserts (Bretall, p. 330): “That 
‘ChristenDOM’ is a prodigious illusion.” 
Be aware: Christendom is not the same as “Christianity” for Kierkegaard. When he talks 
about “Christianity,” he means the real thing, the kind of religion he’s interested in. 
But when he talks about “Christendom,” he means the established Church—the situation 
he found himself in in Denmark, where everyone was considered to be a “Christian” 
simply by being a citizen of the land. 
What SK is against is the idea of Christianity as a kind of “civic religion.” In the 
Denmark of SK’s day, you couldn’t vote unless you were baptized and confirmed in the 
Danish state church. And if you were baptized and confirmed, then you could consider 
yourself—and everyone else would consider you—a full-fledged “Christian,” with 
nothing more needing to be done. As SK asks (Bretall, p. 330): 
What does it mean that all these thousands and thousands call themselves 
Christians as a matter of course? 
                                                 
8 Oddly, he does not mention A Literary Review (also called Two Ages, or The Present Age), 
presumably because it is “merely” a review and therefore not a “work.” 
9 Note: The listing he gives in the note in Bretall, p. 324, oddly includes the “eighteen edifying 
discourses” among the aesthetic works, even though in the body of the text he describes them as religious. 
Likewise, he lists The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress among the religious works, although he 
also says it is an “aesthetic article” and is treated as an aesthetic piece in the main text of Point of View. I 
think the explanation is that the works listed in the note are given in broadly chronological order. 
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Well, we know that, for SK himself, being a real Christian—having faith—is far from “a 
matter of course.” On the contrary, it was extremely rare. It was something you had to 
work at; you couldn’t achieve it just by going through a few liturgical ceremonies with no 
further commitments whatever. 
The difference between SK’s view of Christianity and the prevailing view in a land where 
everyone thinks of himself as a Christian as a “matter of course” is just the difference 
between Christianity and Christendom for Kierkegaard. 
Now of course Kierkegaard wants people to be Christians—that is, real Christians, not 
the bogus Christians of “Christendom.” As he puts it at the beginning of Part Two 
(Bretall, p. 330), “‘Christendom’ is a prodigious illusion.” 
So what’s he going to do? Well, he says (Bretall, p. 331–32): 
Once in a while there appears a religious enthusiast: he storms against 
Christendom, he vociferates and makes a loud noise, denouncing almost 
all as not being Christians—and accomplishes nothing. He takes no heed 
of the fact that an illusion is not an easy thing to dispel. Supposing now it 
is a fact that most people, when they call themselves Christians, are under 
an illusion—how do they defend themselves against an enthusiast? First 
and foremost, they do not bother about him at all, they do not so much as 
look at his book, they immediately lay it aside  As the next step, they 
spirit him out of the way by carefully defining the whole concept, and 
settle themselves securely in their illusion; they make him a fanatic, his 
Christianity an exaggeration—in the end he remains the only one, or one 
of the few, who is not seriously a Christian (for exaggeration is surely a 
lack of seriousness), whereas the others are all serious Christians. 
No, an illusion can never be destroyed directly, and only by indirect means 
can it be radically removed  it must be done indirectly, not by one who 
vociferously proclaims himself an extraordinary Christian, but by one 
who, better instructed, is ready to declare that he is not a Christian at all. 
We’ll see how Johannes Climacus, the pseudonymous author of Fragments and 
Postscript, claims not to be a Christian himself, but only thinking about Christianity, 
trying to figure it out. Again, we saw how Johannes de silentio, in Fear and Trembling, 
says that he can admire Abraham, but he himself cannot make the “movements” of faith. 
Kierkegaard goes on (Bretall, p. 332): 
That is, one must approach from behind the person who is under an 
illusion. Instead of wishing to have the advantage of being oneself that 
rare thing, a Christian, one must let the prospective captive enjoy the 
advantage of being the Christian, and for one’s own part have resignation 
enough to be the one who is behind him—otherwise one will certainly not 
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get the man out of the illusion, a thing which is difficult enough in any 
case. 
And this is just exactly what Kierkegaard himself does—or at least often does—with his 
“indirect communication.” 
Notice what we have here. In this passage, “indirect communication” is a rhetorical 
strategy, a device one adopts in order to persuade people who would surely not be 
persuaded by “direct” means. 
Here there’s not one word (1) about expressing the “ineffable.” What SK is trying to 
convey “indirectly” is exactly what the “enthusiast” succeeds in saying directly—except 
that the enthusiast fails to accomplish anything by doing it his way. 
Again, there’s not one word here about (2) avoiding the appearance of being 
“systematic,” about (3) the impossibility of discussing processes, about (4) the distance 
between “reader” and “text” or the author’s complete lack of authority in interpreting the 
“meaning” of his or her own texts. 
Among the accounts we talked about earlier, what we find here is closest to the picture of 
concealing secrets by conveying them in code. Certainly the “indirect communicator” is 
trying to conceal something: he’s trying to conceal his intentions and purposes, since if 
he told his audience what he was up to, that he was really trying to convince them of the 
same thing the so called “enthusiast” is saying, he would be dismissed just as the 
“enthusiast” is. 
But the “indirect communicator” is absolutely not trying to conceal the content of his 
message. On the contrary, that’s exactly what he’s trying to communicate. Indirect 
communication, in this passage, is not trying to keep the message itself a secret; on the 
contrary, it’s trying to use the most effective way of getting it across in a persuasive way. 
In short, what we get in Point of View is the picture of indirect communication as a 
practical, strategic device SK adopts for the purpose of finding the most effective way to 
convince people of what he wants to say. The device is necessary because people are 
under an illusion. If they weren’t under that illusion, his message could be conveyed quite 
straightforwardly and directly. And in Point of View, at any rate, this seems to be exactly 
the difference between the “indirect,” pseudonymous writings and the “direct” or signed 
writings, the “Edifying Discourses” and similar texts. 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
All right, now let’s turn to Postscript. As I said earlier, there are lots of places in 
Postscript where SK talks about indirect communication, and in many of them I still 
haven’t figured out what’s going on. But I want to focus on just a single passage, 
beginning on p. 75 in the Hong & Hong translation (not in Bretall). 
This is near the beginning of Part Two, Chapter II “Possible and Actual Theses by 
Lessing.” The first thesis is this (Hong & Hong, p. 72): 
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The subjective existing thinker is aware of the dialectic of communication. 
Then we get a fairly extended discussion of the notion of communication, a discussion 
that runs on for some eight pages. Much of it, I’m afraid, is very obscure, largely because 
it repeatedly appeals to the notion of “double reflection,” which is one of the most 
mysterious expressions in the whole Kierkegaardian vocabulary. (I’ve put it on the list of 
“buzzwords” on the an earlier handout.) 
But in the middle of that discussion, we get this passage (p. 75—Text (7) on the present 
handout): 
To require of a thinker that he contradict his entire thought and his world-
view by the form he gives his communication, to console him by saying 
that in this way he will be beneficial, to let him remain convinced that 
nobody cares about it, indeed, that nobody notices it in these objective 
times, since such extreme conclusions are merely tomfoolery, which every 
systematic day laborer regards as nothing—well, that is good advice, and 
also quite cheap. 
Let’s pause. Note that, so far, this sounds very much like what we’ve already heard from 
Point of View. Remember what SK says there about the “enthusiast” who rants and raves 
about how Christendom is an illusion and who therefore is completely ineffective? He’s 
just dismissed, no one reads his books, he’s regarded as an extremist and not serious. So 
too here: “nobody cares” about the message, “nobody notices” it, its “extreme 
conclusions” are dismissed as mere “tomfoolery.” 
So it seems that we’re in the same ballpark we were in with Point of View. But now we 
get an extremely interesting example (ibid.—Continuation of Text (7)): 
Suppose it was the life-view of a religiously existing subject that one may 
not have followers, that this would be treason to both God and men; 
suppose he were a bit obtuse  and announced this directly with unction 
and pathos—what then? Well, then he would be understood and soon ten 
would apply who, just for a free shave each week, would offer their 
services in proclaiming this doctrine; that is, in further substantiation of 
the truth of his doctrine, he would have been so very fortunate as to gain 
followers who accepted and spread this doctrine about having no 
followers. 
In short, he would have defeated his own purposes. 
Think about this. Here again we don’t get the sense that there’s anything ineffable about 
the message that’s being proclaimed—no more than there was in Point of View. Here 
again, just as Point of View, the problem is not at all that we’re trying to say what cannot 
be said, but rather that we’re trying to do what cannot by done by saying it that way. It’s 
a pragmatic paradox, not any kind of paradox about expressing it. 
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But still, there’s a difference between this picture and the one in Point of View—and for 
that matter between this case and what we were perhaps led to expect by all that stuff at 
the beginning of the passage about nobody’s caring about or even noticing what you’re 
saying. 
Here the danger is not that people are going to dismiss you as an extremist (as in Point of 
View) but, just the opposite, that they’re going to believe you—believe you to such an 
extent that they get on the bandwagon too and become your followers! They believe what 
you want them to believe, but they don’t act the way you want them to act. 
The picture in Point of View of why SK has to resort to “indirect communication” was a 
very different and quite general picture. That situation would arise any time listeners or 
readers were suffering from an illusion that prevented them from taking seriously what 
you were saying. Indirect communication in that case is a matter of getting a foothold, of 
sneaking around the illusion and coming in through the back door. 
It was not so much a matter of what you were trying to say but of the condition of your 
audience, something about them that prevents your proceeding directly. 
Here in Postscript, on the other hand, the point doesn’t seem to have anything to do with 
the condition of the audience. This time it seems to have everything to do with what it is 
you’re trying to say: “Have no followers.” 
This, I suggest, is what’s going on at the end of Postscript where Johannes Climacus 
takes the extraordinary step of revoking everything he’s said (Hong & Hong, p. 619—
Text (8) on the handout): 
Just as in Catholic books, especially from former times, one finds a note at 
the back of the book that notifies the reader that everything is to be 
understood in accordance with the teaching of the holy universal mother 
Church, so also what I write contains the notice that everything is to be 
understood in such a way that it is revoked, that the book has not only an 
end but has a revocation to boot. 
Why revoke it? Because, he says (p. 618—Text (9) on the handout): 
 the book is superfluous. Therefore, let no one bother to appeal to it, 
because one who appeals to it has eo ipso [= by that very fact] 
misunderstood it. To be an authority is much too burdensome an existence 
for a humorist. 
In short, he doesn’t want to be appealed to as an authority; he wants no followers. 
But why not? After all, if he really didn’t want any followers, it would have been easy for 
him not to write the book in the first place. 
The answer is that he thinks it’s very important—vitally important—for people to take 
seriously what he’s saying. He just doesn’t want them to follow him in taking it seriously; 
they must take it seriously on their own. 
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Here’s another “thought experiment” along the same line as the one about having no 
followers (p. 77—Text (10) on the handout): 
Suppose, then, that someone wanted to communicate the following 
conviction: truth is inwardness; objectively there is no truth [SK never 
actually claims that, although he does think that objectively there is no 
truth of the kind he’s interested in], but the appropriation is the truth. 
Suppose he had enough zeal and enthusiasm to get it said, because when 
people heard it they would be saved. Suppose he said it on every occasion 
and moved not only those who sweat easily but also the tough people—
what then? Then there would certainly be some laborers who had been 
standing idle in the marketplace and only upon hearing this call would go 
forth to work in the vineyard—to proclaim this teaching to all people. And 
what then? Then he would have contradicted himself even more, just as he 
had from the beginning, because the zeal and enthusiasm for getting it said 
and getting it heard were already a misunderstanding. The main point was 
indeed to become understood, and the inwardness of the understanding 
would indeed be that the single individual would understand this BY 
HIMSELF. Now he had even gone so far as to obtain barkers, and a barker 
of inwardness is a creature worth seeing. 
There you have it. Kierkegaard does want people to understand his message—and even 
understand it in the sense of internalizing and acting on it. But he doesn’t want them to 
get that from him, but rather on their own. 
He wants them to do the work! In a way, this is all of a piece with what we what we were 
talking about in connection with truth as subjectivity, and even more with faith. 
Kierkegaard was interested in those notions because there the energy, the force of 
commitment has to come from you, not from the force of the evidence for what you’re 
committed to. So too here. He doesn’t want you to become convinced of—even 
passionately committed to—what he’s saying because he was so good at saying it, at 
presenting the case. In that case, the passion doesn’t really come from you. 
Two Lectures on Communication 
The two lectures on communication, contained in the Hong & Hong translation of the 
Journals and Papers, vol. 1, pp. 267–308, §§ 649–57,contain an odd and tremendously 
interesting discussion of indirect communication. (It would be good to go dig up a copy 
of these “lectures” and read them now. But if you can’t do that, or just don’t want to, just 
pay attention to the following paragraphs.) 
As I said earlier, they are notes and drafts for two lectures Kierkegaard never gave (and 
it’s not clear he ever intended to give them). They come from 1847, which means they 
are after Postscript (published in February of 1846) and before Point of View (written in 
1848 but never published during his life). 
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If you’ve read through the Lectures, you’ll know that they are fragmentary and repetitive 
at the beginning. He’s obviously just jotting things down and then re-working them, 
adding material, and so forth. But by the time you get toward the end of the material, 
you’re getting some fairly coherent, sustained prose. 
The discussion in these Lectures presents a somewhat different take from what we’ve 
seen so far. 
(I’ll be giving references by section and subsection numbers in the Hong & Hong edition. 
The passage as a whole runs from § 649 to § 657, with most of the sections further 
divided into numbered subsections. I’ll also give you the page number to the Hong & 
Hong volume.) 
At the beginning of the passage (§ 649.1, p. 267)), the topic under discussion is what he 
calls the “delusion and confusion of the modern age.” (Note that this will turn out to be 
not quite the same as the “prodigious illusion” mentioned in Point of View.) Here he says 
(§ 649.5, p. 268): 
More specifically, that the distinction between art and science has been 
forgotten. Everything has become science and scholarship, and art is 
understood only esthetically as fine art [that is, as something to STUDY]. 
But there is a whole aspect of art which science and scholarship have 
taken possession of—or wish to take possession of—this is the ethical. 
The ethical is indifferently related to knowledge; that is, it assumes that 
every human being knows it. 
Then a few lines later (ibid., p. 269): 
 this is the confusion of the modern age, that the ethical is 
communicated as scholarship and science. 
There’s a lot built into this. 
First of all, ethics is a kind of ART. He doesn’t mean “art” in the sense of painting or 
sculpture, but “art” in the sense of the Greek ‘technē’—that is, a skill, a craft. 
Furthermore, note the claim that ethics assumes that every human being knows it. That is, 
an ethical “sense” is in effect innate in all of us, whether we live in accordance with that 
sense or not. (We call it “conscience.”) 
(Note this claim well.  It will be crucial when we come to talk about Fragments soon.) 
Now what does he mean when he says that the confusion of the modern age is that “the 
ethical is communicated as scholarship and science”? Well, basically, he’s talking about 
the old Socratic question “Can virtue be taught?” 
Does taking a course in, say, business ethics make you an honest businessperson—a more 
ethical human being? Like Socrates, Kierkegaard’s answer is no—and even, “No, of 
course not.” You’ll know more about ethics, perhaps—if it’s a good course—but you 
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won’t necessarily know ethics any better, in the sense of being any the more ethical 
personally. That’s a totally different issue. 
Kierkegaard gives an example—it’s an example he returns to several times throughout 
these lectures (ibid., p. 269): 
The military assumes that every country lad who comes into military 
service possesses the necessary capacities to stick it out. Therefore he is 
first of all examined so that there be no difficulties in this respect [he’s 
given a physical] (in the same way the ethical assumes that everyone 
knows what the ethical is). [OK. The ethical and the army start in the same 
place.] Now the communication begins. The corporal does not EXPLAIN to 
the soldier what it is to drill, etc.; he COMMUNICATES it to him as an art, he 
teaches him to use MILITARILY the abilities and the potential competence 
he ALREADY has. 
And this is the way the ethical must be communicated. If one begins first 
of all with a course to instill the ethical into the individual, then the 
communication never becomes ethical and the relationship is disturbed 
from the beginning [because ethics assumes you’ve already got that.] 
In § 649.14, p. 272, SK gives an amusing example of what can result from this confusion: 
An example of the misunderstanding through conceiving instruction aimed 
at capability [that is, aimed at ART] as instruction in knowledge [in 
“science” or “scholarship”]. A sergeant in the National Guard says to a 
recruit: “You there, stand up straight.” Recruit: “Sure enough.” Sergeant: 
“Yes, and don’t talk during drill.” Recruit: “All right, I won’t if you’ll just 
tell me.” Sergeant: “What the devil! You are not supposed to talk during 
drill!” Recruit: “Well, don’t get so mad. If I know I’m not supposed to, I’ll 
quit talking during drill.” 
What does all this have to do with “indirect communication”? Well, let’s see. Early on in 
these Lectures (§ 649.7, p. 270), we get a discussion of communication as involving three 
categories: (1) the teacher, (2) the pupil, and (3) the object of teaching (= what is being 
taught). In other words, (1) the communicator, (2) the one who receives the 
communication, and (3) what it is that’s being communicated. 
(Notice, incidentally, how communicating has become teaching in this discussion. It’s not 
just a matter of saying something and having your listener understand you. No, you have 
to give your listeners something new they didn’t have before. Again, watch for this in 
Fragments.) 
Later on in these Lectures, in the more fully developed drafts, these three components 
become four (§ 651, p. 281): the communicator, the receiver, the object, and the 
communication itself (the activity). But let’s just keep it simple, and stay with the three 
we already have. 
 118
He says (§ 649.9, p. 271): 
Let us now make an experiment and assume that there is an object or a 
knowledge which we all have. [And recall that ETHICS assumes that EVERY 
HUMAN BEING KNOWS IT.] What would be the implications for the 
dialectical in communication? [In other words, what happens when we are 
talking about communication/teaching ethically?] 
Well, (1) the third category—the object communicated—drops out of the picture, since if 
everybody knows it already, one person can hardly communicate (i. e., teach) it to 
another. For the same reason, (2) the second category—the receiver—drops out as well, 
since you can’t get what you’ve already got. And so too, (3) the first category—the 
communicator (= teacher)—drops out, since there’s nothing to communicate and no one 
to communicate it to. Thus (ibid.): 
The only communicator remaining would be the one who had given all 
men this knowledge 
Or (§ 649.11, p. 272): 
There remains only one communicator: God. 
(If you know your history of medieval philosophy, you will perhaps recognize that this is 
beginning to sound an awful lot like St. Augustine’s theory of illumination, which was in 
effect his answer to the famous slave-boy passage in Plato’s Meno, and to the Platonic 
theory of Recollection. All that is correct, and all that is coming back—and all that we’ll 
talk about in connection with Philosophical Fragments.) 
But notice: This holds only if we’re talking about something every human being already 
knows—like the ethical. 
And we’ve been talking about it as if the task of the communicator is to give that 
knowledge to the listener, who therefore doesn’t already have it. Hence, only God is a 
communicator. 
In that case (§ 649.12, p. 272): 
We have now thought through the dialectic of communication as 
knowledge and have seen that it is done away with [if we’re talking about 
communicating the ethical]. Now follows a new conception of 
communication. 
OK, so let’s change the notion of “communication” then. Let’s not think so much of 
imparting some new information to the receiver of the communication—that is, of 
putting something into the receiver—but of bringing something out, in the sense in which 
we speak of a sculptor as “bringing out” of the block of marble the figure that was 
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already latently present within it. It’s a question now of the realization of something 
that’s already potentially there. In the case of the ethical (§ 649, 13, p. 272): 
The object of the communication is consequently not a knowledge but  a 
realization. 
Communication in that case is a whole different kind of process. And this process is what 
he calls indirect communication in these Lectures. The difference between direct and 
indirect communication, on this picture then, is the difference between imparting facts 
and developing the student’s skills. Or, if we want to put it in more modern lingo, it’s the 
difference between teaching that such and such is so and teaching how to do such and 
such. 
Now this is something we haven’t really seen earlier in the other discussions we’ve 
considered. You might think it’s implicit in Postscript, with its emphasis on getting your 
listeners to come to the same result on their own.  But in any case, it’s not really put like 
this in Postscript or in anything else we’ve looked at. 
There are some passages in these lectures that don’t seem to fit this picture (of the 
distinction between knowing that and knowing how), and that sound more like what we 
saw in Point of View. For example, (§ 649.22, p. 274): 
All indirect communication is different from direct communication in that 
indirect communication first of all involves a deception—simply because 
an attempt to communicate the ethical directly would mean to deceive. 
If you think about it, that doesn’t make a lot of sense. To try do it the wrong way 
(directly) would be a deception; therefore, the right way to do it also involves a 
deception? He seems to be thinking here—as he thinks in Point of View but as we have 
not seen so far in these Lectures—that to communicate indirectly (here, to impart a skill) 
means first of all to disabuse the student of certain illusions. And that perhaps involves 
“deceiving a person into the truth.” While this may be true, if it is true it tells us 
something about the nature of modern society or the condition of the audience (that they 
are “under an illusion”—not about the nature of “communication” in general. 
There’s one last point I want to make about these Lectures, although we could spend a lot 
more time on them. In § 650.13, p. 279, we get an extremely important claim: 
The difference between upbringing [i. e., training] in the ethical and 
upbringing in the ethical-religious is simply this—that the ethical is the 
universally human itself [we’ve already seen that claim in FT, and in the 
view that everyone knows the ethical], but religious (Christian) upbringing 
must first of all communicate a knowledge. Ethically man as such knows 
about the ethical, but man as such does not know about the religious in the 
Christian sense. Here there must be the communication of a little 
knowledge first of all—but then the same relationship as in the ethical 
enters in  
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What he has in mind here is the idea that Christianity is a religion that depends essentially 
on a historical claim—that God became a human being, that this actually happened 
historically. While ethics may be in some sense innate in all of us, that historical claim is 
emphatically not innate. That’s something we have to be told, and that’s a matter of 
imparting a factual knowledge we didn’t have before. But once we are told that (and 
presumably once we believe it), then we’re back in the business of developing a skill. 
What Kierkegaard is acknowledging here is the fact that Christianity is a historical 
religion, centered around certain events in the past. That’s why we need the Scriptures, 
for instance—so we’ll be able to know about those events. 
But the actual content of those Scriptures, the actual details of the events they record, is 
for the most part completely irrelevant. What we need on that score is very minimal. 
There’s a striking passage in Fragments that drives this point home very forcefully (Hong 
& Hong, pp. 103–04—not in Bretall—Text (11) on the handout): 
The heart of the matter is the historical fact that the god has been in human 
form, and the other historical details are not even as important as they 
would be if the subject were a human being instead of the god. Lawyers 
say that a capital crime absorbs all the lesser crimes—so also with faith: 
its absurdity completely absorbs minor matters. Discrepancies, which 
usually are disturbing, do not disturb here and do not matter. However, it 
does matter very much if by means of pretty-minded calculation someone 
wants to offer faith to the highest bidder; it matters so much that he never 
comes to faith. 
What he’s talking about here is the worry people sometimes have over reconciling the 
various discrepancies in the Gospels, for instance—getting all the facts straight, perhaps 
supplementing the Scriptures themselves with appropriate philological or archeological 
research. 
Kierkegaard (actually, Johannes Climacus in Fragments) says he stands second to none 
in his admiration and respect for serious scholarship of that kind. But it doesn’t help one 
bit when the question is about how we come to faith. And now we get the striking part 
(ibid., p. 104—Text (12) on the handout): 
Even if the contemporary generation [i. e., contemporary with Jesus, 
contemporary with the events recorded] had not left anything behind 
except these words, “We have believed that in such and such a year the 
god appeared in the humble form of a servant, lived and taught among us, 
and then died”—this is more than enough. The contemporary generation 
would have done what is needful, for this little announcement, this world-
historical nota bene, is enough to become an occasion for someone who 
comes later, and the most prolix report can never in all eternity become 
more for the person who comes later. 
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As a little digression here, notice some things about this passage. 
First, this passage confirms something you begin to sense from a reading of Kierkegaard 
generally: that for him, the main doctrine in Christianity is the Incarnation, and NOT the 
Resurrection. St. Paul says (I Cor. 15:13–14) that if Jesus did not rise from the dead, then 
our faith is in vain. But not for Johannes Climacus. The little report he says would have 
been more than enough has not one word in it about the Resurrection! 
Second and even more shocking, notice that there’s nothing in the passage to require that 
this little report from the contemporary generation even be true. We just have to have the 
report. And for that matter, this “more than enough” report doesn’t even come right out 
and affirm that the events actually took place. All it says is that “we have believed” them. 
End of digression. 
Conclusion 
What picture of “indirect communication” then do we get from these Lectures? Well, we 
get a fairly clear distinction between knowledge that such and such is so and knowledge 
how to do such and such—between factual knowledge and mastering a skill—and the 
identification of indirect communication with teaching the latter. This is something we’ve 
not found in the other texts we’ve looked at. 
There is still nothing here about the ineffable—at least not unless we want to say that any 
real skill is ineffable because it can’t be acquired just by listening to a lecture. Is 
gymnastics then ineffable? Perhaps, if you want to insist, but not in any very mysterious 
or “lofty” sense. 
We also don’t see anything here that’s especially secret—any more than gymnastics is a 
“secret.” It’s only secret, concealed, and can’t be communicated if you try to 
communicate it the wrong way, as if it were a matter of factual knowledge rather than a 
skill. 
On the other hand, there are some features of this account that don’t sit well with other 
things we know about Kierkegaard. For example, in these Lectures Kierkegaard several 
times suggests that in order to communicate a skill, you must possess the skill yourself 
and must in fact practice it in the process of teaching it to others. In gymnastics, he says, 
the teacher displays and exercises the gymnastic skill in the process of teaching others to 
acquire it (§ 649.21, pl. 274). 
Yet he himself is trying to teach the skill of Christianity to others, whereas he repeatedly 
protests—both in his pseudonymous and in his signed works—that he himself is not a 
Christian but only at best becoming one. 
It may be possible to reconcile this, but it’s something to think about. 
Practice in Christianity 
Lastly, I want to look very briefly at Practice in Christianity (Bretall: Training in 
Christianity)—published in 1850, and generally regarded as SK’s last great work. 
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There is a discussion of roughly twenty pages in the Hong & Hong translation (pp. 124–
44) that is a very interesting treatment of the notion of a sign and of indirect 
communication. What we get here is something we haven’t seen in anything we’ve 
looked at so far—the direct and explicit connection between these notions and the central 
doctrine of Christianity, in SK’s view: the Incarnation. 
For SK, the Incarnation itself, the life and message of Jesus, is preeminently an indirect 
communication from God. In these pages, we get section titles like these: 
 “The Impossibility of Direct Communication” (that is, direct communication of 
certain things). 
 “In Christ the Secret of Sufferings Is the Impossibility of Direct Communication.” 
 “The Possibility of Offense Is to Deny Direct Communication.” 
 “To Deny Direct Communication is To Require Faith.” 
I’m not going to go into any of this here, except to observe that in these sections we get a 
much more metaphysical and theological notion of indirect communication than in 
anything we’ve seen so far. Suddenly, everything becomes very concrete. 
It’s not clear to me yet to what extent the notion of indirect communication we get here is 
like what we’ve seen already. My initial sense is that it’s really a quite new picture, but 
I’ve not yet worked all that out. 
Before turning to something entirely new, however, I want to emphasize that I agree with 
the general consensus that Practice in Christianity is one of SK’s genuinely great works! 
It’s not only deep and profound, but also good to read. 
Summary 
OK, now we’ve looked at four different places where SK talks about “indirect 
communication” in some detail. Let’s summarize what we’ve seen. 
 In Point of View, we saw the view that “indirect communication” was a strategic 
device, what might be viewed as a rhetorical strategy of communicating things 
your audience is not antecedently prepared to hear. First they have to be disabused 
of their illusion, and only then—once those obstacles have been cleared away—
will they be in a position to realize the truth of what you’re communicating. In 
Point of View, indirect communication is a very general notion that has nothing 
especially to do with what you’re trying to communicate but only with the 
condition of your audience. 
 In Postscript, in at least some passages, we get, on the contrary, a picture of 
indirect communication as having everything to do with the content of your 
message, and nothing especially to do with obstacles posed by the position of 
your audience. (Recall the doctrine that you should “have no followers.”) We also 
get at least the beginnings of another theme: that indirect communication is to be 
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used when you want your audience not only to agree with you—that is, to hold 
the same convictions you hold—but to come to agree with you ON THEIR OWN, not 
because you convinced them of it. This is the business of getting your hearer or 
reader to do the work on his or her own. 
 In the Two Lectures on Communication we get a development of the idea that the 
difference between direct and indirect communication amounts to the distinction 
between teaching facts (what SK calls teaching “science and scholarship”) and 
teaching a skill. The former can be pounded in to people, but the latter must be 
pounded out—that is, brought out—and must therefore be in some sense latently 
present in there to begin with. Ethics, we are told, is not a science but a skill—it’s 
something you do, not something you learn. Hence ethics must be at least latently 
present in all of us. Similarly, Kierkegaard says, although Christianity has a 
factual claim as a central kernel, it is not a doctrine but a way of life, a practice. 
This is  very much like what we saw in Postscript with its emphasis on getting 
your audience to do things on their own. But there it was more a matter of getting 
your audience to hold the same convictions you do—that is, a matter of what they 
believe—than of getting them to acquire a skill. (At least it was in the passage we 
looked at, although Postscript as a whole probably ends up more like the Two 
Lectures.) 
 Finally, we touched quickly on Practice in Christianity, where we see the claim 
that the Incarnation, the central doctrine in Christianity, in SK’s view, it itself an 
indirect communication of the highest order. We won’t talk any more about that 
now, but instead turn to a new but related cluster of topics. 
  
Kierkegaard’s “epistemology” 
This new cluster of topics is what the tentative “Schedule” in the Syllabus describes as 
“Kierkegaard’s religious epistemology,” and I’ll be talking about them for the next few 
lectures. Among the topics that come together under this heading are: 
 Teaching and learning. (We’ve just seen some discussion of that Two Lectures 
on Communication). 
 Recollection vs. something SK calls “repetition,” another very mysterious 
notion in Kierkegaard. 
 The notion of “offense,” which seems to be an important and central notion in 
Kierkegaard. 
 The “moment,” likewise an important and central notion. 
 The notion of being “contemporary” with something. 
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All this is a bit of a grab-bag, and to some extent our discussion of it will be a bit of a 
grab-bag too. I’m not in a position to weave all these things together in a way that I’m 
confident of and that satisfies me. So I’ll just be able to highlight certain things and do 
the best I can. It will be something of a tangled web. 
The central work I want to focus on in this section of the course is Philosophical 
Fragments, a fairly good selection from which is in the Bretall volume. Related to 
Fragments, I also want you to look at the selections from Repetition and Practice in 
Christianity in Bretall. 
Fragments was published in 1844—just four days before The Concept of Anxiety, which 
is the next major thing we’ll look at. Fragments is attributed to Johannes Climacus, who 
is also the author of Postscript, which was published some two years later in 1846. In 
fact, the full title of Postscript is Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical 
Fragments. 
The two works are not just presented as being by the same (pseudonymous) author, but 
are also presented as being of a piece, part of a single project. 
Fragments repeatedly describes itself as “only a pamphlet,” which is in a sense correct. It 
prints up to slightly over a hundred pages. It’s the first of the so called “algebraic” works
—fairly short, theoretical and concise. (They read much more like what we normally 
think of as “philosophical” texts—“much more,” but it’s still Kierkegaard, after all.) The 
other “algebraic” works are The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness unto Death, both of 
which we’ll read in full. 
The conspicuous contrast between the relatively slim Fragments and the absolutely 
enormous Postscript to it is deliberate. In Postscript he mocks the Hegelians who were 
constantly going around talking breathlessly about the system as something that was for 
all intents and purposes completed. There are a few loose ends that still have to be tied 
up, of course, but that won’t take long. It’s as good as done. Any day now, “by Sunday at 
the latest,” as SK puts it at one point. All we need is a little “postscript” tacked on to the 
end of the system. 
So he publishes not a grand philosophical system but a modest book called Philosophical 
Fragments—and then follows it up with a “postscript” that’s about six times the size of 
the original. 
But make no mistake about it. Small as it is, Fragments is a dense and enormously 
rewarding book. 
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The title and the statement of the problem 
Remember some time ago when I mentioned a short article in the Times Literary 
Supplement (1997) by one M. G. Piety, a kind of review of the Hong & Hong set of 
translations.10 
Well, Piety has some interesting things to say about the translation of Philosophical 
Fragments. First of all the title11: 
That is, the motivation for translating a philosophical text is very often the 
belief of the translator that he can improve on an existing translation and 
thus put the reader in a closer relation to the original text. This implies, of 
course, that the translator is already familiar with the work in translation, 
and this familiarity can affect his understanding of the original text. He 
may unconsciously impose earlier translations on this text and, if he is 
unfortunate, repeat some of the mistakes of these earlier translations. 
This is probably the explanation behind the fact that Philosophiske Smuler 
is translated by Howard and Edna Hong as Philosophical Fragments in the 
new edition. The Latinate “Fragmenter” was common in scholarly and 
philosophical writing in Denmark in the nineteenth century. It was not this 
expression Kierkegaard chose, however, for what was to become one of 
his most important philosophical works, but the less pretentious “Smuler”. 
“Smuler” means scraps or crumbs, thus Philosophiske Smuler is properly 
translated as Philosophical Crumbs. This may seem like a minor point, 
and indeed many Kierkegaard scholars would prefer the title to remain 
Philosophical Fragments. The difficulty is that this obscures the fact that 
the title is clearly an allusion to a popular Danish saying: “Smuler er også 
brød” (Crumbs are also bread), which is, in turn, an allusion to Matthew 
15:27—something which is certainly relevant to an understanding of the 
substance of the text. 
The passage in question is this (Mat. 15:22–28): 
Just then a Canaanite woman from that region came out and started 
shouting, “Have mercy on me, Lord, Son of David; my daughter is 
tormented by a demon.” But he did not answer her at all. And his disciples 
came and urged him, saying, “Send her away, for she keeps shouting after 
us.” He answered, “I was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel” 
[that is, not to this Canaanite woman]. But she came and knelt before him, 
saying, “Lord, help me.” He answered, “It is not fair to take the children’s 
food and throw it to the dogs” [that is, to mere Canaanites]. She said, 
                                                 
10 M. G. Piety, “The dangers of clarity,” TLS April 18, 1997, pp. 8–10. 
11 Ibid., p. 8. 
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“Yes, Lord, yet even the dogs eat the crumbs that fall from their masters’ 
table.” Then Jesus answered here, “Woman, great is your faith! Let it be 
done for you as you wish.” And her daughter was healed instantly. 
The review goes on to suggest why knowledge of this fact might help in understanding 
what’s going on in the book. You may want to look at that part of the review; I don’t find 
it altogether convincing. 
But, in any event, I want to call attention to another passage from the review. This is a 
fairly extended quotation and, again, I’m not sure how much it really matters in the long 
run, but it will serve to lead us in to the contents of the book. Piety says (p. 8): 
The influence of earlier translations probably also accounts for the fact 
that the question with which the new translation [i.e., the Hongs’] of the 
Crumbs or Fragments begins is: “Can the truth be learned?” rather than 
“Can the truth be taught?” [Recall in particular the Two Lectures on 
Communication that we’ve just been through, which were largely about 
teaching.] Danish has only one word, “lære” for both “teach” and “learn”; 
it is thus up to the translator to determine which translation is appropriate 
in a given context. David Swenson, who produced the first English 
translation [of Fragments] in 1939, chose “learned,” and the Hongs 
followed his example both in their revision of the Swenson translation 
[which is the one we have in the Bretall volume] in 1962 and in the new 
Princeton translation in 1985. 
There is considerable evidence, however, that the concern of the Crumbs 
is not whether the truth can be learned, but whether it can be taught. 
[Again, remember how in the Two Lectures the discussion of 
“communication” got transformed into a discussion of teaching.] 
Kierkegaard criticizes [in Fragments] the “Socratic” interpretation of the 
relation of the individual to the truth, on the grounds that it deprives both 
the teacher and the moment at which the truth is learned of any real 
significance. The alternative—i. e., Christian—interpretation invests the 
teacher with what Kierkegaard calls “decisive significance,” yet according 
to this interpretation, he argues, the teacher [i.e., Christ] “is not a teacher.” 
That is, Christ, asserts Kierkegaard, “goes beyond the definition of a 
teacher.” 
One of the most important issues in both the Crumbs and its companion 
volume, the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, is whether there can be an 
intermediary between the believer and Christ, whether Christian truth can 
be passed down from one individual or generation to another. That is, one 
of the most important issues treated in these works is whether Christianity 
is a doctrine that can be taught in the conventional sense. Kierkegaard’s 
conclusion is an unequivocal No. 
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Piety has recently published a translation of what she calls “Philosophical Crumbs,” 
along with a translation of Repetition in the “Oxford World Classics” series, and Alastair 
Hannay has even more recently published a complete translation of Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Crumbs with Cambridge. 
In my own view, “Philosophical Crumbs” just sounds funny, which the title doesn’t 
sound in Danish. I would suggest “bits” instead. 
The issue 
OK, now let’s talk about what goes on in this book. As the TLS review indicates, the 
main issue in Fragments is whether “truth” can be learned or taught. And it comes up 
right at the beginning, in a section entitled “A Project of Thought”—in other words, a 
“thought experiment.” Johannes Climacus throughout the book carefully refrains from 
asserting any particular view. It’s all hypothetical—all a “what if”? (Bretall, p. 154) 
How far does the Truth admit of being learned [taught(?)]? With this 
question let us begin. It was a Socratic question, or became such in 
consequence of the parallel Socratic question with respect to virtue. 
A digression on Socrates and Plato 
The reference is to Plato’s Meno, where there is a long discussion of just that: whether 
virtue can be taught. If no one knowingly does evil (a common Socratic theme), so that 
evil-doing arises out of ignorance and confusion, then—conversely—virtue (doing good 
reliably) must involve a kind of knowledge. But if virtue is a kind of knowledge, we 
would expect to find teachers of it, like other branches of knowledge. And if there were 
teachers of virtue, we would expect virtuous parents to go to great lengths, to spare no 
expense, to hire those teachers—the very best ones—to teach virtue to their children. And 
so we would expect the children of virtuous parents to be conspicuously virtuous 
themselves. 
But we don’t find that. In fact, we often find just the contrary. So something’s obviously 
wrong, and we need to discuss things. 
We’ve already seen exactly this issue come up the Two Lectures on Communication, 
where, recall, Kierkegaard said “this is the confusion of the modern age, that the ethical is 
communicated as scholarship and science”—that is, people try to communicate it that 
way, but that’s a “confusion,” and it doesn’t work. 
Now, in the Meno, the discussion soon shifts from being about teaching virtue in 
particular to being about teaching (or learning) anything at all—not just virtue, not just 
ethics, but anything. 
And why is there that more general problem? Well, now we get the famous “slave-boy” 
passage in the Meno. 
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Socrates calls over one of Meno’s slave-boys who has never been instructed in 
mathematics or geometry. In particular, he certainly doesn’t know the Pythagorean 
Theorem. (Actually, in the Meno itself, it’s a variation of the Pythagorean Theorem, but 
never mind.) Socrates verifies this by drawing diagrams in the dust and asking various 
questions that would require the slave-boy to know the Pythagorean Theorem—and the 
slave-boy keeps giving the wrong answers. 
Yet, by asking him further questions (Socrates very carefully does not tell the slave-boy 
anything, but only asks him questions), Socrates gets the slave-boy into a position where 
he finally does come up with the Pythagorean Theorem and can give right answers now. 
With this, Socrates triumphantly says: Look, a moment ago the slave-boy didn’t know the 
Pythagorean Theorem, and now he does. Yet I haven’t taught him anything, in the sense 
of giving him anything he didn’t have before—all I did was ask him questions. 
At this point, most initial readers of the Meno have an obvious objection: Yes, you just 
asked him questions—but they were obviously leading questions. You fed him the 
answers! You were in effect saying things like, “The square of the hypotenuse is equal to 
the sum of the squares of the other two sides, isn’t it?” And of course the poor, 
intimidated kid is going to agree. No, you fed him the answers, even if you disguised 
them in the form of questions. 
But, while Plato certainly writes the dialogue to encourage that initial impression—it’s a 
trap. Because look: If that is what’s happening, then it’s still true that Socrates hasn’t 
taught the slave-boy anything. The slave-boy doesn’t really know the Pythagorean 
Theorem at the end any more than he did at the outset. He’s willing to agree with 
anything Socrates suggests. He’s answering not on the basis of any real insight or 
knowledge, but simply because of Socrates’s authority or charisma or whatever. 
As I said, Plato certainly writes to reinforce that initial impression. But—what if the 
slave-boy isn’t doing that? What if he’s answering honestly and candidly, and not 
agreeing unless he really does have that insight—really does “see the point”? 
In that case, and only in that case, does the slave-boy appear to have really “learned” 
anything, but he certainly didn’t learn it from Socrates. All Socrates did was to direct his 
attention along certain paths. He didn’t—and couldn’t—have given the slave-boy insight. 
That the slave-boy had to do on his own. 
Socrates’s role is purely that of a kind of midwife—someone who can help others give 
birth (in this case, to come up with knowledge), even if she doesn’t—or can’t—“give 
birth” herself. It’s a “maieutic” method. For that matter, Socrates himself need not 
personally know the Pythagorean Theorem; he doesn’t even have to believe it. All he has 
to know is how to point other people in the right direction, and then they can do it on 
their own. 
All of this, of course, should sound familiar: the maieutic method, doing it on your own. 
We’ve seen these themes in Kierkegaard too—in the Two Lectures on Communication, 
and in some passages from Postscript. 
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Now—the crucial step: Socrates concludes that since the slave-boy obviously does have 
that knowledge now, and since he didn’t get it from Socrates except as a mere catalyst to 
the process that was taking place in the slave-boy, he must in some sense have known it 
all along. 
He knew it, but implicitly, latently. He knew it but had forgotten it. And what we 
normally call “teaching” (what Socrates was doing there with the diagrams in the dust) is 
really just a process of reminding the pupil of something he or she already knew. 
As a result, we get the famous Platonic Theory of Recollection or “Reminiscence”—that 
what we normally call “teaching” is really just reminding, and what we normally call 
“learning” is really just remembering—“recollection.” 
And then Plato goes on (in the Phaedo, for instance) to use these considerations to mount 
an argument for the immortality of the soul. Since the slave-boy had been totally 
uneducated (and therefore didn’t originally acquire knowledge of the Pythagorean 
Theorem in this life and then forget it), and since Socrates obviously hasn’t put that 
knowledge into the slave-boy for the first time (he only asked questions), therefore the 
slave-boy could only have acquired that knowledge originally before his soul was 
implanted in his body down here in the material world. Hence, his soul once existed apart 
from the body—and therefore, there’s no reason to think it can’t do so again. 
But we don’t have to follow Plato further along these paths.  Let’s turn back to 
Kierkegaard. 
Application to Kierkegaard 
All this should sound familiar—not just from what you perhaps already know about Plato 
but from what we’ve seen so far with Kierkegaard. We know Kierkegaard often describes 
his own method as a “maieutic” one, explicitly appealing to the “midwife” metaphors in 
Plato. And remember the difference in Two Lectures between the drill sergeant’s 
pounding something into the recruit (the factual details of the field manual, for instance) 
and his pounding something out of him—in the sense of drawing it out—for example, 
making an actual soldier out of the farm boy. 
Remember also how, in order to pound something out like this, it has to be at least 
potentially or latently present to begin with—in Platonic terms, “learning” is just 
recollection of something you already knew but had forgotten. 
And remember how, from Two Lectures, the ethical somehow assumes that everybody 
already knows it. The military assumes all the recruits “have what it takes” to be a 
soldier. 
The task of Fragments 
OK, now we’re set for the task of Fragments. Fragments is in effect Kierkegaard’s 
answer to the Meno. 
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Suppose all that’s FALSE. Suppose the “truth” is not already in us. Suppose “recollection” 
fails—that’s not what’s involved in what we call “learning” in this life. Bretall, p. 157: 
Now if things are to be otherwise  
Well, on the Socratic-Platonic picture, the so called “teacher” (Socrates) is completely 
incidental to the process of “learning” (= recollection). All he did was remind the slave-
boy of what the latter already knew  but had forgotten. 
If something else had served as a “reminder,” it would have been the same. If shapes in 
the clouds, the Manhattan telephone book—or whatever—had served to remind the slave-
boy, the outcome would have been the same. In short, there’s nothing special about 
Socrates here. In a sense, the slave-boy doesn’t come away really owing very much to 
Socrates. 
By the same token, the particular moment when the slave-boy recollects the Pythagorean 
Theorem is, in a sense, purely incidental. The Pythagorean Theorem, after all, is a kind of 
timeless, “eternal” truth, and the knowledge of it has been lying dormant and latent in the 
slave-boy all these years. So the particular moment when that latent knowledge becomes 
realized is purely incidental; any time would be just as good as any other. Bretall, p. 156: 
From the standpoint of the Socratic thought every point of departure in 
time is eo ipso [by that very fact] accidental, an occasion, a vanishing 
moment. The teacher himself is no more than this; and if he offers himself 
and his instruction on any other basis, he does not give but takes away   
[= that is, he DECEIVES and makes matters worse], he is not even the 
other’s friend, much less his teacher. 
Now the question of Fragments is: What if all that is false? (Cf. Bretall, p. 157: “If things 
are to be otherwise …”) What if we don’t already have the knowledge latently within us? 
What if the slave-boy doesn’t already know the Pythagorean Theorem, even latently or 
implicitly? What if the Socratic picture is false? 
Well then, Socrates’s role is even less. No matter what he does, he can’t give that sense 
of insight—of RECOGNITION—to the slave-boy. That’s something that has to come from 
within the slave-boy himself. And if the slave-boy doesn’t have even an implicit, latent 
prior knowledge of what he comes to recognize, then Socrates certainly can’t point him 
in the right direction, can’t remind him. There’s nothing to be reminded of! The condition 
presupposed before Socrates can do his job is not there, and Socrates himself can’t 
provide the condition. (So too with the military.) 
In other words, in that case, Socrates can’t even play the role of a midwife. He just plays 
no role at all and is utterly irrelevant to the story. 
In a case like that, if nevertheless the slave-boy does come to have knowledge of the 
Pythagorean Theorem where he didn’t have it before—not even implicitly or latently—
then something utterly different is happening. In that case the “teacher,” if there is one—
it isn’t Socrates, but whoever puts that knowledge into the slave-boy’s head—is not just 
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someone who reminds. No, in that case the real teacher is not just a mere occasion any 
longer, but absolutely critical to the whole process. He will be the one who gives the 
slave-boy the very condition that will allow him to recognize and come to terms with the 
Pythagorean Theorem. On the Theory of Recollection, the slave-boy owes his so called 
“teacher” Socrates very little; on this new (non-Socratic) picture, he owes the real teacher 
absolutely EVERYTHING. 
The “moment” 
By the same token, Kierkegaard will hold, the moment when that knowledge is put into 
us becomes absolutely critical too. It’s no longer the case that one time is just as good as 
any other. I confess I don’t really see this point very clearly, but it’s part and parcel of the 
notion of the moment that keeps coming up in Kierkegaard. 
And now let me say a little about this notion of “the moment.” The Danish word here is 
‘øjeblikket’, which, just like the German ‘Augenblick,’ really means “blink of the eye” 
(“twinkling of an eye”). It’s also translated ‘instant’, and this may help us pin it down. 
In The Concept of Anxiety, which we’ll be looking at in a little while, there is a fairly 
extended discussion of “the moment.” There (Hong & Hong, pp. 82–91 and elsewhere) 
we get the notion that the “moment” or “instant” is the intersection of time and eternity. 
In a long footnote beginning on p. 82 of the Hong & Hong translation, this is linked up 
with some things going on in the notorious second part of Plato’s Parmenides—where no 
one knows what’s happening. 
The basic idea seems to be that time “flows”; it’s a continuous passing. Eternity, on the 
other hand, doesn’t “flow.” Eternity is fixed and stable. (‘Eternity’ in this context doesn’t 
mean just an unlimited time, but rather something altogether timeless.) The “moment” or 
“instant” in a sense has features of both. An instant is temporal, for example, it’s “in 
time”—it can be dated precisely (“high noon, July 4, 1776”). And yet it doesn’t “flow,” it 
doesn’t change, it isn’t a continuous passing. It’s fixed and stable. 
(Note: We’re talking now about datable “instants” like “high noon, July 4, 1776,” not 
about other—“indexical”—instantaneous notions like “now,” which are constantly 
changing and “flowing.” This is a standard, recognized distinction drawn by people who 
do the philosophy of time, and goes way back to antiquity.) 
So the “instant” or “moment,” then, combines features of time and eternity, is so to speak 
the intersection of time and eternity. Or, to put it in a way that will obviously be 
significant for Kierkegaard—the moment is when the eternal enters time. 
Doesn’t that sound like the Incarnation? It certainly does, and you can see why 
Kierkegaard wants to make a big deal out of it. 
That’s not the end of the story about the moment, by any means. But it’s enough to get at 
least a preliminary orientation. 
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Why make such an hypothesis? 
But let’s go back now to Fragments. On the Socratic theory of “recollection,” the 
knowledge of eternal truths is implicit in us from the very beginning. A so called 
“teacher,” like Socrates with respect to the slave-boy, is merely a kind of catalyst, the 
occasion that prompts the slave-boy to recover the latent knowledge that is already in 
him. Any other occasion could have served just as well, and it could have happened at 
any time. 
But if that’s not right (Bretall, p. 157: “Now if things are to be otherwise ”), then things 
are going to be different. The very condition is lacking for Socrates to do his minimal job. 
So if the slave-boy is going to learn anything under this new set of circumstances, the 
process is going to be a very different one. 
Now you may be thinking: “All that’s fine, but why make such an hypothesis in the first 
place? Why would we want to suppose the Socratic picture is wrong? 
Here I want to refer you back for a moment to Postscript, to a passage I’ve already asked 
you to read (Bretall, p. 218, in the discussion of truth as subjectivity and faith from 
Postscript): 
Let us now call the untruth of the individual [= i. e., the fact that the 
individual does not start off with the truth—let us call it] Sin.  By 
coming into existence [i. e., time] therefore  he becomes a sinner. He is 
not born AS a sinner in the sense that he is presupposed as being a sinner 
BEFORE he is born [= i. e., we don’t sin first in some other realm, and then 
somehow bring that sin with us into this life], but he is born in sin and as a 
sinner. This we might call Original Sin. [And that is the topic of The 
Concept of Anxiety.] But if existence has in this manner acquired a power 
over him, he is prevented from taking himself back into the eternal by way 
of recollection. 
OK, now let’s unpack that. As always, SK isn’t very worried about philosophical notions 
of truth or anything else in a very broad sense. When he’s talking about “truth” in 
contexts like this, he often means “the truth that will SAVE us.” 
In this passage, then, we see the notion that we don’t have that “salvific” truth within us 
when we come into the world—it isn’t built in. (That’s what “Original Sin” is all about.) 
And if that truth isn’t “built in” [= innate], then of course we can’t just recollect it, as the 
Socratic picture would have it. 
To get to the point—the doctrine of Original Sin means that we don’t come into the 
world with the condition built in that will enable us to realize what we need to realize if 
we’re going to be saved. 
So the “project of thought” Climacus sets up at the beginning of Fragments is no idle 
speculation. When he says “Now if things are to be otherwise ” (Bretall, p. 157), he’s 
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in effect asking “Now if the Socratic picture is wrong, and if Christianity, and in 
particular the doctrine of Original Sin, are true  ” 
What if they are true? What then? Well, go back and think about the example of the drill 
sergeant in Two Lectures. There Kierkegaard observes that the military assumes that its 
recruits have what it takes to be an acceptable soldier. That is, it assumes the condition is 
there in advance. The drill sergeant’s task then is to realize that potential, to draw out that 
latent potential into actuality. But if that precondition is not there—if the recruit is a 
quadruple amputee, for instance—then there’s nothing the drill sergeant can do. And not 
until some medical marvel comes along that will restore the man’s limbs will there be 
anything for the drill sergeant to do. 
So too, there’s nothing any religious author can do, any pastor or missionary, any 
caretaker of souls—there’s nothing Kierkegaard can do with all his indirect, maieutic 
method—to get people to have faith, to acquire the knowledge (in the sense of skill or 
“knowhow”) of being a Christian, if people don’t have the necessary precondition for it 
in the first place. Until people get that precondition, we all might as well save our breath. 
Where are they going to get that precondition? Not from any of us, that’s for sure. And 
people certainly can’t give it to themselves—since you can’t give what you don’t have. 
So how do we get it? Listen (Bretall, pp. 158–59—from Fragments): 
Now [i. e., given the situation we’ve just been describing] if the learner is 
to acquire the Truth, the Teacher [i.e., a real teacher] must bring it to him; 
and not only so, but he must also give him the condition necessary for 
understanding it. For if the learner were in his own person the condition 
for understanding the Truth, he need only recall it [= theory of 
recollection].  
But one who gives the learner not only the Truth, but also the condition 
for understanding it, is more than teacher [i.e., more than any ordinary, 
human teacher]. All instruction depends upon the presence, in the last 
analysis, of the requisite condition; if this is lacking, no teacher can do 
anything. For otherwise he would find it necessary not only to transform 
the learner [as, in a sense, Socrates did], but to RE-CREATE him before 
beginning to teach him. [The drill sergeant would have to RE-CREATE the 
quadruple amputee before he could do anything with him.] But this is 
something that no human being can do; if it is to be done, it must be done 
by God himself. 
Recall Two Lectures, (§ 649.11, p. 272): 
There remains only one communicator: God. 
Again (Bretall from Fragments, p. 162): 
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Insofar as the learner was in Error, and now receives the Truth and with it 
the condition for understanding it, a change takes place within him like the 
change from non-being to being. But this transition from non-being to 
being is the transition we call birth. Now one who exists cannot be born; 
nevertheless, the disciple is born. Let us call this transition the new birth 
[i. e., being reborn, “born again”]. 
You see what Kierkegaard is doing here. He’s spinning out the implications of his purely 
hypothetical “project of thought” (“What if the Socratic picture is false?”) and 
systematically identifying those implications with central Christian theological notions. 
We’ve already seen that God is the only true “teacher” of the kinds of things we’re 
talking about now. But there’s more. 
As we’ll see when we get to The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard has a view of original 
sin according to which it’s not just something we inherit from Adam, but something we 
do ourselves; we are responsible for it. So (Bretall, p. 159—from Fragments): 
The Teacher is then God himself, who in acting as an occasion prompts 
the learner to recall that he is in Error, and that by reason of his own guilt. 
But this state, the being in Error by reason of one’s own guilt, what shall 
we call it? Let us call it Sin. 
Again (Bretall, p. 161): 
What now shall we call such a Teacher, one who restores the lost 
condition and gives the learner the Truth? Let us call him Savior, for he 
saves the learner from his bondage and from himself; let us call him 
Redeemer, for he redeems the learner from the captivity into which he had 
plunged himself  But still we have not said all that is necessary; for by 
his self-imposed bondage the learner has brought upon himself a burden of 
guilt, and when the Teacher gives him the condition and the Truth he 
constitutes himself an Atonement  
Also (Bretall, p. 161), the Teacher like this becomes a Judge. 
Again (ibid.): 
And now the moment (Øjeblikket). Such a moment [i. e., the moment 
when the CONDITION is RESTORED] has a peculiar character. It is brief and 
temporal indeed, like every moment; it is transient as all moments are; it is 
past, like every moment in the next moment. And yet it is decisive, and 
filled with the eternal. Such a moment ought to have a distinctive name; 
let us call it the Fullness of Time. 
We’ve already seen how the notion of being “born again”—the new birth—is derived 
here. 
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Again (Bretall, p. 162): 
In consequence of receiving the condition in the moment, the course of his 
life has been given an opposite direction, so that he is now turned about. 
Let us call this change Conversion. [‘Conversio’ is just Latin for “turning 
around.”] 
So what Kierkegaard has done in the opening pages of Fragments is to recognize a deep 
connection between the Socratic theory of recollection in the Meno, among other places, 
and the central issues of Christianity. It’s not they are the same; far from it. In fact, in a 
sense they are direct opposites. But they are closely connected anyway. 
That’s what I meant when I said earlier that Fragments is Kierkegaard’s answer to the 
Meno. 
Pelagianism 
(Handout of “Miscellaneous Passages.”) 
On the Socratic picture, the Theory of Recollection, we already have the condition for 
realizing knowledge. In principle, we could do it ourselves, although of course it’s easier 
if we have someone like Socrates to point us in the right direction—to remind us. In any 
case, everything takes place at the purely human level. 
When we shift the topic, as Kierkegaard does, so that we’re no longer talking just about 
knowing the Pythagorean Theorem but about knowing the truth that’s going to save us, 
this Socratic Theory of Recollection amounts to the view that human beings can save 
themselves under their own power. We can do it ourselves! We don’t need any special 
outside help. And although we can surely help one another, as Socrates does with the 
slave-boy, there’s nothing here that requires any superhuman power. 
In the theological context, there’s a name for this view. It’s called Pelagianism, named 
after the English monk Pelagius who first espoused it. He was a contemporary of St. 
Augustine in the late fourth and early fifth centuries, and in fact Augustine got involved 
in heated controversy with Pelagius over exactly these issues. 
Augustine thought original sin implied that we cannot save ourselves under our own 
powers. Merely human abilities are not enough; it takes a superhuman, supernatural help
—it takes grace. Augustine’s views eventually prevailed, and Pelagianism is nowadays 
generally regarded as a heresy. 
But the issue has not gone away—partly because Pelagius had some very good points on 
his side. 
So, another way of looking at the Project of Thought in Fragments is that it is in effect 
raising the issue of Pelagianism. “What if the theory of recollection is wrong” amounts to 
“What if Pelagianism is wrong and Augustine is right?” 
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It’s generally agreed that Kierkegaard, like all orthodox Christians, rejected Pelagianism. 
And in fact we’ve already seen some of this. Recall how, in Fear and Trembling, the step 
from being a Knight of Infinite Resignation to being a Knight of Faith is not a step we 
can take by ourselves,  because we’ve used up all our energy—the infinite energy it takes
—to be a Knight of Infinite Resignation. 
But if Pelagianism is to be rejected, it’s not clear exactly what Kierkegaard thinks is the 
correct view instead. For, while it’s true that we cannot have faith (and so achieve 
salvation) on our own, it also seems that we ought to have at least some active role to 
play in our own salvation. Otherwise, salvation seems to be entirely arbitrary and to have 
no basis at all in what I do. God would just pick certain people out at random and in 
effect say, “You there, you’re saved,” while to others, “Sorry, you’re going to hell—
tough!” 
This would amount to a form of predestination, a view associated with Augustine in his 
battle against the Pelagians. (But Augustine’s own views are subtle, and he never really 
settled on them once and for all. They were never as simple as full-strength 
predestination.) 
If Kierkegaard rejects Pelagianism, he also seems to reject predestination. There are 
several passages that indicate this. For example, here’s one from the Journals and 
Papers, IV, p. 352: 
… In order to constrain subjectivity [i. e., in order to keep us from doing it 
all ourselves, saving ourselves under our own power—in order to avoid 
Pelagianism], we are quite properly taught that no one is saved by works, 
but by grace—and corresponding to that—by faith. [This is classic 
Lutheranism. No Pelagianism here.] Fine. 
But am I therefore unable to do something myself with regard to becoming 
a believer? Either we must answer this with an unconditional “no,” [that’s 
confusing, and it should be “yes”—“yes, we are unable”] and then we 
have fatalistic election by grace [= predestination], or we must make a 
little concession. The point is this—subjectivity [= the view that we can 
do it ourselves] is always under suspicion [= the suspicion of 
Pelagianism], and when it is established that we are saved by faith, there is 
immediately the suspicion that too much has been conceded here. [That is, 
our “little concession” a moment ago, to avoid the “fatalist” conclusion, is 
always suspected of slipping back into Pelagianism.] So an addition is 
made: But no one can give himself faith [that’s how we still avoid 
Pelagianism]; it is a gift of God I must pray for. 
Fine, but then I myself can pray, or we must go farther and say: No, 
praying (consequently praying for faith) is a gift of God which no man can 
give to himself; it must be given to him. And what then? Then to pray 
aright must again be given to me so that I may rightly pray for faith, etc. 
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[I. e., faith is something that has to be given to me. Praying for faith is 
likewise something that has to be given to me. And so on.] 
There are MANY, MANY ENVELOPES—but there must still be one point or 
another where there is a halt at subjectivity.12 Making the scale so large, so 
difficult, can be commendable as a majestic expression for God’s infinity, 
but subjectivity cannot be excluded, unless we want to have fatalism. 
Yet, late in Postscript, Kierkegaard seems to go pretty far toward this fatalism. There he 
repeatedly says we can do nothing—absolutely nothing—toward salvation BY 
OURSELVES. 
So Kierkegaard’s views are complicated here—just as complicated as orthodoxy’s. 
There is an article on all this in the Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, by one 
Timothy P. Jackson, “Arminian edification: Kierkegaard on grace and free will,” pp. 
235–56. In fact, it quotes the passage I just read to you. (“Arminianism” is one of the 
variations of possible views on this issue, and Jackson argues it is what Kierkegaard 
holds.) I think it is a very good paper. 
Repetition 
There is a cluster of other notions related to what goes on in Fragments, and I want to say 
a few words about them now. I don’t pretend to have all these worked out—far from it. 
But I think I can give a little orientation. 
The first such term is repetition. 
If recollection is not going to give us the truth that will save us, since that truth is not in 
us to be recollected in the first place, then is there any hope for us at all? 
Well, the answer seems to be something called “repetition.” I have no idea what it really 
is, or how SK thinks it works, but consider this: 
The story of Repetition 
A little background first. Please bear with me. (This will take a while before we get back 
to the theme.) The very same day SK published Fear and Trembling (October 16, 1843), 
he also published a slim little book entitled Repetition, under the pseudonym Constantin 
Constantius (a pseudonym he does not use anywhere else). It’s published in the same 
volume with Fear and Trembling in the Hong and Hong translation. 
This is a very strange work, although it’s quite readable. In fact, it’s probably the closest 
thing SK ever wrote to what we would call an out-and-out novel. In it, the author—
                                                 
12 Note: He says “a halt at subjectivity,” not “a halt to subjectivity.” That is, he’s not saying we 
must put a stop to subjectivity, but rather that we can’t stop until we get to subjectivity; we have to do 
something ourselves. We have to have some role to play in our own salvation! 
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Constantin Constantius—begins by asking about “repetition” (p. 131—none of what I 
will be quoting from Repetition is in the Bretall volume): 
whether or not it [= repetition] is possible, what importance it has, whether 
something gains or loses in being repeated  
Then he suddenly gets a brilliant idea: “I know. I went to Berlin once. [SK actually did 
go to Berlin for a short while on more than one occasion.] I’ll go back and see if 
everything’s the same!” Repetition, see? 
So he does go back—but of course it’s not the same. Oh, there’s a lot that has stayed as it 
was. He goes back to his old apartment, he goes to the same restaurant with the same 
waiter and the same menu. But it’s no good—it’s just not the same the second time. So he 
goes back to Copenhagen and despairs of there ever being any true repetition. 
Meanwhile—we’ve been introduced in the early pages to a Young Man. He’s not given 
any other name, but he does reappear a year and a half later, in Stages on Life’s Way, as a 
guest in the “Banquet” part (= In vino veritas). (At least everyone assumes it’s the same 
Young Man.) 
The Young Man is an acquaintance of Constantin Constantius’s, and comes to him 
because he’s looking for a confidant, someone to whom he can freely unburden himself. 
Well, the Young Man has fallen madly in love with a fair maiden, but it isn’t working out 
for reasons we don’t have to go into here. (Basically, it’s because the Young Man is a 
nut!) 
Eventually, the Young Man decides this can’t go on, that the only way out is for him to 
disappear. So he and Constantin contrive a scheme whereby he escapes to Sweden, but 
makes it appear that he’s really a dastardly scoundrel who’s run off with a seamstress, a 
young lady who’s been hired to act the part but who is in fact has no interest at all in the 
Young Man, and is perfectly honorable (apart from a willingness to engage in deception). 
The Young Man disappears, although without the seamstress, leaving the original “fair 
maiden” rather bewildered and not knowing what to think.  
(Note: Apart from the seamstress and the traveling details, this sounds exactly like what 
SK did to Regine Olsen.) 
Well, in the second part of the book, we get a series of letters from the Young Man to 
Constantin (who never writes back). The Young Man has never got over his “fair 
maiden,” and desperately hopes to get her back—even though he knows he’s ruined it 
forever. He compares his case—significantly—to the sufferings of Job. 
Well, this goes on for a while, and then—finally—in the very last letter from the Young 
Man,13 we read (p. 220): 
                                                 
13 This part was rewritten. The MS copy has some pages literally torn out here. There is some 
reason to think that in the original draft version, the Young Man shot himself! 
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She is married [note that Regine Olsen eventually got married too]—to 
whom I do not know, for when I read it in the newspaper I was so stunned 
that I dropped the paper and have not had the patience since then to check 
in detail. I am myself again. Here I have REPETITION; I understand 
everything, and life seems more beautiful to me than ever. It did indeed 
come like a thunderstorm  
Again (ibid.): 
I am myself again. This “self” that someone else would not pick up off the 
street I have once again. The split that was in my being is healed; I am 
UNIFIED again.  Is there not then a repetition? Did I not get everything 
back double? 
My initial reaction here is, “No, you obviously didn’t.” You didn’t get the fair maiden 
back! You did get your self back, you say, but you’re still not right back where you 
started—any more than Constantin Constantius was right back where he started in Berlin
—because you didn’t get her back. 
But perhaps one might reply: But you never had her in the first place. So by getting your 
self back, you have achieved a kind of “repetition.” You’ve returned to (“repeated”) the 
status quo ante. 
The moral of the story 
OK, now what’s all this about? Well, who knows, but consider these facts: 
 In “The First Love,” from Either/Or, the pseudonymous A ridicules the idea 
that one’s first love is special (that’s the kind of idea you get from reading 
“too many novels”). But in the Or part, the staid and respectable Judge 
William makes a big deal out of the “first love.” It can never be REPEATED. 
You can have other lovers, but it’s not the same. He prides himself on the fact 
that his wife is his first love, that he has been utterly faithful to her, and that 
this—far from meaning that he’s missed out on a lot of fun—is something 
noble and irreplaceably beautiful. He wouldn’t have it any other way. So: the 
first love cannot be REPEATED. 
 In Fear and Trembling, published on the very same day as Repetition, 
Abraham first “loses” the Covenant represented by Isaac and then—
miraculously—gets it back, and we’re right back where we started. Repetition
—or is it? (This is messy, because after all Abraham did not ever really lose 
Isaac; the sacrifice never took place.) 
 The Young Man compares his lot with Job, who—what?—lost everything, 
and then got it back. Once again, repetition—or is it? 
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In fact, two months after the publication of Repetition, on Dec. 16, 1843, 
SK published his Four Upbuilding Discourses, the first of which is a 
meditation on the line, “The Lord gave, and the Lord took away; blessed 
be the name of the Lord.” And whose saying is that? Job’s! 
You should know that there is an article in the Cambridge Companion on this work: 
Edward F. Mooney, “Repetition: Getting the world back,” pp. 282–307. 
What does it have to do with Fragments? 
Let’s bring all this back to the point from which we got on to it. What does this have to 
do with Fragments, with the Socratic theory of recollection and its failure? Well, here are 
some clues. On the very first page of Repetition, Constantin Constantius writes (p. 131) 
 repetition is a crucial expression for what “recollection” was to the 
Greeks. Just as they taught that all knowing is a recollection, modern 
philosophy will teach that all life is a repetition  Repetition and 
recollection are the same movement, except in opposite directions, for 
what is recollected has been, is REPEATED backward, whereas genuine 
repetition is RECOLLECTED forward. Repetition, therefore, IF IT IS POSSIBLE, 
makes a person happy, whereas recollection makes him unhappy. [Note 
the contrast between past and future here.] 
Again (p. 149): 
 repetition is the interest of metaphysics, and also the interest upon 
which metaphysics comes to grief; repetition is the watchword in every 
ethical view; repetition is the conditio sine qua non for every issue of 
dogmatics [= theology]. 
And there are other such strident passages in Repetition and elsewhere. 
Whatever all this means, it’s clear that repetition is going to be something important for 
Kierkegaard—theologically important. It’s going to make us happy—in theological 
vocabulary, it’s going to save us. 
The Greek theory of recollection—which held that the truth is already in us and needs 
only to be remembered—runs aground on the doctrine of Original Sin, as we’ve seen. 
The truth that’s going to fix everything for us is just not in us to begin with. 
(This of course doesn’t mean SK rejects the Theory of Recollection wholesale, although 
perhaps he does; but in any case it does mean he thinks Recollection isn’t going to do this 
for us!) 
So—one rough way of putting it is that repetition is RECOLLECTION INTO THE FUTURE. 
Recollection looks backward; repetition looks forward. But there’s another difference not 
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to lose sight of too: recollection is a matter of knowledge; repetition is a matter of life. 
Recall (p. 131 again): 
Just as they [the Greeks] taught that all knowing is a recollection, modern 
philosophy will teach that all life is a repetition. 
You live life forward; you think about it backward. (Sartre makes a similar point in 
Nausea.) And somehow, the difference is theologically significant—and is the answer to 
the implicitly Pelagian theory of recollection. 
There’s another factor here. The Young Man in Repetition has this sudden healing that 
comes like a thunderstorm—this reunification of the self—only after he realizes that he 
can do nothing more on his own; the woman is married! He stops trying to do it himself. 
(Again, in this case, it’s not done unto him either. He never does get the woman back.) 
Similarly, Job loses everything—his family, his cattle, everything! But he doesn’t mope 
or get depressed. And he doesn’t suppose he’s being punished for something he’s done, 
so that if he just stopped doing it God might relent. On the contrary, he knows he is a 
“good and righteous man,” and that he’s done nothing wrong. No, there’s nothing he can 
do to fix things. It’s not up to him. “The Lord gave, and the Lord took away; blessed be 
the name of the Lord.” And then—he gets it all back and double. 
Again, Abraham knows he can do nothing on his own to get the Covenant back. If he 
doesn’t plunge the knife into Isaac, then he himself has broken the Covenant by 
disobeying God. If he does plunge the knife, then Isaac is dead and again the Covenant is 
destroyed. Only when he gives up trying to manage things himself does God take over 
and do it for him. Once again, Abraham cannot on his own make the step from the Knight 
of Infinite Resignation to the Knight of Faith. 
There is obviously a lot more going on here than I understand. But that should give you 
food for thought. 
With that—sketchy as it is—let’s leave the notion of repetition and go on to another 
notion related to what happens in Fragments: the notion of “offense.” 
Offense 
You will frequently encounter the notion of “the offense” in Kierkegaard. For example, 
the Appendix to one part of Fragments is entitled “Offense at the Paradox.” 
Again, Practice in Christianity is made up of three discourses. (For practical purposes, 
they’re just three more “upbuilding discourses”—except that they’re pseudonymous—
and look for all the world like sermons.) The second one is a meditation built around 
Jesus’s remark in Matthew 11:6: “Blessed is he who is not offended at me.” And the 
same term comes up all over the place in Kierkegaard. 
What he says about “the offense” may puzzle you. For example, he talks about being 
offended by “the paradox,” about the offense of Christianity, the notion of the God-man 
as being offensive. 
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Now, you may or may not find many things offensive about Christiniaty, but I’ll bet it’s 
not what Kierkegaard is talking about. The doctrine of the God-man, the Incarnation, may 
strike you as paradoxical, outlandish, absurd—but OFFENSIVE? 
To call it “offensive” suggests indignation, outrage. And that’s what seems not quite right 
about the locution here. 
But there are some things you need to know, and they might help in dealing with this 
word. 
First of all, I went and looked it up, and the word translated as “offense” here is ‘anstød’, 
which can also be translated ‘scandal’ and literally means something you “bump up 
against.” In Greek, σκάνδαλον, or “scandal” is literally a “stumbling block.” 
In I Cor. 1:22–23, we read: 
For the Jews require a sign, and Greeks seek after wisdom [seekers after 
wisdom = “philosophers”]: But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews 
a stumbling-block, and unto the Greeks foolishness. 
The word there is σκάνδαλον, and in the Danish Bible it’s ‘anstød’. So when Kierkegaard 
talks about “the offense,” what he really means can often be best understood by thinking: 
“stumbling-block.” 
The God-man, therefore, is what’s going to trip you up, make you stumble. 
That realization goes a long way, I think, toward lessening the puzzling sense of moral 
indignation, outrage suggested by the word “offense.”14 
But we don’t want to get rid of that sense entirely. 
In the Notes to Vol. 3 of the Journals and Papers, there’s a heading for “Offense.” There 
Hong & Hong explain that paradox is related to offense as intellect is related to will and 
decision. 
So Christianity is not just a “stumbling block” in the sense of being a “stumbling block” 
to the intellect—a paradox. It’s a “stumbling block” that first and foremost has to do with 
tripping up my actions, decisions, and will. 
Here’s what Hong and Hong say (JP 3.840): 
According to Kierkegaard, no one can become a Christian without 
encountering the possibility of offense, whether one then becomes a 
Christian or not. In the first case [i. e., if one does become a Christian], 
offense acquires a positive significance for a person: he ceases his natural 
opposition to Christianity and humbles himself under it. This form of 
offense is presented in Practice in Christianity, where it is shown that 
                                                 
14 This isn’t the case with many other passages in SK where we get words translated as forms of 
“offense.” Elsewhere, the word is frequently Forargelse, which does have the sense of “outrage.” 
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even Christ’s disciples had to go through offense, which reached its 
climax when they were confronted by Christ’s suffering and death. 
The second case, being offended and remaining in offense, is described in 
The Sickness unto Death. The culmination of this offense, active hostility 
toward Christianity, is, according to Kierkegaard, the sin against the Holy 
Spirit. 
[Note the slippage here between “offense” and the “possibility of offense.” 
This is frequent in SK, and may be significant.] 
So, the crucifixion, the utter humiliation of Jesus, must have given the disciples pause, to 
say the least, not just to their intellects, but to their wills and actions. Not to mention the 
fact that by associating with this man they were turning themselves into outcasts and 
weirdos. So they must have said to themselves, “Whoa! This is more than I bargained for. 
Come on! I’m not so sure I really want to get involved in this any further.”—The 
possibility of offense. 
Here’s a good passage in the Journals and Papers, Vol. 3, p. 369 (§ 3033): 
How often have I not caught myself thinking and saying to myself: Even 
if, humanly speaking, you know yourself to be well-meaning toward men, 
you must make an effort to be more loving; then things will go well and 
you will get along better with men. And what then—then Christianity 
steps up and says: You fool, what humbug is this, wasn’t Christ love—and 
what happened to Him? Humanly speaking, there is something frightfully 
cruel in this thought. And yet this is Christianity. To be specific, 
Christianity declares: You must by no means refrain from doing what you 
had in mind [i.e., being more loving]—but you must know that it will lead 
you directly to the opposite goal. [I.e., you won’t get along better with 
men.] 
So, while the sense of moral outrage or indignation is surprising in Kierkegaard’s use of 
“offense,” and while  that can be lessened somewhat by pointing out the word’s frequent 
links with Scripture and the root meaning “stumbling block,” the outrage and indignation 
are not entirely out of place either. 
This, incidentally, makes some sense out of a very peculiar passage in Either/Or, Part II, 
where Judge William is addressing A, and at one point in the argument says that A would 
remind the Judge that he was talking about (Hong/Hong, p. 48): 
the God of the Christians, the God of spirit, jealous of everything that is 
not spirit. You would recall that in Christianity the beautiful and sensuous 
[that’s a mistranslation—it should be ‘sensual’] are negated; in a trice you 
would remark that, for instance, it would be a matter of indifference to the 
Christians whether Christ had been ugly or handsome, 
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And on the next page, he continues (p. 49): 
And of course I know that it is not necessary for the Christian that Christ 
must have been physically beautiful,   
When I read that, I was startled, to say the least. What an odd point to raise! And at first I 
thought Kierkegaard’s answer was that no of course it doesn’t make any difference, so 
that all these saccharine-sweet portraits of Jesus as a delicate, handsome man are really 
emphasizing something that ought not be emphasized, and that if someone were to make 
a point of portraying him as a hideous, deformed monster, there wouldn’t have to be 
anything really wrong with that. 
But no. In Practice, we get a lengthy discussion of the “abasement” of Jesus. And there 
he all but says that it’s absolutely crucial to Christianity that Jesus be disgustingly ugly. 
It’s essential that Jesus be the most despised and abased of men. 
Why? Well, for at least two reasons. (a) First, in order to guarantee that Jesus is really the 
LEAST common denominator among human beings, so that salvation will be open to 
absolutely everyone—no one will be unavoidably left out. No one will be able to say, 
“Oh, that’s all right for him. He had all those advantages I don’t have.” 
(b) And second, in order to magnify the degree of offense involved. He’s got to be so 
“abased” that the disciples are literally revolted at the prospect of even associating with 
him, much less following him. 
The contemporary 
Finally, I want to call your attention to one more notion that keeps coming up in 
Kierkegaard—the notion that the Christian is in an important sense contemporary with 
Jesus. 
The first time I taught this course, in 2000, my colleague Jim Hart from the Department 
of Religious Studies was sitting in. And he made the following very interesting 
suggestion about a remark I made earlier this semester. I remarked, you will recall, on 
how Kierkegaard seems to downplay the importance of the Resurrection of Jesus. Well, 
in this connection Jim Hart suggested that perhaps we should read SK’s repeated claim 
that all Christians are “contemporary” with Jesus as implicitly an acknowledgement of 
the Resurrection [= Jesus came BACK to life and is still living, so that he is still 
CONTEMPORARY with us today], and that therefore his emphasis on the claim of 
contemporaneity can be viewed as in a sense an emphasis on the Resurrection too. 
But I want to suggest now a different take on the notion of contemporaneity. No doubt 
there’s much in what Jim Hart was saying, but—as always—there are many sides to 
Kierkegaard. 
The notion of  being a “contemporary” is a big theme in Fragments, where we learn that 
there is no relevant difference, when it comes to acquiring faith, between (a) the people 
who were contemporaries of Jesus in the sense that they lived at the same time he did, 
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actually saw him and talked with him and witnessed the events, and (b) us today, some 
2000 years later. 
Jesus’s contemporaries had no essential advantage in virtue of the fact that they were 
eyewitnesses. And on the other hand, we today have no essential advantage either, in 
virtue of having all these long centuries to observe the success of Christianity and thereby 
make things easier for us. No, when it comes to becoming a Christian, we’re all in the 
same situation. 
This is an important theme in Fragments, where Part IV is entitled “The Situation of the 
Contemporary Follower” [i. e., contemporary with Jesus], and Part V is entitled “The 
Follower at Second Hand” [i. e., us today, long after the fact—after a “Mellemspil” or 
“interlude” of 1800 years, he says.]. Kierkegaard argues that there’s no difference. 
He comes back to this issue in Practice, and says some things there that I think help a lot 
in understanding this. I just want to call your attention to one short passage (Bretall, p. 
409): 
For in relation to the absolute there is only one tense: the present. [That 
much does sound like Hart’s suggestion. But SK goes on …] For him who 
is not contemporary with the absolute—for him it has no existence. And as 
Christ is the absolute, it is easy to see that with respect to Him there is 
only one situation: that of contemporaneousness. The five, the seven, the 
fifteen, the eighteen hundred years are neither here nor there; they do not 
change Him, neither do they in any wise reveal who He was, for who He 
is is revealed only to faith. 
Christ is (if I may express it so seriously) not a comedian, not at all a 
merely historical person, since as the Paradox He is an extremely 
unhistorical person. But this is the difference between poetry and reality: 
contemporaneousness. [That is, poetry is not contemporary; reality is.] 
The difference between poetry and history [NB the contrast poetry/reality 
vs. poetry/history.] is clearly this, that history is what really occurred, 
whereas poetry is the possible, the imaginary, the poetized. But what 
really occurred (the past) is not (except in a special sense, i. e. in contrast 
with poetry [we’ve just seen that contrast, since poetry is about the 
“imaginary”]) the real. It lacks the determinant which is the determinant of 
truth (as inwardness) and of all religiousness, the for thee. The past is not 
reality—for me: only the contemporary is reality for me. What thou dost 
live contemporaneous with is reality—for thee. And thus every man can 
be contemporary only with the age in which he lives—and then with one 
thing more: with Christ’s life on earth; for Christ’s life on earth, sacred 
history, stands for itself alone outside history. 
This seems to suggest that being a “contemporary” with something is a matter of making 
it present to me, realizing its presence — i.e., making it “real,” making it matter. It’s not 
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enough for that thing’s existence and mine merely to overlap chronologically. I HAVE TO 
DO SOMETHING in addition to make it contemporary for me. 
If this is right, then the fact that Jesus came back to life, and is still living, and therefore 
chronologically overlaps with us today is not enough to make him “contemporary” with 
us. It makes it possible—but in order to actualize that possibility, I have to make it true 
for me. 
Or—to put it another way—Jesus is not a contemporary with present-day non-Christians, 
only with present-day Christians. And, when you think about it, that’s the way 
Kierkegaard puts it. He never says as far as I know that everybody today is contemporary 
with Jesus—he says only that the Christians are. 
 
The Concept of Anxiety 
As the next item on our agenda, I’m going to give you something of a “sight-seeing” tour 
of The Concept of Anxiety. We will not be able to go through this work in great detail, 
partly because it is an enormously dense work and no one really knows what all is going 
on in it, and partly too because we also want to work through The Sickness unto Death 
with some care and don’t have an unlimited amount of time left. The Concept of Anxiety 
is a very important work, and in some significant ways related to The Sickness unto 
Death. 
Oddly, what I will have to say about The Concept of Anxiety will have very little to do 
with anxiety itself—i. e., with the psychology or phenomenology of that feeling or 
emotion. That’s because there’s plenty of other stuff to talk about in this book, and 
because there is a fairly good article on this in The Cambridge Companion. It’s by 
Gordon Marino, who’s Director of the Hong Library at St. Olaf College in Minnesota. 
It’s entitled “Anxiety in The Concept of Anxiety.” I refer you there for things we’re not 
going to cover here. 
Orientation 
First, let’s orient ourselves. And, for the moment, let’s consider The Concept of Anxiety 
and Sickness unto Death side by side. They are, conceptually, very closely related. 
Sickness was published July 30, 1849, under the pseudonym Anti-Climacus. The Concept 
of Anxiety was published a full five years earlier—a long time as far as SK’s authorship is 
concerned—on June 17, 1844. On the very same day, he published the curious little work 
called Prefaces, under the pseudonym Nicolaus Notabene. 
Nicolaus says that, while he has some inclination toward writing, he doesn’t want to be 
an out and out “author,” because his wife is against it. Authors just waste their time 
writing “works,” and so he’s not going to do that. Instead, he’s just going write 
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“prefaces” to works, because everybody knows no one ever really says anything in a 
“preface” anyway. 
And so that’s what he does. Prefaces is just that, a collection of all-purpose prefaces the 
reader might find useful for one occasion or another. And in fact, one of them (the 
seventh) was originally intended to be the Preface to Anxiety, but he replaced it. 
The work Prefaces is very slight, and one wonders whether there’s anything really 
serious going on in it at all. It’s very hard to fit it into the claim in Point of View that the 
entire authorship had a religious purpose from the very beginning. 
Well, in any case, Anxiety and Prefaces were published on the same day, June 17, 1844. 
Four days earlier, on June 13, he had published Philosophical Fragments, under the 
pseudonym Johannes Climacus. So, while Anxiety is, conceptually, very closely linked 
with Sickness, it is chronologically much closer to Fragments. 
All three of these works, Fragments, Anxiety, and Sickness, are so called “algebraic” 
works. (And in fact, you’ll see SK actually using the term ‘algebraic’ in Anxiety, p. 113 
n., and on p. 128. These passages are where we get the designation “algebraic.”) We’ve 
already looked briefly at one of the “algebraic” works (Fragments), although we’ve not 
read the whole thing, so we have some idea what to expect: The “algebraic” works are 
relatively short, as SK’s writings go; they’re more “structured” than many of his writings, 
and have a more coherent, developed “theme”; and there’s much more “theory” in them. 
They are very rich and rewarding works. 
Why the term “algebraic”? Algebra uses variables—which can stand for anything. 
Accordingly, there aren’t very many examples in the so called “algebraic” works. Or at 
least the examples are not developed very much psychologically. 
The best example is in Fragments: the example of the king who loved a humble maiden 
(Bretall, pp. 165ff.). It’s a stunning example, and helps a lot, but it’s not psychologically 
developed in the way Don Giovanni or Johannes the Seducer is in Either/Or, for instance. 
Back in the late 90s, when I and a graduate student I was working with at the time first 
read through a bunch of Kierkegaard, we read Anxiety and Sickness one right after the 
other. And we came away with the initial impression that the two books are so closely 
related that the one might very well be considered a continuation of the other. In fact, we 
had—and I still have—to keep reminding ourselves that despite the continuity in their 
content, they are after all on different topics—and in fact are attributed to totally distinct 
pseudonyms. 
Sickness, as you know, was published under the pseudonym “Anti-Climacus.” Anxiety is 
published under the pseudonym “Vigilius Haufniensis” (= “The Watchman of the 
Harbor” or “The Watchman of Copenhagen”), a pseudonym not elsewhere used by 
Kierkegaard. 
In both cases, in fact, SK had considered publishing the works under his own name. Later 
on, we will look at some passages from his Journals where SK had considered published 
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Sickness, together with the material that was eventually published in Practice in 
Christianity, and together with all the other completed but as yet unpublished writings, 
ALL under his own name as a sort of last hurrah! 
Well, it turns out that Kierkegaard also at least for a time—quite apart from that grand 
plan—considered publishing Anxiety under his own name. Look at Anxiety, Supplement, 
p. 177. 
(Each of the items in the Hong/Hong series of translations comes with a Supplement of 
related passages from other works of Kierkegaard, and a full set of notes. The 
Supplement in the volume for Anxiety is fairly helpful —especially the notes.) 
What is the significance of the fact that Anxiety and Sickness appeared under different 
pseudonyms? 
Who knows, but it ought to warn us, at least, against thinking the two are works are too 
closely linked. Furthermore, consider this: 
‘Anti-Climacus’ was the last pseudonym Kierkegaard used. Furthermore, as he says in 
his Journals, in some passages we’ll look at later, it’s a special pseudonym, a “higher” 
pseudonym, unlike the previous ones in that Kierkegaard considers himself inferior to 
Anti-Climacus (in the sense of being not as far “advanced” as him spiritually or 
psychologically), whereas he regards himself as more advanced than Johannes Climacus, 
and apparently than all the other, “lower” pseudonyms too. Notice what this implies: it 
implies that he considers himself “higher” than the “lower” pseudonymous Vigilius 
Haufniensis. If we are to take that remark seriously, then, it would follow that Sickness 
and Anxiety are written from different perspectives, so that they do not really present a 
continuous story after all. 
Again, Sickness was published only in 1849, after Point of View was written (in 1848), 
whereas Anxiety was published in 1844, well before Point of View. Now in Point of View, 
Kierkegaard explicitly includes Anxiety among the so called aesthetic works (Bretall, p. 
324 n. 1)—indirect works, the purpose of which, he says there, is to disabuse people of 
the “prodigious illusion” of Christendom. Whether this “disabusing” is in fact what we 
find in Anxiety you’ll have to judge for yourself. But it’s certainly not what is going on in 
Sickness. 
So again, perhaps there’s reason to think Anxiety and Sickness are not written from the 
overall same point of view. 
Nevertheless, despite what we read in Point of View, which would lead us to distinguish 
these works, there is contrary evidence to suggest the two are written from a single point 
of view: 
(1) For example, there is a passage in Postscript (1846, before Sickness) where 
Johannes Climacus is discussing The Concept of Anxiety. And here in part is what he says 
(the “Survey of Danish Literature” in Postscript, Hong/Hong pp. 269–70): 
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The Concept of Anxiety differs essentially from the other pseudonymous 
writings in having a direct form, and in being even a little bit objectively 
dogmatic. Perhaps the author has thought that on this point a 
communication of knowledge might be needful, before going on to 
engender inwardness; which latter task is relative to one who may be 
presumed essentially to have knowledge, and hence not in need of having 
this conveyed to him, but rather needing to be personally affected. 
Here we have the claim that Anxiety is a direct work, not an indirect one—although we 
have to be careful, since this claim is itself made in a pseudonymous work. In any case, 
there is at least some reason to think Anxiety is a special pseudonymous work, and may 
be more “direct” than most, despite what Point of View would have us believe. As we 
will see later on, there is also reason to think Sickness is itself a “direct” work in some 
sense, even though it too is pseudonymous. Of course, if they’re both to be regarded as 
“direct” works, then we should expect them to present similar viewpoints. 
(Notice also in this passage the business about being assumed to have certain knowledge 
in advance, so that you don’t need to be told it directly, and how if you don’t have it in 
advance, then the only way you can get it is by being told directly, which is why Concept 
of Anxiety is in “a direct form.” And notice how that fits in perfectly with the discussion 
we got in the “Two Lectures on Communication.”) 
(2) Here’s another reason to think Anxiety perhaps ought to be viewed as a direct 
work. Marino points out in his Cambridge Companion article (p. 310): 
By 1831,15 Kierkegaard was in the habit of publishing an “upbuilding 
discourse” in his own name for every book he published pseudonymously. 
The books to which he signed his name were to represent the religious 
point of view, whereas those to which he did not were to be expressions of 
an aesthetic or ethical [where does that come from? SK talks about them 
only as aesthetic.] orientation. To put it another way, with every indirect 
communication, Kierkegaard produced a direct communication—at least 
up until The Concept of Anxiety. [Note that Point of View makes no 
exception for Anxiety.] This book must have seemed direct and religious 
enough since he did not proffer an accompanying set of upbuilding 
discourses. Just the opposite. Along with the somber and sometimes 
ponderous Concept of Anxiety, he published the relatively airy Prefaces, 
the official author of which is none other than Nicolaus Notabene. [The 
point of that last clause is that Prefaces is PSEUDONYMOUS, not a “signed” 
work, as we would expect.] 
                                                 
15 That date has got to be a misprint, although I’m not sure what year Marino means. SK’s very 
first publication was not until 1834, and was not accompanied by any kind of “upbuilding discourse.” In 
1831, SK was only 18 years old! Also, SK didn’t just publish an “upbuilding discourse” for each 
pseudonymous work; it was a book of “upbuilding discourses.” 
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The point, then, is that Anxiety must be a “direct” work, since there is no corresponding 
“upbuilding discourse” to accompany it. 
(3) On the other hand, he did publish a set of Four Upbuilding Discourses some two 
months later (on August 31, 1844) without any accompanying pseudonymous work. 
Perhaps these were to be the direct work matching the pseudonymous Concept of Anxiety.  
But then what matches Prefaces? The whole “two-track” picture presented in Point of 
View breaks down when you look closely at it—or at least it’s not at all clear how it’s 
supposed to work. 
In the end, the whole situation is a mess, and we can’t be quite sure on the basis of these 
external factors just what the status of Anxiety is and how it should be regarded. 
My point about whether Anxiety—and, as we shall see, Sickness—should be regarded as 
direct works is just that if they are both to be regarded as more or less “direct,” then SK is 
presumably (!) expressing his real views in both of them, so that we should expect them 
at least to agree with one another broadly and perhaps even to be closely related in 
content. So it wouldn’t be surprising that the graduate student and I had that impression 
when we read them. 
But, as we’ve seen, on the basis of the external evidence, it’s just not clear what to do 
with Anxiety. 
(4) Nevertheless, Anxiety and Sickness do seem to be connected, if you look at their 
actual content, rather than just at these external factors.  Much of the discussion in 
Anxiety is predicated on exactly the same kind of metaphysics of the self we will see 
developed in Sickness. For example, at the beginning of Anxiety Chap. III, p. 81: 
In the two previous chapters, it was maintained continually that man is a synthesis 
of psyche and body [= soul and body] that is constituted and sustained by spirit. 
Again, p. 85: 
Man, then, is a synthesis of psyche and body, but he is also a synthesis of 
the temporal and the eternal. 
This sounds very close to what we’ll see in the opening pages of Sickness. There’s much 
more like that as well, and it goes beyond mere superficial similarities. 
We don’t want to think that a full-blown metaphysics of the self, of the kind we will find 
in Sickness, was already developed by the time SK wrote Anxiety, and that he just waited 
another five years before he got around to telling us about the details. No, there’s no 
evidence for that. Nevertheless, it is true that many of the main pieces are already in place 
as early as 1844. 
The title page 
Let’s look now at the title page of the work. 
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 The Concept of Anxiety. Also translated as “The Concept of Dread”—e.g., by 
Walter Lowrie. 
Now we’ve already talked to some extent about the notion of “dread” or “anxiety,” back 
when we were talking about the capsule or standard picture of Kierkegaard. There it was 
described as the fear of our own freedom. And that is in fact exactly what it is. So that 
much of the “capsule picture” still holds. 
Again, we’ve already talked to some extent about how, despite the “capsule picture’s” 
claim that criterionless choice, and therefore anxiety, are relatively rare and confined to 
momentous, life-orienting decisions, Kierkegaard in fact seems to think anxiety is quite 
common—although I’m not sure he would go so far as to say anxiety accompanies every 
decision we make, as Sartre would have it. 
Now let’s look at the subtitle: 
 A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of 
Hereditary Sin. 
First of all, what on earth does he mean when he calls says the work is a “simple” 
deliberation? Well, it’s certainly not simple in the sense of being easy or elementary; on 
the contrary, our translator, Reidar Thomte, suggests (p. xii) that it’s “possibly the most 
difficult of Kierkegaard’s works”—which is really saying something! 
No, the work is “simple” in the sense of focused, single-minded. The whole discussion 
centers implicitly around the implications of one theological doctrine, what he calls 
“hereditary sin.” (We’ll talk about that in a moment.) 
But notice second that the book is described as “psychologically orienting.” In fact, this is 
one of the most psychologically rich of Kierkegaard’s writings (it’s only competitor is 
Sickness—not even Either/Or is as rich). 
In the “Introduction” (pp. 14 ff.), Vigilius Haufniensis talks at considerable length about 
how the various sciences might try to deal with the concept of “sin”—and get it wrong. 
It’s only on p. 19 that we come to dogmatics—i. e., theology—as the “science” that can 
deal properly with sin. And even dogmatics doesn’t “deal with” sin in the sense of 
explaining it. On the contrary, it presupposes it (p. 20), and goes on from there, whereas 
the other sciences try to “explain” it, and end up explaining it away by distorting the 
concept of sin into something false. 
Now, turn back to p. 14, in the “Introduction.” Here we get a kind of statement of the 
program of the book: 
The present work has set as its task the psychological treatment of the 
concept of “anxiety,” but in such a way that it constantly keeps in mente 
[in mind] and before its eye the dogma of hereditary sin. Accordingly, it 
must also, although tacitly so, deal with the concept of sin [i. e., sin in 
general]. 
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So the whole book is psychologically oriented. 
Now notice the next sentence: 
Sin, however, is no subject for psychological concern, and only by 
submitting to the service of a misplaced brilliance could it be dealt with 
psychologically. 
We’ve just seen (p. 19) that sin is a proper subject of concern only for “dogmatics”—i. e., 
for theology. 
But if sin has no business being dealt with psychologically, there’s another, related and 
more or less parallel phenomenon that can be dealt with psychologically, at least in part. 
And that is anxiety. 
So what we have here is the picture that anxiety is a kind of psychological manifestation 
of sin (or at least of sinfulness, and we’ll see what difference that makes later on). At 
least this seems to be true at all but the very highest level of development. As we’ll see in 
Sickness, unlike despair, which is gone once we’re “saved” and have acquired an 
“integrated” self, anxiety persists even after we’re saved and are therefore no longer in a 
state of sin—even if that can’t be fully achieved in this life. So anxiety need not be 
always a psychological spin-off of sin, although it is up until that very last step. 
What we’re getting in this book, then, is not a “dogmatic” or “theological” discussion, 
but rather a psychological analysis of anxiety, something that pretty much parallels and 
so to speak “tracks” in synch with a central dogmatic or theological notion—sin, and in 
particular hereditary sin.  
Other themes in the introduction 
There are a couple of other themes I want to mention too from this “Introduction.” (In 
general I think the “Introduction” is extremely difficult and certainly not the most 
rewarding part of the book, at least not yet for me.) 
Quantitative vs. qualitative change 
Throughout the “Introduction” and frequently in the body of the text, SK rejects—even 
ridicules—the broadly “Hegelian” tendency to think that qualitative changes can be 
accounted for in terms of an accumulation of quantitative differences. (Often SK 
describes this in terms of Hegelian “mediation.”) 
What’s he talking about? 
In recent times, a good example of this kind of thinking would be the view that human-
like self-consciousness (notice I say “self-consciousness”) will eventually be achieved by 
computers as they get faster and faster—as if the difference between your own self-
consciousness and your computer were just a matter of processing speed or complexity. 
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Kierkegaard thinks that kind of thinking is hopeless. For him, a qualitative change—for 
instance (speaking of sin) the difference between being innocent and being guilty of sin
—is not something you can sneak up on gradually. It’s a matter of what he calls a “leap” 
(in Danish a Spring)—it’s like a switch, it’s either on or off. One moment you’re 
innocent, and the next moment you’re in a state of sin. You’re not first (1) innocent, then 
(2) not quite so innocent, and then by stages (3) almost guilty, (4) really, really close to 
being guilty, (5) near as no matter to being guilty, and (6) finally at last guilty! 
So too in switching lifestyles, on the “standard view.” 
You’ll see this theme recurring all over the place. It’s IMPORTANT. 
The two ethics 
I want to call your attention briefly to something that is mentioned in the “Introduction” 
to The Concept of Anxiety, but is not developed in that book. This is the notion of the 
“second ethics.” 
Beginning on p. 14 in the “Introduction,” as mentioned, we get a discussion of the 
various sciences and disciplines that might try (and fail) to deal with the concept of sin. 
Thus, we get aesthetics (bottom p. 14), metaphysics (p. 15 middle), psychology (p. 15), 
religion (top p. 16—“religion” in the sense of “sermonizing,” not SK’s full sense of 
religion), and finally ethics (p. 16 middle). About ethics, here’s what we read (p. 16): 
Now ethics should be a science in which sin might be expected to find a 
place. [Recall  how “guilt/sin” was the negative feature of the ethical view 
on the “standard interpretation.”] But here there is a great difficulty. Ethics 
is still an ideal science, and not only in the sense that every science is 
ideal. [Think of the ideal gas laws of physics.] Ethics proposes to bring 
ideality into actuality. [I.e., it tells us: LIVE AN IDEAL LIFE!] On the other 
hand, it is not the nature of its movement to raise actuality up into ideality. 
Ethics points to ideality as a task, and assumes that every man possesses 
the requisite conditions. 
(Note the Pelagian tone of that last clause. And recall the Two Lectures and Fragments.) 
In other words, ethics doesn’t want to get its hands dirty. It doesn’t try to help you live an 
ideal life. Ethics stands before you as a kind of ideal model or pattern, demands that you 
live up to it, assumes that you have the wherewithal to do so (Pelagianism), and judges 
you if you don’t. That’s it; it’s up to you. As we read (p. 17), ethics is “shipwrecked” on 
the notion of sin, on the notion that we cannot achieve that ideality after all. 
We’ve already learned that the only “science” that can deal with “sin” is “dogmatics” or 
theology. Thus, we read (p. 19): 
With dogmatics begins the science that, in contrast to that science called 
ideal stricte [in the strict sense], namely ethics, proceeds from actuality. It 
begins with the actual in order to raise it up into ideality [precisely what 
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ethics DIDN’T do]. It does not deny the presence of sin; on the contrary, it 
presupposes it and explains it by presupposing hereditary sin  
On p. 20, he begins to talk about a new science that begins with “dogmatics,” 
presupposes sin, and within which something like ethics again finds its place: 
It is easy to see the difference in the movements, to see that the ethics of 
which we are NOW speaking belongs to a different order of things. The 
first ethics was shipwrecked on the sinfulness of the single individual. 
Therefore, instead of being able to explain this sinfulness, the first ethics 
fell into an even greater and ethically more enigmatic difficulty, since the 
sin of the individual expanded into the sin of the whole race. [Don’t worry 
about it. Just listen.] At this point, dogmatics came to the rescue with 
hereditary sin. The new ethics presupposes dogmatics, and by means of 
hereditary sin it explains the sin of the single individual, while at the same 
time it sets ideality as a task, not by a movement from above and 
downward but from below and upward. 
[Note the difference in direction. The “second” ethics IS willing to get its hands dirty.] 
Now, I don’t pretend to understand all that completely. But you should realize that this 
notion of two ethics is not an isolated, one-time thing in Kierkegaard. It comes back 
again in a big way, three years later, in Works of Love, and again in parts of Practice. The 
late Philip Quinn has a paper on it—“Kierkegaard’s Christian Ethics”—in the Cambridge 
Companion. 
So we have to learn to be careful when we read Kierkegaard talking about “ethics.” 
Sometimes it means the “ethics” of Hegel, of Judge William, and sometimes it means 
“Christian ethics”—this “second ethics.” For the most part so far in this course, we’ve 
been dealing with the first sense exclusively. But you should be aware of this alternative 
sense. 
Hereditary sin 
Now what is this notion of “hereditary sin” that’s built into the subtitle of The Concept of 
Anxiety? Well, it’s what is otherwise called “original sin.” 
We encountered the doctrine of original sin back when we were talking about 
“Pelagianism” in connection with Philosophical Fragments (which, remember, was 
published just four days before Anxiety). 
The doctrine of “original sin” is in effect the claim that we cannot “save ourselves” under 
our own power, without outside help. (Pelagianism is the doctrine that we can.) 
But there’s more to it than that. Along with that bare-bones statement, there is a Biblical 
story you’re no doubt familiar with. It’s the story of Adam and Eve in the Garden of 
Eden, and the consequences of their action there. 
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Adam and Eve were living on Easy Street. They had everything they wanted, and there 
were no problems at all. Then, one day God tells them, “You can eat the fruit of any of 
the trees in the Garden—except that one over there, the tree of the knowledge of good 
and evil. Don’t eat the fruit of that true, or you will surely die.” Now Adam and Eve 
didn’t know anything about death yet, and they certainly didn’t know anything yet about 
the difference between good and evil, because there wasn’t any evil. But they did know—
now, after this announcement—that they weren’t supposed to eat the fruit of that one tree. 
Well, along comes the serpent, and he hisses in Eve’s ear and tempts her, and through her 
Adam—and the result is that they do eat the fruit. And sure enough, they do learn the 
difference between good and evil. As punishment for their sin, they’re kicked out of the 
Garden of Eden, they eventually die, and the entire history of the human race gets under 
way. 
But there’s still more to the story. As a consequence of Adam’s and Eve’s sin, all the rest 
of us ever since have been born into some kind of a corrupt state, a fallen nature (which is 
why death is still with us). This corrupted, fallen state is what requires the Atonement—
and is the “pit” that orthodoxy says we cannot climb out of on our own. 
Those are the main factors of the doctrine. But of course there are lots of variations, lots 
of different emphases and ways of putting it in an attempt to make sense of it. 
For there are all kinds of difficulties with the doctrine. 
(a) Just what is it that we “inherit” from Adam and Eve in this doctrine, and 
just how is that we “inherit” it? (SK speaks of hereditary sin.) 
(b) Furthermore, if we are still suffering the consequences of Adam’s and 
Eve’s sin thousands of years ago, and if those consequences include things 
like loss of eternal happiness unless we’re lucky enough to hear the 
Gospel, take it to heart and be “saved,” then doesn’t that mean we’re in a 
very real sense being held responsible for deeds we didn’t commit and had 
nothing to do with? What kind of sense does that make? 
Those are all issues surrounding the discussion in Concept of Anxiety, and some of them 
are explicitly raised in the book. 
Note that all this is going on even though Vigilius Haufniensis has told us in the 
Introduction that the book is going to be a psychological book and so has no business 
dealing with the concept of sin. 
Conceptual link with Sickness 
But there are yet other ways we can think about the topic of Concept of Anxiety, ways 
that conceptually link it with what we will be talking about in Sickness unto Death. 
For example, the picture in Sickness, as we’ll see, is as if the self starts off, when it’s 
created, as a synthesis of body and soul, finite and infinite, the temporal and the eternal 
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[see pp. 81, 85 of Anxiety]—a synthesis that is set up by God at the outset in a proper 
balance or harmony. But then God “lets go,” so to speak, thereby setting the self free, and 
it immediately flops out of balance. Our task then is to restore that balance by coming to 
terms with God again, so that we end up in a kind of state of “integrated” selfhood. 
This way of picturing the situation in Sickness suggests a number of questions and 
problems that are in effect exactly questions and problems about original sin. For 
example: 
 When God sets us free, “lets go” of us, so to speak, do we inevitably fall out 
of balance? Is it impossible for us to go on in a state of equilibrium? If it is, if 
we can’t help but fall “out of balance” as soon as we’re “set free,” then how 
can we be held responsible when we do fall out of balance? Isn’t this just like 
the problem of original sin, being held responsible for sins we have no control 
over? 
 On the other hand, if it’s not inevitable, if it’s not impossible to be “set free” 
and then continue on in a state of steady equilibrium, then why is it no one 
ever does? Kierkegaard seems to think in Sickness that no one can get to a 
state of “integrated” selfhood without going through the imbalance of despair 
first. But why should that be so unless there’s some necessity about the 
matter? 
So the issues of Anxiety and Sickness are very closely linked. 
Highlights 
Let me now highlight a few things in this book. I don’t know how to make all of these 
themes consistent with one another. But here we go anyway. 
“Hereditary” sin vs. “original” sin 
First of all, notice that the title says “hereditary sin”; it doesn’t say “original sin”—and so 
throughout the book. When I realized this, I wondered whether there is any significance 
to this terminological nuance. I’m not entirely sure, but I don’t think so. 
The old Walter Lowrie translation of Anxiety just translates the subtitle as “original” sin, 
and doesn’t seem to worry about whether Kierkegaard intends some subtle distinction 
here. 
The Danish, however, is ‘Arvesynden’ = literally, “inherited sin” or “hereditary sin.” This 
is just the regular Danish word for the doctrine of Adam’s sin and the consequences of it, 
but this may reflect the fact that Denmark is a Lutheran country. That is, there may be 
some distinction between “original” sin in, say, the Catholic sense, and “hereditary” sin 
in a Lutheran sense. My knowledge of Reformation theology doesn’t yet extend this far. 
In any case, what Kierkegaard says about “hereditary sin” is far from being 
commonplace, although it may not be entirely unprecedented. (I’d like to know, for 
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instance, more about the influence on Kierkegaard of Schleiermacher’s The Christian 
Religion.) 
On all this, you may want to look at the notes to our translation of Anxiety—p. 230, n. 6. 
There the translator seems to indicate that, among the people Kierkegaard was reading 
and familiar with, the expression ‘original sin’ referred to the consequences IN US of 
Adam and Eve’s sin, not to what they did. On the other hand, ‘hereditary sin’ or 
‘inherited sin’ would seem to refer to exactly the same thing, since Adam and Eve, of 
course, did not inherit their sin in any sense. (There was as yet nobody they could inherit 
it from.) In short, I’m still not sure there’s any terminological significance to the 
distinction between “hereditary sin” and “original sin.” It may be just a matter of 
translation. 
We are all in the same situation as Adam 
One of the most striking things about The Concept of Anxiety is this: Kierkegaard seems 
to think that, in a very important sense, there’s nothing special about Adam in the 
doctrine of original (or hereditary) sin. Adam was chronologically the first to sin (or Eve 
was, actually). But that fact is purely incidental. We are all in essentially the same 
position Adam and Eve were in. 
And what was that? Well, to begin with they were completely innocent. Not only were 
they not guilty of any actual sins of their own, they also had no inherited guilt for the sins 
of their ancestors. 
And we are all in that situation. Like Adam and Eve, every subsequent individual starts 
off in a state of innocence. Consider, for instance, p. 60: 
To want to deny that every subsequent individual has and must be 
assumed to have had a state of innocence analogous to that of Adam 
would be shocking to everyone and would also annul all thought 
And, in context, it’s clear that he means “shocking” in the bad sense, not “shocking” in 
the sense in which we all ought to be “shocked” from time to time. 
Again, p. 52: 
In the state of innocence—and of such a state one might also speak in the 
case of subsequent man  
More strongly, perhaps, p. 35: 
Just as Adam lost innocence by guilt, so every man loses it in the same 
way. If it was not by guilt that he lost it, then it was not innocence that he 
lost; and if he was not innocent before becoming guilty, he never became 
guilty. 
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And p. 31: 
Through the first sin, sin came into the world. Precisely in the same way it 
is true of every subsequent man’s first sin that through it sin comes into 
the world. That it was not in the world before Adam’s first sin is, in 
relation to sin itself, something entirely accidental and irrelevant. It is of 
no significance at all and cannot justify making Adam’s sin greater or the 
first sin of every other man lesser. 
Nevertheless, if we all start off innocent, just as Adam and Eve did, we also very soon 
fall (“fall out of balance”—Sickness), just as Adam and Eve did. So to speak, each of us 
eats of the fruit of our own personal “tree of the knowledge of good and evil.” We each in 
effect re-enact the Garden of Eden scene one by one in our own lives. 
I must confess, when I read this my first reaction was, “Well, there goes the doctrine of 
original sin. There’s nothing inherited about it at all.” Kierkegaard has in effect theorized 
the dogma away. 
When he says, for instance, that it would be shocking to deny that we all start off in a 
state of innocence, just as Adam did, my reaction was: “Yes, but that’s precisely why the 
doctrine of original sin is so shocking—because we’re being blamed and held guilty for 
things we didn’t personally do. To reinterpret the doctrine so as to avoid that shock 
sounds like exactly the kind of fainthearted behavior he’s constantly accusing 
Christendom of.” 
Whatever you think of that, it’s clear that SK does want to say this—that we are guilty 
only of the things we ourselves do on our own account, not of the sins of our ancestors. 
Look again at p. 60, immediately  before the passage about what would be so “shocking 
to everyone”: 
Therefore, although anxiety becomes more and more reflective [don’t 
worry about that part of it], the guilt that breaks forth in anxiety by the 
qualitative leap retains the same accountability as that of Adam, 
There’s a passage in the Epistle of James that seems to link to this, and SK frequently 
cites it (cf. e.g., Anxiety, p. 48). It’s James 1:13–15: 
No one, when tempted, should say, “I am being tempted by God” [or, we 
might add, by anything except ourselves]; for God cannot be tempted by 
evil and he himself tempts no one. But one is tempted by one’s own 
desire, being lured and enticed by it; then, when that desire has conceived, 
it gives birth to sin, and that sin, when it is fully grown, gives birth to 
death. 
That’s not completely unequivocal, granted. But it does suggest that sin is our own doing, 
not something we “inherit” and therefore are not responsible for. 
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Note incidentally that, in general, the Epistle of James seems to be one of Kierkegaard’s 
favorite Scriptural texts. When he’s quoting the Epistles, he seems to prefer James’s—in 
fact, he shows a marked suspicion of St. Paul, and in a very late passage in The Moment, 
he seems to criticize St. Paul for saying that, if you just can’t stand being celibate and 
have to get married rather than commit fornication, well then it’s better to be married 
than to burn in with lust! Kierkegaard suggests St. Paul was being too accommodating, 
compromising! 
Note also that the Epistle of James was rejected by Luther. Luther called it a “straw 
epistle,” because of James 2:20–26, including the passages: 
 “faith without works is useless” 
 “Was not Abraham our father justified by works ” 
 “You see that a man is justified by works and not by faith alone.” 
 “For just as the body without the spirit is dead, so also faith without works is 
dead.” 
Note finally that, shortly after the passage I’ve just quoted above from James’s epistle, 
we get the passage about how “Every true and perfect gift is from above,” a passage that 
Kierkegaard wrote several Upbuilding Discourses on. 
Sin vs. sinfulness 
In any case, I say that was my first reaction. But, as always with Kierkegaard, things are 
not as simple as they appear at first. 
For if we don’t actually inherit guilt—out and out sin—from Adam and Eve, we do 
inherit something else: what Kierkegaard calls sinfulness. 
And what is “sinfulness”? I suppose the best way to think of it is as a kind of tendency to 
sin—a tendency to actual sin. 
How does it work? Well, we come into the world in a state of personal innocence. 
Nevertheless, we are surrounded by sin on all sides, the actual sins of other people. These 
actual sins serve as examples to us, perhaps—on p. 31 (near the bottom), SK in a throw-
away but very illuminating phrase mentions “the power of the example” in connection 
with sinfulness. 
There may be other ways in which this tendency toward sin operates as well. But in any 
case, this tendency may be greater or less. In fact, I think it’s even true that SK says the 
tendency grows stronger over time, with each subsequent generation. (But I’m not sure 
about that.) 
But notice: A tendency toward sin is not the same as sin, and a greater tendency toward 
sin is not any more the same as sin either. You might think that sinfulness, which after all 
can be traced back to Adam and Eve, somehow makes it easier to explain our own fall 
into actual sin than it is to explain Adam and Eve’s sin—because after all, before they 
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actually sinned there wasn’t any tendency toward sin, no “sinfulness” that would make it 
easier for them to sin. In short, there wasn’t any basis for temptation in them before the 
sin. 
But that would be wrong. That would be to confuse the quantitative with the qualitative, 
which we know from the Introduction is a mistake. See p. 38: 
It might also appear that it would be easier to explain how a subsequent 
person lost innocence. But this is only apparent. The greatest degree of 
quantitative determinability no more explains the leap than does the least 
degree; if I can explain the guilt in a subsequent person, I can explain it in 
Adam as well. 
Now this sinfulness is what we inherit from Adam and Eve, not actual sin. So, hereditary 
sin or original sin, in the sense of what we get from Adam and Eve, is not really a sin at 
all and does not make us guilty; we do that on our own. On the other hand, original sin in 
the sense of what Adam and Eve did themselves likewise doesn’t make us guilty at all, 
although it made them guilty. 
The individual and the race 
There’s another theme I want to highlight for you, and I’m not very sure how it is 
supposed to be consistent with the notions we’ve just been developing. On pp. 28–29, we 
get the important claim: 
At every moment, the individual is both himself and the race. This is 
man’s perfection viewed as a state. It is also a contradiction, but a 
contradiction is always the expression of a task, and a task is movement, 
but a movement that as a task is the same as that to which the task is 
directed is an historical movement. Hence the individual has a history. 
[Compare the Judge on “history.”] 
That last part sounds to me like complete hocus pocus. But the important claim here is 
that the individual is both himself and the race. (‘Race’ here means the human race, the 
human species, not “race” in the sense of “racism.”) 
Again (p. 28): 
man is individuum and as such simultaneously himself and the whole race, 
and in such a way that the whole race participates in the individual and the 
individual in the whole race. 
Then he goes on to add in a footnote that this is quite different from the relation between 
species and individual in the case of brute animals. 
The importance of this odd view is that Kierkegaard seems to think it’s the basis for our 
sharing in Adam’s sin. Even if we’re not exactly guilty of it—since after all, we didn’t do 
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it, he did—nevertheless, we are compromised by it, lessened by it, we are shamed by it. 
Furthermore (and this is the really interesting thing), we don’t feel there’s anything 
wrong with that, except perhaps when we begin to philosophize about it too much. That 
is, we all recognize that if Adam sinned, we should by compromised by it, we should be 
shamed by it. 
This has always been the conceptually hard part of the doctrine of original sin, why there 
should be some kind of collective penalty or punishment even where there really isn’t any 
collective guilt (since it was only Adam and Eve who did it). 
Well, what does SK say about this? He says (p. 29): 
Every individual is essentially interested in the history of all other 
individuals, and just as essentially as in his own. 
Take an analogy. Consider what the U.S. government did to the Japanese-Americans on 
the West Coast during World War II—rounding them up and carting them off to 
internment camps. Isn’t that just scandalous? Doesn’t it make you ashamed to be an 
American? (Pick your own example if that one doesn’t work for you, but pick one that 
does produce that effect.) 
Now think about that. Why should it? After all, it has nothing to do with anything you did 
personally. And yet you feel lessened by it, and furthermore that you should feel lessened 
by it. There would be something wrong with you if you didn’t feel lessened by it. 
Or suppose someone in your family is caught doing something really, really terrible. 
(They’ve been buying and selling slaves. And furthermore, it turns out it’s really true and 
it’s been going on for a long time.) This is the kind of thing families traditionally try to 
hush up. Why? Because they feel collectively shamed by it. (Perhaps I’ve misidentified 
the emotion here, and it’s not shame or a sense of guilt. Nevertheless, you don’t gossip 
about it.) 
You may object: Why should we? There’s no reason we need to feel compromised by 
other people’s deeds. 
Perhaps not, but that’s irrelevant. This isn’t an argument. It may very well be that there’s 
no good reason to feel this sense of corporate guilt. BUT WE DO ANYWAY, DON’T WE? 
And furthermore, good reason or no good reason, we all feel that’s perfectly appropriate. 
If you don’t, if you don’t feel that the behavior of your family members reflects on you as 
well as on them, then to that extent you have in a sense severed your ties with the family, 
you’re not really part of it any more. 
So too, the only way to avoid being tainted by Adam’s sin, and for that matter by the sins 
of one another, is to cut ourselves off from the human race—to be quite literally 
inhuman. 
Note how Hegelian all this sounds. 
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Anxiety 
I said when I began talking about Anxiety that I would not have much to say about the 
actual psychological emotion “anxiety.” But I do want to say a bit about it. And I want to 
warn you that from here on in our discussion of Anxiety, things are going to get very 
crazy. 
We talked early on in the course about how “anxiety” accompanies free choice, and that’s 
right. Anxiety is a kind of fear of what I might do. 
But let’s look at what Vigilius Haufniensis himself says about “anxiety.” Look at p. 41 
(Part I, § 5: “The Concept of Anxiety”): 
Innocence is ignorance. [NB: Therefore, knowledge → guilt!] In 
innocence, man is not qualified as spirit but is psychically qualified in 
immediate unity with his natural condition. 
That’s a mouthful, and we don’t need to worry about all of it for now. But notice what 
he’s talking about: he’s talking about the state of innocence, which is to say the state 
before that first individual sin. 
And he says here that in that condition, a human being is “not qualified as spirit” but 
rather “psychically.” ‘Psychically’ here refers to the “psyche,” the soul or mind. So we 
have a contrast here between mind and “spirit.” 
What is spirit? There’s going to be a long story about that in Sickness unto Death. But for 
the present, let’s just look at what Alastair Hannay says about “spirit” in his 
“Introduction” to Sickness (p. 4): 
‘Spirit’ for Kierkegaard is what sets a human being apart from and above 
its simply human nature—apart from and above it in a way that leaves the 
individual without a given or natural identity, and forced to acknowledge 
or construct another. In The Sickness undo Death spirit is identified as the 
‘self’, and we find that the increased levels of awareness which form the 
main topic of the ‘exposition’ [Anti-Climacus describes Sickness unto 
Death as “A Christian Psychological EXPOSITION for Edification and 
Awakening”] are levels of an increasing self-awareness. [I.e., awareness, 
sense of self. Recall Either/Or II.] 
That seems to me to be perfectly correct as far as it goes, and to apply to Anxiety as much 
as to Sickness (except that Anxiety doesn’t do any real “taxonomy” of levels of self-
awareness such as we find in Sickness). So, what do we have? 
The passage in Anxiety, therefore, says that in this prelapsarian state of innocence, we are 
not yet qualified as spirit. That is, in this early stage of our development, we don’t yet 
really have any sense of “who we are,” any real sense of self-identity. 
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In short, we’re not yet fully human. We have a human nature, to be sure, which means in 
part that we have a “psyche” or mind, but it’s not fully developed. We are “psychically 
qualified in immediate unity with” our “natural condition,” as the passage says. In effect, 
we’re children, and fairly young children at that, without any real sense of self. We’ve 
not yet reached “the age of reason,” as it’s sometimes put. 
The passage goes on (p. 41): 
The spirit of man is dreaming [in this early stage]. This view is in full 
accord with that of the Bible, which by denying that man in his innocence 
has knowledge of the difference between good and evil [which comes only 
after eating the fruit of our own “tree of the knowledge of good and evil”] 
denounces all the phantasmagoria of Catholic meritoriousness. 
I’m not sure what that last part means exactly. But notice the part about “the spirit of man 
is dreaming.” There is a similar discussion in the Don Giovanni passage from Either/Or, 
where A describes the character of the “page boy” in Mozart’s Marriage of Figaro as in 
effect a child in whom “desire” is dreaming. 
And for that matter, recall how in our discussion of the Don Giovanni passage from 
Either/Or, we said that Don Giovanni is described as a force of nature, and so as not fully 
human. There’s an important sense, then, in which Don Giovanni too is a childish 
character, not really qualified by spirit. He’s not yet a moral agent, any more than thunder 
is. 
Let’s go on a bit (p. 41): 
In this state there is peace and repose, but there is simultaneously 
something else that is not contention and strife, for there is indeed nothing 
against which to strive. What, then, is it? Nothing. But what effect does 
nothing have? It begets anxiety. This is the profound secret of innocence, 
that it is at the same time anxiety. Dreamily the spirit projects its own 
actuality,  
OK, so what we have here then is a picture of the child—before original sin (and 
remember, we each commit our own personal “original sin”)—as in this kind of dreamy 
state where we don’t even have a good sense of self-identity. And yet all is not well in 
that dreamy state. There’s a kind of bubbling latent turmoil, which he’s here calling 
anxiety. 
Our text goes on (p. 42): 
The concept of anxiety is almost never treated in psychology. Therefore, I 
must point out that it is altogether different from fear and similar concepts 
that refer to something definite, whereas anxiety is freedom’s actuality as 
the possibility of possibility. For this reason, anxiety is not found in the 
beast, precisely because by nature the beast is not qualified as spirit. 
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Now, you might say, wait a minute! I thought we just said that in this state of innocence 
we’re now talking about, we do have anxiety (“This is the profound secret of innocence, 
that it is at the same time anxiety”—p. 41) and yet “In innocence, man is not qualified as 
spirit” (p. 41). So what about it? Does anxiety require being qualified as spirit or not? Are 
we basically not distinct from beasts in that state of innocence? 
Well, listen to what he says on p. 43: 
In innocence, man is not merely animal, for if he were at any moment of 
his life merely animal, he would never become a man. So spirit is present, 
but as immediate, as dreaming. 
So, spirit is present in a way, but in a way not. It’s all potential, latent. So too, we’re not 
really beasts, but we’re not fully human yet either—we’re children. 
I want to call your attention to one other passage at this point. It’s on p. 42, and is a 
famous definition of anxiety: 
Anxiety is a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy. 
That is, we’re simultaneously attracted to and repelled by what we might do! (Recall the 
story of the graduate student who was drying dishes in the kitchen with his wife, and 
began to have weird thoughts about the knife in his hand. There was something attractive 
about the idea of what he might do. Not that he wanted to. But the thought was attractive 
enough that he nevertheless toyed with the idea for a while. At the same time, it was a 
scary thought—and its being scary was in fact part of what made it attractive!) 
There’s an awful lot else going on in these early sections of Anxiety. For example, on p. 
44, we get a discussion of God’s prohibition in the Garden of Eden, when he tells Adam 
not to eat of the tree. To begin with, Adam has only this vague, unsettled, undefined 
anxiety, without object. “The spirit is dreaming,” it’s not fully alert. But then God tells 
him not to eat the fruit of the tree. Here’s what Vigilius says (p. 44): 
Innocence still is, but only a word is required and then ignorance is 
concentrated. [Recall p. 41: “Innocence is ignorance.”] Innocence 
naturally cannot understand this word, but at that moment anxiety has, as 
it were, caught its first prey. Instead of nothing, it now has an enigmatic 
word. When it is stated in Genesis that God said to Adam, “Only from the 
tree of the knowledge of good and evil you must not eat,” it follows as a 
matter of course that Adam really has not understood this word, for how 
could he understand the difference between good and evil when this 
distinction would follow as a consequence of the enjoyment of the fruit? 
He goes on (p. 44) to remark that, at this stage at any rate, the notion that prohibition 
produces desire—that as soon as you tell people they can’t have something, that’s exactly 
what they want—isn’t quite right. Prohibition doesn’t produce desire, it awakens anxiety 
(p. 44): 
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The prohibition induces in him anxiety [even though we said in a sense it 
was there even before], for the prohibition awakens in him freedom’s 
possibility. What passed by innocence as the nothing of anxiety has now 
entered into Adam, and here again it is a nothing—the anxious possibility 
of being able. He has no conception of what he is able to do; otherwise—
and this is what usually happens [i. e., this is the way the story is usually 
told]—that which comes later, the difference between good and evil, 
would have to presupposed. Only the possibility of being able is present as 
a higher form of ignorance  
He goes on (p. 45) to observe that after God tells Adam not to eat the fruit, he adds that if 
he does, “he shall certainly die.” But of course Adam has no more knowledge of what it 
means to die at this stage than he has of the difference between good and evil. (Does this 
mean that nothing died in the Garden of Eden—not even brute animals? Maybe. There’s 
the Greek notion of the Fall as a cosmic event. SK alludes to this on p. 56 in his 
discussion of “objective anxiety.”) 
So Adam does not really understand what it is he’s being forbidden to do! And he doesn’t 
understand what the punishment is if he does do it. What kind of sense does that make? 
Note a possible objection here: Adam doesn’t really have to know what “the difference 
between good and evil” means in order to know he’s not supposed to eat the fruit of that 
tree. But (reply) Kierkegaard (Vigilius Haufniensis) seems to be interpreting the story 
allegorically (as is certainly legitimate and traditional), in such a way that God is not 
really forbidding a certain diet but rather saying “Don’t learn about the difference 
between good and evil!” The figure of the tree and its fruit is simply a literary way of 
making that point. In other words, “Stay ignorant, stay at the childish stage—don’t grow 
up!” 
So, what do we do about this problem—Adam really has no way of knowing what he’s 
being forbidden to do, and no way of knowing what the penalty is for doing so? 
Well, now things begin to get pretty free-wheeling! He says (p. 45): 
Here, in the conclusion, I have adhered to the Biblical narrative. I have 
assumed the prohibition and the voice of punishment as coming from 
without. Of course, this is something that has troubled many thinkers. [I’m 
not sure who he is thinking of here. But remember the Epistle of James 
and the claim that we are tempted only by ourselves.] But the difficulty is 
merely one to smile at. Innocence can indeed speak, inasmuch as in 
language it possesses the expression for everything spiritual. Accordingly, 
one need merely assume that Adam talked to himself. The imperfection in 
the story, namely, that another [= God] spoke to Adam about what he did 
not understand, is thus eliminated. From the fact that Adam was able to 
talk, it does not follow in a deeper sense that he was able to understand 
what was said. 
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I’m not sure this really solves anything, but notice what he’s doing here. He’s saying, 
yes, the Biblical narrative says one thing. But we’ll reinterpret it some other way. It 
wasn’t God who spoke to Adam; it was Adam talking to himself! And that 
reinterpretation will eliminate the “imperfection in the story” and so improve on the Bible 
itself! 
It gets even weirder. On p. 47, we learn that anxiety belongs more to women than to men! 
This isn’t a typical example of “male chauvinism” (as it used to be called not long ago16), 
because as a footnote on the same page makes clear, “anxiety is by no means a sign of 
imperfection.” On the contrary, as we know, it’s a precondition for being fully human. 
On the same page (p. 47), we also get the observation: 
The imperfection in the narrative—how it could have occurred to anyone 
to say to Adam what he essentially could not understand—is eliminated if 
we bear in mind that the speaker is language, and also that it is Adam 
himself who speaks. 
We’ve seen that before. 
So are we supposed to interpret Adam as a kind of symbol for language in general? Or 
what? 
On p. 48, we get the candid admission that the author doesn’t know what to do with the 
serpent in the story: 
Instead, I freely admit my inability to connect any definite thought with 
the serpent. 
The problem, as he goes on to explain, is this (ibid.): 
Furthermore, the difficulty with the serpent is something quite different, 
namely, that of regarding the temptation as coming from without [and not 
just the prohibition as coming from without]. This is simply contrary to 
the teaching of the Bible, contrary to the well-known classical passage in 
James, which says that God tempts no man and is not tempted by anyone, 
but each person is tempted by himself. 
The passage is one I’ve quoted to you before (James 1:13–15): 
No one, when tempted, should say, “I am being tempted by God”; for God 
cannot be tempted by evil and he himself tempts no one. But one is 
tempted by one’s own desire, being lured and enticed by it; then, when 
that desire has conceived, it gives birth to sin, and that sin, when it is fully 
grown, gives birth to death. 
                                                 
16 Chauvinism was originally a French nationalist movement (Bonapartism). 
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The problem, of course, is that when Vigilius says “This is simply contrary to the 
teaching of the Bible,” the response is that it may very well be contrary to the Epistle of 
James, which Luther had had trouble with anyway, but it’d definitely not contrary to 
Genesis! It is Genesis! 
What’s going on in all of this? 
I confess I don’t know, but I have a troubling suspicion. Isn’t this exactly the kind of 
thing Kierkegaard was criticizing the Hegelians for doing? Taking a central theological 
doctrine and explaining it away? Recall how Hegel insisted he was not denying 
theological doctrine, but simply giving a philosophical account of what it really meant? 
Talk about God was really talk about some kind of universal spirit, which is basically 
human spirit. Talk about the Incarnation was really a mythological and primitive way of 
recognizing the fact that this universal spirit is present in all of us. 
So too perhaps SK: in the Genesis story of Adam and Eve, Adam turns out to be simply a 
personification of language, and the serpent is just written off as an embarrassment. 
For that matter, the whole traditional notion that we somehow inherit guilt from Adam is 
rejected. Adam didn’t pass anything on to us, except perhaps a tendency to sin 
(“sinfulness”), which is not to be confused with actual sin. 
Isn’t this exactly the kind of “explaining things away” the Hegelians were guilty of, and 
that Kierkegaard—I thought—doesn’t like? 
Well, I don’t know.  
The demonic 
In Chap. IV of Anxiety, we get a number of very interesting developments. First of all, 
there’s the almost impenetrable footnote on pp. 111–12, where Viglius Haufniensis 
makes a big point of saying that freedom is never in abstracto, but always in concreto. 
This seems to mean that we never in practice find ourselves in a situation where we are in 
some neutral state and have to choose between good and evil. No, in every choice we are 
already either on the side of the good or on the side of evil, and the question is what 
we’re going to do in that situation. This doesn’t mean we have to stay on whichever side 
we start in, but only that we are never in a position of choosing from a neutral standpoint. 
So the kinds of choices we’re talking about here are not to be thought of as “pick a 
number, any number,” or “call heads or tails.” That’s not the right model. 
This claim obviously raises all sorts of theoretical questions. If, as we’ve seen, we all 
start off in a state of innocence—which doesn’t seem to mean merely an absence of guilt 
but not yet being a real moral agent—then how do we get into a state of exercising 
freedom, which now seems to presuppose that we already are moral agents, siding either 
with good or with evil? Well, I don’t know the answer to that, but this is part of what 
Vigilius Haufniensis means by a “qualitative leap,” a notion that keeps coming up 
throughout the book. Freedom is not a matter of quantitative build-up, of approximation. 
As we discussed earlier, we don’t start off innocent, for instance, and then become almost 
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guilty, and then really, really close to guilty, and then finally guilty. No, it’s an all-at-
once leap, and then—presto!—we’re guilty. As he frequently says, sin presupposes itself 
(see p. 112, also p. 62). And presumably the same holds for siding with the good. (Recall 
Judge William in Either/Or II.) 
Notice also that there is absolutely nothing here to support Anderson’s view that 
Kierkegaard doesn’t believe in absolute values, that it’s basically just a matter of 
choosing your priorities and doing what you feel is “right for you.” Of course you have to 
choose your priorities, but that doesn’t mean there’s nothing absolute about good and 
evil. There is, for Vigilius Haufniensis, for Anti-Climacus (a “higher” pseudonym), and
—I dare say—for Kierkegaard himself. 
Now normally, we tend to think of anxiety—the fear of our own freedom, of what I might 
do—as closely allied to temptation. That is, often what I’m afraid of is that I might do 
something bad, might deliberately do something bad, and this makes me anxious (or 
rather this is anxiety). 
And no doubt this is exactly right is a lot of cases. It’s what in Chap. IV § 1 (pp. 113–18), 
Vigilius calls “anxiety about evil.” 
But there’s another kind of anxiety he discusses too, beginning in Chap. IV § 2 on p. 118: 
Anxiety about the Good. This is what he subtitles “The Demonic.” Here what you’re 
afraid of is not that you might deliberately do something bad, but on the contrary, that 
you might deliberately do something good! 
What does he have in mind? Well, he talks about the various passages in the Gospels 
where certain people are described as possessed by demons. (They are “demonic.”) 
Vigilius doesn’t think these passages are to be thought of as being literally about being 
“possessed” by a kind of invasion force from outside. On the contrary, this is not a matter 
of external forces, but a kind of self-generated pathology. We’re the perpetrators as well 
as the victims of what’s going on here. (Recall James’ epistle again.) 
This notion of the demonic comes up again in Sickness, and is one of the most striking 
points of continuity between the two texts. (And it also comes up in that strange story of 
“Agnete and the Merman” in Problema III of Fear and Trembling. I have absolutely no 
idea what’s going on there.) 
What is he talking about? 
Well, what he’s got in mind is a kind of willful stubbornness, based in the end on pride. 
We’re in a state of sin, we’ve sided with evil—at least to start off. We recognize that our 
“spirit” is in a state of imbalance. (We’ll talk more about that when we come to Sickness.) 
We recognize that we need help in order to set things right. (Recall, no Pelagianism.) 
But—dammit!—we’re not going to have any of it! Rather than turn our psychic and 
spiritual health over to someone else (God), we’re going to insist on doing things our own 
way, even if we’re miserable as a result! 
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In Sickness, pp. 73–74, SK talks about the situation of someone who owns a beautiful 
home, a mansion really, with many stories and levels, and rooms decorated and 
maintained in the most comfortable and luxurious manner, with everything one could 
possibly want—but who nevertheless insists on living in the cellar, because “after all, it is 
his house!” 
Notice that, in a sense, the fellow is right. It is his house, and he can live in whatever part 
of it he wants! But still, there’s something obviously pathetic—or perhaps comic—about 
one who, simply in order to maintain the principle that he’s in charge here, insists on 
living in the cellar rather than doing the obvious thing. 
The analogy is perhaps not perhaps not perfect. The man, after all, can move upstairs to 
the more comfortable quarters under his own power, any time he wants. But when we’re 
in a state of sin, we cannot correct things under own power. (That would be Pelagianism.) 
But never mind. We still have the picture of someone who stubbornly insists on being in 
charge—even if it’s only being in charge of his own misery. There are passages where 
SK talks about the demonic as saying, in effect, “Leave me alone in my misery!”—as if 
he’d rather be miserable than suffer the indignity of being helped and thereby give up 
control of his own destiny, even if he recognizes that he needs help! (Think of people 
who are “too proud to accept charity.” We often put this in terms of “self-respect.” But 
self-respect can turn out to be just another form of the demonic!) 
I think this is deep psychological stuff, and not discussed by philosophers nearly as often 
as it should be. I make no claim to having it all figured out. 
On p. 123, we begin to get a discussion of something called “inclosing reserve” (det 
Indesluttede).17 This too is a notion that comes up big-time in Sickness, and in other 
places as well (e.g., in Stages). Here again, we get the notion of stubbornly refusing to 
deal with any outside factors, of being in complete charge of oneself. “Inclosing reserve” 
is a refusal to communicate, of simply “shutting the door.” (Recall the question in 
Problema III of Fear and Trembling, about why Abraham kept silent and didn’t tell Sarah 
what he was doing.) It won’t work in the end, of course, and in extreme cases the 
individual might even recognize that it doesn’t work and that he’s engaging in a self-
defeating enterprise. But never mind! He’s going to be in charge, even if it’s only being 
in charge of his own misery! 
Sin and sexuality 
Here’s another theme that I absolutely don’t know what to do with in this text. On pp. 48 
ff., we get the claim that sin has something crucial to do with sexuality. And I assume 
he’s not talking about “sexuality” in the sense of biology but in the sense of psychology. 
Here’s what he says (p. 48): 
                                                 
17 Ordinary Danish uses the word this word to mean “reserved” (Hanny, Sickness, n. 43 [to p. 
49]). But it also has overtones of  “barricading oneself in,” or “shutting oneself in.” 
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The consequence [of original sin]is a double one, that sin came into the 
world and that sexuality was posited; the one is to be inseparable from the 
other. 
This is a rather odd thing to find SK saying. After all, this is the same guy who wrote the 
rapturous discussion of Don Giovanni in Either/Or, not to mention Diary of a Seducer or 
Judge William’s praise of marriage! On the whole, Kierkegaard is no prude; he doesn’t 
think of sex as bad, or that it has any connection at all with sin (although there’s some 
reason to think he does later on, near the end of his life). 
In any case, he goes on to say (ibid.): 
We shall  simply assume the presence of the sexual difference before 
the fall, except that as yet it was not, because in ignorance it is not. In this 
respect we have support in the Scriptures. 
I’m not sure what Scriptural passage he has in mind here. But I recall that my former 
colleague David Brakke in the Religious Studies Department one reported that in the 
early Church the view was often that in the Garden of Eden, Adam and Eve had sex, yes, 
but there was nothing passionate about it. It was more like—as Brakke put it—“shaking 
hands.” 
Here’s another intriguing passage (p. 49): 
So sinfulness is by no means sensuousness [the Hongs mean “sensuality”], 
but without sin there is no sexuality, and without sexuality, no history. A 
perfect spirit has neither the one nor the other, and therefore an angel has 
no history. 
The point comes up again on p. 79, where we read that if Adam had not sinned in the first 
place, human beings would have no sexual drive, and that angels and human beings after 
the resurrection will have no sexual drive. (Note: This is one of the few places where 
Kierkegaard actually mentions the resurrection. In this case it’s the “resurrection” of 
everyone at the end of the world, not the resurrection of Jesus in particular, but never 
mind.) 
I have absolutely no idea what’s going on there, but I want to call your attention to it. 
The role of anxiety in faith 
In the last Chapter of the text, Chapter v “Anxiety as Saving through Faith,” we get a 
discussion of the role of anxiety in salvation. Plainly, anxiety turns out not to be a bad 
thing, although of course it’s dangerous. On the contrary, anxiety is a precondition of 
being saved at all. 
Earlier, on p. 53, we get the suggestion that anxiety is always with us. He says: 
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Only in the moment that salvation is actually posited is this anxiety 
overcome  When salvation is posited, anxiety, together with possibility, 
is left behind. This does not mean that anxiety is annihilated, but when 
rightly used it plays another role 
And then there’s a reference to Chapter V. 
Again, I have no idea what all this means, but this is the text where Kierkegaard suggests 
that—unlike despair—anxiety is a permanent feature of human consciousness, one that 
goes along with freedom. 
How are we to read all this? 
It’s time to step back for a moment from all of this and to ask ourselves what on earth 
we’re to make of it. Anyone trained in recent North American philosophy has got to 
come away thinking “This isn’t philosophy as I’ve been trained to think of it.” 
In fact, it’s not clear just what it is. It seems to be this odd mish-mash of very suggestive 
thoughts, psychological insights, theological assumptions, exasperatingly imprecise 
terminology, and who knows what else! Is there really some secret meaning behind all 
this, or are we all just reading tea-leaves, so that we can speculate any way we want? If 
there is some secret meaning, is it worth it in the end, or does it just boil down to 
trivialities? 
In short, just how much of this abuse are we willing to put up with? 
I confess that I have exactly this reaction sometimes. And yet I find that I continue to 
read Kierkegaard, and find it profitable to continue reading him. 
And that’s what intrigues me. What is it about this guy that is attractive, despite all the 
frustration? Part of it is that he’s fun, of course. But is there anything more serious than 
that? 
After long reading, I’ve come away with the conclusion that Kierkegaard is what might 
be called a mad genius. Both parts of that description are important. He was a genius, no 
doubt about it. But he was also mad—perhaps even clinically mad. 
I’ve known other people like this. Perhaps not as brilliant as Kierkegaard, but still in the 
same ballpark. They were way too smart for their own good, obviously pathological cases 
who were cursed by too much cleverness and perhaps by too much self-knowledge they 
didn’t quite know what to do with. The ones I’ve known have without exception burnt 
themselves out in short order. (Recall that SK himself died at the relatively early age of 
42.) 
So what does this mean for us? I think it means that we just have to get what we can out 
of it. Kierkegaard, for instance, is not always at all consistent in his terminology or even 
in his claims. But we just have to deal with it. Look behind the actual words. What is it 
this guy is concerned about? Often you get the sense that Kierkegaard is more or less 
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writing on autopilot, that he’s just “going with the flow” and not worrying over-much 
about whether what he’s saying is consistent with what he said earlier. 
Sometimes we may just have to dismiss certain passages as hyperbole, exaggeration, or 
not well thought out. But we should do that only carefully. 
My point is that this kind of writer requires an entirely different “skill set” than what 
we’re ordinarily familiar with in reading a philosophical author. And that’s what I find 
intriguing. 
The Sickness unto Death 
OK, let’s turn now to the last main work we’re going to consider, The Sickness unto 
Death. 
When I started talking about Concept of Anxiety, I remarked that it seems, at least, that 
there is a close connection between Anxiety and Sickness. Here is some further 
information along those lines. It comes from Walter Lowrie’s18 magisterial biography of 
SK, called simply Kierkegaard, originally published in two volumes (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1938), and reprinted in a paperback edition, 1962.19 I recently acquired 
a copy of a reprint of that 1962 reprint. Here in part is what Lowrie says (vol. II, Part V, 
Chap. 2, pp. 409–10): 
The Sickness unto Death was the first work produced in 1848 [N.B.: but it 
wasn’t published until the following year], and S. K. was justified in 
regarding it as the greatest of his religious works. It shows how 
profoundly he was influenced by Luther at this time. Luther had dwelt 
upon the dreadfulness of the sin of doubting the forgiveness of sin. 
Essentially it [= Sickness] is not a pseudonymous work, in spite of the fact 
that when it came to be published it was ascribed to Anti-Climacus. 
Clearly it is S. K. who is speaking in his own person all the way through 
 One may not at first realize the importance of the problems it handles. 
The first impression is baffling because there is nothing in the literature of 
the world with which it can be compared. To this one exception must be 
made. This later work of S. K.’s [i. e., Sickness] is essentially so like his 
earlier work on The Concept of Dread that it might almost be regarded as 
a very much expanded edition of it—understanding that the expansion is 
in the direction of depth as well as of breadth. Both books are properly 
described in the title as ‘psychological’ studies [the subtitle of Sickness is: 
“A Christian PSYCHOLOGICAL Exposition for Edification and Awakening,” 
                                                 
18 Walter Lowrie was one of the first people in North America to study Kierkegaard seriously. He 
translated many of Kierkegaard’s works, and those translations form the starting point for all subsequent 
English translations of SK. 
19 This isn’t the same as Lowrie’s A Short Life of Kierkegaard, which is much sketchier. 
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and we’ve already talked about the subtitle of Anxiety] and both deal 
(essentially, if not formally [this is an acknowledgement that Anxiety 
explicitly says it is not written from the standpoint of “dogmatics”—i. e., 
theology—and so is not talking about sin]) with the same subjects: sin and 
faith. And yet in a sense they are like concentric circles which touch one 
another at no point, or rather they are like two ellipses described from the 
same foci, sin and faith  
Despite the rather forced simile there at the end, I quote this both in order to support my 
earlier suggestion that Anxiety and Sickness are closely related and to call your attention 
to the fact that Walter Lowrie too regards Sickness as in effect a “direct” work, even 
though it is published under the pseudonym Anti-Climacus. 
If that’s right, and if Sickness and Anxiety are as closely related in content as Lowrie 
suggests, then it would seem to follow that Anxiety is in effect a “direct” work too, even 
though it is under the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis. 
We’ve talked about all this before, and I don’t want to make too big a deal out of it, but I 
do want to emphasize that there are good reasons for thinking that in these two works SK 
is pretty much speaking for himself and not being particularly “indirect” or subtle. In 
short, he’s not playing games in these books. 
That’s too bad, because these two books are probably the most difficult and obscure of all 
the things SK wrote. And, if there is to be a competition, no doubt Sickness would win 
hands down as the most difficult of them all—although Anxiety is possibly more baffling. 
Probably the biggest difficulty in reading this work is that it is so dreadfully abstract. If 
you’ll recall the intense lyrical quality of Fear and Trembling, then Sickness stands at the 
absolute opposite end of the spectrum. 
SK recognized this himself. The draft of Sickness was completed sometime in early 1848. 
In a journal entry dated May 13, 1848, SK worries about the book (JP VI 6136): 
There is one difficulty with this book: it is too dialectical and stringent for 
the proper use of the rhetorical, the soul-stirring, the gripping. The title 
itself seems to indicate that it should be discourses—the title is lyrical. 
Perhaps it cannot be used at all, but in any case it is enriched with an 
excellent plan which always can be used, but less explicitly, in discourses. 
The point is that before I really can begin using the rhetorical I always 
must have the dialectical thoroughly fluent, must have gone through it 
many times. That was not the case here. 
Then in the margin of his journal entry (JP VI 6137), he added in part: 
But the point is that the task is much too great for a rhetorical 
arrangement, since in that case every single individual would also have to 
be depicted poetically. 
 174
I take it this refers to the fact that in Sickness we get a very nuanced taxonomy of various 
forms and levels of despair (the “sickness unto death”). And there are a lot of them, so 
that the “poetical”—or “rhetorical”—depiction of all of them—as, for example, the 
“poetical” description of the “Knight of Infinite Resignation” in Fear and Trembling in 
terms of the young man who loved a fair maiden—would simply become too 
cumbersome. Finally, he says (ibid.): 
The dialectical algebra works better. 
In short, this is another one of the so called “algebraic” works, along with Fragments and 
Anxiety. The word for ‘algebra’ SK uses here is ‘Bogstavregning’ = literally, “character 
reckoning” or “letter reckoning.”20 This refers to the fact that algebra uses variables that 
in a sense “have no content,” can stand for any number, no matter which. 
And that tells us one of the things we’ve already seen about these so called “algebraic” 
works: they don’t use a lot of examples. It’s almost all unrelenting theory, with very little 
in the way of concrete illustrations. (There are some, but not many, and not where you 
need them most. The most successful one is perhaps in Fragments, the example of the 
king who loved a fair maiden who was a commoner.) 
Although SK had finished the draft of Sickness in early 1848, it was not brought to the 
printer until June, 1849, and did not finally appear until July 30, 1849. Let’s step back a 
moment, and look at where we are in SK’s “authorship.” 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript was published in 1846, scarcely three years after what 
SK regarded as his “authorship” had begun with Either/Or in 1843. As its title suggests, 
the Concluding Postscript was intended to be the end of the “authorship.” (There’s also a 
suggestion of “concluding” the system, even though Fragments emphatically does not 
give a “system.”) After Postscript, he intended to stop writing, become a rural pastor 
somewhere, and live out the rest of his life in peace. (In 1846, SK was 33 years, and 
recall that he had a kind of superstitious belief that he would not live to be 34—and so 
outlive Jesus. So his “retirement” would be short-lived. He wouldn’t last until the 
following May!) 
Well, it didn’t work. (And I don’t just mean he didn’t die.) Even while he worked on 
getting a pastoral appointment—although it’s not clear to me just how hard he worked at 
this—he continued to write. In 1847, he published the signed Upbuilding Discourses in 
Various Spirits (which includes the famous “Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing”) and 
the likewise signed Works of Love (containing the so called “second ethics”). 
                                                 
20 Stav, en, -er = “stave”; stav, -en, -e = “stick.” But this is based on bogstavet, the participle from 
the verb stave, vt., vi. = “to spell.” Recall that the Runic script consists basically of “stick-characters.” 
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In 1848, he published the signed Christian Discourses (in effect, some more “upbuilding” 
discourses),21 and the rather slight pseudonymous The Crisis and A Crisis in the Life of 
an Actress (by the pseudonymous “Inter et inter”). We’ve also seen that he drafted 
Sickness unto Death early that year, and by November he records in his Journals that 
Point of View was “as good as finished,” although he ended up never publishing that at 
all. (Note: There’s no pretense of the “two-track” pattern of publishing any longer.) 
Even in Point of View, however, he gives every indication that he is still planning to be 
done with his writing, and that Postscript represents a kind of crucial turning point. After 
Postscript, we get what is sometimes called SK’s “second authorship,” in contrast to his 
initial “authorship” up to that point. 
By 1849, SK’s first work in the whole “authorship,” Either/Or, was scheduled to come 
out in a second edition (which it did on May 14). This was SK’s most successful work by 
far, in terms of sales, and he seems to have regarded its being republished as an occasion 
that called for some kind of decisive step on his part. 
He considered publishing Point of View, but eventually decided against it. But five days 
after the second edition of Either/Or appeared, he did publish Two Ethical-Religious 
Essays (pseudonymously, under the name “H. H.”)—on May 19. On the same day 
Either/Or was republished (May 14), he also published a (signed) upbuilding discourse 
The Lily of the Field and the Bird of the Air. 
So he obviously wasn’t quite ready to let go, but was still thinking the time had come to 
end his authorship. At one point, he intended to publish “all the completed manuscripts” 
[that is, perhaps, all the unpublished completed manuscripts, which at the time he wrote 
this would have included Sickness, parts of Practice, Point of View, Armed Neutrality 
(which we’ve not talked about), and Two Ethical-Religious Essays], “all under my name
—and then to make a clean break.” (JP VI 6517.) 
So the picture we get here (and there’s a lot more to the story) is of a person in a state of 
mental turmoil about what to do with his writings. 
Even after he decided to publish Sickness unto Death, there remained the question who 
was to be listed as its nominal “author.” At first he was going to make it a signed work: 
The Sickness unto Death, by S. Kierkegaard. Then he decided to make it pseudonymous, 
and changed “S. Kierkegaard” to “Anticlimacus” (no hyphen). Finally, he changed it to 
“Anti-Climacus” (with the hyphen), but “edited by S. Kierkegaard.” 
In short, here we have a man obsessed. The impartial reader might very well wonder just 
what difference it would make whether one included the hyphen or not. But SK seems to 
have blown these matters up to cosmic proportions; he had to be sure he was not 
interfering with divine providence. It had to be done exactly the way God was leading 
him to do it. 
                                                 
21 At one point, he explains that the upbuilding discourses don’t presuppose any peculiarly 
Christian categories, whereas the Christian discourses do; neither, of course, consists of sermons. I’m not 
sure this distinction really works, but that’s what he says. 
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Again, the impartial reader might very well ask, “He certainly does think he’s important, 
doesn’t he?” As though a misplaced hyphen would wreck God’s whole plan for the 
universe! And yes, it must be granted that there is a strong dose of megalomania here, 
even while SK is at the same time protesting about how insignificant he is, and how 
everything is all up to providence. This is the kind of thing I meant when, some time 
back, I described SK as a mad genius. 
Setting all SK’s own worries aside, what are we to make out of this pseudonym “Anti-
Climacus” (with or without the hyphen)? 
Well, obviously, “Johannes Climacus” (the “author” of Fragments and Postscript) and 
“Anti-Climacus” (Sickness and Practice in Christianity) are supposed to be connected in 
some way. The name “Anti-Climacus” is not to be taken in the sense of “against 
Johannes Climacus” but in the sense of “before Johannes Climacus”—that is “prior to,” 
“above,” “superior.” (We likewise have this sense of ‘anti-’ as “before” preserved in 
English in the word ‘anticipate’—or, for that matter, in ‘anti-climax’.) 
And that’s exactly the way Anti-Climacus describes himself in an unpublished journal 
entry from 1849, probably from before June of that year (JP VI 6349): 
Climacus and Anticlimacus [no hyphen] 
A Dialectical Discovery 
by 
Anticlimacus [again no hyphen] 
Postscript22 
I, Anticlimachus [note the spelling—no hyphen, but with an extra ‘h’], 
who wrote this little book (a poor, simple, mere man just like most 
everybody else) was born in Copenhagen and am just about, yes, exactly, 
the same age as Johannes Climachus [again, note the spelling], with whom 
I in one sense have very much, have everything in common, but from 
whom in another sense I am utterly different. He [i.e., Johannes Climacus] 
explicitly says of himself that he is not a Christian; this is infuriating. I, 
too, have been so infuriated about it that I—if anyone could somehow 
trick me into saying it—say just the opposite  I say, in fact, that I am an 
extraordinary Christian such as there has never been, but, please note, I am 
that in hidden inwardness. 
There are other passages like this. When Sickness was published, SK sent a copy of it to 
his friend and one-time protégé Rasmus Nielsen (1809–84), saying (JP VI 6434): 
I am sending along a new book. Presumably you will have no difficulty in 
discovering why this pseudonym is called Anti-Climacus, in which respect 
he is quite different from Johannes Climacus, with whom he certainly does 
                                                 
22 I take it this means this fragment was drafted as a “Postscript” to Sickness. 
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have something in common (as they do also share parts of a name), but 
from whom he differs very essentially in that J. Cl. humorously denies that 
he himself is Christian and, in consequence, can only make indirect 
attacks, and, in consequence, as a humorist must take it all back [recall the 
“revocation” at the end of Postscript]—while Anti-Climacus is very far 
from denying that he himself is Christian, which is evident in the direct 
attack. 
Again (JP VI 6433): 
I [i. e., Kierkegaard himself] would place myself higher than Johannes 
Climacus, lower than Anti-Climacus. 
Again (JP VI 6431): 
The pseudonym is Johannes Anticlimacus [!] in contrast to Climacus, who 
said he was not a Christian. Anticlimacus is the opposite extreme: a 
Christian on an extraordinary level—but I myself manage to be only a 
very simple Christian. 
Note that in both these passages, SK is placing himself between Johannes Climacus and 
Anti-Climacus. Note also that, oddly, in the last passage, he does claim to be a Christian, 
but only a “very simple” one. Generally we see him declining to make even that minimal 
claim, even in the “signed” works. 
One more (JP VI 6442): 
If I have represented a person so low that he even denied being a Christian 
[that’s Johannes Climacus], then the opposite also ought to be represented 
[that will be Anti-Climacus]. And Christendom does indeed greatly need 
to hear the voice of such a judge [i.e., an authority]—but I will not pass 
myself off as the judge, and therefore he also judges me, which is easy 
enough and quite appropriate, for anyone who cannot present ideality so 
high that he is judged by it himself must have a poor understanding of it. 
So SK himself claims he has such an understanding of this “ideality,” even though he 
himself doesn’t live up to it; he is judged by it. In other words, he is cognitively in 
agreement with Anti-Climacus (and not with Johannes Climacus), even though is only 
striving to live up to the ideal standard Anti-Climacus represents. 
So we have, as you will recall, two kinds of works from SK: pseudonymous and signed. 
The pseudonymous works, it now turns out, come in two kinds: the “lower” pseudonyms 
and the “higher” pseudonym Anti-Climacus. (The Hongs suggest that “H. H.” in Two 
Ethical-Religious Essays is also a “higher pseudonym,” but I can find no basis whatever 
for that claim.) 
 178
SK himself presumably occupies the position represented in the signed works, since they 
have his own name on them. He disavows BOTH the lower and the higher pseudonyms, 
although for opposite reasons. He rejects the lower pseudonyms because he regards 
himself as above them; he disavows Anti-Climacus because he regards him as above 
himself. But he agrees cognitively with what Anti-Climacus is saying. 
Contents of Sickness unto Death 
With that, let’s turn to the actual contents of Sickness. 
One way to look at this work is to say its topic is to analyze the notion of despair, which 
the book explicitly identifies as the “sickness unto death” (Part One, p. 41, and again on 
p. 43). Or again, as an analysis of sin, which Part II of the book explicitly identifies with 
despair (p. 107). But another way to look at it is to say that what we get in this book is 
SK’s most sustained discussion of the ontology of the self. In short, the book can also be 
legitimately viewed as a book of metaphysics. 
One of the themes that unites the disparate writings in SK’s “authorship” is, what is it to 
be a self. This doesn’t come up in all his writings (for example, not really in Fragments, 
and not really in Fear and Trembling), but it’s definitely a recurring theme in a number 
of works. 
We’ve already seen, for instance, how The Concept of Anxiety talks about the 
development of personality, of consciousness, of the “spirit” or “self” in terms of 
increasing levels of anxiety, about how even in the state of innocence there is a kind of 
potential spirit there that is dreaming. 
I mentioned also how, in the Don Giovanni discussion in Either/Or, one of things he talks 
about is again this development of the self. (In the page boy in Figaro, for instance, 
desire isn’t yet fully formed, but is only dreaming.) 
Likewise, recall how the Judge in the second half of Either/Or diagnosed the aesthetic 
life as one of despair. The aesthete defines himself, gets his whole “self” or sense of 
identity in terms of some finite and immediate value beyond his control, and that despair 
consisted in the fact that he was deceiving himself about what he was doing. The problem 
with A, recall, was—according to the Judge—just that he had seen through all this, had 
seen the futility of trying to build any kind of self-identity that way (and to that extent 
was “to a certain degree beyond the aesthetic territory”), but had not yet acquired the will 
to move on to some other way to build a self. 
We haven’t talked about it much, but in Purity of Heart is To Will One Thing, we get a 
discussion about how not willing “one thing”—that is, something that is genuinely one 
thing, not just mistakenly regarded as being one thing—is to have a divided will and 
therefore a fractured self. 
In Works of Love, we get a very subtle discussion of how the usual kinds of human love, 
including friendship, are not just love of the other person, but simultaneously a form of 
self-love. Love of this kind is a kind of transactional love, a love one engages in for the 
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sake of mutual benefit. Of course, to say “mutual benefit” is to say I get something out of 
it too. So if I’m doing it for the sake of this mutual benefit, then I’m doing it in part for 
myself. In terms of Purity of Heart, this means the usual kind of love is not “willing one 
thing,” and therefore once again to have a fractured self. 
Digression: There are two words in Danish that get translated ‘love’: Elskov and 
Kærlighed (old spelling: Kjærlighed). They correspond roughly to the distinction 
between Greek eros and agape that we find in the New Testament. Eros is, of 
course, the source of our term ‘erotic’. But in Greek—and in Danish Elskov—this 
doesn’t just mean sexual love. It means any kind of love based on a drive or 
inclination. In Plato, for instance, one can have eros for the Form of the Beautiful, 
or for Wisdom. (See Plato’s Symposium, for instance.) 
Hong/Hong frequently, but not always, translate Elskov as ‘erotic love’, in order 
to signal which Danish term is being used. But as a result their translations 
sometimes sound far more risqué than the Danish does. 
Kærlighed, on the other hand, can be translated as “charity,” in the sense of the 
Christian virtue. It is not based on any kind of psychological urge or drive; it is 
not “transactional.” The Hongs, however, don’t usually translate it as ‘charity’, 
but just as ‘love’. Sometimes it’s not clear just which word they’re translating. 
But that’s probably OK, because the distinction doesn’t seem to be all that precise 
in Danish. 
One further complication. Although Danish has these two nouns for ‘love’, it has 
only one verb: elske. There is no verb-form going with Kærlighed, any more than 
there is a verb-form of ‘charity’ in English.23 So the command to “elske one’s 
neighbor” doesn’t have to be read in terms of Elskov. End of digression. 
My point (before the digression) was just that this notion of a “self,” what it is to have a 
“self,” how one develops a “self,” a healthy “self”—is a recurring theme in lots of SK’s 
writings, both signed and pseudonymous. 
Now the central text in which what it is to have a self is worked out in greatest detail is 
Sickness unto Death. So what then, is it to have a “self”? Well, let’s listen (Sickness, p. 
43)24: 
The human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is 
the self? The self is a relation which relates to itself, or [in the sense of “or 
more precisely”] that in the relation which is its relating to itself. The self 
is not the relation but the relation’s relating to itself. A human being is a 
                                                 
23 Perhaps “cherish” is close. 
24 With this entire discussion, see Erik Lindland, Kierkegaard on Self-Deception, Ph.D. 
dissertation, Indiana University, 2004, UMI Number: 3162279, available from ProQuest. Depending on 
how you access ProQuest, you may be able to get a copy of this for free. I was privileged to be the director 
of this fine dissertation. 
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synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of 
freedom and necessity. In short a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation 
between two terms. Looked at in this way a human being is not yet a self. 
It’s probably only fair to say that this is not completely clear! 
To begin with, note what appears to be a blatant contradiction in it. We start off with the 
claim that the human being is spirit, and that spirit is the self—from which it would seem 
to follow that the human being is the self. But at the end of the paragraph, we read that a 
human being is not yet a self. 
So which is it? Is a human being a spirit, and therefore a self? Or is a human being not 
yet a self? Well, the answer is both, although obviously something more has to be said. 
What we have, I think, is the picture of the self as a kind of goal to be achieved, a task to 
be accomplished. Insofar as the task is assigned, insofar as the goal is set, we can be said 
to have (or be) a self all along, in some sort of teleological sense. But insofar as we 
haven’t accomplished the task, haven’t reached the goal, we can still say we are not yet a 
self. 
Whatever ontological picture this might imply, we all at least recognize that there’s some 
sense in talking this way. How often have you heard the advice, “Just be yourself,” “Be 
who you really are,” etc. On the one hand, that sounds like the easiest thing in the world 
to do—of course I’m going to be myself! Who else would I be? But in another sense, we 
also all recognize that, whether this advice is good advice or not, there is something it’s 
advising us to do; there is a task being talked about. 
Now I don’t mean to suggest that SK is thinking in terms of the popular psychological 
notion of a real you as opposed to the public you. We’ve all heard the talk about how 
there’s the public “me” that I present to others and perhaps even present to myself. But 
deep down inside me there’s another “me,” the real me. The public me is just a kind of 
mask that hides the deeper self, the real me. And the task is to identify myself with that 
real me, to throw off the superficial, public me and let the true, real me shine forth in all 
its glory. 
SK is not doing anything as superficial as that, to be sure. But there’s something along 
the same lines going on here. (And there are passages where SK talks about “the deep 
self.”) 
Earlier, when we were talking about The Concept of Anxiety, I referred you to a passage 
on p. 4 of Hannay’s “Introduction” to Sickness, where he tries to explain what ‘spirit’ 
means for SK. And we saw then that “spirit” can be thought of, to a first approximation, 
as a sense of self-identity, of who I am. Notice I said “self-identity.” Here once again 
there is this close link-up between spirit and self. 
Now I think SK wants to say two things: 
(1) On the one hand, this self, this “who I am,” is something I construct. That 
is, I give myself an identity by giving myself a sense of my identity. My self and 
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my sense of self are, if not exactly the same thing, at any rate closely connected. 
Those of you who’ve had my Sartre course will recognize that this is very much 
Sartre’s view, when—for instance—he says “Man makes himself.” 
(2) On the other hand, SK certainly doesn’t think it follows from this that 
whatever I think about myself is automatically right, so that thinking so makes it 
so. No, my self-interpretation can be totally off the mark, and in fact almost 
always is. (That’s despair, that’s the sickness unto death.) 
How to reconcile these two things is not at once clear. But let’s go on. 
Spirit, then, is a sense of self-identity. In other words, it’s the story I tell myself about 
myself. To push this a little, we might say then that spirit is my self-NARRATIVE. 
In short, one of the things that happens as I acquire a sense of who I am is that all the 
random little events of my life get organized into an overall picture, so that they make 
sense. The mere chronicle of events in my life, a kind of meaningless succession of 
happenings, gets transformed and becomes a history. 
This notion of history is something that keeps coming up in odd places in SK’s writing. 
And I’m not talking now about history at large, world history, but an individual history. 
Back in Anxiety, for instance, in that strange discussion about how the individual is 
simultaneously both himself and the race, we get the following remark (pp. 28–29): 
At every moment, the individual is both himself and the race. This is 
man’s perfection viewed as a state. It is also a contradiction, but a 
contradiction is always the expression of a task, and a task is movement, 
but a movement that as a task is the same as that to which the task is 
directed is an historical movement. Hence the individual has a history. 
And in Either/Or, Part II, Judge William keeps talking about how only in marriage does a 
human’s life acquire a history. That is, only then is it a coherent life-story. And the 
Judge’s complaint about A is just that A doesn’t have a coherent life-story, he doesn’t 
have any sense-of-self, he doesn’t know who he is. In an important sense, A has not yet 
acquired a self, he has no spirit. He really isn’t anybody. 
Look again at that opening paragraph on p. 43 of Sickness. About half-way through the 
paragraph, we get a description of a human being as a synthesis involving three pairs of 
terms: 
A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal 
and the eternal, of freedom and necessity. 
In effect what he’s talking about here is the traditional picture of a human being as a 
combination of body and soul, or body and mind. And in fact the three pairs of terms he 
talks about here line themselves up nicely under these traditional headings: 
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Body Soul 
finite infinite (don’t read this in 
the mathematical sense) 
temporal eternal (doesn’t necessarily 
mean timeless) 
necessity (bodily 
limitations, etc.) 
freedom (later on he calls 
this possibility) 
 He goes on (p. 43): 
A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal 
and the eternal, of freedom and necessity. In short, a synthesis. A synthesis 
is a relation between two terms [in this case, body and soul]. Looked at in 
this way, a human being is not yet a self. 
That is, if we don’t look any further than the relation between body and mind, we don’t 
yet have a self. Not until that composite of body and mind begins to interpret itself, tell 
itself who it is, do we have a self. 
With that in mind, let’s now go back and look at the beginning of that opening paragraph 
of Sickness again. There is still a lot of this we are not in a position to understand, and 
this is going to be pretty free-wheeling. But we have to start somewhere, so let’s go—I’m 
going to insert some explanatory comments as we go along: 
The human being is [at least implicitly] spirit. [That is, the human being is 
a life-story.] But what is spirit? [What kind of life-story?] Spirit is the self. 
[The story of a self, a self-interpretation The life-story, then, is not just a 
biography but an autobiography.] But what is the self? The self is a 
relation [between soul and body] which relates to itself [through self-
consciousness, through a self-interpretation], or [since that’s not quite 
right—the self is not just a certain kind of body-soul relation, one that does 
a certain thing] that in the relation [of body and soul] which is its relating 
to itself [in other words, the self is not just the body-soul composite that 
engages in this self-interpreting process, is not the thing that engages in 
this process, but rather the process itself]. The self is not the relation [of 
soul and body] but the relation’s relating to itself. [In effect, this just 
repeats the point at the end of the preceding sentence.] 
And then we get the business about how a human being is a synthesis of those three pairs, 
and how if we don’t look any further than that, we don’t yet have a self. 
Now the whole emphasis here is going to be on this self-relating process, how we view 
the balance between body and soul in ourselves, the relation between necessity and 
freedom or possibility in our lives, etc. 
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This process of self-interpretation can of course take many general forms. (a) One form is 
a kind of passive self-interpretation, shaped by events and the things that happen to us. 
This is the kind of situation where we’re not really in charge of our own story, where we 
view the process as simply a matter of discovering who we are. (b) Another is a more 
active process, where we take charge and actively supervise the story. And each these 
will admit of all sorts of variations. 
This I think is basically what is going on in the second paragraph on p. 43, where Anti-
Climacus distinguishes this self-relating process in the form of what he calls a “negative 
unity” from what he calls a “positive third”—the more “take charge” kind of self-
interpreting process. 
Three forms of despair 
OK, now before we go any further in trying to unravel these opening paragraphs, let’s 
pause. Anti-Climacus is going to maintain that this active or passive “self-relating” 
process (what we are thinking of in terms of “self-interpretation”) can—and almost 
always does—go wrong. This “going wrong” is what he calls despair, and “despair is the 
sickness unto death.” (See the section title at the top of p. 43.) 
Right below that heading, we get a subsection heading (confusingly, both the main 
section and the subsection are labeled “A.” But the main section heading has a period 
after it, whereas the heading for the subsection does not). Here’s what he says: 
Despair is a sickness of the spirit, of the self [notice how he’s using these 
terms virtually interchangeably here], and so can have three forms: being 
unconscious in despair of having a self (inauthentic despair), not wanting 
in despair to be oneself, and wanting in despair to be oneself. 
The first form—what he’s here calling “inauthentic despair”—is what he has in mind in 
the first part of the second paragraph when he talks about “a negative unity.” As I said a 
moment ago, this is a situation where we’re not really supervising our own self-
interpretation, but are just passively getting our sense of self from whatever happens to 
us. This is a primitive state, and the despair is not really full-grown yet; that’s why he 
calls it “inauthentic despair.” There isn’t much of a self yet, “spirit” is pretty much still 
just a suggestion. 
By contrast, the other two forms of despair he calls “authentic despair”—i. e., the real 
thing. Cf. the bottom of p. 43:  
That is why there can be two forms of authentic despair. 
Setting “inauthentic despair” aside for the moment, look at the other two forms: (b) not 
wanting in despair to be oneself, and (c) wanting in despair to be oneself. 
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Now you might look at that and say—well, since we either do or don’t want to be 
ourselves (that’s the Law of Excluded Middle), it looks as if we’re stuck in despair no 
matter what we do. 
But no, that doesn’t follow. The three forms are not merely: 
(a) being unconscious of having a self, 
(b) not wanting to be oneself, 
(c) wanting to be oneself, 
but rather: 
(a′) being unconscious in despair of having a self, 
(b′) not wanting in despair to be oneself, and 
(c′) wanting in despair to be oneself. 
So there may be a way out after all: there’s nothing that says we have to do all these 
things in despair. And in fact Anti-Climacus thinks there is a way out. 
Look at the last paragraph of section A, on p. 44: 
This then is the formula which describes the state of the self when despair 
is completely eradicated: in relating to itself and in wanting to be itself, the 
self is grounded transparently in the power that established it. 
We’ll look at this in a moment, but for now just notice the way out is described as a form 
of wanting to be oneself. So, once we have got rid of sin (which we know is identified 
with despair, as I’ve already told you — cf. p. 107), once we are healed, once we are 
saved—we will want to be ourselves, only we’ll want that in the right way, not in despair. 
Now, let’s try to fill out that formula a little more. Look back to the end of paragraph 2 
on p. 43, where Anti-Climacus talks about “the positive third.” This, we said, is the kind 
of “self-interpretation” where we are more actively in charge, where we’re supervising 
the story. This is the kind of situation where the two forms of “authentic” despair might 
arise—but don’t have to, of course. And this is the kind of situation where we have a real 
“self,” rather than the purely germinal, latent “self” we can loosely talk about in the case 
of “inauthentic” despair. 
He goes on in the next paragraph (paragraph 3) on p. 43: 
Such a relation [i. e., this “supervised” relation, the “positive third”], 
which relates to itself, a self, must either have established itself or been 
established by something else. 
Well, that at least seems clear enough. It’s got to be either the one or the other. 
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Here is what Woody Allen says about this sentence (using a different translation of 
Sickness)25: 
“Such a relation which relates itself to its own self (that is to say, a self) 
must either have constituted itself or have been constituted by another.” 
The concept brought tears to my eyes. My word, I thought, to be that 
clever! (I’m a man who has trouble writing two meaningful sentences on 
“My Day at the Zoo.”) True, the passage was totally incomprehensible to 
me, but what of it as long as Kierkegaard was having fun? 
Still, joking aside, all he’s saying is that our active self-interpretation (the “positive 
third,” as distinct from the “inauthentic despair” where we just passively let events shape 
our own view of ourselves) must either be one we just make up for ourselves, or else one 
we actively adopt or accept on the basis of what has been given or assigned to us. 
Of course, who is there who could give us or assign us a life-story, a history, a “self”? 
Obviously, Kierkegaard thinks, only God. And that of course is exactly the alternative SK 
is going to adopt. See paragraph 5, starting at the bottom of p. 43: 
Such a derived, established relation is the human self, a relation which 
relates to itself, and in relating to itself, relates to something else [= to 
God]. 
That is, my own active self-interpretation is simultaneously an interpretation of my 
relation to God. Am I going to accept the self I was assigned by God, or am I going to 
insist on doing it my way? 
Note that, for Kierkegaard, you don’t have to believe in God in order for your own view 
of yourself to be simultaneously a view about your relation to God. If you don’t believe 
in God (whether or not you call him “God”), then your view of yourself will be a view 
that relates to God by denying him, or perhaps by just ignoring him and not raising the 
issue at all. 
Of course if you’re an atheist, you’re going to say that’s just silly. But we’re not talking 
about your theory; we’re talking about Anti-Climacus’s theory (or SK’s theory), and he 
believes in God, so that he’s going to say that if you’re an atheist, you’re just wrong, and 
your self-interpretation is simultaneously a relating yourself to God, whether you think 
that’s what you’re doing or not. 
This raises an interesting question: just how much of SK’s theory can a non-
believer accept? I don’t want to pursue the question now, but I suspect the answer 
is: more than one might think. 
                                                 
25 Woody Allen, “My Philosophy,” in his Getting Even, (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 
27–33, at pp. 27–28. Originally published in The New Yorker. 
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OK, so we’ve got the picture then that this “self,” this self-interpreting relation, either 
establishes itself or else is established by something else—call it God—and that Anti-
Climacus accepts the second alternative. 
Now look back again at paragraph 5, starting at the bottom of p. 43. We’ve already talked 
about the first sentence of that paragraph. Let’s go on: 
… That is why there can be two forms of authentic despair. If the human 
self were self-established [i. e., if atheism were true, or if God did not have 
a providential plan for each of us], there would only be a question of one 
form [of authentic despair]: not wanting to be itself [i. e., the second of the 
three forms listed in the section heading at the top of the page]. There 
could be no question of wanting in (p. 44) despair to be oneself [i. e., the 
third form of despair listed at the top of p. 43]. [That is, you could 
presumably want to be yourself, but you couldn’t despairingly do that. 
Why not? He goes on:] For this latter formula [i. e., wanting in despair to 
be oneself] is the expression for the relation’s (the self’s) total 
dependence, the expression of the fact that the self cannot by itself arrive 
at or remain in equilibrium and rest, but only, in relating to itself, by 
relating to that which has established the whole relation [i. e., God]. [So, if 
there were no God, this last alternative could not arise; it wouldn’t be a 
form of despair.] 
By now, all this should begin to sound familiar. By itself, the self cannot get or remain in 
a state of equilibrium and rest. By itself, it’s always going to be out of balance, sick—in 
fact, sick unto death. By itself, the self is always going to be in despair. And we know 
Anti-Climacus is going to identify that with sin. 
In short, this third form of despair (the second form of authentic despair, which insists on 
doing this all by itself—without relying on God) is in effect PELAGIANISM. 
We’ll return to these themes in a little while. But for now, let’s skip ahead and look once 
again at the last paragraph (paragraph 6) in this first section, on p. 44: 
This then is the formula which describes the state of the self when despair 
is completely eradicated: in relating to itself and in wanting to be itself, the 
self is grounded transparently in the power that established it. 
In short, not being in despair—being saved—amounts to wanting to construct a self, but 
wanting to do it in coordination with the self God has providentially planned for me, 
wanting to do it while accepting God’s help and God’s guidance. (Don’t worry for now 
about what “grounded transparently” means, exactly. I’m not sure either.) 
A link between Sickness and Either/Or 
Let’s summarize where we are so far. The picture in Sickness about what the self or spirit 
is was: 
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A more or less explicit process of telling ourselves who we are—a self-narrative
—that involves a balancing of body and soul. Or, in other ways of putting the 
same contrast (p. 43) 
 finite/infinite 
 temporal/eternal 
 necessity/freedom or possibility 
Compare the same picture we get in Anxiety, but not as fully (Anxiety, p. 81) 
In the two previous chapters, it was maintained continually that man is a 
synthesis of psyche and body [= soul and body] that is constituted and 
sustained by spirit. 
And (Anxiety, p. 85): 
Man, then, is a synthesis of psyche and body, but he is also a synthesis of 
the temporal and the eternal. 
(There is no mention in Anxiety of the third pairing, necessity and freedom or possibility.) 
This self-interpreting balancing act can and almost always does go wrong in one of three 
ways (these are the forms of despair): 
(a) Inauthentic despair: not quite seeing what the task is in the first place. 
And then two form of authentic despair: 
(b) Seeing what the task is, but being unwilling to do it. 
(c) Seeing what the task is, but insisting on doing it my own way 
[= Pelagianism]. 
If there were no God—were no power that “established me” (established not only the 
general nature of the task but a fairly detailed version of how it is supposed to turn out for 
me)—then alternative (c) would be the right way to do it, it wouldn’t be a form of 
despair, and there would turn out to be only two forms of despair (one form of authentic 
despair). 
But there is a God, and therefore the correct balance is different (see Sickness, p. 44). 
Now—a BIG POINT: 
We’ve seen all three of these forms of despair before—and in fact, we’ve seen them all in 
Either/Or. 
Recall how in Either/Or, we had first of all (a) the aesthete. Then we had (b) A, who 
could still be considered more or less an aesthete, but who, according to Judge William, 
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was already “to a certain degree beyond the aesthetic territory.” And finally, we had (c) 
Judge William. 
The only full-length portrayal we ever got in Either/Or of a real aesthete who was not, 
like A, already “to a certain degree beyond the aesthetic territory” was the discussion of 
Don Giovanni, who we said was virtually subhuman, and who might be better thought of 
as a force of nature. (We also get the discussion of the “regular” aesthete the Judge 
describes in Either/Or II. But the “regular” aesthete never gets to speak for himself in 
Either/Or.) 
OK, so we’ve got: (a) Don Giovanni, (b) A, and (c) Judge William. 
(a) Don Giovanni is in the first form of despair, inauthentic despair—not 
really being conscious of even having a self to despair of. So is the 
regular aesthete described by the Judge. 
(b) A is in the second form of despair, the first form of authentic despair—
not wanting in despair to be oneself. Recall how Judge William’s 
diagnosis was that A had seen through the vanity of trying to interpret 
himself in terms of finite worldly goals and ends, but had not yet 
acquired the will to go beyond that. He was unwilling to take charge of 
his own self-definition, short of “taking charge” negatively and 
refusing to do it in terms of finite, worldly goals. In short, A does not 
want a self. The only kind of self he knows how to think in terms of is 
one he won’t accept, and he is unwilling to go any further. 
Note that this is Judge William’s diagnosis of A. And Judge William, we 
know, is a representative of the ethical stage, not of a full-fledged religious 
viewpoint. The fact that we’re seeing the same kind of diagnosis of one 
form of despair now, in the religious author Anti-Climacus, suggests 
perhaps that what Anti-Climacus is saying here is not something that 
depends in any essential way on his own religious viewpoint, or for that 
matter on the Judge’s own ethical viewpoint. What’s going on in A is 
something the Judge, Anti-Climacus—and for that matter A himself—
might well be able to recognize. (Recall my earlier point about how much 
of SK’s view is available to a non-believer.) 
In short, the point is one that doesn’t depend on a particular perspective or 
point of view; it doesn’t depend on what “existence sphere” one is in. In 
principle, anyone ought to be able to see what’s going on. A’s problem is 
not that he doesn’t see what his problem is. On the contrary, A seems very 
sharp about his own state of despair (recall the Diapsalmata at the 
beginning of Either/Or, for instance). The problem with A is not an 
intellectual matter; as the Judge recognizes, and as A himself might well 
recognize too, A is just not willing to move on! And, I think, Anti-
Climacus himself would agree. 
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Notice what’s happening here. The whole emphasis is getting shifted away 
from our intellectual faculties to the will. For all our talking about self-
interpretation, our “view of ourselves,” etc.—all of which sounds 
cognitive and a matter of our intellect—it turns out, as we delve deeper, 
that the real motor behind all this is not the intellect but the will. 
Here is one point on which I think we can find some continuity between 
Kierkegaard, Reformation thought (Luther, etc.), and late medieval 
philosophy and theology in the Franciscan tradition. One of the things that 
happened in late medieval theology in the Franciscan tradition is a shift 
from an ethics and theology of salvation based on the intellect to one 
based on the will. 
Does the intellect lead the will—so that the will chooses what the intellect 
presents to it as the best available choice? (Socrates.) Or does the will lead 
the intellect—so that what the intellect thinks is the best choice depends 
on the will’s values, on what it is willing to do? (William of Ockham.) The 
Franciscan tradition—to oversimplify things enormously—sides with the 
second alternative. And so does much of Reformation thought, and so 
does Kierkegaard. 
I don’t want to develop that connection very much, because I can’t. But I 
think it’s undeniably there. 
Back to the connection between Sickness and Either/Or. 
So far we’ve seen that both the ordinary aesthete—Don Giovanni, and perhaps even a 
somewhat more reflective aesthete the Judge talks about (the “regular” aesthete—the 
pianist who identifies himself in terms of his performing ability, or the movie star who 
identifies himself or herself in terms of physical appearance, or the banker who identifies 
himself in terms of his financial success)—both they and A himself are in despair, 
although in different forms of it. 
But we’ve already seen that claim made in Either/Or itself. Recall how Judge William 
had that curious argument that the aesthetic life inevitably involved despair—even the 
borderline sort of aesthetic life represented by A. Recall how the Judge claimed 
(Either/Or, Hong/Hong, II, p. 192—I read you this passage back when we were 
discussing Either/Or): 
Thus it turns out that every aesthetic life-view is despair, and that 
everyone who lives aesthetically is in despair, whether or not he knows it.  
In general, I want to claim there is a very close connection between Sickness unto Death 
and Either/Or. Many of the same points are made again, and even some of the same 
arguments are made again. Once you’re attuned to it, the convergence is actually quite 
striking and far more than minimal. 
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In this connection, I want to recall to your mind a passage in Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Kierkegaard, which we discussed briefly earlier in 
the semester (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. IV, pp. 336–37): 
One device of Kierkegaard’s must be given special attention: he issued 
several of his books under pseudonyms and used different pseudonyms so 
that he could, under one name, ostensibly attack his own work already 
published under some other name. His reason for doing this was precisely 
to avoid giving the appearance of attempting to construct a single, 
consistent, systematic edifice of thought. Systematic thought, especially 
the Hegelian system, was one of his principal targets. 
I think we are now in a position to show that this view, if not outright false, is at best 
seriously misleading. Granted, Kierkegaard is not “systematic” in the sense that Euclid or 
even Hegel is systematic. But if the view is that it makes no sense to look for an overall 
coherent philosophy in Kierkegaard, an overarching theory, then I think we can now 
show that is false. It’s not that he says the same things in all his writings. No, of course 
not. And it’s not the case that Kierkegaard already had all the details fully worked out 
right at the beginning, so that his thought didn’t develop. But there is a surprising 
consistency  between Either/Or, the very first work in what Kierkegaard regarded as his 
“authorship,” and Sickness unto Death, attributed to the very last pseudonym he ever 
used—and, for that matter, I would be willing to argue, throughout his authorship as a 
whole. 
Let’s look at some more details. 
Remember Judge William’s odd argument that if the aesthetic pianist [my example], for 
instance, who identifies himself in terms of his skills at the keyboard, suddenly loses the 
use of his hands and falls into despair as a result (i.e., comes to be consciously in 
despair), that shows he was in despair all along. Well, compare the following passage in 
Sickness (p. 54): 
If at any time a physician is convinced that so and so is in good health, and 
then later that person becomes ill, then the physician may well be right 
about his having been well at the time but now being sick. Not so with 
despair. Once despair appears, what is apparent is that the person was in 
despair  [Skipping a sentence.] For when whatever causes a person to 
despair occurs, it is immediately evident that he has been in despair his 
whole life.  
This sounds a lot like what the Judge would say, doesn’t it? 
Again, recall how in Either/Or, we said that Don Giovanni was a kind of limiting case, a 
“pure” aesthete who was in some sense subhuman. Well, we get confirmation of that in 
Sickness. This kind of subhuman state can be regarded as an extrinsic limit, which can 
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never really be achieved in practice, but can approximated quite closely. Consider the 
following extended passage from Sickness, pp. 78–79: 
How far being completely clear about oneself—about the fact that one is 
in despair—is compatible with actually being in despair, that is to say, 
whether the clarity of this knowledge and of self-knowledge cannot help 
but lift a person out of his despair, make him so appalled at himself that he 
ceases to be in despair, is not a question we will settle here  Actual life 
is too complex to turn up contrasts as abstract as that between a despair 
that is completely ignorant of being despair [Don Giovanni] and one that 
is completely conscious of being so [the demonic]. [In short, Don 
Giovanni and the demonic are limiting cases.] One must assume that in 
most cases the state of the despairer is one of having only a dim idea, 
though again with countless nuances, of what that state is. He no doubt 
realizes in himself to some extent that he is in despair [whatever he 
himself calls it]; he is able to detect it in himself as one detects a sickness 
one goes about with in one’s body, but he won’t readily admit what the 
sickness is. At one moment he is almost clear that he is in despair, but then 
at another it is as though his indisposition had some other cause, 
something outside him, and if only that were changed he would no longer 
be in despair. Or perhaps he tries to keep his own condition in the dark by 
diversions and other means, for example, work and pressures of business, 
as ways of distracting attention, though again in such a way that he is not 
altogether clear that he is doing it to keep himself in the dark. Or perhaps 
he even realizes he is doing this in order to immerse the soul in darkness, 
does it with a certain perspicacity and shrewd calculation, with 
psychological insight, but in a deeper sense does not fully realize what he 
is doing, how despairing his behaviour actually is, etc. 
There’s a lot more along these lines. But notice the talk, in the later parts of that 
quotation, about diversions, about distracting attention, about doing things in order to 
keep oneself in the dark. 
This supports a point I made much earlier in the semester, when we were talking about 
Judge William, when I said that, in this picture, despair is self-deception. The pianist who 
loses the use of his hands can’t have been surprised to find out that his “self-identity,” 
what he based everything on, was contingent, risky and beyond his control. The despair is 
not in the risk (the Knight of Faith does that, after all) but in the self-deception. 
We’ll have to come back to this. 
The Judge as in the third form of despair 
So far we’ve seen that the first form of despair mentioned in Sickness, “inauthentic 
despair” or what we might call unconscious despair that doesn’t quite realize that there’s 
a problem to solve or a task to be achieved, can be linked with the limiting case of Don 
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Giovanni in Either/Or—or perhaps with the less limiting case of the “normal” aesthete. 
(Again, we don’t get any real portrayal of the “normal” aesthete in Either/Or. At best, we 
get a description of him by the Judge.) Again, the second form of despair in Sickness, the 
first form of authentic despair, can be linked with A himself. 
But there are three forms of despair in Sickness. 
The Judge, I claim, is in the third form of despair (the second form of authentic despair). 
A while ago, we saw that this form of despair was in effect Pelagianism. 
Now we saw when we were discussing Either/Or that there was something suspicious 
about the Judge, although it was hard to identify just what it was. (It was not a sense of 
guilt, as the “standard picture” would have led us to believe.) We sensed that all his 
glorification of the mediocre was in a way “protesting too much.” 
Now I want to claim the Judge has a kind of blind spot. His own account of despair 
allows for an obvious exception. He doesn’t see it, but he should have seen it. And 
Sickness points it out. 
Let’s go back to discuss a possible problem with the Judge’s analysis of the aesthetic life, 
a problem I gave you a handout on earlier (See the handout “They Can’t Take That Away 
from Me!”). 
Here’s part of what I said there: 
Consider, say, an accomplished musician [this is my example] who thinks 
of himself entirely in terms of his performing ability. Or consider an 
explorer whose whole sense of self-identity is that he discovered certain 
important rivers and geographical formations that were previously 
unknown. That’s “who he is, the one who did that.” (To avoid mixing the 
case, let’s stipulate that it’s not the fame the musician or explorer might 
enjoy that gives him his sense of self. He doesn’t care about that; it’s the 
fact of accomplishing those undeniably amazing deeds.)  
The musician suddenly is paralyzed somehow, the explorer grows old and 
can scarcely get around his own house now. Neither one can any longer 
continue to pursue the things that gave him his sense of self. The “finite 
condition” has failed. But does he despair? Is he devastated? Is he 
shattered? [As the Judge suggests he will be?] 
Not necessarily. It would seem just as likely that the person would begin 
to think of himself as “the one who did accomplish those things.” “I can’t 
do it any longer, but I did do it once, and that was really something. And 
no one can take that away from me.” [This is the notion I want to focus on 
now.] 
 
Now what’s the point? The point is: He doesn’t despair. [Or at least he 
isn’t conscious of any despair.] He hasn’t completely lost his identity. No 
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doubt his situation is sad, and he probably regrets his present 
circumstance. But he isn’t totally shattered by it. 
In fairness to the Judge, we have to admit that he doesn’t really say the person would 
have to despair. He only says: 
 here I merely insist that you admit that a very great many people would 
find it all right to despair. 
But still, it seems likely that just as many would not, and the point of my objection when 
we were talking about the Judge is reinforced: How on earth is this supposed to show that 
the pianist or the explorer—whether he falls into despair (i.e., a consciousness of despair) 
or not—was in despair all along? 
That’s the problem we’ve seen already with the Judge. Now compare that problem with 
the following observations about Sickness. 
In the later sections of Part I of Sickness [“The Forms of this Sickness (Despair”), 
beginning on p. 59], we get what I’ve called a kind of taxonomy of various forms this 
“sickness” (despair) can take. It’s quite nuanced, and we won’t be able to go through the 
whole hierarchy. 
But one of the forms, fairly early on in the analysis, is what Anti-Climacus calls “Despair 
over the earthly or something earthly” (p. 80). 
The wording may be confusing. “Despair over something earthly” is the kind of thing the 
Judge seems to have mainly in mind: the pianist’s despair over losing the use of his hands 
(if he does despair), the explorer’s despair over no longer being able to continue doing it. 
But despair over the earthly—i.e., over the earthly in general—is something more subtle. 
Despair over the earthly is going to be represented by A from Either/Or. But let’s sneak 
up on that claim gradually. Let’s talk for now about an intermediary stage—not yet A, but 
someone who’s a little beyond the paralyzed pianist whose sense of self is shattered by 
his paralysis. After all, the pianist who loses the use of his hands might nevertheless still 
become a great singer. The explorer who doesn’t “get around much anymore” might 
nevertheless begin to exercise his intellectual talents and become a great linguist late in 
life—or whatever. Let’s consider those cases. 
We’re not yet talking about the kind of case I mentioned a moment ago, where the pianist 
or the explorer decides to identify himself in terms of his past accomplishments (“which 
no one can take from him”). Rather, we’re talking about an intermediate stage: a person 
who identifies himself in terms of one finite, worldly end or goal might very well 
substitute another one instead, if the first one proves to be no longer feasible—and 
therefore avoid despairing over “something earthly.” He’s lost the “something earthly” he 
originally thought of himself in terms of, but has avoided (obvious) despair by cleverly 
switching to thinking of himself in terms of some new “something earthly.” In short, 
there’s a fickleness here. 
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But the person who despairs over “the earthly” (in general)—e.g., A—has gone beyond 
that and recognized that a stable self-identity is not just a matter of substituting one finite 
end or goal for another, since the same problem can emerge for all of them. And in fact 
the realization that he can always substitute one finite end for another may even prevent 
him from forming a self-identity in the those terms. No, the person who despairs over the 
earthly comes to recognize the futility of all finite ends; it’s not just a matter of picking 
the right one or jumping  around from one to another. 
What’s the point of these observations? Well, consider the following passage in Sickness 
(p. 91): 
But then is there no essential difference between the two hitherto 
identically used expressions: to despair over the earthly (the totality) and 
to despair over something earthly (the particular)? Indeed there is. When 
with infinite passion the self despairs in imagination over something 
earthly, the infinite passion makes of this particular, this something, the 
earthly in toto [as a whole]  
For example, the pianist we’ve been talking about who loses the use of his hands and 
doesn’t take the opportunity to substitute some other self-identifying goal instead, but 
falls into outright conscious despair at his loss, builds up this “something earthly” until 
for him it’s the whole of the earthly; there’s nothing else, as far as he’s concerned. 
On the other hand, despair over the earthly in general is importantly different. In the 
former case, the despair was triggered by the loss of the finite particularity in terms of 
which one was identifying oneself, and such (overt) despair could be avoided, we said, by 
switching to some other finite particularity instead, and, although in the long run it would 
be just as risky as the previous finite particularity, at least it hasn’t failed yet. But, as 
Anti-Climacus observes (p. 91): 
It is impossible actually to lose or be deprived of everything earthly  
As long as you’re alive, the earthly as a whole is going to be available to you. 
In short, there’s an important difference between falling into despair over something 
earthly that has failed for you in this life and falling into despair over the earthly in 
general—which cannot fail you in this life. Despair over the earthly in other words—A—
cannot be prompted by the loss of the particular condition in terms of which one is 
identifying oneself. It’s going to involve a higher degree of reflectiveness than that. 
The point I want to make here is that here we have a case a little like what we were 
considering earlier with the pianist or the explorer who, once his powers failed him, 
nevertheless went on to get his sense of self-identity in terms of his past accomplishments
—which no one can take away from them. And yet, Anti-Climacus is saying, we have a 
kind of despair even in this case. That is, even in a case where the despair cannot be 
prompted by the failure of the condition in terms of which one is identifying oneself, or 
even by the realization of its possible failure. It cannot fail. 
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And yet, Anti-Climacus says, the person is in despair. 
Now I don’t want to draw the connection too tightly here. But I do want to suggest that 
here’s a case, in Sickness, where Anti-Climacus acknowledges that not all despair has to 
be prompted by the failure, or even the possible failure, of the condition in terms of 
which one is identifying oneself. 
The Judge’s argument in Either/Or does not seem to have foreseen such a possibility. 
And yet he should have. We already know that the Judge thinks A has seen through the 
vanity of identifying himself with “something earthly,” and yet is unable to go beyond 
the earthly in general to something further. And yet, the Judge insists, A IS in despair. In 
the terminology of Sickness unto Death, he is in despair over the earthly. 
In short, the Judge has a blind spot. His own account of how one falls into despair 
(because one has put one’s sense of self-identity in something “risky”) doesn’t seem to 
accommodate the case of someone he nevertheless admits is in despair! 
The Judge as a Pelagian 
But the situation is worse than that. The Judge not only doesn’t seem to have an 
altogether good account of A. He himself is in despair and doesn’t realize it. The Judge is 
a Pelagian. And we said earlier that the third form of despair (the second form of 
“authentic” despair)—wanting in despair to be oneself—is in effect Pelagianism. 
If you go back and think about what we said about the Judge earlier in the course, this 
makes sense. The Judge seems to be supremely confident that it’s all just a matter of will, 
that what A lacks is simply the will to go further. There’s no suggestion at all that, even 
with all the will there is, A couldn’t possibly do it by himself. And there’s even less 
suggestion in Either/Or that the Judge himself isn’t in a position to work things out on his 
own. Oh, the Judge will occasionally talk about divine assistance, and so on. (There’s one 
line, for instance, about the “self” you choose “or rather receive.”) But he doesn’t 
altogether take seriously the consequences of what he’s saying. He’s still pretty smug. 
Despair is a disease, not the consciousness of the disease 
Despair, we’ve said, is a kind of imbalance in the psyche; it is a sickness. On pp. 52–53, 
we get a forceful discussion of how a person is not always the best judge of whether or 
not he is in despair, just as we’re not always the best judge of whether or not we’re 
medically healthy. We may think we’re healthy when secretly there’s some hidden 
disease ravaging away in there. So too, we may very well be in despair, even if we’re not 
conscious of being in despair. 
Now when Anti-Climacus talks about despairing or being in despair, he usually—but not 
always—means the illness, not the consciousness of the illness. The Judge is not so 
careful, however. We’ve already seen him say that when the aesthete despairs over the 
loss of his finite, earthly goal, that shows he was in despair all along. This can only be 
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read as: when the aesthete becomes conscious of his despair as the result of the loss of his 
finite, earthly goal, that shows was in despair all along. 
Notice how Anti-Climacus puts essentially the same point more carefully (p. 54): 
Once despair appears, what is apparent is that the person was in despair. 
On the other hand, a few lines later on the same page, even Anti-Climacus puts it 
imprecisely, the way the Judge had: 
For when whatever causes a person to despair [i.e., whatever causes one to 
become aware of despair] occurs, it is immediately evident that he has 
been in despair his whole life. 
So we sometimes have to know how to read between the lines. 
Is despair a bad thing or a good thing? 
Despair then is a kind of sickness, an imbalance, we’ve said. But it by no means follows 
that it’s best not to have it. As Anti-Climacus says on p. 45: 
The possibility of this sickness is man’s advantage over the beast; to be 
aware of this sickness is the Christian’s advantage over natural man; to be 
cured of this sickness is the Christian’s blessedness. 
Without being able to despair, we would be nothing more than a synthesis of body and 
soul, body and mind. And, as we know from the very first paragraph of the main text on 
p. 43: 
Looked at in this way, a human being is not yet a self. 
That is, without the possibility of despair, we are nothing more than rational animals. 
Perhaps the bests model is children. 
He goes on on p. 45: 
Consequently it is an infinite merit26 to be able to despair. And yet not 
only is it the greatest misfortune and misery actually to be in despair; no, it 
is ruin. 
Let’s now consider three possible situations: 
1. to be able to despair but never actually to be in despair 
2. actually to be in despair but to get over it, to be cured of the sickness 
                                                 
26 Note that he says “merit” here. “Merit” means something especially deserving. It’s a 
theologically loaded term. SK does not say it is an infinite benefit. 
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3. actually to be in despair and to stay in despair, not to get over it. 
Now, in practice situation (1), although theoretically possible, is never actually realized. 
As Anti-Climacus says (p. 52): 
Just as a physician might say there isn’t a single human being who enjoys 
perfect health, so someone with a proper knowledge of man might say 
there is not a single human being who does not despair at least a little  
Again (ibid.): 
 there is no one and never has been anyone outside Christendom who 
isn’t in despair; and no one in Christendom who is not a true Christian; 
and so far he is not wholly that, then he is still to some extent in despair. 
That is, no one who is not a perfect Christian in the most ideal sense of the term (and of 
course no one but Jesus is that—since it’s an ideal limit) is entirely free of despair. Hence 
no one who is not an ideally perfect Christian is in situation (1). Thus: 
(1) → ideal Christian 
Would an ideally perfect Christian be in situation (1)—recognizing of course that we’re 
talking about an unreachable limiting case? That is, what about the other way around: 
ideal Christian → (1)? 
Not necessarily. The limiting case of the true Christian is without despair, but that might 
be because he had it and is cured of it rather than because he never had it at all. In short, 
the ideal Christian might be in situation (2) rather than in situation (1). 
On the other hand, situation (1) has got to be possible, even if it never really happens. If it 
weren’t, then despair—which we know is the same as sin—would be something we 
couldn’t avoid. And we’ve seen already in Anxiety that SK doesn’t believe that. Every 
human being starts off in a state of innocence, and becomes guilty of sin (which we know
—see Sickness, p. 107) is the same as despair) through a leap we freely make on our own. 
Anti-Climacus makes a similar point on pp. 45–46: 
Despair is the imbalance in a relation of synthesis, in a relation which 
relates to itself. But the synthesis is not the imbalance, the synthesis is just 
the possibility [of the imbalance]; or, the possibility of the imbalance lies 
in the synthesis. If the synthesis were itself the imbalance, there would be 
no despair; it would be something that lay in human nature itself, that is, it 
would not be despair; it would be something that happened to a person, 
something he suffered, like a sickness he succumbs to, or like death, 
which is the fate of everyone. No, despair lies in the person himself. But if 
he were not a synthesis there would be no question of his despairing; nor 
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could he despair unless the synthesis were originally in the right 
relationship from the hand of God. 
Where then does despair come from? From the relation in which the 
synthesis relates to itself, from the fact that God, who made man in this 
relation, as it were lets go of it  
This is the basis for my metaphor about the spinning top God lets go of. 
So we need to preserve the possibility of situation (1) in theory, in order to ensure that 
human beings are responsible for their sins. But in practice we can ignore it, and 
situations (2) and (3) are the only ones we need consider. 
Of situations (2) and (3), plainly it’s far better to be in (2) than in (3). And it is (3), I 
suggest that is what Anti-Climacus means on p. 45: 
 not only is it the greatest misfortune and misery actually to be in 
despair; no, it is ruin. 
(Plainly wouldn’t be any ultimate ruin if you’re saved from it, as in (2).) 
What about situation (1) in theory? Again, would it be better to be in situation (1) than in 
situation (2)? That is, would it be better to be able to despair but never actually have done 
so, or instead to have been in despair but to be cured of it? 
That’s a difficult question. 
I want to suggest that it is better to be in situation (2) than in situation (1). I can’t find 
absolutely decisive evidence for this (although there may well be some, and I’ll mention 
a passage in a moment), but I do have the support of Alastair Hannay (“Introduction,” p. 
5): 
There may be illnesses that for various reasons are best left to run their 
course, but in general the ideal way to cope with an illness is to nip it in 
the bud. It is better still, of course, to take precautionary measures which 
prevent it occurring at all. But for Kierkegaard this analogy does not hold 
in the case of despair. Despair is not a disorder of the kind that should be 
rooted out or prevented. Indeed, from the point of view of spiritual 
development, there is something healthy about it. 
Recall our discussion of The Concept of Anxiety. There we said each human being makes 
the leap from being innocent to being guilty—each one of us commits his own personal 
“original sin”—and that, although it’s undeniably a sin and so a terrible thing, 
nevertheless in another sense it is a good thing, since without it we would never be a full-
fledged human being. We would stay at the “dreamy,” infantile level he describes in 
Anxiety. 
So too, I suggest, in Sickness. To be capable of despair and yet never actually to despair 
would be to remain in a kind of infantile state, never to be a full human being. 
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This seems to be Alastair Hannay’s picture as well. 
What we have here the notion of “Felix culpa.” This is a Latin phrase used in a very 
ancient hymn for the Catholic liturgy of the Easter Vigil, the so called Exultet. It’s still 
used, always not always in Latin, in the Catholic liturgy, the Anglican church, the 
Scandinavian and Baltic Lutheran church (including SK’s form of Lutheranism), and in 
other Western Christian churches. Now, understand: This is the Vigil of Easter—the most 
solemn time of the liturgical year. Here’s how it starts: 
Exultet iam angelica turba caelorum, 
exultent divina mysteria, 
et pro tanti Regis victoria tuba insonet salutaris. 
Let the heavens’ angelic throng rejoice. 
Let the divine mysteries rejoice. 
And let the trumpet of salvation sound for such a kingly victory. 
So that’s the overall tone—one of solemn exultation. And right in the middle of the 
hymn, there’s the following verse: 
O certe necessarium Adae peccatum, 
quod Christi morte deletum est! 
O felix culpa 
quae talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem! 
Oh certainly necessary sin of Adam, 
which was wiped out by the death of Christ! 
Oh happy sin, 
which deserved to have such and so great a Redeemer! 
So think of it like this: Despair is a little like adolescence. Adolescence is certainly a 
disorder, a kind of imbalance in the personality—hardly a stable condition. And yet it’s 
far better to go through it than not to go through it at all! Not to go through it means to 
remain a child. We have a name for that—we call it (1) the “Peter Pan Syndrome.” 
On the other hand, (3) to enter adolescence and not get over it is a really bad situation. 
The “Peter Pan Syndrome,” after all, at least leaves you in a kind of blissful state of 
childish immaturity. The permanent adolescent is caught in a kind perpetual hell! It’s 
“not only  the greatest misfortune and misery  no, it is ruin.” 
By far the best outcome is (2) to go through adolescence, come out the other side of it, 
and—hopefully—be basically OK as an adult. So too with despair. 
Here’s perhaps a piece of confirmation that this really is SK’s view (Sickness, p. 56): 
 despair is that sickness of which it is true that it is the greatest bad 
fortune never to have had it; it is truly providential [NB] to get it, even 
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though it is the most dangerous of all sicknesses if one does not want to be 
cured of it. 
Anyone in despair is bringing it on himself 
The “sickness unto death” (despair), therefore, is unlike normal kinds of medical 
sicknesses insofar as it’s better to have had this sickness and recovered from it than never 
to have had it at all. So it’s unlike most normal diseases in that respect. 
But there’s another sense in which this “sickness” is unusual too. Some diseases you just 
“catch” without actively doing anything to get them. You don’t have to do anything to get 
Parkinson’s Disease, for instance. For other diseases, you can do something that results in 
your getting them; you might engage in unsafe behavior and catch AIDS, for instance, or 
you might smoke and get lung cancer. But once you’ve got the disease, it will pretty 
much run its course without any further encouragement from you. In other words, you 
might be said to have “brought it on yourself,” but you can’t (usually) be said to be 
bringing it on yourself even while you’re suffering from it. 
By contrast, despair is something you can only have while you’re bringing it on yourself. 
See pp. 46–47: 
Note how one talks of someone bringing a sickness upon himself, through 
carelessness say. So the sickness sets in and from that moment it takes 
effect and is now something actual, and its origin becomes more and more 
past. It would be both cruel and inhuman to keep on saying, ‘You, the 
patient, are this very moment bringing sickness upon yourself’  It is true 
that he brought the disease upon himself, but he did that only once; the 
perseverance of the sickness is a simple consequence of the fact that that is 
what he once did; its progress is not to be referred every moment to him as 
its cause. He brought it upon himself, but one cannot say, ‘He is bringing 
it upon himself.’ Not so with despair  every moment he despairs he 
brings it upon himself. 
This highlights a point I’ve made before: Despair is a matter of the will. We saw this as 
early as our discussion of Either/Or, when we were talking about Judge William’s 
diagnosis of A. His view, recall, was not that A didn’t understand what he was doing; on 
the contrary, A seemed remarkably clear-headed about his own psychological situation, 
about the despair he was in. The Judge’s view was that what A was doing was refusing to 
do anything else; in short, a matter of the will. 
Random observations 
Here are some additional random observations about Sickness. And then I want to come 
back to make an important point about the three forms of despair. 
We’ve seen (Sickness, p. 43) that the self (spirit) is a synthesis of body and soul, or 
equivalently (keep track of these terms): 
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finite vs. infinite 
temporal vs. eternal 
necessity vs. freedom/possibility 
Now look at the heading on p. 59: “C. The Forms of this Sickness (Despair)”27: 
Heading “A.” was on p. 43—that despair is the sickness unto death. 
Heading “B.” was on p. 52—the generality of this despair 
Here, under heading “C.,” is where we start to get an elaborate taxonomy of despair. Here 
how section “C.” begins: 
It must be possible to find out the forms of despair by reflecting on the 
factors which constitute the self as a synthesis. The self is made up of 
infinitude and finitude. But this synthesis is a relation, and a relation 
which, though derived, relates to itself, which is freedom. The self is 
freedom. But freedom is the dialectical element in the categories of 
possibility and necessity. 
In the main, however, despair must be considered under the aspect of 
consciousness; it is whether or not despair is conscious that qualitatively 
distinguishes one form of despair from another 
Here we get the self as a synthesis of infinitude and finitude. (He’s reversed the usual 
ordering here, but never mind.) And he goes on to mention possibility and necessity as 
well. Note that he does not here say freedom and necessity, as he did on p. 43, but 
possibility and necessity. Here it’s the self—presumably the whole synthesis—that’s 
identified with freedom (“the self is freedom”). So there’s a shift of terminology from 
that on p. 43. 
Note that there’s no mention here of temporality and eternity! I don’t know that that’s 
significant, but there it is. 
Throughout this section “C.,” there are two aspects being played off: (i) one is the factors 
that go into the synthesis, and (ii) the other is the degree of consciousness of “this 
sickness” (despair). 
                                                 
27 As a review, here’s the layout of Part One of Sickness: “The Sickness undo death is despair” (p. 
41): 
A. That Despair is the Sickness unto Death (p. 43). 
   A  Despair is a sickness … 
   B The Possibility and Necessity of Despair (p. 44). 
   C Despair is “the sickness unto death” (p. 47). 
B. The Generality of this Sickness (Despair) (p. 52) 
C. The Forms of this Sickness (Despair) (p. 59) 
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Subsection “A” (no period—it gets confusing)—pp. 59–72—discusses (i) the factors that 
go into the synthesis. Subsection “B” (no period)—beginning on p. 72—discusses (ii) the 
degrees of consciousness. 
The first subsection (pp. 59–72) confirms the same two pairs we’ve already seen: (a) p. 
59 the infinite and the finite, and (b) p. 65 possibility and necessity. 
Eternity, which we’ve not seen so far in this entire section “C.” (with the period) comes 
back into the picture in subsection “B” (no period), sub-subsection “(a)”—on p. 73, with 
the talk about having “an eternal self.” 
Another distinction that gets made in this section “C.” is the distinction betewen 
despairing OVER and despairing OF. 
We’ve already seen “despair over the earthly or something earthly” (p. 80). But now, on 
p. 91  (§ C.B(b)α.(2)—it’s very complicated by this point), we get: 
Despair over the earthly or over something earthly is really also despair of 
the eternal and over oneself, in so far as it is despair, [p. 92] for this is 
indeed the formula for all despair. 
Then comes an important footnote on p. 92n. One despairs over “what binds one in 
despair”—i.e., what explicitly prompts you consciously to despair. And this can be many 
different things—bad luck, loss of a fortune, even the earthly as a whole. 
But what one despairs of is what would release one from despair: the eternal, one’s self 
[i.e., one’s true self], etc. 
He goes on to say it’s easy to be clear about what you despair over, while it almost 
always escapes us what we despair of. 
Then—the last line of p. 92n.: 
 purely philosophically it could be a subtle question whether it is 
possible both to be in despair and to be quite clear about what one despairs 
of. 
But wait a minute: Isn’t that just what the demonic is doing? Earlier, I read you a passage 
from pp. 78–79 about how: 
Actual life is too complex to turn up contrasts as abstract as that between a 
despair that is completely ignorant of being in despair [Don Giovanni] and 
one that is completely conscious of being so [the demonic]. 
In actual practice, we deceive ourselves—we’re doing it in order to keep ourselves “in 
the dark” (p. 78), to distract ourselves (p. 79). To distract ourselves from what? From 
what would get us out of it—in short, from what we are despairing of. 
Like Don Giovanni, then, the demonic is a kind of extrinsic limit. 
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But then what about the beginning of subsection “B” (no period) of section “C.” (with a 
period)—on p. 72: 
It is the rising level of consciousness, or the degree to which it rises, that is 
the continual intensification of despair: the more consciousness the more 
intense the despair. One sees this everywhere, most clearly in the 
maximum and minimum of despair. The devil’s despair is the most intense 
despair, for the devil is pure spirit and to that extent absolute 
consciousness and transparency: in the devil there is no obscurity which 
might serve as a mitigating excuse; his despair is therefore the most 
absolute defiance. This is despair at its maximum   
He goes on. In the paragraph as a whole, we get confirmation of the claim that both Don 
Giovanni and the demonic are extrinsic limits—strictly off the scale of consciousness. 
This raises an important question: Does SK really believe in the devil? 
Also, we’re told here that the devil is pure spirit. But we know spirit is a synthesis of 
body and soul. Does that mean the devil has a body? 
Finally, let’s look briefly at Part Two of Sickness, beginning on p. 107: “Despair is sin.” 
In particular, section “B. The Continuation of Sin” (p. 138): 
Being in a state of sin [i.e., not just committing the sin, but staying in it] is 
always new sin; or as it may be, and in the following will be, more 
precisely expressed: being in a state of sin is the new sin, it is the sin. The 
sinner may think this exaggerated: at most he acknowledges that every 
actual new sin is a new sin. But eternity, which keeps his account, must 
enter the state of sin as a new sin. There are only two columns and 
‘whatsoever is not of faith, is sin’. Every unrepented sin is a new sin; and 
every moment it is unrepented is a new sin. 
This looks like the way to an infinite regress. But the point is rather to shift us away from 
counting sins, and instead to focus on the general attitude of sin. 
SK talks about this point earlier in “On the Occasion of a Confession,” from Discourses 
on Imagined Occasions. As here, the point there is not to worry about counting sins. But 
there he adds the observation that being concerned about sin is not just “signing a blank 
sheet of paper” either. We can’t just say, “Oh yes, it’s terrible I’m a sinner. But we’re not 
counting sins, so I might as well do it again!” 
As in the problem of Pelagianism vs. grace, SK is here trying to balance two opposite 
factors without abandoning either of them. 
Do the three forms of despair reduce to one another? 
We’ve already discussed the three forms of despair listed at the beginning of Part One (p. 
43). 
 204
1. Inauthentic despair. 
2. Authentic despair: not wanting to be oneself. 
3. Authentic despair: wanting to be oneself. 
I now want to call your attention to two striking and puzzling passages: 
On p. 44, we read: 
Indeed, so far from its being the case that this second form of despair 
(wanting in despair to be oneself) [that is, the second form of authentic 
despair, the third form in the full list of three] amounts to a special form 
on its own, all despair can in the end be resolved into or reduced to it. 
In short, the first two forms of despair can in some sense be reduced to the third. What 
does that mean? 
But it gets worse. On p. 50, we read: 
To despair over oneself, in despair to want to be rid of oneself, is the 
formula for all despair. So that the second form of despair—wanting in 
despair to be oneself [again, the second form of authentic despair, the third 
form on the original list] can be traced back to the first—in despair not 
wanting to be oneself [the first authentic form, the second form on the 
original list]—rather as in the aforegoing we resolved the form ‘in despair 
not wanting to be oneself’ into ‘wanting in despair to be oneself’. 
So not only can the first two of the three forms of despair be “reduced” to the third, the 
third (and, he says, all despair) can be reduced to the second! And he explicitly 
acknowledges that he speaks both ways. What are we to make of this? 
Sometimes in the secondary literature you will read that either the second or the third 
kind of despair is the most basic. Generally the authors are focusing on the one or the 
other of these two passages in making such claims. 
But practically no one in the secondary literature seems to have paid sufficient attention 
to the fact that Anti-Climacus makes both claims: all forms of despair can be reduced to 
the second, and yet all forms can likewise be reduced to the third. Does this mean that the 
second and the third form of despair are secretly the same? But in that case why bother 
distinguishing them in the first place? 
We don’t find any passage where Anti-Climacus comes right out and says all forms of 
despair can be reduced to the first form, inauthentic despair (“being unconscious in 
despair of having a self”). But it is not hard to make the point for him: 
We’ve seen before how Anti-Climacus seems to use ‘spirit’ and ‘self’ pretty much 
interchangeably. For example, right at the very beginning, in the heading at the start of 
Part One, Section A, we read (p. 43): 
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Despair is a sickness of the spirit, of the self. 
OK, so for practical purposes, spirit = self. But now look at p. 55, where we find: 
But despair is exactly man’s unconsciousness of being characterized as 
spirit. 
Substituting identicals (or virtual identicals), therefore, we get: Despair is 
unconsciousness of being characterized as a “self.” 
And that is pretty much exactly how the first form of despair, inauthentic despair, is 
described: “being unconscious in despair of having a self” (p. 43). 
(What does the phrase “in despair” add here? Perhaps all it does is rule out being in a 
coma, or asleep—or perhaps being a child.) 
So it looks as if despair is exactly inauthentic despair. 
What do we have? We have quite explicit statements that all forms of despair can be 
reduced to the second and to the third kinds, and at least a strong suggestion that they can 
all be reduced to the first kind as well. 
Are there then really three forms of despair or only one? 
I suggest the following: Ontologically or metaphysically, there is really only one process 
that is going on in all forms of despair—the process of self-deception. But 
psychologically, we may not be (and typically are not) clear about what we’re doing. As 
a result, the self-interpretation we have, the story we tell about ourselves, about what 
we’re doing, may not be the same type of story in all cases. 
Don Giovanni, of course, is not really telling himself any story, and to that extent is more 
or less subhuman; he doesn’t count. The ordinary aesthetes—the movie star and the 
financial wizard who identify themselves in terms of glamour and wealth, respectively—
may not fully recognize that they are choosing to identify themselves in these terms, but 
they are. A’s identity, the only identity he’s aware of, is that he refuses—i.e., chooses not
—to think of himself in terms of merely finite, immediate ends and goals, and yet also 
refuses—chooses not—to take the next step and think of himself in any other terms 
either. Judge William thinks of himself as acquiring a self as a result of his own will. The 
Judge is effectively a Pelagian, recall; he thinks he alone is in charge of writing his own 
story. 
What all these people (except Don Giovanni) fail to come to terms with is that there is 
someone else (God) writing their story—so they do have a story—and that it’s not the 
story they’re writing for themselves (the ordinary aesthete—the movie star or the 
financial wizard—hasn’t even come to terms with the fact that he is writing a story for 
himself). What none of them is willing to deal with is the fact that what they need to do is 
to choose to identify themselves with the story that has already been written for them. 
Recall the formula for avoiding despair, on p. 44 (the last paragraph of Section A). 
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The way they picture the situation to themselves instead varies, according to the three 
forms of despair described on p. 43. 
Conscience 
In order to get this to work, we need to be able to say that God (or something that does 
the same job) does write a story for each of us, that we do have a kind of pre-planned self 
providentially assigned to us, that it’s a fairly detailed story and not just as broad as an 
overall “human nature,” and that it is our task to adopt that story. Furthermore, we need 
to make the case that we are all basically aware of this assigned self it is our task to 
identify ourselves with. After all, I can hardly be said to be avoiding the task, deceiving 
myself about it, if I don’t somehow realize it’s there. 
But is that in fact true? How do I know what kind of person God wants me to be? (It 
won’t do to say we can find it in the Bible, or something like that. The claim that we are 
all in despair—self-deception—is not confined to those with access to the Bible. The 
pagans are in despair too! 
The answer, I think: We know it through the call of conscience. 
Conscience isn’t discussed much in Sickness, at least not under that name. But it does 
come up in a number of other late works of Kierkegaard, notably Works of Love. 
This also addresses the point: How detailed is this pre-planned self I’m supposed to 
identify with? Does God intend for me to drive home via 3rd St., or is it OK if I take 2nd 
St. today? Answer: The plan is as detailed as matters of conscience are. 
So, I’m being pulled in two different directions: the tug of conscience, and my own 
willfulness. And I’m deceiving myself about what’s going on. 
Problem: How to distinguish genuine conscience from mere social conditioning. 
Some small points of terminology: self-deception = Selfbedragelse. ‘Bedrage’ comes 
from ‘drage’ = drag, draw = Latin traho. So ‘bedrage’ = betray. 
The point is that the cognitive side is played down here. “Self-deception” in SK is not so 
much a matter of fooling yourself as of betraying yourself, swindling yourself. It’s not a 
matter of intellect but of will. (Compare Sartre’s notion of “bad faith.”) 
Again, despair = “Fortivlelse, fortvivle” = to be doubled, “of two minds.” Recall, purity 
of heart is to will ONE thing—not two. In Danish, tvivle = “doubt” (note the root in 
“double”). In German it’s Verzweiflung. 
This makes things theoretically simpler, perhaps. In modern analytic discussions of “self-
deception,” there are all kinds of problems about how we can deceive ourselves. And it’s 
hard to see how I can have this state cognitively without introducing all sorts of 
complications into the psyche. But it’s much more familiar to talk about willing two 
different things. 
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Purity of Heart and Works of Love 
Fair Warning: This section is not as well worked out (or as clear) as other sections of 
these notes. But I didn’t want to omit this material entirely. So—here it is, warts and all: 
I want to talk a bit about two works we have not assigned this semester. First of all, 
Purity of Heart Is To Will One Thing. This is the first of the Upbuilding Discourses in 
Various Spirits, published on March 13, 1847—a little over a year after Postscript. 
Secondly, I also want to say some things at the same time about Works of Love, which 
was published about six months later, on September 29. 
Purity of Heart is an upbuilding discourse, ostensibly designed for the occasion of a 
confession. That is, it is meant to be a kind of meditation you go through in preparation 
for going to confession. 
Like most of the upbuilding discourses, it takes a Scripture text as its starting point. This 
time it is from SK’s favorite Epistle, James 4:8: 
Keep near to God, then he will keep near to you. Cleanse your hands, you 
sinners, and purify your hearts, you double-minded. 
Note: Double-minded = Tvesindede, and remember the etymological connection with 
tvivle = to doubt and Fortvivlelse = despair, which we know = the sickness unto death 
and sin. To will one thing is not to be “double-minded,” to purify your heart, and at the 
same time to get out of despair and so out of sin. Hence the connection with the 
forgiveness of sins and confession. Note also: The double-mindedness here is not 
primarily a matter of believing two things. It’s not mainly a cognitive matter; hence the 
connection with tvivle = to doubt is played down. Double-mindedness in Purity is 
primarily a matter of being double-willed, and so too is despair, as we saw in Sickness. 
There are all sorts of thematic connections among all these texts: Sickness, Purity and 
Works of Love. The most sustained discussions of self-deception in the entire authorship 
are found in the Purity and Works of Love. In Purity, the reader is invited to reflect on his 
relations to other people and to ask if he relates to them without “divisiveness,” a 
discussion echoed by the one in Works of Love about loving the neighbor. Here’s what he 
says in Purity: 
And what is your frame of mind toward others? Are you in harmony with 
everyone—by willing one thing? … Alas, there is something in the world 
called an alliance; it is a dangerous thing, because all alliances are 
divisiveness. [Purity, 144—my quotations will be from the Hong/Hong 
translation.] 
In Works of Love there several pages devoted to having a “pure heart” (Works of Love, 
pp. 147-150), as well as a locution that clearly hearkens back to Purity: 
 208
Remember that the person who in order truly to will one thing chose to 
will the good in truth has this blessed comfort: one suffers only once but is 
victorious eternally” (Works of Love, p. 89). 
The talk about “willing one thing” by choosing to “will the good in truth” is straight out 
of Purity. 
There’s another connection between Purity and Works of Love that’s not obvious at first. 
Although SK never comes right out and says it in Works of Love, “erotic love” (= Elskov) 
is a conspicuous instance of the double-mindedness diagnosed in Purity. 
(a) Purity. Of course, the ruthless aesthetic pursuit of power and wealth that serves as 
the defining factor of many people’s lives has had many detractors (not least, 
Judge William himself). The greed, selfishness, and emptiness involved in such 
lives are frequently pointed out. And in Purity, SK takes such lives to task, 
arguing that people who follow these paths are creating a division in their very 
being and choosing to submerge themselves in delusion and self-deception. 
(b)  Works of Love. The selfless surrender of oneself to a single beloved through the 
bond of everlasting love is a goal, realized or unrealized, in terms of which many 
people define themselves and their highest aspirations. You’d be hard pressed to 
find a psychologist or poet who would deny the importance and beauty of such an 
expression of self-denial. But in Works of Love SK’s assessment of selflessly 
committing to a single beloved is grimmer than his assessment of the ruthless 
pursuit of power and wealth. He views all these pursuits as forms of double-
mindedness predicated on self-deception. But, the self-deception involved in 
erotic love (Elskov) is more radical.  
There are at least three structural features SK detects in the pursuit of the worldly aims 
described in Purity that are also structural features of Elskov described in Works of Love. 
Both involve: 
1. Unrealizability: willing an end that cannot be realized; 
2. Multiplicity: willing a purported unity that is actually a multiplicity; and  
3. Opposites: seeming to will a goal, while actually willing just the opposite. 
As we saw in Sickness when we were talking about the distinction between the story I tell 
myself about who I am and the real “self” assigned by God, in despair the self is divided 
from itself, or perhaps we should say divided within itself, since we’re talking about a 
divided will. This state can go unrecognized (“inauthentic despair”), or at least 
unacknowledged. Individuals who do recognize this split in themselves may seek to find 
some way to integrate and heal the division, some way of unifying both the volitional and 
cognitive (“story telling”) aspects of the self internally and with respect to one another. 
SK describes this integrating task as one of identifying an end that one can will as a unity. 
As with most human pursuits, there will be ways of achieving this goal successfully, and 
other ways that are inherently doomed to failure.  
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In Purity SK claims there is actually only one end that, when willed properly, has this 
effect: “the good” (He doesn’t explicitly identify “the good” with God in Purity, but it’s 
not hard to make that identification.) To will anything else but the good is automatically 
to will a multiplicity, so that the volitional side of the self cannot be integrated in that 
case. Insofar as the individual who’s willing a multiplicity interprets himself as willing 
one thing instead, he’s engaging in self-deception. 
The person who wills one thing that is not the good is actually not willing 
one thing; it is an illusion, a semblance, a deception, a self-deception that 
he wills only one thing—because in his innermost being he is, he must be, 
double-minded” (Purity, p. 25). 
Why does SK think you can’t will pleasure, honor, wealth, fame, power, etc. with a 
unified self? Can’t we easily think of people who, with a single mind and will, pursue as 
much wealth or power as possible? Couldn’t they honestly report that their goal in life is 
to do this at any cost? SK’s point isn’t that such striving is evil (though that may also be 
true), but that it is inherently fractured and indicates a fractured state of existence. Why 
does he think this? 
SK’s reasoning here (Purity, pp. 26–30) is far from systematic. But his fundamental 
observation seems to be that these candidates for the object of a unified will ultimately 
fail because they involve change. Since change involves multiplicity, willing worldly 
ends necessarily involves willing a multiplicity, whether you realize it or not. 
How does this work? SK discusses three ways change is involved in the pursuit of a finite 
goal and results in a divided will. And now I want to focus on Purity (not Works of Love) 
for the moment. 
1. Unrealizability. It is a structural fact about the single-minded pursuit of any 
worldly goal that one can only have degrees of success. Willing any of these ends 
to completion, he thinks, is impossible. Instead, only temporary goals can be 
willed. When they are reached, the bar is raised, and the goal is changed. For 
example, the single-minded pursuit of wealth may very well involve setting an 
initial benchmark (you will be satisfied when you’ve become a millionaire). But 
on reaching that goal, you have to set a new threshold to overcome. Otherwise, 
you will no longer be single-mindedly pursuing the goal of wealth.  
This structural fact about the pursuit of wealth—and power, pleasure, fame, etc.—works 
itself into the psychology of people who define themselves in terms of such pursuits. As 
SK puts the matter, the worldly goal “insinuates itself searchingly into a person’s inner 
being” (Purity, p. 26). No matter how high you climb up the ladder of wealth, there will 
always be someone with more than you, someone who’s outdone you in this relentless 
pursuit. Or in any case there will always be more to get, and if you’ve got it all, then the 
world should just produce more wealth, so you can get it too. More, more, more! The trap 
of comparison like this continually turns the satisfaction gained from the realization of 
the temporary threshold into a new craving. As he says (Purity, p. 28):  
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So too with honor and wealth and power, for in the prime of life, 
when he aspired to honor, did he really find some limit, or was it 
not the ambitious one’s restless preoccupation to climb higher and 
higher; did he find some rest in his sleepless effort to capture honor 
and hold it fast; did he find some refreshment in the cold fire of his 
passion! 
2. Multiplicity. Even if, for the sake of argument, we grant that this upper limit 
could be reached, there is still a problem. The unity of each of these various ends 
is an illusion, “as when a swarm of insects in the distance seems to the eye like 
one body” (Purity, p. 28). ‘Honor’, ‘power’ and ‘fame’ are just blanket terms for 
gaining the “respect” (or submission) of many people, that is, not for willing one 
thing, but for willing many things—and the more honor you want the more your 
will is dispersed and divided. 
[I]t was just the unanimity of these thousands that he wanted … Is 
this wanting to count, then, willing one thing—to count and count 
until there are enough… is this willing one thing? Therefore, 
whoever wants this honor or fears this contempt, even if he is said 
to will one thing, is nevertheless in his innermost being not merely 
double-minded but thousand minded and divided. (Purity, p. 28) 
Again, ‘wealth’ is a blanket term for property, money, stocks, etc.—and the fact that the 
mental health of people who will this end is often indexed to the health of particular 
stocks reveals the multiplicity willed in cases like this. ‘Pleasure’ is a blanket term for 
willed objects so varied and diverse as to be uncountable. (Remember, the last thing you 
want if you’re an aesthete is to be bored. Recall “The Rotation Method” in the first half 
of Either/Or.) 
3. Opposites. The last change SK discusses is the transformation of a worldly end 
into its opposite. Given the world and how it operates, the single-minded pursuit 
of power, wealth, fame, etc. typically involves forced choices that undermine the 
realization of the goal in practice.  
Thus, a person who wills a finite end changes from being an individual pursuing the goal 
that he esteems into a person who wills the end he despises. 
For example, it is not unusual for individuals at the pinnacle of success in achieving 
wealth to realize how utterly empty and spiritually poor their lives have become. The 
willing of wealth has been transformed into a willing of poverty. The example SK gives 
in Purity is honor’s changing to contempt. 
And so in his life when he must grovel—in order to attain honor; when he 
must flatter his enemy—in order to attain honor; when he must court the 
favor of the one he despises—in order to attain honor; when he must 
betray the person he esteems—in order to attain honor, in order to attain 
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honor, that is, in order to have contempt for himself at the pinnacle of 
honor …” (Purity, p. 28) 
This is the only example SK gives, but it’s clear that he intends it to apply to worldly 
ends in general. 
The individual who’s attempting to unify himself by willing “one” thing when it’s not 
“the good” is actually willing at least four things, two pairs of opposites. He’s willing a 
unity as an end (he’s trying to “unify” himself, after all) but also willing a multiplicity as 
an end. Again, he’s willing a goal he esteems but also willing a goal he despises. SK’s 
name for this state of the self is “double-mindedness.”  
SK’s discussion of “erotic love” (Elskov) in Works of Love gives us a more nuanced and 
psychologically compelling account of double-mindedness than we find in Purity. But, 
without the general discussion of the structure of double-mindedness in Purity, it would 
be difficult to recognize that Elskov is a form of double-mindedness. Taking the two texts 
together us to see this clearly. 
This is perhaps useful since the pursuit of Elskov or “erotic love” (perhaps better here, 
“preferential love”), unlike the relatively rare single-minded pursuit of the worldly ends 
discussed so far, is an experience almost everyone is familiar with. Thus, thinking 
through what’s involved in double-mindedness and self-deception is perhaps more 
accessible, because more familiar, even if it’s also more subtle. 
While it’s true that erotic love (Elskov) is a form of double-mindedness, and so, in terms 
of assessing the state of the self, is qualitatively equivalent to the pursuit of the worldly 
ends discussed in Purity, nevertheless we should expect there to be at least one difference 
between the two cases. The pursuit of the ends discussed in Purity does not necessarily 
involve any alleged moral dimension. There are exceptions, of course. The single-minded 
pursuit of power, for example, is going to involve a certain amount of ruthlessness. On 
the other hand, people in love necessarily interpret themselves as giving themselves 
wholly over to the other truthfully and in full faith. If it’s true that they are actually 
willing the opposite of this, the self-deception involved is going to be pretty radical. 
In Works of Love Kierkegaard sharply distinguishes two kinds of love we discussed 
earlier. On the one hand there is Christian love for God and neighbor (Kjærlighed). On 
the other hand we have “erotic love” (Elskov), which in this context also includes not 
only romantic love but things like friendship (Venskab), so that it’s perhaps better to 
translate it “preferential love”  
SK’s assessment of Elksov is really grim. His analysis indicates that romantic love, for 
example, involves a dramatic display of self-deception.  
He understands this romantic form of Elskov pretty rigorously: “[T]here is but one and 
only one beloved in the whole world, and this one and only one time of erotic love is 
love, is everything: the second time is nothing” (Works of Love, p. 49). He goes on to say 
that any description of romantic love that proposes one can “love many times” is a 
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watered down, false version of it (Works of Love, p. 50). (Note: To this extent, he’s siding 
with the Judge and against A.) 
But if SK is right, the very relation to another that’s supposed to embody mutual self-
sacrifice and surrender is really the expression of a hidden self-love. So the implication 
then, is that all the poets, artists, psychologists, who praise this form of love, and all the 
people who define a large part of themselves and their lives in terms of it, are praising a 
delusion, defining themselves in terms of a lie. 
The first point Kierkegaard makes about romantic love is that it is divisive. It requires the 
lover to single out one person from the rest of humanity to love on the basis of personal 
preference. In this way, this type of love stands in stark contrast to Christian love 
(Kjærlighed), which commands us to love all people equally, irrespective of and indeed 
in the face of any personal preference. 
The same holds true of friendship as of erotic love, inasmuch as this, too, 
is based on preference: to love this one person above all others, to love 
him in contrast to all others. Therefore the object of both erotic love and of 
friendship has preference’s name, “the beloved,” “the friend,” who is 
loved in contrast to the whole world. The Christian doctrine, on the 
contrary, is to love the neighbor, to love the whole human race, all people, 
even the enemy, and not to make exceptions, neither of preference nor of 
aversion. (Works of Love, p. 19) 
You might think that friendship, at least, is not as exclusive as SK claims romantic love 
is. After all, you might have lots of friends. But still, the element of preference is there. 
You’re not friends with absolutely everyone, after all, and probably couldn’t be. But the 
Christian commandment is to love everyone. 
The second point Kierkegaard makes about Elksov is that it’s selfish. It masquerades as 
other-regarding, but in fact it’s just a disguised form of self-love. “[I]n his impetuous, 
unlimited devotion the lover is actually relating himself to himself in self-love” (Works of 
Love, p. 55). Again: 
Just as self-love selfishly embraces this one and only self that makes it 
self-love, so also erotic love’s passionate preference encircles this one and 
only beloved, and friendship’s passionate preference encircles this one and 
only friend. [Make the adjustments for friendship, if you want.] For this 
reason the beloved and the friend are called, remarkably and profoundly, 
to be sure, the other self, the other I … [Latin: “alter ego.”] But where 
does self-love reside? It resides in the I, in the self. Would not self-love 
then also start loving the other I, the other self? (Works of Love, p. 53) 
Romantic love then involves jealously choosing, for oneself, which individual is 
deserving of the love. The beloved is viewed through the lens formed by the preferences 
deemed worthy by the lover. It is this discrimination based on one’s own determinations 
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(motivated by whatever reason or reasons—fear, desire, lust, laziness, etc.) that is one 
component in erotic love’s selfishness. It wants what it wants.  
Self-love’s preference is easy to see in the friendships as well. Typically, you become 
friends with someone based on a shared interest, cultural background, socio-economic 
status, etc. 
In erotic love and friendship, the two love each other by virtue of the 
dissimilarity or by virtue of the similarity that is based on dissimilarity (as 
when two friends love each other by virtue of similar customs, characters, 
occupations, education, etc., that is, on the basis of the similarity by which 
they are different from other people, or in which they are like each other 
as different from other people). (Works of Love, p. 56) 
The more intense your self-love is in preference, the more you need to see the other in 
terms of the preferences you’ve chosen, and the more limited your ability to perceive the 
other objectively. It may just be the imaginative projection of your desire to see the other 
in a way that conforms with your picture of what’s worthy of love that you actually fall in 
love with. Christian love resists this. 
When it is a duty in loving to love the people we see [as SK thinks 
Kjærlighed requires], then in loving the actual individual person it is 
important that one does not substitute an imaginary idea of how we think 
or could wish that this person should be. The one who does this does not 
love the person he sees but again something unseen, his own idea or 
something similar. (Works of Love, p. 164) 
By choosing to love others in accordance with our view of what’s lovable and what isn’t, 
we’re in effect playing God and, SK thinks, deceiving ourselves about what we’re doing. 
Only through the sobriety gained by obeying the commandment to love others equally 
and without preference can we come to a clearer view of ourselves. 
This raises a serious question: What happens to marriage if “preferential” love is 
abolished? What happens to friendship and romantic love? Is SK really insisting that we 
are commanded to be completely affectless? The answer to this isn’t clear, and there is 
unfortunately a lot of nonsense written about it in the secondary literature. Many authors
—apparently thinking they have to defend SK no matter what, and yet remaining 
unwilling to accept what SK seems to be saying—try to argue that marriage and 
friendships are OK for SK once they’ve been “Christianized,” although it’s not clear how 
that’s supposed to change what he says. 
The third point Kierkegaard makes is that erotic love is not qualitatively different from 
barter. In the optimal transaction, you will get equal or greater payoff for what you’ve 
doled out, and in a less than optimal transaction you’ll get anything from less than what 
you gave to nothing at all. Determining what’s worthy of love based on your own 
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preferences, combined with the expectation of a payoff for selecting the other based on 
those preferences, specifies the self-love involved in Elskov.  
What makes this form of bartering tricky is that, unlike the exchange of physical goods, 
labor, or money, it’s difficult to verify whether the trade has taken place equitably, if at 
all. SK, rightly or wrongly, thinks it’s this unacknowledged “transaction”-model of love 
that lies at the heart of romantic love. 
There is a lower view of love, therefore a lower love that has no view of 
love in itself. This view regards loving as a demand (reciprocal love is the 
demand) and being loved (reciprocal love) as an earthly good, as temporal
—and yet, alas, as the highest bliss. Yes, when this is the case, the 
deception is clearly able to play the master, just as in the commercial 
world. A person pays out money in order to purchase some convenience; 
he has paid out the money, but he did not get the convenience—well, then 
he has been duped. He makes a love deal; he barters his love, but he did 
not receive the reciprocal exchange—well then he has been deceived. 
(Works of Love, p. 237) 
Furthermore, the possibility that you’re being “cheated” haunts Elskov and can account 
for some of its expressions. 
However joyous, however happy, however indescribably confident 
instinctive and inclinational love, spontaneous love, can be itself, precisely 
in its most beautiful moment it still feels a need to bind itself, if possible, 
even more securely. Therefore the two swear an oath, swear fidelity or 
friendship to each other. (Works of Love, p. 29) 
If the love here were truly confident, this need for further “confirmation” would be 
superfluous. A hidden anxiety lies at the basis of Elskov, anxiety about the status of the 
hidden transactions. 
The point here is not that the problem of other minds, or the possibility of certain kinds of 
people with suspicious mindsets, can frustrate the process of developing mutual trust and 
faith. Rather, SK is pointing out that even in the best case scenario lovers find it 
necessary to engage in these actions as a form of reassurance. 
The exchanging of rings between lovers is regarded as a very expressive 
symbol of erotic love; it is truly very expressive, but a poor symbol of love
—it is, after all, an exchange” (Works of Love, p. 267). 
If this model is accurate, then we’ve got a very unstable phenomenon. This “giving” is, if 
SK is correct, best viewed as a transaction driven by selfishness. Mix this with the fact 
that this transaction can always be doubted, and the result is a very volatile brew. 
 215
Spontaneous love can be changed within itself; it can be changed into its 
opposite, into hate. Hate is a love that has become its opposite, a love that 
has perished. Down in the ground the love is continually aflame, but it is 
the flame of hate; not until the love has burned out is the flame of hate 
burned out. (Works of Love, p. 34) 
Hatred is here the manifestation of an Elskov that is still alive. SK’s point here is that the 
fuel firing the hate is the fuel that had been firing the love.  
There are undoubtedly many ways romantic love can be transformed into hate. There are 
also many ways unacknowledged transactions can take place in romantic love. Despite 
this variability on the surface, SK is committed to the view that all erotic love is hate, 
whether this becomes manifest or not. Consider this: 
Would any more revolting combination be possible than loving—and 
falsity? But it is, of course, an impossibility, because to love falsely is to 
hate. This holds true not only for falsity, but it is impossible to join the 
slightest lack of honesty with loving. As soon as there is any lack of 
honesty, there is also something concealed, but selfish self-love hides in 
this concealment, and insofar as this is present in a person, he does not 
love. (Works of Love, p. 151) 
To sum up, the lover in Elskov is not admitting to the beloved that his love is a form of 
self-love predicated on a jealous vision of what’s lovable and on the expected outcome of 
a selfish transaction, and he’s not admitting this to himself. So all erotic love is loving 
falsely, that is, hatred. In other words, if it’s true that all erotic love is haunted by the 
hidden anxiety that the transaction it’s based on isn’t taking place, this betrays the need 
for suspicion and withholding trust at the core of a false love. 
Earlier, we said that the first structural feature identified in Purity is that the end the 
double-minded person is trying to fulfill can never be fulfilled, for structural reasons. 
That is, you can never have enough power, wealth, pleasure, honor, fame, etc., if you’re 
attempting single-mindedly to attain it. The same is true of Elskov, but in a different way. 
The person in Elskov cannot admit to himself that his goal is personal gain, so we 
shouldn’t expect him to be as clear about the change that results from resetting temporary 
thresholds in the context of a transactional framework as is the individual pursing other 
worldly, aesthetic goals.  
But such transactions are continually taking place. The way to show it is this: in the 
presence of the beloved, treat a random person with as much preference and care as you 
show the beloved and watch his or her reaction. 
Test it, place as the middle term between the lover and the beloved the 
neighbor, whom one shall love, place as a middle term between two 
friends the neighbor, whom one shall love, and you will immediately see 
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jealousy … [T]he devotion with which the lover gives himself to this one 
and only, indeed, clutches the beloved, is self-love. (Works of Love, p. 54) 
The individual in a case of Elskov is structurally barred from willing his love to 
completion, just as the individual willing a worldly end is. The reason is that there’s no 
definite sign that the beloved is reciprocating. There’s no transaction that could erase the 
anxiety that bars the lover from giving to the beloved the trust and faith that’s the 
precondition for a fully realized Elskov.  
The second structural feature of double-mindedness identified in Purity is that although it 
claims to will a unity, it actually wills a multiplicity. The unity it wills is an illusion. In 
the discussion of finite ends, ‘honor’, for example, was the blanket term for the respect of 
individual people. The same is true of Elskov. ‘Elskov’, a unity one says one is willing, is 
actually the blanket term for a series of disguised, ongoing transactions. The only 
difference here from the earlier forms of double-mindedness is that you’re not only not 
acknowledging that you’re willing a multiplicity, but also not acknowledging that you’re 
willing a series of transactions.  
The third structural feature of double-mindedness was that it’s predicated on the 
contradiction of willing both what one esteems and what one despises. In Purity, this was 
put in terms of an ideal’s manifesting itself as its opposite in practice. In Works of Love 
the Elskov’s contradictory nature is there from the start. In willing a supposedly selfless 
erotic love, you are simultaneously willing its opposite—self-love. We’ve seen that this 
in part explains the volatility of Elskov and its ability to be transformed into its opposite. 
In that love which has only existence [I’m not sure how to interpret this], 
however confident it is, there is still an anxiety, an anxiety about the 
possibility of change. Such love does not understand that this is anxiety 
any more than the poet does, because the anxiety is hidden, and the only 
expression is the flaming craving, whereby it is known that the anxiety is 
hidden underneath. Otherwise why is it that spontaneous love is so 
inclined to, indeed, so infatuated with, making a test of the love? … The 
testing undoubtedly has its basis in love, but this violently flaming desire 
to test, this craving desire to be put to the test, denotes that the love itself 
is unconsciously uncertain. (Works of Love, pp. 32-33) 
SK goes so far as to say that romantic love is actually hate, even if it’s unrecognized. He 
also says the finite ends in Purity are inherently contradictory, even though this typically 
isn’t recognized until the height of their realization (that the single-minded pursuit of 
wealth is willing an internal poverty, power is based on dependence). 
In short, both Purity and Works of Love describe cases of (1) willing an earthly end that 
cannot in principle be realized, (2) willing a purported unity that is really a multiplicity, 
and (3) willing an avowed goal while actually willing its opposite. 
The double-mindedness of Elskov involves dislocations in the self. As a first dislocation, 
within the will, the self wills the unity of Elskov, and it wills a series of continual 
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transactions. The self wills the selfless surrender of itself to another human being, and it 
wills its jealous vision of what is to count as being worthy of love, a vision based in self-
love.  
There’s a second dislocation between cognition and volition as well. The self interprets 
itself only along the favorable dimensions of the will—that it wills a unity and is engaged 
in the project of surrender to another—and masks the unfavorable dimensions of volition 
from itself, thereby cutting self-interpretation off from the actual state of the will. The 
masking of the transactional context in which the self is operating shows up in “love’s 
very strange gesticulations and mysterious signs” (Stages, p. 39)—the “exchange of 
rings,” that betray the hidden anxiety that the transaction may be failing, or is threatening 
to fail. In the end, the pursuit of Elskov is not qualitatively distinct from the pursuit of 
worldly goods in Purity. 
This ends the section that I gave you a “fair warning” about above. 
The Moment 
As a sort of grand finale to this course, I want to spend some time discussing SK’s last 
years. And they were pretty remarkable. 
First of all, I want to introduce you to two figures: 
 Jakob Peter Mynster, bishop of Sjælland (= Zealand,the main island part of 
Denmark, on which Copenhagen sits). He was head of the Danish Church (the 
“Primate of Denmark”—sort of like the Archbishop of Canterbury) during most 
of SK’s life. Before he rose to this post, had been the pastor for SK’s father, 
Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard, and was something of a friend of the family. 
 Hans Lassen Martensen, Mynster’s successor as Primate of Denmark, and at one 
time SK’s teacher at the University of Copenhagen. He was one of the important 
intellectual figures of the day. 
During his “second authorship” (after Postscript), SK delayed the publication of several 
already completed works (Sickness, Practice, Armed Neutrality) because he was hoping 
for some kind of decisive action on Mynster’s part. (But he nevertheless did publish 
many of them eventually.) 
What exactly did he want Mynster to do? To confess and admit that he had 
accommodated Christianity to the “demands of the times.” In short, that he had watered it 
down. SK wanted Mynster to admit publically that “Christendom” ≠ “Christianity” in the 
New Testament sense. 
It’s not really clear why SK delayed publishing at this point or for this reason. But SK’s 
relationship to Mynster was very complex. He admired the old man, but thought he had 
toned down Christianity. Furthermore, SK thought that Mynster privately agreed with 
him, and that it was a failure of nerve that prevented him from admitting what he had 
done. 
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In any case, SK continued to publish occasionally from 1846–51 (for five years), 
although not with nearly the frequency he had earlier. But after the publication of For 
Self-Examination on September 10, 1851, he fell silent for over three years, until 
December of 1854. (This was as long as the time between Either/Or and Postscript—the 
entire first authorship!) 
At that point, December 1854, he began a series of vitriolic attacks on the established 
Church of Denmark, first in a series of articles in a Copenhagen newspaper called 
Fædrelandet (= “Fatherland”) and elsewhere, and then in a series of self-published 
pamphlets he called The Moment (Øjeblikket)—the same word used in Fragments. Less 
than a year after this final flurry of writing began, he died (Nov. 11, 1855). 
What prompted him to break his silence in this final blast? To begin with, Mynster died 
(January 30, 1854). On February 5, 1854, Hans Lassen Martensen delivered a eulogy for 
Mynster, in which he described the old bishop as an “authentic truth-witness,” one of “the 
whole succession of truth-witnesses that like a holy chain stretches through the ages from 
the days of the Apostles to our own day” (Moment, p. 359). He calls upon us to imitate 
Bishop Mynster’s faith, whose message remains the same even though the times change. 
This enraged SK, who thought this was precisely not the case with Mynster. According to 
SK, Mynster had diluted the true message of Christianity, accommodated it to the 
“demands of the times,” and furthermore Mynster himself knew better. 
But still, this was in February, and SK did not fire his first shot until December. Why 
wait? Well, when Martensen delivered his eulogy, it wasn’t clear where his own future 
lay. But, as the year 1854 progressed without a Primate of Denmark, it became clear that 
Martensen was going to be named Mynster’s successor as the Primate. He was so 
designated on April 15, 1854, although he wasn’t actually consecrated Bishop of 
Sjælland until December 26, 1854, the day after Christmas. A few days earlier 
(December 18), SK published his first article in the series. He had written this article as 
early as February, shortly after Martensen had delivered his eulogy, but had held it back 
until Martensen was just about to take up the primacy. 
The article, some five pages in length, has SK’s own name on it (as all this last material 
does), and is entitled, “Was Bishop Mynster a ‘Truth-Witness,’ One of ‘the Authentic 
Truth-Witnesses’—Is This the Truth?” (Referring to Martensen’s eulogy of Mynster.) 
SK’s answer is no. 
By this time, there was a major change in SK’s views on faith. There’s no more of this 
“hidden inwardness” stuff that we had in Postscript. No more “Knight of Faith”—who is 
indistinguishable from anyone else and looks just like a tax-collector. (It’s unclear just 
why SK changed his mind on this.) 
No, by this time, SK had become fairly clear in his view that becoming a true Christian 
meant suffering. If you really do love thy neighbor as you’re supposed to, if you really do 
seek FIRST the kingdom of God rather than seeking first a secure job, a family, 
respectability in the community—and only then, perhaps, the kingdom of God—people 
are going to hate you. They’re going to think you’re crazy, an extremist, and in the end 
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dangerous. After all, look what they did to Jesus! Now Jesus, after all, is supposed to be 
the prototype of Christian life, and anyone who imitates that prototype is going be treated 
the same way. 
That’s not what we find, SK thinks, in the case of Mynster. After all, Mynster wore 
exquisite episcopal gowns and lived in conspicuous luxury and ease. 
Here is part of what SK says (Moment, p. 5): 
Bishop Mynster a truth-witness? You who read this, you certainly do 
know what is Christianly understood by a truth-witness, but let me remind 
you of it, that it unconditionally requires suffering for the doctrine. And 
when it is said more pointedly: one of “the authentic” truth-witnesses, then 
the word must accordingly be taken in the strictest sense. In order to make 
it vivid to you, let me try in a few strokes to suggest what must be 
understood by this. 
 A truth-witness is a person who (6) in poverty witnesses for the truth, 
in poverty, in lowliness and abasement, is so unappreciated, hated, 
detested, so mocked, insulted, laughed to scorn—so poor that he perhaps 
has not always had daily bread, but he received the daily bread of 
persecution in abundance every day. For him there was never 
advancement and promotion except in reverse, step by step downward. A 
truth-witness, one of the authentic truth-witnesses, is a person who is 
flogged, mistreated, dragged from one prison to another, then finally—the 
last advancement, by which he is admitted to the first class in the 
Christian order of precedence among the authentic truth-witnesses—then 
finally, for this is indeed one of the authentic truth-witnesses Prof. 
Martensen talks about, then he is crucified or beheaded or burned or 
broiled on a grill, his lifeless body thrown away by the assistant 
executioner into a remote place, unburied—this is how a truth-witness is 
buried!—or burned to ashes and cast to the winds so that every trace of 
this “refuse,” as the apostle says he has become, might be obliterated. 
Obviously, SK thinks Bishop Mynster wasn’t like that at all, and that it is a travesty to 
suggest he was (p. 6): 
Truly, there is something that is more against Christianity and the essence 
of Christianity than any heresy, any schism, more against it than all 
heresies and schisms together, and it is this: to play at Christianity. But 
(entirely, entirely in the same sense as the child plays at being a soldier) it 
is playing at Christianity: to remove all the dangers , to replace them 
with power , goods, advantages, abundant enjoyment of even the most 
select refinements  
So this is the opening shot. 
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Martensen was foolish enough to reply to this. On December 28, 1854, ten days after SK 
published his article and only two days after he himself had become Bishop of Sjælland, 
Martensen published a reply in the Berlingske Tidene (= “Berling Times”, a Danish 
newspaper that is still publishing). 
Basically, he argues that SK has so narrowed the notion of “truth-witness” that it 
becomes restricted to those who are literal martyrs (p. 360). (That’s actually not such an 
arbitrary restriction. After all, ‘martyr’ comes from Greek for “witness.”) 
If we have to adhere to that restricted use of the word, Martensen goes on, then by calling 
Mynster a “truth-witness” (p. 361): 
I surely would have made myself guilty, if not of a crying-to-heaven 
untruth and other offenses against the sacred  then at least of an 
erroneous use of words. 
But, he says (p. 361): 
 whatever can it be that justifies his [SK’s] restricting the concept in 
such an arbitrary way, contrary to all ecclesiastical usage, a restriction 
according to which the apostle John—who  was neither beheaded nor 
crucified, nor after death slung aside by the assistant executioner, but 
buried by his congregation—must be excluded from the number of truth-
witnesses. 
It seems to me Martensen has a valid point here. 
But there’s more. Martensen goes on to offer some observations about SK’s own version 
of Christianity, which after all had by this time become pretty well known through SK’s 
own publications. He says (p. 362) that SK’s Christianity is “without Church and without 
history,” that he “seeks Christ only in the ‘desert’ and in ‘private rooms’”—and, by 
implication, not in any kind of institutionalized Church. (Note: This seems to be a 
perfectly correct observation about SK.) 
He says Kierkegaard’s (p. 364): 
Christianity is not at all the faith of a community but solely and simply a 
private religion, a Christianity in which the Christian Church and the work 
of the Holy Spirit in the Christian Church are left out  
Again, this seems to be a quite correct interpretation of what SK was saying. 
SK’s original article was pretty strong, pointed and direct. But Martensen’s reply, at least 
to me, seems positively bitter and directed against SK personally. He refers, for instance, 
to SK’s article as “slovenly” (p. 364). 
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After this initial reply, Martensen publishes nothing further in this exchange, although SK 
certainly did publish. Martensen seems to have learned his lesson that it’s best just to let 
SK rant and rave, and not try to argue with him. 
But if Martensen kept quiet, other people did not. It seems a Danish pastor named Jens 
Paluden-Müller published a pamphlet in which he writes (p. 624 n. 38): 
I challenge Dr. S. Kierkegaard, with the New Testament alongside, to 
establish his above-mentioned allegation [that Mynster was not a truth-
witness] in any way worth discussing; I shall then take it upon myself to 
show that the allegation is altogether without warrant. 
In other words, let’s look at the New Testament, look closely at Mynster’s life, and see if 
they really are so different after all. 
On January 12, 1855, SK published another article in Fædrelandet, in which he picks up 
on Paluden-Müller’s challenge to establish his point “in any way worth discussing.” SK 
says the question was whether Mynster was a “truth-witness.” Now there is a danger of 
turning it into a scholarly argument with learned quotations! (p. 17.) (On the other hand, 
it was SK himself who brought up the NT in his first article.) 
SK  agrees with the others that Mynster was not a “preacher of repentance,” but a 
“preacher of peace.” But peace is exactly what you don’t get on SK’s version of 
Christianity, so that Mynster’s preaching amounts to “malpractice” (p. 18). 
Notice what has happened here. The issue is no longer about Mynster, really; the issue is 
now about the proper interpretation of Christianity. 
Well, the publications go on. On January 29, 1855, he suggests in Fædrelandet that 
perhaps it is providential that Martensen has succeeded Mynster, because while Mynster 
had a gift for hiding the weaknesses in the established order of the Church, Martensen has 
a “gift” for exposing those weaknesses almost whatever he does! Perhaps divine 
providence intends for the established Church to fall now that Mynster is gone! (p. 25.) 
And it’s clear that SK thinks that would be a good thing. He really does want a private 
religion. 
In some drafts SK didn’t publish, he raises Martensen’s point about how SK has “only a 
Christianity without Church and without history.” “Fine, I would reply, if only I do not 
have a Christianity without the New Testament” (p. 501). 
In another draft, he refers to “These buildings [he had originally written “pest holes” and 
then crossed it out], which no one leaves without being infected, I mean the churches ” 
(p. 547). 
There were several other publications during this last hurrah. I only want to highlight a 
few of them. 
On March 22, 1855, SK published an article he had written the preceding year, in which 
he says (p. 34): 
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But an end, an end must be made to the official—well-intentioned—
untruth. 
Here he’s actually calling for abolishing the established Church. Earlier he sounded as if 
he were hoping for a reform of the Church, that if only Bishop Mynster had honestly 
admitted that they were falling short of the New Testament ideal, perhaps things could be 
put back on the right track. But he’s no longer talking that way. 
By now the articles are coming out every few days. On March 26, he writes (p. 35) 
“Christianity does not exist at all.” That is, what we have in Christendom is not 
Christianity. 
On March 28, he notes that Luther had 95 theses, but he has only one: Christianity does 
not exist at all (p. 39). Therefore, there is nothing to reform. On March 30, Protestantism 
is a falsehood. The fundamental confusion of both Protestantism and Catholicism is in the 
concept of “Church,” or “Christendom.” What goes on in the Churches is a travesty of 
true Christianity (p. 43): 
Abominable; even humanity’s most prodigal dregs still have the merit that 
their crimes are not hailed and honored, almost worshipped and adored as 
Christian virtues. 
On March 31, he publishes a short article called “What Do I Want?” And the answer is 
that he wants—very simply—honesty. 
He argues that even if “official Christianity”—by which he means Christendom—is 
compatible with the New Testament (NB, different from, but at least compatible with it), 
still it us not compatible with the New Testament to hide and cover over the differences 
between the two. 
Notice: As far as this goes, it sounds as if SK would be perfectly happy if someone 
replied—as in fact “official Christianity” might very well reply: “Fine, let’s do be clear 
and honest about the situation. We ‘official Christians’ are not Christians in the New 
Testament sense—and good for us, because the times are not New Testament times! 
Things have changed, and we’ve changed with them. But we are still doing—or striving 
to do—what is necessary for our salvation.” 
But SK goes on to make clear that he’s not going to allow that. Accommodating to “the 
times” amounts to a compromise—a distortion—of the “Christian requirement.” In other 
words, the only way to be a Christian is to be a Christian in the original New Testament 
sense. (So they’re not compatible after all.) 
Toward the end of this essay, he even says he would be willing to “go along” with an 
honest rebellion against Christianity—Note: he says ‘Christianity’, not ‘Christendom’—
as long as it is really honest. Here’s what he says (p. 48): 
Let me venture the most extreme in order, if possible, to be understood 
with regard to what I want. 
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I want honesty. If this, then, is what the generation of the contemporaries 
want, if they want straightforwardly, honestly, candidly, openly, directly 
to rebel against Christianity and say to God, “We cannot, we will not 
submit to this power”—but, please note, this is to be done 
straightforwardly, honestly, candidly, openly, directly—well, then strange 
as it might seem, I go along with it, because I want honesty. Wherever 
there is honesty, I am able to go along with it; an honest rebellion against 
Christianity can be made only if one honestly acknowledges what 
Christianity is and how one relates oneself to it. 
 By the very end of this essay, he seems to be virtually inviting out and out martyrdom 
for himself (p. 49): 
If the official Christianity in this country wants to take the occasion to use 
force against me because of what is said here, I am prepared, because I 
want honesty. 
For this honesty I am willing to venture. However, I am not saying that it 
is for Christianity that I venture. Suppose, just suppose that I become quite 
literally a sacrifice—I would still not become a sacrifice for Christianity 
but because I wanted honesty. 
Recall how, early on in this semester when we were talking about Fear and Trembling, 
we saw Johannes de silentio saying that he, at least, has the courage to think a thought 
whole, to think a thought through—in other words, honestly. Here, at the very end of 
SK’s career, we see him insisting on the very same thing. 
Well, the barrage goes on. SK continues to publish these screeds against the established 
Church, and occasionally someone will dare to publish something in reply—perhaps even 
in a spirit of compromise, trying to put this whole embarrassing development to rest. That 
of course, just prompts SK to go on. 
On May 15, we get an article with a curious claim that may be important for 
understanding SK (p. 66): 
Meanwhile, in the books by me or by pseudonymous authors, I have 
thoroughly, as I always work, expressed and described the different stages  
before reaching where I am at present. Thus one will find, especially in the 
pseudonymous Johannes Climacus [i.e., in Philosophical Fragments and 
in Postscript], what approximately may be said in defense of the kind of 
Christianity that is closest to that of the established order, and will find it 
described in such a way that I would like to see whether any of my 
contemporaries here in the country can do it better. 
It’s not clear exactly what passages in the Climacus-writings he has in mind here. 
(Perhaps the distinction between Religion A and Religion B in Postscript?) 
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On  May 24, 1855, SK publishes an actual volume (i.e., not an article in Fædrelandet or 
elsewhere, but a slim book of its own) entitled, This Must Be Said; So Let It Be Said. And 
what is it that “must be said”? This (p. 73): 
Whoever you are, whatever your life is otherwise, my friend—by ceasing 
to participate (if you usually do participate) in the public divine service as 
it now is (professing to be the Christianity of the New Testament), you 
always have one and a great guilt less—you are not participating in 
making a fool of God by calling something New Testament Christianity 
that is not New Testament Christianity. 
In short, he’s telling people, Stop going to church, and you’ll have at least one less sin 
you’re guilty of. 
Note: This in effect confirms Martensen’s observation that SK’s Christianity is a 
Christianity without a Church. 
Then SK goes back to publishing in the magazines. 
Eventually, SK gives up carrying on this polemic in the Copenhagen newspapers and 
magazines, and starts publishing a series of pamphlets on his own (i.e., he’s the one 
paying for their publication), called The Moment. There were nine of these pamphlets that 
came out during SK’s lifetime—beginning on May 24, 1855, less than six months before 
his death, and a tenth was prepared, but only came out after his death. 
The pamphlets contain a series of essays with titles like this: “Is It Defensible for the 
State—the Christian State—to Make, If Possible, Christianity Impossible?” (Because 
that’s what the state is doing!) SK’s answer, of course, is no, it is not defensible. 
Some of them are hilarious. One of them, with the title “If We [i.e., “official” Christians] 
Actually Are Christians—What Then Is God?,” he says: 
He is the most ludicrous being that has ever lived, his Word the most 
ludicrous book that has ever come to light: to set heaven and earth in 
motion (as he indeed does in his Word), to threaten with hell, with eternal 
punishment—in order to attain to what we understand by being a Christian 
(and, after all, we are true Christians)—no, something that ludicrous has 
never happened! Imagine that a man confronted a person with a loaded 
pistol and said to him, “I am going to shoot you down,” or suppose 
something still more dreadful, that he said, “I am going to seize you and 
torture you to death in the most horrible way if you do not (pay attention 
now, here it comes!), if you do not make your life here on earth as 
profitable and enjoyable as you possibly can”—this certainly is the most 
ridiculous talk, because to bring this about one really does not need to 
threaten with a loaded pistol and the most agonizing death penalty; 
perhaps neither the loaded pistol nor the most agonizing death penalty 
would be able to prevent it. And so it is also, to want, through a fear of 
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eternal punishment (fearful threat!), through the hope of eternal happiness, 
to bring about—yes, to bring about what we are (for what we call 
Christian is, after all, what it means to be a Christian), that is, to want to 
bring about what we are: that we live just as we please—since to abstain 
from civil crimes is, of course, merely ordinary sagacity. (Moment II.8, p. 
121.) 
This raises an interesting question: Why should SK be so opposed to “official 
Christianity’s” making is so impossible to be a real Christian, when he himself wants to 
make it so difficult—and, in fact, being a real Christian becomes a kind of ideal, and 
therefore impossible, limit? 
It’s clear that he does want to make it very difficult. Even early on in the controversy (p. 
41), he seems to be saying that it would be a bad thing if everyone were a Christian. He 
wants there to be only a few Christians; it’s good that there are only a few, and it would 
be even better if there were fewer! After all, Christianity requires persecution. If 
everyone were Christian, who would do the persecuting? 
The same theme is picked up later on. Cf. Moment V (p. 181): 
Thus in three and a half years he [Jesus] won only eleven [Judas didn’t 
count], whereas one apostle in one day [he’s referring to St. Peter in Acts], 
I dare say in one hour, wins three thousand followers for Christ. Either the 
follower is here greater than the Master, or the truth is that the apostle is a 
bit too hasty in striking a bargain, a bit too hasty about propagation; thus 
the dubiousness already begins here. 
In short, even St. Peter wasn’t pure enough for SK! 
In some of the other installments of The Moment, he goes on to argue against infant 
baptism, on the grounds that it makes no sense. Baptism, insofar as it is what makes one a 
Christian—or even insofar as it is what makes one start trying to be a Christian—is not 
something you can undertake before you are in a position to answer for yourself. 
He goes on to argue against the sacrament of Confirmation, on the grounds that it’s just a 
substitute for what baptism was originally supposed to be. Confirmation comes later, 
presumably after one has reached the “age or reason.” But even there, there is a tendency 
to push the age of confirmation back earlier and earlier, and so to make it meaningless. 
In The Moment VII, he all but says marriage is a mistake! He seems to be saying it’s OK 
only for someone who got married before becoming a Christian. 
He goes on to say it’s more acceptable to be married by a blacksmith than by a pastor! (p. 
247) What does he say then about the story of the Marriage at Cana, where Jesus worked 
his first public miracle? In effect, he says it was Mary’s idea, not Jesus’s! 
Again (pp. 250–51), having children is anything but pleasing to God. But wouldn’t the 
human race then die out? Yes, and that would be a good thing! 
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And so on. In short, he’s gone around the bend! 
But note: Not a single thing in any of this goes beyond what we see in one or another 
recognized Protestant sect, generally of an evangelical variety. So, in that sense, SK is 
still well within the recognized tradition, or at least certain parts of the recognized 
tradition, and is just being very loud about it! And—at least in his on terms—very 
consistent about it. 
There’s a problem of interpretation: A lot of the SK secondary literature wants not only 
to understand what SK is saying, but to be able to agree with it. In other words, they want 
to be followers. 
As a result, certain interpretations of SK are dismissed, or downplayed, because they 
depart too obviously from what one wants to believe about SK if one is going to defend 
him. 
A case in point: Marriage. In Works of Love, he seems to be rejecting the notion of 
“preferential love” (Ekskov) in favor of Kjærlighed. But it would be hard to keep the 
institution of marriage without some notion of “preferential love”—after all, you’re 
married to one spouse to the exclusion of (preference over) everyone else. 
The result, according to the followers: SK isn’t really rejecting preferential love in Works 
of Love. What he’s saying is that it is perfectly OK, as long as it is “purified” in some 
way by Christian charity. (And therefore marriage really is OK after all.) (See Jamie 
Ferrera’s book on Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Works of Love.) 
But these very late writings suggest that this is not the direction SK is in fact going. 
In short, what happens in a lot of the recent literature is a case-study in “offense,” in 
“accommodation.” 
The best way to approach SK is not as someone we have to defend no matter what, but as 
someone we first have to understand. 
Kierkegaard on cannibalism 
Now I want to talk about an odd little essay in The Moment IX. It’s entitled “That the 
Pastors Are Cannibals, and in the Most Abominable Way.” (If you can possibly find a 
copy of this, I strongly urge you to do so!) 
First of all, note that The Moment IX was the very last thing Kierkegaard published during 
his lifetime—on September 25, 1855 (which, coincidentally, was also the date of the last 
entry in the Journals), one week to the day before he was admitted to the hospital on 
October 2, and less than two months before his death on November 11. Apparently he 
had collapsed on the street a few days before October 2, was taken home, and later went 
to the hospital. I’ve been unable to determine exactly when he collapsed. 
He did have a tenth volume of The Moment finished and ready to go, but it didn’t come 
out until after his death. 
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There are several other essays in The Moment IX as well, but this is the one I want to 
focus on. 
I think it’s fair to say that when you read this essay, it strikes you at first as shedding 
more heat than light. It reads like nothing but shrill hyperbole, based primarily on a 
metaphor chosen for its shock-value. Not only are the pastors “cannibals,” he says, but 
particularly egregious ones at that! 
First of all, let me assure you that the charge of cannibalism is a metaphor. The pastors do 
not  literally eat other people’s flesh, and Kierkegaard doesn’t claim they do. So what is 
the basis for Kierkegaard’s rant? Let’s make several passes over it. 
First: The Christianity of the New Testament, he says, is “suffering.” First of all, Jesus 
himself suffered—he not only suffered death but suffered throughout his whole life, 
according to Kierkegaard. But it’s more than Jesus: any subsequent “apostle” or genuine 
“truth-witness” (a term that we’ve seen has a particular significance in the history of his 
late polemical attack on the established church)—suffered too. 
But what do the pastors do? They preach about this suffering, “depict” it, proclaim the 
teaching of these “glorious ones” as “doctrine”—and then live comfortably off the 
proceeds (p. 321): 
“ Cannot this be done [he rhetorically asks in words attributed to the 
pastors] and in such a way that it would yield enough so that a man who 
wishes to enjoy life could live on it, marry on it, beget children who are 
fed on it?” In other words, is it not possible to turn the glorious ones into 
money, or to eat them, to live with wife and children by eating them?  
With this somewhat strained analogy, Kierkegaard triumphantly concludes, “See, there 
you have it: cannibals, that the pastors are cannibals!” (p. 321 bottom). At first glance, 
therefore, the complaint seems to be that the pastors are profiting—indeed profiting 
handsomely—from the sufferings of these “glorious ones.” 
But if that’s all that’s going on in this essay, it just doesn’t work. Arguably, we all live 
off the “sufferings” of others. We all have to struggle through life “by the sweat of our 
brow,” and we rely on one another just to “get by.” As long as we live together in any 
kind of society, we derive mutual benefit from one another’s toil—a kind of “suffering.” 
So are we all “cannibals” then? Why single out the pastors? 
Second pass: But we can perhaps make SK’s point more strongly than that. Let’s say 
we’re not talking about “suffering” in the loose sense, we’re not just talking about the 
universal struggle through life—mere discomfort or inconvenience—but about much 
more extreme suffering. After all, Jesus was crucified, the early Christians were 
persecuted, and we’ve already seen what he thinks happens to the true truth-witnesses: 
they are  
flogged, mistreated, dragged from one prison to another, then finally  
crucified or beheaded or burned or broiled on a grill, [etc.]. 
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Perhaps then the complaint is that the pastors are benefiting from the “sufferings” of 
others in this much stronger sense—more than just inconvenience and the normal 
tribulations of life. 
But that still doesn’t work. Note the consequences: it is not only the pastors who benefit 
from this, but also the apostles and truth-witnesses themselves and indeed ALL TRUE 
CHRISTIANS who follow them (as distinct from the cannibalistic pastors, who apparently 
do not). In fact, the true Christians benefit far more than the “cannibalistic” pastors do. 
The pastors gain only a living in this life, whereas the others gain salvation and eternal 
life. If this were the only issue, if it were simply a matter of deriving benefit from the 
sufferings of the “glorious ones,” then true Christians would seem to end up being much 
worse offenders than even the pastors! So, once again, why single out the pastors? 
In terms of the “cannibalism” metaphor itself, it doesn’t do any good to respond that the 
true Christians suffer in their turn, unlike the comfortable pastors, as if that somehow 
meant that true Christians aren’t cannibals. It doesn’t change things at all. After all, a 
cannibal is no less a cannibal if he ends up being eaten himself, or even if he’s willing to 
be eaten! 
No, it seems that simply deriving benefit from the suffering and death of others, no 
matter how extreme, is no real basis for the charge of cannibalism, even metaphorically, 
in the way SK seems to be talking about it A hit-man, an executioner, a torturer-for-hire 
all make a living in this way. But, however reprehensible we may think those professions 
are, we don’t call them “cannibals”—much less cannibals “in the most abominable way.” 
And we do not call them any the more “cannibals” if they’re unwilling to be themselves 
“targets,” i.e., executed or tortured. 
Consider a tour-guide at a former Nazi concentration camp, or at the slave-quarters of an 
old American plantation that’s now a tourist attraction. Such a person plainly benefits—
literally makes a living, perhaps even a comfortable living—from the sufferings and even 
the death of others. We may be a little uneasy and squeamish about such jobs, but not 
necessarily. After all, perhaps the guide is fully conscious of the evils of Nazism and 
slavery, and in fact regards it as part of his or her job to highlight those evils, call our 
attention to them and warn us against them. An attitude like that would probably lessen 
our moral qualms about the tour-guide’s job, not increase our inclination to call him or 
her a “cannibal,” as Kierkegaard does the pastors. And yet, how does their job differ from 
the pastors’ turning the sufferings of the “glorious ones” into “doctrine” and making a 
comfortable living off them, one of the bases for his complaint against them? 
Third pass: Well, perhaps there’s a difference after all. The sufferings of Nazi prisoners, 
or of slaves in the American South, do not, after all, demand that we imitate them. On the 
contrary, insofar as we find a moral imperative at all in their sufferings, it’s probably an 
imperative to eliminate the conditions under which it was necessary for them to suffer 
and die in the first place, and therefore to eliminate the very opportunity for us to imitate 
them—to eliminate racist prejudice. For Kierkegaard, on the other hand, the “glorious 
ones” do demand that we imitate their sufferings. And in fact, he makes it quite plain 
throughout his late writings, beginning with Practice in Christianity, that he thinks the 
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need for such suffering is not something we should avoid or even try to eliminate, but 
should rather wholeheartedly embrace. Jesus is supposed to be prototype to be imitated, 
not just some model to be admired. Yet the pastors do try to avoid such suffering; they 
want to live as comfortably as possible. Is this then the basis for Kierkegaard’s calling 
them “cannibals”—that they don’t fulfill the demand for imitation? 
OK, then let’s consider not a tour-guide at a death camp or a plantation, but guides at the 
Christian catacombs in Rome, or, heaven help us, at the Church of the Holy Sepulcher on 
Golgotha outside Jerusalem. Here we are dealing, let’s say, with sufferings that demand 
imitation. Yet the guides, let’s suppose, are in it purely for the pay. Are they “cannibals” 
in Kierkegaard’s sense? Would they be subject to the particular kind of abuse 
Kierkegaard heaps on the “pastors”? 
Reply: I don’t think so. So far, all we’ve seen is the accusation that the pastors—or for 
that matter, the tour guides—are not fulfilling the demands made by the people on the 
basis of whose sufferings they are making a living. 
But in fact, I think there is something much more going on here. What’s going on is 
something that isn’t entirely explicit in the Danish, and certainly not clear in the Hong’s 
translation. 
Notice how the Hongs start off their translation: 
What is meant by cannibals [Menneske-Ædere = literally, “man-eaters”] 
everyone certainly knows; indeed the word  says it. 
In fact, there are two words at play in this essay, and the Hongs ignore the distinction 
entirely. One is in effect “man-eater” (Menneske-Æder, plural Mennekse-Ædere, or in the 
abstract Menneske-Æderie = “man-eatery”), which we’ve just seen, and the other is 
straightforwardly “Canibalen” (or “Kanibalen”) = “the cannibal.” 
The word Canibalen first appears in our essay on p. 322, where SK gives a list beginning 
with “1. The cannibal is a savage ” and then goes to list a total of three items. In the 
previous paragraph, where he says “This is cannibalism, and it is cannibalism in its most 
abominable form, which I shall now show”—it is Menneske-Æderie = “man-eatery.” 
The Hongs are not the only or even the first people to overlook the difference between 
these words in this passage. In 1944, Walter Lowrie published a selection of material 
from these late writings, which he called Attack upon Christendom (Princeton, N. J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1944, reprinted with a new introduction 1968, and still 
readily available). Here’s how Lowrie translates the beginning of our passage (p. 268—
compare the beginning of the Hong’s translation): 
The priests are cannibals, and that in the most odious way 
Everyone understands what cannibals are, they are man-eaters. 
But in fact the literal translation of the Danish would go: 
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The priests [or pastors—the Hongs] are man-eaters, and in the most 
odious [or abominable—the Hongs] way 
What one understand by “man-eaters” everyone knows; it is said with the 
word. [That is, it is built into the word itself.] 
And later on, when Kierkegaard begins listing the differences, Lowrie, like the Hongs, 
obliterates the distinction (p. 269): 
This is cannibalism, and it is the most odious form of it, as I shall now 
show. 
1. The cannibal is a savage 
As I pointed out a moment ago, the first term there is literally “man-eatery,” while the 
second is literally “cannibal.” 
OK—so what’s the big deal? What’s the difference? 
Well, if you think about it, there is a difference between a “cannibal” and a “man-eater.” 
A cannibal is someone or something that eats its own kind. Certain beetles, for instance, 
sometimes devour their young, and are in that sense “cannibalistic.” A “man-eater,” by 
contrast, is something that eats human beings—but not necessarily a human being who 
eats human beings. After all, we speak of a “man-eating tiger,” although we don’t call it a 
cannibal. 
This suggests an interesting possibility, therefore. Is it the case perhaps that by the 
terminological distinction between “man-eaters” and “cannibals,” Kierkegaard is 
suggesting that the man-eating pastors are not really human beings at all, that they are 
subhuman? 
But isn’t this just being too fancy? Is this just straining at terminological gnats? 
Well, let’s see. Let’s go through Kierkegaard’s works, and see just where he uses 
“cannibal” (or forms of it), and where he uses “man-eater” (or forms of it), and see 
whether it really makes any difference. 
I’ve done just that, and I’ve come to the conclusion that it does makes a difference, and a 
difference that I don’t think has ever been pointed out before. (Handout “Cannibals and 
Man-Eaters.”) 
I’ve given you a handout of some other passages I’ve found in Kierkegaard’s writings 
where he talks about either “cannibalism” or “man-eating.” And I’ve inserted the relevant 
Danish words in square brackets. (There are more such passages, but these will do to 
make my point today.) 
First of all, it must be admitted that there are some throw-away passages, where it doesn’t 
seem Kierkegaard is making any fine-grained distinction at all. For instance, in the 
pseudonymous The Crisis (1848), he uses the phrase “cannibalistic taste for human 
 231
sacrifices” in a way I don’t really have a good sense of. (Passage (1).) It’s not clear to me 
exactly what he’s saying in this passage. 
Again (passage (2)) as early as his dissertation The Concept of Irony (1841), he says 
Socrates was a “man-eater” (oddly, the Hongs translate this as “an ogre” here) in his 
relation with his interlocutors. 
Again, in passage (3), a Journal entry from 1852 about Pascal, we get the complaint that 
the pastors’ and the professors’ appeal to Pascal’s thoughts but do not imitate his personal 
qualities. And here he says that what they are doing is cannibalism (Canibalisme); he 
doesn’t say “man-eatery” (Menneske-Æderie). 
I confess there doesn’t seem to be anything terminologically subtle going on in those 
passages. 
But look at passage (4) on the handout, a Journal entry from 1854. This passage is a fairly 
close parallel to parts of our essay in The Moment. But here SK draws an explicit 
distinction between the metaphorical “man-eating” of the pastors—interestingly, he here 
broadens his charge to include the professors (compare also passage (3))—and literal 
cannibalism. 
Two out of the three contrasts he draws in The Moment (pp. 322–33) show up here as 
well: (a) “the cannibals kill a man and eat him—then it is done” (passage (4)). But the 
pastors and the professors make a career out of it (compare point 3 in The Moment, p. 
323); and (b) “The cannibal  does not claim to be the best and truest friend of those he 
slays and eats. But the minister, the professor, also enjoys the honor and esteem of being 
the true friend and the follower of the noble ones” (passage (4)—compare point 2 in The 
Moment, p. 322). 
Finally, SK says (end of passage (4)), “I also say that the cannibals shall enter the 
kingdom of God before the clergy and the professors.” 
Apart from being a wonderful passage, note the distinction it’s drawing. If the literal 
cannibals will get to heaven before the man-eating pastors and professors do, they’ve got 
to be two distinct groups. 
So we’ve got a distinction being drawn between cannibalism and man-eating. But so far, 
we’ve seen nothing to indicate that being subhuman is part of the issue here against the 
“man-eating” pastors (professors). Nevertheless, there are other passages. 
Remember the “Attunement” passages from Fear and Trembling? And remember the 
first one (Hannay, pp. 45–46) where, as he raises the knife, Abraham turns his head away 
for a moment, and then turns back with his face transformed into a fiend’s, and says: 
“Foolish boy, do you believe I am your father? I am an idolater. Do you 
believe this is God’s command? No, it is my own desire.”  But below 
his breath Abraham said to himself: “Lord in heaven I thank Thee; it is 
after all better [p. 46] that he believe I am a monster than that he lose faith 
in Thee.” 
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The word translated “monster” here is literally Umenneske = “un-man,” “inhuman.”  
Now you may well object, “Well fine, but there’s nothing at all about cannibalism or 
man-eating here.” But aaahhh— 
Look at passage (5). This is from the Journals and Papers, an 1843 unpublished draft of 
the first “Attunement” passage. There are other interesting differences of detail here, but 
the one I want to call your attention to is this: Instead of the first part of passage I just 
quoted, he says in the draft: 
You thought I was going to do this because of God, but you are wrong, I 
am an idolater, and this passion has again stirred in my soul—I want to 
murder you, this is my desire; I am worse than a cannibal [Menneskeæder 
= “man-eater”]. Despair, you foolish boy who fancied that I was your 
father; I am your murderer, and this is my desire. 
And then, as in the final version, he goes on say it is better that Isaac think he is a 
“monster” = Umenneske, “unman.” There is no mention of literal cannibalism in this 
entire passage. 
Here then we get, and get quite early on in the authorship, a link between man-eating—
which, remember, doesn’t necessarily mean eating your own kind—and being inhuman. 
Still, you might quibble, being inhuman doesn’t necessarily mean being subhuman; it just 
means being different from humans. 
OK, look then at passage (6), a Journal entry from 1854. Here he’s not talking about 
cannibalism or man-eating in so many words. But he does talk about the “assistant 
professor” [Docenten, it doesn’t have the sense “assistant professor” has in the American 
academic world], and says: 
Actually, “The assistant professor” is a nonhuman [U-Menneske]; I could 
almost be tempted to call him a nonanimal [U-Dyr], inasmuch as in 
reason, intellectuality, etc. he stands far above the animal, who excusably 
lacks all such things and cannot be charged with sophistication—perhaps 
he can be properly called a nonthing [U-Ting]. 
Here the point is more or less explicit. The “assistant professor” is not just different from 
a human being, but inferior to a human being. And the inferiority does not come from any 
lack of essential characteristics, since in those respects—in reason and intellectuality, he 
says—the “assistant professor” stands far above your run-of-the-mill animal. Rather, his 
inferiority seems to be a moral inferiority and to come precisely from the fact that the 
assistant professor fails to make good use of these natural advantages. For that matter, he 
fails to make good use of his non-essential advantages too, his culture and education. 
(Note the use of the word “sophistication” in the passage I just read you.) The latter is a 
point we find brought out in our passage from The Moment. There, recall, the first of the 
list of the three points on which SK contrasts the literal cannibal with the “man-eating” 
pastors is (p. 322): 
 233
The cannibal is a savage; “the pastor” is a cultured, university-educated 
man, which makes the abomination much more shocking. 
As a result, the pastors, and in passage (6) the assistant professors (and we’ve already 
seen the pastors and the professors linked in passages (3)–(4)) are morally inferior both to 
literal savage cannibals and to sheer brute animals, who don’t know any better than to 
behave the way they do. In fact, in passage (6) SK suggests that this abuse of his 
advantages, whether natural or cultural, puts the assistant professor at the absolute bottom 
of the moral hierarchy. Not only is he a non-human, he is a non-animal, and even perhaps 
a non-thing! 
Still, what is it that the natural or cultural advantages of the professors or pastors enables 
them to do that makes them so abhorrent in SK’s eyes, and that sets them apart from the 
primitive savage or the brute animal? 
I suggest it’s hypocrisy. The pastors and the professors (depending on the passage) are 
hypocrites, and this is what sets SK off. Brute animals, mere things, don’t engage in 
hypocrisy, and—to hear him tell it—the honest, simple cannibal doesn’t either. As we’ve 
seen him say elsewhere in the period of The Moment, what he really wants is simple 
honesty. 
Danish has two ways of talking about hypocrisy. One is a word I don’t know the 
etymology of: hykleri, with associated cognate forms hykler = “hypocrite” and hyklerisk 
= “hypocritical.” The other is a circumlocution: skinhellighed, which comes from skin = 
German Schein = “appearance” (we get “shine” from it), and hellig = “holy.” The suffix 
-hed is just the English suffix “-hood.” So, put all together, it means apparent holiness. It 
might also be translated “sanctimonious.” 
Take a look now at passage (7) on the handout. This is, again, a Journal entry from 1854. 
Here he’s talking about cannibalism only; he doesn’t draw any distinction here between 
cannibalism and man-eating. 
Nevertheless, he talks in the second paragraph about “the other kind of cannibalism,” 
suggesting that he’s drawing at least some kind of distinction. It’s a “loathsome” thought, 
he says, to imagine one is eaten by literal cannibals, and then goes to heaven and has to 
live for all eternity with the very people who ate you. “Shocking!,” he says. 
And then he says, 
Yet the other kind of cannibalism [Kanibalisme] is still more abominable, 
especially because of its hypocrisy [hykkelske Skin = literally, 
“hypocritical appearance”]. 
The entire passage is linked up with the “assistant professors” in a way that is by now 
familiar. 
So I suggest that SK’s real complaint throughout this entire cluster of texts is against the 
hypocrisy of the pastors and, in some passages, of the professors or assistant professors. 
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(In passage (8), which I’m not going to discuss at length, he goes on to include novelists, 
writers of romance, and minor authors. It’s the same complaint, I think.) 
It’s the hypocrisy, I think, that is the real basis for SK’s diatribe against the pastors in our 
passage from The Moment. And this was the basis for his complaint against Bishop 
Mynster from the very beginning of this late period—that Mynster knew better, and just 
wouldn’t come out and admit it. It was his “apparent holiness” (= hypocrisy) that leads us 
to think he’s really worthy of, as SK says, a “a silver cruet-stand, a knight’s cross, a 
complete set of embroidered armchairs” (Moment, p. 322). 
